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Dear Secretaries of State,
In April 2001, you asked me to chair an Independent Statutory Inquiry following 
the death of Victoria Climbié, and to make recommendations as to how such an 
event may, as far as possible, be avoided in the future. I am pleased to submit my 
report to you.
I appointed four expert assessors to assist me in my task. They were Dr Nellie 
Adjaye, Mr John Fox, Mrs Donna Kinnair and Mr Nigel Richardson.  
I take responsibility for this report and I am pleased that my four colleagues who 
sat with me fully endorse its findings and its recommendations.
Yours sincerely,
LORD LAMING
DR NELLIE ADJAYE          MR JOHN FOX 
MRS DONNA KINNAIR        MR NIGEL RICHARDSON“I have suffered too much grief in setting down 
these heartrending memories. If I try to describe him, 
it is to make sure that I shall not forget him.”
Jiro Hirabayashi from Yasunori Kawahara’s 
translation of The Little Prince by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry.
This sentiment applies also to Victoria Climbié. 
This Report is dedicated to her memory.The Victoria Climbié InquiryContents
v
Contents
Part one  Background
1      Introduction  1
2      The Inquiry  15
3      Victoria’s story  25
Phase One
Part two  Social services
4      Ealing Social Services  39
  The managerial context  39
  Victoria in Ealing  46
  Analysis of practice  67
5      Brent Social Services  71
  The managerial context  71
  Victoria in Brent  85
  Analysis of practice  102
6      Haringey Social Services  109
  The managerial context  109
  Victoria in Haringey  140
  Analysis of practice   196
7      Tottenham Child and Family Centre  215
 The  referral  215
 Case  recording  219
  What should have been done?  220
8      Enfield Social Services  221
  The managerial context  221
  Victoria in Enfield  226
  Analysis of practice  235
Part three  Health
9      Central Middlesex Hospital  239
10    North Middlesex Hospital  255
11    Health analysis  279
  The information gathered about Victoria  279
  Status of child protection  284
12   General practice and liaison health visiting  287
 General  practice  287
  Liaison health visiting  291The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
vi
Part four  The police
13   Brent Child Protection Team  295
14   Haringey Child Protection Team  309
15   Child protection policing in north west London  331
 Training  331
 Staff  levels  333
 Equipment  335
 Accommodation  337
 Accountability  338
16    Working with diversity  345
Phase Two
Part five  Learning from experience
17    The seminars   349
  The purpose of the seminars  349
  Seminar one: Discovery and inclusion  349
  Seminar two: Identification  351
  Seminar three: Determining requirements  353
  Seminar four: Service provision and delivery  355
  Seminar five: Monitoring performance  357
 Seminar  conclusions  359
  The need for change  360
Part six  Recommendations
18    Recommendations   371
 General  recommendations  371
 Social  care  recommendations  374
 Healthcare  recommendations  379
 Police  recommendations  382
Annexes
Annex 1  Glossary 385
Annex 2  Witnesses 387
Annex 3  Inquiry staff  397
Annex 4  Legal representatives  399
Annex 5  Seminar participants  401Part one: Background1 Introduction
1
1 Introduction
“Victoria had the most beautiful smile that lit up the room.” Patrick Cameron 
1.1       This Report begins and ends with Victoria Climbié. It is right that it should do so. 
The purpose of this Inquiry has been to find out why this once happy, smiling, 
enthusiastic little girl – brought to this country by a relative for ‘a better life’ 
– ended her days the victim of almost unimaginable cruelty. The horror of what 
happened to her during her last months was captured by Counsel to the Inquiry, 
Neil Garnham QC, who told the Inquiry:
“The food would be cold and would be given to her on a piece of plastic 
while she was tied up in the bath. She would eat it like a dog, pushing 
her face to the plate. Except, of course that a dog is not usually tied up 
in a plastic bag full of its excrement. To say that Kouao and Manning 
treated Victoria like a dog would be wholly unfair; she was treated worse 
than a dog.”
1.2       On 12 January 2001, Victoria’s great-aunt, Marie-Therese Kouao, and Carl John 
Manning were convicted of her murder.
Abuse and neglect
1.3       At his trial, Manning said that Kouao would strike Victoria on a daily basis with a 
shoe, a coat hanger and a wooden cooking spoon and would strike her on her toes 
with a hammer. Victoria’s blood was found on Manning’s football boots. Manning 
admitted that at times he would hit Victoria with a bicycle chain. Chillingly, he 
said, “You could beat her and she wouldn’t cry ... she could take the beatings and 
the pain like anything.”
1.4       Victoria spent much of her last days, in the winter of 1999–2000, living and 
sleeping in a bath in an unheated bathroom, bound hand and foot inside a bin 
bag, lying in her own urine and faeces. It is not surprising then that towards the 
end of her short life, Victoria was stooped like an old lady and could walk only with 
great difficulty.
1.5       When Victoria was admitted to the North Middlesex Hospital on the evening 
of 24 February 2000, she was desperately ill. She was bruised, deformed and 
malnourished. Her temperature was so low it could not be recorded on the 
hospital’s standard thermometer. Dr Lesley Alsford, the consultant responsible for 
Victoria’s care on that occasion, said, “I had never seen a case like it before. It is 
the worst case of child abuse and neglect that I have ever seen.”
1.6       Despite the valiant efforts of Dr Alsford and her team, Victoria’s condition 
continued to deteriorate. In a desperate attempt to save her life, Victoria was 
transferred to the paediatric intensive care unit at St Mary’s Hospital Paddington. 
It was there that, tragically, she died a few hours later, on the afternoon of 
25 February 2000.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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1.7       Seven months earlier, Victoria had been a patient in the North Middlesex Hospital. 
Nurse Sue Jennings recalled:
“Victoria did not have any possessions – she only had the clothes that she 
arrived in. Some of the staff had brought in dresses and presents for Victoria. 
One of the nurses had given her a white dress and Victoria found some pink 
wellingtons which she used to wear with it. I remember Victoria dressed like 
this, twirling up and down the ward. She was a very friendly and happy child.”
Victoria’s injuries
1.8       At the end, Victoria’s lungs, heart and kidneys all failed. Dr Nathaniel Carey, a 
Home Office pathologist with many years’ experience, carried out the post-mortem 
examination. What stood out from Dr Carey’s evidence was the extent of 
Victoria’s injuries and the deliberate way they were inflicted on her. He said: 
“All non-accidental injuries to children are awful and difficult for 
everybody to deal with, but in terms of the nature and extent of the 
injury, and the almost systematic nature of the inflicted injury, I certainly 
regard this as the worst I have ever dealt with, and it is just about the 
worst I have ever heard of.” 
1.9       At the post-mortem examination, Dr Carey recorded evidence of no fewer than 
128 separate injuries to Victoria’s body, saying, “There really is not anywhere that 
is spared – there is scarring all over the body.” 
1.10     Therefore, in the space of just a few months, Victoria had been transformed from 
a healthy, lively, and happy little girl, into a wretched and broken wreck of a 
human being. 
Abandoned, unheard and unnoticed
1.11     Perhaps the most painful of all the distressing events of Victoria’s short life in this 
country is that even towards the end, she might have been saved. In the last few 
weeks before she died, a social worker called at her home several times. She got 
no reply when she knocked at the door and assumed that Victoria and Kouao had 
moved away. It is possible that at the time, Victoria was in fact lying just a few 
yards away, in the prison of the bath, desperately hoping someone might find her 
and come to her rescue before her life ebbed away.
1.12     At no time during the weeks and months of this gruelling Inquiry did familiarity 
with the suffering experienced by Victoria diminish the anguish of hearing it, or 
make it easier to endure. It was clear from the evidence heard by the Inquiry that 
Victoria’s intelligence, and the warmth of her engaging smile, shone through, 
despite the ghastly facts of what she experienced during the 11 months she lived 
in England. The more my colleagues and I heard about Victoria, the more we came 
to know her as a lovable child, and our hearts went out to her. However, neither 
Victoria’s intelligence nor her lovable nature could save her. In the end she died a 
slow, lonely death – abandoned, unheard and unnoticed.
Victoria’s parents
1.13     Before moving on to the introductory part of this Report, I wish to pay a warm 
tribute to Victoria’s parents, Francis and Berthe Climbié. They were present for the 
whole of Phase One of this Inquiry. Their love for Victoria was clear, as were their 
hopes that she would receive a better education in Europe. In the face of the most 
disturbing evidence about the treatment of their daughter, they displayed both 
courage and dignity. 1 Introduction
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What went wrong?
1.14     I recognise that those who take on the work of protecting children at risk of 
deliberate harm face a tough and challenging task. Staff doing this work need a 
combination of professional skills and personal qualities, not least of which are 
persistence and courage. Adults who deliberately exploit the vulnerability of children 
can behave in devious and menacing ways. They will often go to great lengths to 
hide their activities from those concerned for the well-being of a child. Staff often 
have to cope with the unpredictable behaviour of people in the parental role. 
A child can appear safe one minute and be injured the next. A peaceful scene can 
be transformed in seconds because of a sudden outburst of uncontrollable anger.
1.15     Whenever a child is deliberately injured or killed, there is inevitably great concern 
in case some important tell-tale sign has been missed. Those who sit in judgement 
often do so with the great benefit of hindsight. So I readily acknowledge that staff 
who undertake the work of protecting children and supporting families on behalf 
of us all deserve both our understanding and our support. It is a job which carries 
risks, because in every judgement they make, those staff have to balance the rights 
of a parent with that of the protection of the child.
A lack of good practice
1.16     But Victoria’s case was altogether different. Victoria was not hidden away. It is 
deeply disturbing that during the days and months following her initial contact 
with Ealing Housing Department’s Homeless Persons’ Unit, Victoria was known 
to no less than two further housing authorities, four social services departments, 
two child protection teams of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), a specialist 
centre managed by the NSPCC, and she was admitted to two different hospitals 
because of suspected deliberate harm. The dreadful reality was that these services 
knew little or nothing more about Victoria at the end of the process than they 
did when she was first referred to Ealing Social Services by the Homeless Persons’ 
Unit in April 1999. The final irony was that Haringey Social Services formally 
closed Victoria’s case on the very day she died. The extent of the failure to 
protect Victoria was lamentable. Tragically, it required nothing more than basic 
good practice being put into operation. This never happened.
1.17     In his opening statement to the Inquiry, Neil Garnham QC listed no fewer than 
12 key occasions when the relevant services had the opportunity to successfully 
intervene in the life of Victoria. As evidence to the Inquiry unfolded, several other 
opportunities emerged. Not one of these required great skill or would have made 
heavy demands on time to take some form of action. Sometimes it needed nothing 
more than a manager doing their job by asking pertinent questions or taking 
the trouble to look in a case file. There can be no excuse for such sloppy and 
unprofessional performance.
A gross failure of the system
1.18     Not one of the agencies empowered by Parliament to protect children in positions 
similar to Victoria’s – funded from the public purse – emerge from this Inquiry 
with much credit. The suffering and death of Victoria was a gross failure of the 
system and was inexcusable. It is clear to me that the agencies with responsibility 
for Victoria gave a low priority to the task of protecting children. They were under-
funded, inadequately staffed and poorly led. Even so, there was plenty of evidence 
to show that scarce resources were not being put to good use. Bad practice can be 
expensive. For example, had there been a proper response to the needs of Victoria 
when she was first referred to Ealing Social Services, it may well be that the danger 
to her would have been recognised and action taken which may have avoided the 
need for the later involvement of the other agencies.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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1.19     Even after listening to all the evidence, I remain amazed that nobody in any of the 
key agencies had the presence of mind to follow what are relatively straightforward 
procedures on how to respond to a child about whom there is concern of 
deliberate harm. The most senior police officer to give evidence from the MPS 
was Deputy Assistant Commissioner William Griffiths. He said of the investigation 
carried out by Haringey Child Protection Team, “In the A to Z of an investigation, 
that investigation did not get to B.” Therefore, I conclude that, despite the 
Children Act 1989 having been in force for just under a decade, the standard of 
investigation into criminal offences against children may not be as rigorous as the 
investigation of similar crimes against adults. 
Widespread organisational malaise
1.20     It seems that the basic discipline of medical evaluation, covering history-taking, 
examination, arriving at a differential diagnosis, and monitoring the outcome, was 
not put into practice in Victoria’s case. I accept the evidence of Dr Peter Lachman, 
clinical director for Women and Children Services Directorate of North West London 
Hospitals NHS Trust, that paediatric doctors and nurses are highly trained in helping 
sick children get well. However, as he said, “child abuse is one of the most complex 
areas of paediatrics and child health”. That being so, I found it hard to understand 
why established good medical practice, that would have undoubtedly helped clarify 
the complexities in Victoria’s case, was not followed on the paediatric wards at the 
Central Middlesex Hospital and North Middlesex Hospital.
1.21     Having considered the response to Victoria from each of the agencies, I am forced 
to conclude that the principal failure to protect her was the result of widespread 
organisational malaise.
1.22     It is, however, instructive to contrast the inadequate response to safeguarding 
Victoria with the work of the health service in attempting to save her life at the 
end, and the professionalism of the police investigation after her death that led 
to the prosecution of Kouao and Manning. Alas, it was then too late for Victoria.
Management issues
1.23     It is not to the handful of hapless, if sometimes inexperienced, front-line staff that 
I direct most criticism for the events leading up to Victoria’s death. While the 
standard of work done by those with direct contact with her was generally of very 
poor quality, the greatest failure rests with the managers and senior members of 
the authorities whose task it was to ensure that services for children, like Victoria, 
were properly financed, staffed, and able to deliver good quality support to children 
and families. It is significant that while a number of junior staff in Haringey Social 
Services were suspended and faced disciplinary action after Victoria’s death, some 
of their most senior officers were being appointed to other, presumably better paid, 
jobs. This is not an example of managerial accountability that impresses me much.
1.24     Following Victoria’s death, the response of the various agencies involved was 
variable. One example of the approach taken by senior management to the 
tragedy was provided by Dr John Riordan, medical director at the Central 
Middlesex Hospital, who told me:
“If I am totally frank I was being advised by other partners in the health 
economy ‘get an external inquiry done because it will protect your 
position’ and I thought that was a good idea initially, but I later came 
to the view that, given the difficulty we had in getting it, as time had 
moved on it was not going to be worth pursuing.”
Credit should be given to both UNISON and the Police Federation for the support 
they gave to some front-line staff who gave evidence to this Inquiry.1 Introduction
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1.25     The front-line staff of the key public services were all employees. They acted on 
behalf of the organisations which employed them. Those in senior positions in such 
organisations carry, on behalf of society, responsibility for the quality, efficiency 
and effectiveness of local services. I believe that several of those in such positions 
who gave evidence to this Inquiry, either did not understand this, or did not accept 
it. Front-line staff may well have a different perception of the organisation they 
work in from that of their senior managers. Based on the evidence to this Inquiry, 
the differences could only be described as a yawning gap. The failure to grasp this 
was undoubtedly the fault of the managers because it was their job to understand 
what was happening at their ‘front door’.
1.26     Some used the defence “no one ever told me”. The chief executive of Brent 
council, Gareth Daniel, chose to describe his role as “strategic” and to distance 
himself from the day-to-day realities. Gina Adamou, a Haringey councillor, said, 
“If I ask questions she [Mary Richardson, the director of social services] would 
say ‘everything is okay, do not worry, if there is a problem I will let you know’.” 
I find this an unacceptable state of affairs. Elected councillors and senior officers 
must ensure that they are kept fully informed about the delivery of services to the 
populations they serve, and they must not accept at face value what they are told. 
There was also a reluctance among senior officers to accept there was anything 
they could have done for Victoria. The former chief executive of Haringey council, 
Gurbux Singh, said, “There is the issue of resources ... but beyond that I cannot 
honestly think of what else I could have actually done to ensure that the tragedy 
which happened did not happen.” This is not a view I share.
The future
1.27     I strongly believe that in future, those who occupy senior positions in the public 
sector must be required to account for any failure to protect vulnerable children 
from deliberate harm or exploitation. The single most important change in the 
future must be the drawing of a clear line of accountability, from top to bottom, 
without doubt or ambiguity about who is responsible at every level for the 
well-being of vulnerable children. Time and again it was dispiriting to listen to the 
‘buck passing’ from those who attempted to justify their positions. For the proper 
safeguarding of children this must end. If ever such a tragedy happens again, 
I hope those in leadership posts will examine their responsibilities before looking 
more widely.
1.28     The most lasting tribute to the memory of Victoria would be if her suffering 
and death resulted in an improvement in the quality of the management and 
leadership in these key services. What is needed are managers with a clear set 
of values about the role of public services, particularly in addressing the needs 
of vulnerable people, combined with the ability to ‘lead from the front’. Good 
administrative procedures are essential to facilitate efficient work, but they are not 
sufficient on their own and cannot replace effective management. This Inquiry saw 
too many examples of those in senior positions attempting to justify their work in 
terms of bureaucratic activity, rather than in outcomes for people.
Moving forward
1.29     It is important to understand what went wrong in the way individual social 
workers, police officers, doctors and nurses responded to Victoria’s needs, and how 
deficiencies in their organisations contributed to this. This is dealt with in detail in 
sections 4 to 16. However, this Inquiry has been more than just a forensic exercise. 
It has been charged with looking forward and to make recommendations for “how 
such an event may, as far as possible, be avoided in the future”. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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1.30     The gross failings that I heard about during the Inquiry caused me to consider a 
number of ways in which current arrangements for the safeguarding of children 
might be strengthened. For example, I have given careful thought as to whether 
or not this might be achieved by the development of a National Child Protection 
Agency. While at first this seemed to be a worthwhile proposition, on reflection, 
I believe the following points are factors which rule against this:
• It is not possible to separate the protection of children from wider support to 
families. Indeed, often the best protection for a child is achieved by the timely 
intervention of family support services. The wholly unsatisfactory practice, 
demonstrated so often in this Inquiry, of determining the needs of a child before 
an assessment has been completed, reinforces in me the belief that ‘referrals’ 
should not be labelled ‘child protection’ without good reason. The needs of the 
child and his or her family are often inseparable.
• I am in no doubt that effective support for children and families cannot be 
achieved by a single agency acting alone. It depends on a number of agencies 
working well together. It is a multi-disciplinary task.
• Evidence to this Inquiry demonstrated very clearly the dangers to children if staff 
from different agencies do not fulfil their separate and distinctive responsibilities. 
No set of responsibilities is subordinate to another, and each must be carried out 
efficiently and effectively. Gathering together staff in a dedicated team might 
well run the risk of blurring their responsibilities. 
• I am not persuaded there is an untapped source of talent standing ready to 
operate a national child protection service. It is likely that staff would simply 
transfer from their current employment into the new organisation. 
• I recognise the fact that over the years, successive governments have refined 
both legislation and policy, no doubt informed in part by earlier Inquiries of 
this kind, so that in general, the legislative framework for protecting children 
is basically sound. I conclude that the gap is not a matter of law but in its 
implementation.
• I am convinced that it is not just ‘structures’ that are the problem, but the skills 
of the staff that work in them. For example, at the time of the joint review of 
Haringey, they were convinced of the merit of integrating the management of 
housing and social services. They have since separated these two departments 
at the very time that Ealing was combining them into a single organisation. 
Therefore, I am satisfied that organisational structure is unlikely to be an 
impediment to effective working. What is critical is the effectiveness of the 
management and leadership.
1.31     From the evidence I heard I conclude that it is neither practical nor desirable to try 
to separate the support services for children and families from that of the service 
designed to investigate and protect children from deliberate harm. Therefore, 
an alternative solution must be found. To address this, I set out elsewhere in 
this Report a number of changes which I recommend should be introduced to 
the organisation and management of services designed to protect children and 
support families. These changes are intended to build on the best in the current 
arrangements, and to respond to the changes since the Children Act 1989. The 
recommendations that flow from these changes are intended to secure a clear line 
of accountability for the safety of children and the support of families – a factor 
sadly lacking in the current arrangements.1 Introduction
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Changes in services to support children
What is wrong with current arrangements?
1.32     Current inter-agency arrangements for protecting children depend very heavily 
on the key agencies in health, the police and social services working within closely 
related geographical boundaries. This is no longer the case. Local authorities with 
responsibility for social services have been reorganised so they are now smaller and 
more numerous. Indeed, there are now 150 of them in England. In contrast, health 
authorities are now larger and fewer, numbering only 30. Front-line health services 
are provided by a growing number of Primary Care Trusts, currently over 300, 
while 43 police authorities cover England and Wales.
1.33     As a result, Area Child Protection Committees (ACPCs), the organisations with 
responsibility for co-ordinating child protection services at a local level, have 
generally become unwieldy, bureaucratic and with limited impact on front-line 
services. I was told that in the London Metropolitan Police area, there are 33 
local authorities with social services responsibilities and 27 Area Child Protection 
Committees. In Liverpool, there are five ACPCs, while in Essex (with a population 
of over one million) there is one. Such wide variations in geographical areas and 
populations served by the ACPCs must inevitably lead to equally wide variations 
in the co-ordination and quality of services offered to vulnerable children. A new 
arrangement is needed.
Improvements at a national level
A Children and Families Board
1.34     Therefore, I recommend a fundamental change in the way that services to support 
children and families are organised and managed. With the support of the Prime 
Minister, a Children and Families Board should be established at the heart of 
government. The Board should be chaired by a minister of Cabinet rank and 
have representatives at ministerial level from each of the relevant government 
departments. This Inquiry was told that well-intentioned ministerial initiatives are 
introduced piecemeal, and either do not fulfil their potential or divert staff from 
other essential front-line work. This Board should be charged with ensuring that 
the impact of all such initiatives that have a bearing on the well-being of children 
and families is considered within this forum.
A National Agency for Children and Families
1.35     In addition, a National Agency for Children and Families should be created. The 
chief executive of this agency – who may have the functions of a Children’s 
Commissioner for England – would be responsible for servicing the Government’s 
Children and Families Board. The National Agency for Children and Families 
should:
• assess, and advise the Children and Families Board about, the impact on children 
and families of proposed changes in policy;
• scrutinise new legislation and guidance issued for this purpose;
• advise on the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child;
• advise on setting nationally agreed outcomes for children and how they might 
best be achieved and monitored;
• ensure that policy and legislation are implemented at a local level and are 
monitored through its regional office network;
• report annually to Parliament on the quality and effectiveness of services to 
children and families, in particular on the safety of children;
• at its discretion, conduct serious case reviews or oversee the process if this task is 
carried out by other agencies.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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At a local level
1.36     Clearly, it is for central government to make key decisions on overall policy, 
legislation and the funding of services. However, it is unrealistic for service delivery 
to be managed centrally. The managers of local services must be given the 
responsibility to assess local need and to respond accordingly. However, where 
the care and protection of children and the support of children and families is 
concerned, this independence must not be pursued to the detriment of effective 
joint working. I recognise that committee structures and job descriptions vary 
between local authorities.
1.37     The future lies with those managers who can demonstrate the capacity to work 
effectively across organisational boundaries. Such boundaries will always exist. 
Those able to operate flexibly need encouragement, in contrast to those who 
persist in working in isolation and making decisions alone. Such people must 
either change or be replaced. The safeguarding of children must not be placed 
in jeopardy by individual preference. The joint training of staff and the sharing of 
budgets are likely to ensure an equality of desire and effort to make them work 
effectively. 
Committees for Children and Families
1.38     In order to secure strong local working relationships so that collaboration on the 
scale of that which I envisage takes place, I propose that each local authority 
with social services responsibilities should establish a Committee for Children and 
Families, with members drawn from the relevant committees of the local authority, 
the police authority and relevant boards and trusts of health services. This 
committee will oversee the work of a Management Board for Services to Children 
and Families. 
Management Board for Services to Children and Families
1.39     In each local authority, the chief executive should chair a Management Board for 
Services to Children and Families, made up of chief officers (or very senior officers) 
from the police, social services, relevant health services, education, housing and the 
probation service. The Management Board for Services to Children and Families will 
be required to appoint a director of children and family services at local level. This 
person will be responsible for ensuring service delivery, including the effectiveness 
of local inter-agency working, which must also include working with voluntary 
and private agencies. Each board must also establish a local forum to secure the 
involvement of voluntary and private agencies, service users, including children, 
and other contributors as appropriate. Special arrangements will have to be made 
in London, to take account of the fact there are 33 London authorities.
Accountability
1.40     The relevant government inspectorates should be jointly required to inspect the 
effectiveness of these arrangements.
1.41     In order to ensure coherence within this proposed structure, it should be a 
requirement that each Management Board for Services to Children and Families 
reports to its parent Committee for Children and Families. In turn, the Committee 
for Children and Families will report through the regional structure to the National 
Agency for Children and Families. The Children and Families Board should report 
annually to Parliament on the state of services to children and families.
1.42     The purpose of these proposals is to secure a clear line of accountability for the 
protection of children and for the well-being of families. Never again should people 
in senior positions be free to claim – as they did in this Inquiry – ignorance of what 
was happening to children. These proposals are designed to ensure that those who 
manage services for children and families are held personally accountable for the 1 Introduction
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effectiveness of these services, and for the arrangements their organisations put in 
place to ensure that all children are offered the best protection possible.
Improvements to the exchange of information
1.43     Improvements to the way information is exchanged within and between agencies 
are imperative if children are to be adequately safeguarded. Staff must be held 
accountable for the quality of the information they provide. Information systems 
that depend on the random passing of slips of paper have no place in modern 
services. Each agency must accept responsibility for making sure that information 
passed to another agency is clear, and the recipients should query any points of 
uncertainty. In the words of the two hospital consultants who had care of Victoria:
“I cannot account for the way other people interpreted what I said. 
It was not the way I would have liked it to have been interpreted.” 
   (Dr Ruby Schwartz)
“I do not think it was until I have read and re-read this letter that I 
appreciated quite the depth of misunderstanding.” 
   (Dr Mary Rossiter)
The fact that an elementary point like this has to be made reflects the dreadful 
state of communications which exposed Victoria to danger.
1.44     There can be no justification for hospitals in close proximity to each other failing 
to access information about earlier patient contact. In this day and age, it must be 
reasonable to expect the free exchange of information within the National Health 
Service. The need for this is all the more critical because experience shows that 
‘shopping around’ the health service is one of the favourite ploys of carers wishing 
to evade suspicion about their treatment of their children.
1.45     Effective action designed to safeguard the well-being of children and families 
depends upon sharing relevant information on an inter-agency basis. The following 
contribution to one of the Phase Two seminars was compelling in this respect:
“Whenever we do a Part 8 case review ... we have this huge chronology 
of information made available to the Panel and it is very frustrating 
to read that ... a long way before that happened, a pattern of things 
emerging, but knowing that at the time ... separate agencies held 
those bits of information. So GPs will be seeing things, accident and 
emergency will be seeing things, the police may be dealing with other 
aspects of what is going on in that child’s life, and nobody is bringing 
it together.”
1.46     However, I was told that the free exchange of information about children and 
families about whom there are concerns is inhibited by the legislation on data 
protection and human rights. It appears that, unless a child is deemed to be in 
need of protection, information cannot be shared between agencies without staff 
running the risk of contravening this legislation. This has two consequences: either 
it deters information sharing, or it artificially increases concerns in order that they 
can be expressed as the need for protection. This is a matter that the Government 
must address. It is not a matter that can be tackled satisfactorily at local level.
A national children’s database
1.47     Those who deliberately harm children have a tendency to cover their tracks. Poor 
record-keeping, doubts about the exchange of information between services, and 
inadequate client information systems make that easy. We live in a highly mobile 
society. Ninety million people pass through our ports of entry each year. Many The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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children experience several moves. I have considered the benefits of establishing 
a national database on children. In the circumstances set out above, there is 
much to be said in favour of a database covering all children. I was told that such 
a database is technically feasible and that there are many much larger systems. 
The benefit of such a database would be that every new contact with a child by 
a member of staff from any of the key services would initiate an entry that would 
build up a picture of the child’s health, developmental and educational needs. 
I have recommended that the Government commission work to look into the 
feasibility of such a national database, and this may result in pilot studies being 
carried out.
Action now
1.48     While the introduction of the proposals set out above will require changing the 
law, the vast majority of recommendations in this Report can be implemented 
immediately. Some 82 of the 108 recommendations should be implemented within 
six months. The Inquiry website received around three million hits in the period 
30 September 2001 to 30 September 2002, and already a number of the key 
agencies have reviewed their practices. In this respect, the Inquiry has already had 
a considerable impact on service delivery. This momentum must be maintained 
and, where necessary, speeded up, if the unacceptable practice I heard about is to 
be eliminated. This Report is intended to have an impact on practice now – not 
just some time in the future. Its recommendations cannot be deferred to some 
bright tomorrow. Robust leadership must replace bureaucratic administration. The 
adherence to inward-looking processes must give way to more flexible deployment 
of staff and resources in the search for better results for children and families. 
Service funding
1.49     Some elected councillors from Haringey and Brent insisted that the amount of 
money allocated by central government to their authorities for children’s services 
under the Standard Spending Assessment (SSA) was a result of the distribution 
formula and did not reflect the needs of the local area. They claimed that because 
80 per cent of the funding comes from central government, and because they 
were being pressed to address central government priorities, they had little scope 
to influence spending at a local level.
1.50     In this respect, local authorities portrayed themselves as being little more than the 
agents of central government, rather than being independently elected corporate 
bodies. If this is correct, it has potentially serious implications for the future of 
local government in this country. Significantly, at the time that Ealing, Brent and 
Haringey were spending well below their SSA on services for children, the national 
picture was quite different, with most local authorities overspending the SSA on 
services for children and families. 
1.51     Nobody from these authorities could give a convincing explanation as to why 
services for children and families were so significantly underfunded. For example, 
in 1998/1999 the Brent SSA for children and families was £28 million, whereas the 
amount spent was just £14.5 million. Since the death of Victoria, Ealing, Brent and 
Haringey have increased their budgetary provision for children and families. It is my 
opinion that elected councillors and senior managers in these authorities allowed 
the services for children and families to become seriously under-funded, and they 
did not properly consider the impact this would have upon their front-line services.
Eligibility criteria
1.52     The management of the social care of children and families represents one of the 
most difficult challenges for local government. The variety and range of referrals, 
together with the degree of risk and urgency, needs strong leadership, effective 
decision-making, reliable record-keeping, and a regular review of performance. 1 Introduction
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Sadly, many of those from social services who gave evidence seemed to spend a 
lot of time and energy devising ways of limiting access to services, and adopting 
mechanisms designed to reduce service demand.
1.53     The use of eligibility criteria to restrict access to services is not found either 
in legislation or in guidance, and its ill-founded application is not something 
I support. Only after a child and his or her home circumstances have been assessed 
can such criteria be justified in determining the suitability of a referral, the degree 
of risk, and the urgency of the response.
1.54     Local government in this country should be at the forefront of organisations serving 
the public. Sadly, little I heard persuades me that this is so. Many of the procedures 
that I heard about seemed to me to be self-serving – supporting the needs of the 
organisation, rather than the public they are set up to serve. Local authorities should 
take the lead in promoting social regeneration and combating social exclusion. 
In this regard, I have recommended that local authorities become more closely 
engaged with their local communities in defining local needs and the ways to meet 
them. Little I heard in this Inquiry convinced me that local authorities accept that in 
public service, the needs of the public must come first. This must change.
Availability of services
1.55     The availability of services provided by social services departments emerged as 
a very important matter. The ‘out-of-office-hours’ teams in Ealing, Brent and 
Haringey were involved with Victoria to varying degrees. Office hours cover, at 
best, 40 hours of the working week. During the remaining 128 hours, a single 
member of staff, possibly with little or no experience of services for children, is 
frequently expected to cover all social care needs within an authority. Inevitably, 
the intervention can only be limited until the full service is again available. As 
families often experience problems during the times when they are most likely to 
be together – during the evening and at weekends – it is clearly unsatisfactory to 
provide services in this restricted way. In future, local authorities should be funded 
to provide specialist services for children and families on a 24-hour basis, as do the 
other ‘emergency’ services, such as the police and the health service.
The use of agency and locum staff
1.56     The practice of using a front-line ‘duty team’ with agency staff is totally 
unacceptable. This was particularly apparent in the way Brent Social Services 
managed its duty commitments. Furthermore, even the most able members of staff 
working on duty should at all times have access to someone dedicated to the task 
of managing the duty arrangements and supervising the work of the staff.
1.57     I was also concerned to learn that a locum junior hospital doctor, with little 
knowledge of local child protection procedures, was left unsupported at the 
Central Middlesex Hospital and allowed to handle alone Victoria’s discharge from 
hospital. This is also totally unacceptable. No member of staff, from any of the 
agencies, should be put in a position that places both them and their client, or 
patient, in such a vulnerable position.
Training and supervision
1.58     In addition to promoting better practice immediately, I hope that this Report will 
be used for the training of future generations of social workers, police officers and 
doctors and nurses. There is a huge task to be undertaken to ensure that in each 
of the services, staff are trained adequately to carry out their duties in the care 
and protection of children and support to families. A balance between theoretical 
teaching and practical training should be guaranteed on all training courses. 
All staff appointed to any of the services where they will be working with children 
and families must have adequate training for the positions they will fill. However, The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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along with this general requirement of competence to do the job, it is vital that all 
staff have the benefit of a period of induction that covers, specifically, their roles in 
protecting children and supporting families.
1.59     Supervision is the cornerstone of good social work practice and should be seen 
to operate effectively at all levels of the organisation. In Haringey, the provision 
of supervision may have looked good on paper, but in practice it was woefully 
inadequate for many of the front-line staff. This must change. The same is true for 
the police and the health services. 
Practice guidance and documentation
1.60     I also heard much about front-line staff working with numerous volumes of 
guidance, some of which was seriously out of date. In Ealing, the field work 
manual was so out of date it did not include reference to the Children Act 
1989. In Haringey, there were no fewer than 13 documents containing policies, 
procedures and guidance to staff in relation to children’s services. It was the belief 
of two senior staff managers from Haringey that some staff had difficulty in reading 
practice guidance because of problems with literacy.
1.61     Judging by the material put before the Inquiry, the problem is less about the ability 
of staff to read and understand guidelines, and more about the huge and dense 
nature of the material provided for them. Therefore, the challenge is to provide 
busy staff in each of the agencies with something of real practical help and of 
manageable length. The test is simply one of ensuring the material actually helps 
staff do their job.
The issue of race in relation to Victoria
1.62     Understandably, the agencies with whom Victoria came into contact have asked 
the question: “If Victoria had been a white child, would she have been treated any 
differently?” Having listened to the evidence before me, it is, even at this stage, 
impossible to answer this question with any confidence. Much has been made 
outside this Inquiry of the fact that two black people murdered Victoria, and a high 
proportion of the staff who had contact with her were also black. But to dismiss 
the possibility of racism on the basis of this superficial analysis of the circumstances 
is to misunderstand the destructive effect that racism has on our society and its 
institutions.
1.63     As Neil Garnham QC put it so perceptively in his opening statement:
“Assumption based on race can be just as corrosive in its effect as blatant 
racism ... racism can affect the way people conduct themselves in other 
ways. Fear of being accused of racism can stop people acting when 
otherwise they would. Assumptions that people of the same colour, 
but from different backgrounds, behave in similar ways can distort 
judgments.”
He urged the Inquiry to “keep its antennae finely tuned” to the possible effects of 
racial assumptions. This I have sought to do, and return to the subject in section 16. 
Conclusion
1.64     Throughout this Inquiry, it has been my firm intention to produce a report that 
is unambiguous, and has a set of recommendations that will strengthen the 
safeguards for children. It is my hope that this Report will be read in its entirety. 
It is only by doing this that readers will understand the full impact of the events 1 Introduction
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surrounding Victoria’s life and death, the inter-relationships between them, and the 
similarities of the issues emerging from the analysis of practice and organisational 
factors in the three agencies charged with Victoria’s care.
1.65     Sadly, the Report is a vivid demonstration of poor practice within and between 
social services, the police and the health agencies. It is also a stark reminder of 
the consequences of ineffective and inept management. Too often it seemed that 
too much time was spent deferring to the needs of Kouao and Manning, and not 
enough time was spent on protecting a vulnerable and defenceless child. This must 
change. However, this Report is no more than a summary of what was heard and 
can neither rehearse nor condense the vast amount of the evidence that was put 
before me. That material will remain available on the Inquiry’s website for at least 
a year. (www.victoria-climbie-inquiry.org.uk)
1.66     It has felt as if Victoria has attended every step of this Inquiry, and it has been my 
good fortune to have had the assistance of colleagues whose abilities have been 
matched by their commitment to the task of doing justice to Victoria’s memory 
and her enduring spirit, and to creating something positive from her suffering 
and ultimate death. These colleagues have shared with me a determination that 
the Inquiry should be open, fair and rigorous. Throughout, we have all kept a 
clear focus on the facts and on finding out what happened to Victoria, why things 
happened the way they did, and how such terrible events may be prevented in 
the future. I am convinced that the answer lies in doing relatively straightforward 
things well. Adhering to this principle will have a significant impact on the lives 
of vulnerable children. It is the duty of those in authority to see that this happens. 
Unfortunately, none of us can bring Victoria back, but we can all try to ensure that 
some lasting benefit comes from her death, and that other children do not suffer a 
similar fate.
1.67     This Inquiry was established under three Acts of Parliament. In this respect it is 
probably unique. I am solely responsible for the content of this Report and any 
weaknesses it may have. However, I am delighted that the four expert assessors, 
Dr Nellie Adjaye, Donna Kinnair, John Fox and Nigel Richardson, endorse this 
Report. The names of the whole Inquiry team are recorded in Annex 3. Each has 
played their part to the full, and richly deserves the warm tribute which I gladly 
pay them. They have been unfailing in the help and support which they have 
given me. I am indebted to them. It is invidious to make mention of individuals, 
because this has been a real team effort. But some of my colleagues have carried 
an exceptionally heavy workload and done so cheerfully. They are Mandy Jacklin, 
Secretary to the Inquiry; Neil Garnham QC, Counsel to the Inquiry; and Michael 
Fitzgerald, Solicitor to the Inquiry. I am grateful to Neil Sheldon, Barrister, for 
assisting me in marshalling evidential material, to Dr Valerie Brasse and Dr Susan 
Shepherd for their assistance in drafting this Report, and to Paul Rees, the Director 
of Communications.
1.68     It is the hope of the full Inquiry team that the horror of what happened to Victoria 
will endure as a reproach to bad practice and be a beacon pointing the way to 
securing the safety and well-being of all children in our society.142 The  Inquiry
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2 The Inquiry
Why establish the Inquiry?
2.1       On 25 February 2000, Victoria Adjo Climbié died in the Intensive Care Unit 
at St Mary’s Hospital Paddington. She died as a result of months of appalling 
ill-treatment at the hands of two individuals who were supposed to be caring 
for her. 
2.2       On 12 January 2001 at the Central Criminal Court, Marie-Therese Kouao and 
Carl John Manning were convicted of her murder. Both were sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Victoria had been called ‘Anna’ by Kouao while she was in this 
country. I decided early on that this Inquiry would call her by her proper name.
2.3       On 20 April 2001, I was appointed by the Secretary of State for Health and the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department to conduct three statutory Inquiries. 
Together they would be known as The Victoria Climbié Inquiry. 
2.4       The first Inquiry was established under section 81 of the Children Act 1989. It was 
concerned with the functions of local authority social services committees and the 
way they relate to children. The second Inquiry was established under section 84 
of the National Health Service Act 1977 and was concerned with matters arising 
under that Act. The third Inquiry was established under section 49 of the Police Act 
1996 and was concerned with policing.
2.5       The Inquiry’s Terms of Reference were as follows:
1.  To establish the circumstances leading to and surrounding the death of Victoria 
Climbié.
2.  To identify the services sought or required by, or in respect of Victoria Climbié, 
Marie-Therese Kouao and Carl Manning from local authorities in respect of their 
social services functions, the Health bodies and the Police between the arrival of 
Victoria Climbié and Marie-Therese Kouao in England in March 1999 and Victoria 
Climbié’s death in February 2000.
3.  To examine the way in which local authorities in respect of their social services 
functions, the health bodies and the police:
  (i)  responded to those requests, or need for services
  (ii)  discharged their functions
  (iii) co-operated with each other
 (iv)    co-operated with other services including the local education authorities and 
the local housing authorities;
  in respect of the three persons named above during the period referred to above 
and thereafter.
4.  To reach conclusions as to the circumstances leading to Victoria Climbié’s death 
and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State for Health and to the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department as to how such an event may, as far 
as possible, be avoided in the future.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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5.  To deliver a report of the Inquiry to the Secretary of State for Health and to 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who will then arrange for its 
publication.
The Inquiry panel 
2.6       I appointed four assessors to help me to consider and analyse the evidence: 
• Dr Nellie Adjaye, a Fellow of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health and 
a consultant paediatrician with the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust;
• John Fox, a detective superintendent and the head of the Specialist Investigations 
Department in the Hampshire Constabulary;
• Donna Kinnair, a nurse and health visitor and formerly the strategic commissioner 
for children’s services for the Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham Health Authority; 
• Nigel Richardson, the assistant director of Children and Families for North 
Lincolnshire Council.
2.7       The assessors gave advice on matters within their areas of expertise throughout 
the Inquiry. Their knowledge and support were of enormous value and I am very 
grateful to them, and to their employers for releasing them so that they could take 
part in this important work. 
2.8       We also had very beneficial advice and assistance on housing issues from Mike Smith, 
head of Community Housing Services, Greenwich Council.
2.9       I appointed Mandy Jacklin as Secretary to the Inquiry. She was responsible for the 
management of the overall work of the Inquiry. With the consent of the Attorney 
General, I appointed Neil Garnham QC to be Counsel to the Inquiry, and Caroline 
Gibson and Neil Sheldon to be junior Counsel to the Inquiry. Their role was to help 
me in the investigation, advise me on matters of law and evidence, and present the 
evidence to the Inquiry at its hearings. Michael Fitzgerald acted as Solicitor to the 
Inquiry. A full list of those who worked on the Inquiry is in Annex 3.
Inquiry accommodation
2.10     The Inquiry was accommodated at Hannibal House, a government building 
at Elephant and Castle, London. The floors used for Inquiry purposes were 
substantially refurbished to provide secure accommodation for the Inquiry’s offices 
and a well-equipped Inquiry room for the hearings. These floors were kept entirely 
separate from the other occupiers of the building.
What form did the Inquiry take?
Public or private?
2.11     The two secretaries of state allowed me to decide whether the Inquiry should be 
conducted in public or in private. After careful consideration, I decided it would 
be a public inquiry. However, I reserved the right to hear evidence in private in 
exceptional circumstances. I exercised that power on just one occasion, when 
it was necessary for the Inquiry to hear evidence that involved the child of one 
witness. I took the view that in order to protect the interests of the child, their 
evidence should be heard in private.
Format? 
2.12     I decided that the Inquiry would be divided into two phases. Phase One (Parts one 
to four of this Report) would be mostly backward-looking. It would try to discover 
what happened to Victoria while she was in this country and why it happened. 2 The  Inquiry
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Phase One would address paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Terms of Reference (see 
paragraph 2.5), and look at the conclusions that could properly be drawn from 
the evidence on those topics.
2.13     Phase Two (see Part five of this Report) would be forward-looking and examine what 
recommendations might be made to avoid, as far as possible, a tragedy like this 
happening again. 
Adversarial or inquisitorial?
2.14     There is no statutory entitlement for any person to call witnesses, cross-examine or 
make submissions in an Inquiry of this sort. However, it was for me to decide what 
form the Inquiry should take, and I decided the Inquiry would be inquisitorial not 
adversarial in nature. In Phase One, Counsel to the Inquiry would decide which 
witnesses it was necessary to call to give evidence, and they would examine them. 
Identifying Interested Parties and Represented Witnesses
2.15     A number of bodies and individuals expressed an interest in the work of the 
Inquiry. Therefore, it was decided to recognise people who had a legitimate 
interest in the work of the Inquiry as ‘Interested Parties’. Also, a number of 
witnesses not represented as an Interested Party asked to be represented by 
lawyers at the Phase One hearings. In every case, permission was granted and 
these witnesses were known as ‘Represented Witnesses’. A list of Interested Parties 
and their representatives and Represented Witnesses and their representatives can 
be found in Annex 4.
2.16     Most Interested Parties were public bodies or individuals involved with Victoria’s 
case in this country who wished to be involved in Phase One, and who I thought 
could help the Inquiry with its work. At an early stage, we received an application 
for Victoria’s parents, Francis and Berthe Climbié, to also be granted that status. 
I decided that it would be right to grant that application, given the obvious human 
interest any parent would have in an investigation into their child’s death. Mr and 
Mrs Climbié also asked me to recommend to the Government that the cost of 
their travelling to the UK and their accommodation here throughout Phase One 
be met from the public purse. After careful reflection, I decided to make those 
recommendations, and the Government accepted them. 
2.17     I decided that, as a general rule, Interested Parties and those acting for Represented 
Witnesses would not be allowed to call or cross-examine witnesses. I had indicated 
at the preliminary meeting (described in more detail in paragraph 2.20) that 
there might be exceptions to this general rule. However, I was only asked to make 
such an exception once, and I granted the request. Counsel to the Inquiry agreed 
to consider any requests for them to call additional witnesses and any requests 
for particular lines of questioning to be put to witnesses. I indicated during 
the preliminary meeting that if Counsel did not call such witnesses or ask such 
questions, I would adjudicate on the need to do so. In fact, this was not necessary 
and I am grateful to Counsel to the Inquiry and all the representatives for their 
sensible co-operation in this regard.
2.18     Those representing Interested Parties and Represented Witnesses were allowed 
to re-examine witnesses whom they represented. That re-examination was 
time limited. 
2.19     At the end of oral hearings, representatives of Interested Parties and Represented 
Witnesses who wished to do so were allowed to make time-limited closing 
submissions, which could be supplemented with written submissions.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Preparing for the Inquiry
Preliminary meeting
2.20     On 30 May 2001, we held a preliminary meeting at Hannibal House and invited 
everyone who had expressed an interest in the work of the Inquiry. The meeting 
was open to the public. We began the meeting by holding a minute’s silence in 
memory of Victoria.
2.21     At the meeting, I set out the arrangements I proposed to make for the running of 
the Inquiry, and I invited comments on those arrangements. No one suggested 
then, or in the weeks that followed, that the arrangements should be changed. 
Therefore, the arrangements proposed at the meeting were put into effect. 
Gathering witness statements
2.22     In order to structure the work in Phase One, a list of issues was produced which 
reflected the Terms of Reference.
2.23     The Solicitor to the Inquiry wrote to everyone who might be able to give relevant 
evidence, asking them to produce a witness statement. A questionnaire was 
included that set out matters arising from the list of issues, which it was thought 
they would be able to speak about. In most cases these requests were made 
through the Interested Parties, and I am grateful for their assistance with this. 
2.24     A bundle of witness statements was prepared by the secretariat and copies 
were made available to Interested Parties. The Interested Parties made a written 
statement that they understood they had to keep that material confidential and 
only use it for the purposes of this Inquiry.
Gathering documents
2.25     The three statutes to which I have referred gave me power to require the 
production of documents. The secretariat wrote to the relevant public bodies 
asking them to produce all relevant documents. One of the more difficult tasks 
that fell to the secretariat was managing the vast amount of documentation that 
was produced in response. 
2.26     This work was made particularly difficult because of the late supply of some 
relevant material by some of the Interested Parties, and by others. For example, 
Brent council was late providing some documents and at times I felt material was 
drip-fed to us. Similarly, at one stage I was unhappy with the NSPCC’s provision 
of documents. Documents which were supposedly lost were suddenly discovered, 
and on one occasion it was only during witness examinations that it became clear 
that documents had been given to the Inquiry in an edited form. However, in most 
cases, including those of Brent and the NSPCC, the problems were temporary and 
solved quickly due to the good sense and co-operation of those concerned. 
2.27     I regret to say this was not always the case with Haringey council. I was so 
concerned about the way Haringey was responding to requests for documents 
that I issued a summons, in line with my powers under section 250 of the Local 
Government Act 1972. The summons was directed to Haringey’s director of 
social services requiring her to produce four identified documents and any other 
documents relevant to the lessons learned by Haringey as a result of Victoria’s 
death. From then on, there could be no confusion as to what the Inquiry required. 
2.28     More than 650 new documents were produced in response to this summons. 
Several times after this, Haringey produced even more documentation. This was 
material that should have been produced, at the latest, by the date stated in the 2 The  Inquiry
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summons. I invited Haringey’s chief executive to attend the Inquiry and explain 
Haringey council’s conduct. He did so, and expressed his embarrassment at what 
had happened. 
2.29     More material continued to be produced. I found it particularly disturbing that 
documents directly relevant to Victoria’s case were found in a filing cabinet in the 
office where her case had been handled, and in a locked storage area next to that 
office. Haringey’s Counsel told me that her client’s embarrassment about these 
discoveries was “off the scale”. I requested a further explanation from Haringey’s 
chief executive. In the course of that explanation, I was told that to describe him as 
“absolutely furious” about what had happened would be an understatement.
2.30     I have seriously considered whether Haringey’s method of dealing with its 
documentation was the result of a deliberate attempt to frustrate the Inquiry’s 
work, or simple incompetence. Having considered the observations of Haringey’s 
chief executive, I have concluded it was incompetence.
2.31     The smooth functioning of Inquiries such as this will always depend on the 
co-operation and assistance of the public bodies involved. The enormous 
inconvenience that can be caused by the late submission of relevant material was 
graphically illustrated by a document provided by the Social Services Inspectorate 
(SSI) after the Phase One hearings had been completed.
2.32     I describe in paragraphs 2.37 to 2.41 the significance of the document in question 
and the impact that its late submission had on the running of this Inquiry. For 
present purposes, I simply wish to express my surprise and disappointment that the 
work of the Inquiry was delayed in this manner. 
2.33     The documents were read and assessed by the Inquiry team and bundles of 
relevant material were produced. Copies of the bundles were made available to 
Interested Parties in the same way referred to in paragraph 2.24. The material was 
made available in hard copy form and a searchable, electronic index on disk was 
produced to accompany the Inquiry bundle.
Phase One proceedings 
Opening the Inquiry and hearing evidence
2.34     The hearings began on 26 September 2001, when Counsel to the Inquiry made his 
opening statement. That statement identified the matters which the Inquiry would 
need to focus on over the following months. In line with what had been said at the 
preliminary meeting, a television crew was given access to the Inquiry on that day. 
The next day, opening statements from the other Interested Parties were received. 
2.35     The first witness, Francis Climbié, Victoria’s father, was called on 28 September 
2001. After this, Counsel to the Inquiry called a further 158 witnesses, all of whom 
gave their evidence on oath. In the case of four witnesses who had subsequently 
moved abroad, it was decided that the most convenient and economic method of 
obtaining their evidence was to use a video link between studios in their present 
country of residence and a Department of Health building close to the Inquiry’s 
premises. This evidence was recorded and the video recordings were played in the 
public sessions of the Inquiry. The arrangements worked extremely well.
2.36     The written statements of a further 119 witnesses were put into evidence without 
the need for them to attend the Inquiry. Most of the oral evidence was completed 
by 4 February 2002. A list of the witnesses who were called to give evidence and 
those whose statements were read into the evidence can be found in Annex 2. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Final submissions from the Interested Parties and Counsel to the Inquiry were heard 
on 18, 19 and 27 February 2002. Proceedings on the first two of those days were 
also televised. 
Reconvening Phase One hearings
2.37     I had expected the final submission on 27 February 2002 to mark the end of the 
public hearings in Phase One. However, on the advice of Counsel to the Inquiry, 
I chose not to close Phase One at that point because it was possible that further 
matters might emerge which would require the taking of additional evidence.
2.38     This advice turned out to be crucial. On 27 February 2002, the SSI gave the 
Inquiry a report of the Joint Review of Haringey Social Services. The Joint Review 
had been conducted by the SSI and the Audit Commission and published in 
November 1999.
2.39     It quickly became obvious that this document was not just relevant but potentially 
greatly important to Phase One of the Inquiry. It was immediately distributed to the 
Interested Parties and documents relevant to its preparation were sought from the 
SSI and the Audit Commission. These documents filled a further six lever-arch files. 
2.40     This additional material was read and analysed. Then Counsel to the Inquiry 
advised that further witness statements should be obtained. The Inquiry was given 
14 such statements, which were then circulated to the Interested Parties. 
2.41     Having considered these additional statements, I reluctantly came to the view 
that I had no option but to reconvene the Phase One public hearings in order 
to take additional oral evidence. As a result, the Inquiry sat for two days on 
9 and 10 July 2002. Four witnesses gave oral evidence subject to the same 
procedures used before. Interested Parties and the SSI were given the opportunity 
to make closing submissions on the new material, although not all Interested 
Parties took up that opportunity.
2.42     The three statutes under which the Inquiry was established gave me the power to 
call witnesses to attend and answer questions. It was necessary for me to exercise 
that power on only three occasions. The first was in respect of Carole Baptiste, 
the Haringey social work manager, who refused to agree to attend the Inquiry 
voluntarily. She also disobeyed the summons I issued and, as a result, criminal 
proceedings were begun against her. After this, she did attend and answered 
questions put to her. However, I decided that the criminal proceedings should 
go ahead.
2.43     I also issued summonses against Kouao and Manning. Kouao, who had refused to 
co-operate with the Inquiry in any way, was brought from prison to the Inquiry 
to give evidence in person. At first she refused to answer Counsel’s questions. 
Eventually she was persuaded by him to give answers to some of the matters he 
raised with her. Manning, by contrast, had co-operated throughout and had given 
the Inquiry a witness statement when requested. It was arranged that he would 
give his evidence by video link from the Combined Court Centre in Leeds. That 
evidence was recorded and then played at the public hearings. 
The involvement of broadcasters
2.44     A number of broadcasting organisations applied for access to the video evidence 
of Manning. At the time of the recording of his evidence, I sought Manning’s 
views on whether I should allow his evidence to be broadcast. He opposed it. 
Having considered his views and the detailed oral and written submissions from 
Counsel acting on the broadcasters’ behalf and from others, I decided to refuse 
the application. 2 The  Inquiry
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Publishing evidence and data protection
2.45     All oral evidence was simultaneously transcripted using a system called Livenote. 
The system proved very useful.
2.46     I believed it was important that the Inquiry should conduct its work as openly and 
transparently as possible. I wanted to give those with an interest in the evidence 
as much access to it as possible, at the same time ensuring the fair conduct of 
the proceedings. In particular, I wanted those who might be able to contribute to 
Phase Two to have a convenient way of learning about the issues being raised in 
Phase One. 
2.47     As a result, an Inquiry website was established (www.victoria-climbie-
inquiry.org.uk). All statements provided to the Inquiry and transcripts of each 
day’s evidence were placed on this website. The website received around three 
million hits in the period 30 September 2001 to 30 September 2002. The average 
length of the website’s ‘visitor sessions’ was 20 minutes (compared with an internet 
average of three minutes). This suggests that members of the public were using 
the site for detailed reading, rather than out of a passing interest.
2.48     Before statements and transcripts were published in this manner, the Inquiry 
contacted the assistant data protection commissioner. It was agreed with him that 
the Inquiry constituted legal proceedings for the purposes of section 35 of the 
Data Protection Act 1998, and that the Inquiry might lawfully process non-sensitive 
personal data without the consent of the data subject. It was made clear that 
telephone numbers, addresses and names of family members would be removed 
from witness statements before they were placed on the website, and that the 
security of such information would be strictly maintained by the Inquiry team. 
It was confirmed that the Inquiry could also lawfully process sensitive personal 
data without the explicit consent of the person concerned.
2.49     The assistant data protection commissioner agreed that statements and transcripts 
of the public hearings would be placed on the website but would not contravene 
the Eighth Data Protection Principle. The Principle restricts the communication of 
personal information to countries which have adequate protection for personal 
information in place. It was in the public interest to make this information 
available, especially to those who would be able to make a contribution to Phase 
Two of the Inquiry.
Legal expenses
2.50     The Inquiry does not have any power to order payment of legal costs from public 
funds or by any other party. However, the Government indicated to me that if 
I made a recommendation that the costs of an Interested Party or Represented 
Witness should be met out of public funds, then it would be sympathetically 
considered. I made such a recommendation for one Interested Party and two 
Represented Witnesses and on each occasion the Government accepted my 
recommendation. 
Dealing with potential criticism
2.51     I made clear at the preliminary meeting that some individuals or organisations 
could be criticised in this Report, and that out of fairness I would adopt a procedure 
that allowed those concerned to address any criticism. The procedures for the 
representation of Interested Parties and Represented Witnesses and the preparation 
of their statements seemed to me to already meet those requirements. However, 
I proposed taking an extra step to ensure proceedings were conducted fairly.
2.52     I made it clear that I would make no findings significantly adverse to an individual 
or organisation without ensuring that they first had a proper opportunity to answer The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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the criticism. Wherever it was possible to do so, the witness would be informed by 
the Inquiry team of the nature of the potential criticism before they were called to 
give evidence. Where that was not possible, either because of the time at which 
grounds for the potential criticism emerged or otherwise, arrangements would be 
made either for the witness to respond in writing, or for the witness to be recalled 
so that they could answer the criticism. At the preliminary meeting, I made it clear 
that I would particularly welcome representations on those procedures. I received 
no suggestions indicating a need to amend the proposed arrangements and so 
they were put into practice during the course of the Inquiry. 
2.53     Notices of potential criticism were sent to individuals or public bodies where it 
appeared they may be criticised for their conduct in relation to matters covered 
by the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference. Each witness was given the chance to address 
these points during the course of their evidence. The Solicitor to the Inquiry wrote 
to the relevant party afterwards to make sure they felt they had been given a fair 
chance to respond. No one said that they had not.
Phase Two
Preparing for Phase Two
2.54     The fourth paragraph of our Terms of Reference requires us to make 
recommendations as to how a tragedy like this could be avoided in the future.
2.55     It was apparent early on that, in responding to this, we were likely to have to 
consider making two different types of recommendations. The first type would be 
addressed to the particular circumstances of Victoria’s case and to the events that 
occurred in Ealing, Brent and Haringey while Victoria lived there. The second type 
would be recommendations with wider potential impact and that might affect 
relevant agencies across the country. 
2.56     In the course of Phase One, we were likely to become familiar with practice and 
procedure in certain parts of London, but it would be an obvious mistake to assume 
that these same practices and procedures were necessarily followed elsewhere. 
We are not charged with conducting a review of the whole child protection system 
in this country. However, we had to devise a way for a wider audience to test the 
ideas prompted by Victoria’s case so that they could be used elsewhere.
Providing a framework for Phase Two
2.57     Phase Two was designed to be a way for such wider consideration to happen. 
In order to give some shape to our thinking on these subjects, the Inquiry produced 
a provisional framework document for Phase Two in late October 2001. That 
framework was based on our reading of the documents and witness statements 
gathered for Phase One. It identified broad issues, aspects of which we believed 
might be worthy of consideration in Phase Two. We asked for comments on the 
structure and contents of that framework and suggestions for topics that should be 
considered. We received a large number of responses to that framework document 
and, in the light of those responses, we drew up a discussion paper, which we 
published on the website and circulated widely.
2.58     The issues were addressed in two ways. First, we invited written submissions from 
the public at large. We anticipated that not all of the submissions we received were 
likely to help us, so we made it clear in the beginning that only those that were 
relevant and valuable would be treated as evidence to the Inquiry. In fact, out of 
over 200 submissions we received, we accepted 77 as evidence and published 
them on the website. I am very grateful to all those who took the trouble to send 
in written submissions.2 The  Inquiry
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2.59     Second, the Inquiry organised a series of five seminars, which were held in March 
and April 2002. They were conducted in public at the Inquiry’s premises at Hannibal 
House. The seminars covered the following aspects of working with children:
• Ensuring that children and their families receive the full range of services they are 
entitled to;
• Making sure that children and families in need of extra care and support are 
identified at an early stage;
• Carrying out a proper assessment of the needs of children and families and 
developing plans to achieve the best outcomes for them;
• Making sure that key agencies are able to deliver an effective service;
• Monitoring the performance of the key agencies.
2.60     A wide range of people with an interest in our work were invited to the seminars. 
These included practitioners and managers from social services, the police, health 
services, academics, lawyers and commentators. They were chosen from those 
who had responded to our framework document and discussion paper, and from 
those not previously involved in the Inquiry. A full list of those who took part in the 
seminars can be found in Annex 5. The seminars were chaired by Neil Garnham 
QC and attended by the assessors and myself. They were a most valuable source of 
ideas, and are discussed further in section 17 of this Report. I am most grateful to 
all those who took part.
Closing the Inquiry
2.61     On 31 July 2002, I formally closed the evidence-gathering process of the Inquiry. 
No material received by the Inquiry after this date has been considered for the 
purposes of preparing this Report. 243 Victoria’s  story
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3 Victoria’s story 
3.1       This section looks in detail at the interaction between Victoria, Kouao and 
Manning, and the various professionals they came into contact with during the 
course of Victoria’s life in this country. It gives a brief account of the evidence 
received by the Inquiry about Victoria’s background. It also looks at the way she 
was treated by people who were supposed to have assumed responsibility for her 
welfare while she was in this country. 
Victoria meets Kouao
3.2       Victoria Adjo Climbié was born near Abidjan in the Ivory Coast on 2 November 
1991. She was the fifth of seven children and, according to her parents, she had 
a healthy and happy early childhood. She started school at the age of six and 
showed herself to be intelligent and articulate. She seems to have been a child 
who stood out.
3.3       Perhaps this was why Victoria came to the attention of her father’s aunt, 
Marie-Therese Kouao, when she turned up at the Climbié house in October 1998. 
Kouao had lived in France for some years but was visiting the Ivory Coast to attend 
the funeral of her brother. She told Mr and Mrs Climbié that she wished to take 
a child back to France with her and arrange for his or her education. Apparently, 
Victoria was happy to be chosen.
3.4       In fact, Victoria was a late substitute for another young girl called Anna whom 
Kouao had originally intended to take. However, Anna’s parents appear to have 
had second thoughts. This would explain why the ‘daughter’ named on the 
French passport used by Kouao and Victoria to gain entry into the UK was called 
‘Anna’. This was also the name by which Victoria was known throughout her life 
in this country. 
3.5       Victoria’s parents’ reasons for allowing her to travel to Europe with Kouao fall 
outside the Terms of Reference of this Inquiry. It is not a matter I will be dealing 
with, except to observe that I have seen evidence which shows that entrusting 
children to relatives living in Europe who can offer financial and educational 
opportunities unavailable in the Ivory Coast is not uncommon in Victoria’s 
parents’ society.
3.6       After leaving her parents’ house, Victoria travelled first to another part of the Ivory 
Coast, where she stayed with Kouao’s brother. Shortly afterwards, probably some 
time in November 1998, she and Kouao flew to Paris. 
Victoria in France
3.7       Victoria spent approximately five months in France. It is possible that she lived in 
Rue George Meliés, Villepinte, which was the address given by Kouao to Ealing 
Social Services shortly after they arrived in the UK. However, on other occasions 
she gave a different address, in Tremblay-en-France. There is little credible evidence 
available concerning Kouao’s background, but it appears from documents the 
Inquiry has seen that her husband, whom she divorced, died in 1995. Before 
Victoria arrived, according to French social services, Kouao lived with her three 
sons, claiming welfare benefits.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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3.8       In the beginning, Kouao seemed prepared to honour her promise to make sure 
Victoria received a proper education. Shortly after her arrival in France, Victoria was 
enrolled at the Jean Moulin primary school in Villepinte. However, by December 
1998, Kouao began to receive formal warnings from the school about Victoria’s 
absenteeism. The situation became serious enough by February 1999 for the 
school to issue a Child at Risk Emergency Notification. A social worker became 
involved and she reported a difficult ‘mother and child relationship’ between 
Victoria and Kouao.
3.9       Some of Victoria’s absences from school were justified by medical certificates, all 
of which said she needed to rest. When she was at school, staff worried about 
Victoria’s tendency to fall asleep in class. As a result, the school formed the view 
that Victoria was clinically unwell and being monitored and treated by doctors. 
The head teacher, Monsieur Donnet, also recalled Kouao mentioning that Victoria 
was suffering from some form of dermatological condition.
3.10     Some time in the spring of 1999, Kouao gave the school notice that she was 
removing Victoria so she could receive “treatment” in London. The home address 
of Esther Ackah was given as a forwarding address. Ms Ackah was a distant relative 
of Kouao’s and the two had been in intermittent contact for the previous two 
years. When Victoria went to say goodbye to her classmates on 25 March 1999, 
Monsieur Donnet noticed that Victoria had a shaven head and was wearing a wig.
3.11     Why Kouao decided to leave France for the UK is unclear. For a long while before 
leaving, she had been claiming benefits that she was not entitled to. The French 
benefits agency was trying to recover money for these benefits, and this could 
have influenced her decision.
Victoria arrives in the UK
3.12     Kouao and Victoria boarded a flight from Paris to London on 24 April 1999. 
They travelled on Kouao’s French passport, in which Victoria was described as her 
daughter. The picture in the passport was not of Victoria but ‘Anna’, the child 
she had replaced. The two children did not look particularly similar so it is likely 
that Victoria was made to wear a wig so she looked more like the child in the 
photograph. 
3.13     Kouao and Victoria travelled as EU citizens, so no immigration record of their arrival 
exists. However, the date they travelled can be established by the airline ticket that 
was later shown to Ealing Social Services by Kouao as proof of her identity. Kouao also 
presented documentation from the French travel company that arranged the trip.
3.14     When they arrived in the UK, Kouao and Victoria went to Acton and moved into a 
double room in a bed and breakfast in Twyford Crescent. The reservation had been 
made in France and lasted until 1 May 1999.
3.15     At about 4.30pm on 25 April 1999, Victoria and Kouao paid an unannounced 
visit to Ms Ackah. Ms Ackah had just come home from work when she heard the 
doorbell ring at her house in Hanwell, west London. Victoria was introduced to 
her as ‘Anna’. Despite being somewhat taken aback by their presence, Ms Ackah 
invited Kouao and Victoria inside.
3.16     The first thing Ms Ackah noticed about Victoria was that she was wearing a wig. 
This was also remarked upon by Ms Ackah’s daughter, Grace Quansah, who 
joined her in a visit to see Victoria and Kouao later that day. Ms Quansah removed 
the wig from Victoria’s head to discover that she had no hair and her scalp was 3 Victoria’s  story
27
covered with patchy marks. She also thought Victoria looked rather small and frail, 
but neither she nor her mother noticed anything inappropriate or disturbing about 
Victoria’s behaviour or her interaction with Kouao at this stage.
3.17     The following day, Kouao and Victoria visited Ealing’s Homeless Persons’ Unit 
because they needed somewhere to live when their week in Twyford Crescent ran 
out. The unit agreed to provide them with accommodation in a hostel situated at 
Nicoll Road, Harlesden, and they moved in around 1 May 1999.
The first warning signs 
3.18     Over the next few weeks, Victoria and Kouao attended Ealing Social Services several 
times to collect subsistence payments and, on one occasion, to complain about 
the standard of their accommodation. During this period, concerns first started to 
emerge. A number of Ealing staff who saw Kouao and Victoria together during May 
1999 noticed a marked difference between Kouao’s appearance (she was always 
well dressed) and that of Victoria (who was far scruffier). Deborah Gaunt, who saw 
the two of them together on 24 May 1999, went as far as to say that she thought 
Victoria looked like an “advertisement for Action Aid”.
3.19     It is unclear how Victoria passed her days during the first month she spent in 
the Nicoll Road hostel. No effort was made, either by Kouao or by Ealing Social 
Services, to enrol her in any form of educational or daycare activity, and there is 
no evidence to indicate she had any friends or playmates.
3.20     On 8 June 1999, Kouao took Victoria to a GP surgery on Acton Lane, Harlesden. 
Here she was seen by the practice nurse, Grace Moore. Nurse Moore did not carry 
out a physical examination of Victoria because she was reported not to have any 
current health problems or complaints. She felt there were “no child protection 
concerns that required follow up or reporting to other agencies”.
3.21     Shortly afterwards, Victoria began to show what may have been early signs of 
deliberate physical harm. Ms Ackah, who had not seen Victoria since her visit six 
weeks earlier, bumped into her and Kouao on the street on or around 14 June 
1999.  Victoria was wearing a dress with long sleeves, leaving only her face and 
hands exposed. Ms Ackah noticed a fresh scar on Victoria’s right cheek, which 
Kouao told her had been caused when Victoria fell on an escalator. 
Victoria meets Manning
3.22     Later that same day, Victoria met Manning for the first time. He had been driving 
a bus boarded by Kouao four days before and the two had fallen into conversation. 
According to Manning, he gave Kouao his telephone number and she called him 
a few days later inviting him to visit her at Nicoll Road. This appears to have been 
the start of their relationship. It lasted until their arrest just over eight months later.
Anonymous telephone call
3.23     Ms Ackah was sufficiently concerned by what she had seen of Victoria in the 
street to visit Nicoll Road on 17 June 1999. She thought the accommodation was 
unsuitable for a child because it was dirty, cramped and ill-equipped. She also 
thought Victoria had lost weight since she had last seen her. A Ghanaian man was 
present and he told Ms Ackah he was concerned about the way Kouao treated 
Victoria. The following day, Ms Ackah made the first of her two anonymous 
telephone calls to Brent Social Services. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Victoria and the childminder
3.24     By the middle of June, Victoria was spending the majority of her days being looked 
after by Priscilla Cameron, an experienced, but unregistered, childminder. Kouao 
approached Mrs Cameron when she (Kouao) got a job at the Northwick Park 
Hospital on 8 June 1999. Victoria’s history was taken by Dr Rhys Beynon at the 
Central Middlesex Hospital on 14 July 1999 from Mrs Cameron’s daughter, Avril. 
His notes record that Mrs Cameron had been caring for Victoria for the previous 
five weeks. Typically, Victoria would arrive around 7am and not be picked up until 
the evening, sometimes as late as 10pm.
3.25     There is nothing to indicate that Victoria was treated with anything other than 
kindness and generosity by Mrs Cameron during the days she spent at her house. 
She would watch television, draw, play and often took a nap after lunch. Her 
English improved and she appears to have struck up a good relationship with 
Mrs Cameron’s adult son, Patrick, whom she showed how to dance. Mrs Cameron 
provided all her meals on the days Victoria came to stay. 
3.26     Mrs Cameron was not greatly impressed by the way Victoria was treated by 
Kouao. She noticed that Kouao would often speak very harshly to Victoria. On one 
occasion, when Mrs Cameron mentioned to Kouao that Victoria would sometimes 
move household objects around when she should not, she was shocked to hear 
Kouao shout at Victoria that she was a “wicked girl”, something she repeated on 
numerous occasions. Her unease was increased by a conversation she had with a 
woman she referred to as “Nigerian Mary”, who asked Mrs Cameron what it was 
she said to Kouao that made her beat Victoria every night. Both Mrs Cameron and 
her son, Mr Cameron, recalled that Victoria would become very quiet and reserved 
when Kouao arrived at the house to take her home. Victoria tended to look down 
at the floor, rubbing her hands together, whenever Kouao was present.
3.27     On several occasions, Victoria turned up at Mrs Cameron’s house with a number 
of small cuts to her fingers. When questioned about them, Kouao said they had 
been caused by Victoria playing with razor blades. Mr Cameron also noticed marks 
to Victoria’s face, although these were not serious and he thought they could have 
been caused by ordinary childish rough and tumble.
Kouao and Victoria move in with Manning
3.28     Kouao’s relationship with Manning developed quickly. On 6 July 1999, Victoria and 
Kouao moved into his flat at 267 Somerset Gardens. The flat was really no more 
than a small bedsit. There was a separate bathroom and kitchen area, but only one 
room for all three people to sleep in. The bedsit contained two sofa beds. Manning 
said Victoria slept on one of them, and he and Kouao slept on the other. This 
arrangement continued until October, when Victoria’s sofa bed was thrown out 
and she began to spend her nights in the bathroom.
3.29     There is some evidence to suggest that Victoria’s physical abuse increased 
considerably soon after she moved into Manning’s flat. Both Ms Ackah and 
Mrs Cameron had seen marks on Victoria’s face and fingers before July, but the 
injuries she was suffering from when she turned up at Mrs Cameron’s house on 
the evening of 13 July 1999 seem to have been of a different order.
3.30     According to Mrs Cameron, Kouao was in an agitated state when she turned up 
on her doorstep that evening. She asked Mrs Cameron to take Victoria “for good” 
because apparently Manning was not prepared to tolerate Victoria living with him. 
Mrs Cameron refused but agreed to take Victoria in for one night because “the 3 Victoria’s  story
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poor child was looking so ill”. Kouao then presented Mrs Cameron with two large 
bags full of Victoria’s clothes. 
3.31     When she arrived, Victoria was wearing a baseball cap pulled down over her brow. 
When Mrs Cameron removed it, she saw what she took to be a burn the size of a 
50 pence piece on Victoria’s face. Mr Cameron also noticed three circular marks 
on Victoria’s lower right jaw which looked to him “like injuries that had been 
healing for a little while”. Both he and Mrs Cameron noticed Victoria’s eyes were 
bloodshot, and Mrs Cameron also observed a loose piece of skin hanging from her 
right eyelid. Mrs Cameron’s opinion as to the likely cause of these injuries is shown 
by the fact she asked Kouao who had burned and beaten Victoria. Kouao replied 
that all the injuries were self-inflicted.
3.32     Manning’s account offers a different explanation. He said Victoria began to suffer 
from urinary incontinence very soon after she came to live in his flat. He told 
the police that this prompted him to hit Victoria. He recalled that he began by 
slapping her, but by the end of July he had started using his fist. It is highly likely 
that at least some of the injuries observed by the Camerons on the night of 13 July 
1999 were the result of deliberate physical harm.
3.33     Mrs Cameron gave Victoria a clean pair of pyjamas and put her to bed. Later that 
evening, she heard groaning coming from the room and went in to see what was 
the matter. Victoria was asleep but Mrs Cameron saw that her face was swollen 
and her fingers were oozing pus. Mrs Cameron called her daughter Avril to come 
and look. They agreed that Victoria had to be taken to hospital.
3.34     The next morning, Avril Cameron took Victoria to see Marie Cader, a French 
teacher at her sons’ school. She wanted to discover the cause of the injuries as well 
as get them treated. Ms Cader noticed injuries to Victoria’s face and fingers, but 
Victoria was reluctant to talk about how she got them. She advised Ms Cameron to 
take Victoria to hospital.
Victoria’s first visit to hospital
3.35     Ms Cameron took Victoria to the accident and emergency department of 
the Central Middlesex Hospital around 11am on 14 July. Victoria was seen 
by Dr Beynon within an hour of her arrival. Dr Beynon took a history from 
Ms Cameron which, together with the results of a basic examination of Victoria, 
concerned him enough to refer the matter to a paediatric registrar. In his view 
there was a “strong possibility” that this was a case of non-accidental injury. 
3.36     The paediatric registrar who saw her next was Dr Ekundayo Ajayi-Obe. She performed 
a more extensive physical examination than Dr Beynon and discovered a large 
number of injuries to Victoria’s body, which she recorded on a set of body maps. 
She formed the view that at least some of Victoria’s injuries might be non-accidental. 
Dr Ajayi-Obe arranged for Victoria to be admitted overnight and called Brent Social 
Services to inform them. The police were told and Victoria was placed under police 
protection at 5.20pm. The medical notes record the instruction that there were to be 
no unsupervised visits by Victoria’s mother.
3.37     That evening, a very agitated and displeased Kouao discovered from the Camerons 
that Victoria had been admitted to the Central Middlesex Hospital. She went to the 
hospital and was there when Dr Ruby Schwartz saw Victoria as part of her evening 
ward round. As a result of her examination that evening, Dr Schwartz concluded 
Victoria was suffering from scabies. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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3.38     Due to the infectious nature of scabies, Victoria was nursed in isolation for the rest 
of her stay on the ward. Victoria was extremely distressed to see Ms Cameron leave 
earlier that evening, but then seemed to settle down and, apart from wetting the 
bed, she passed a fairly uneventful night. The next morning, after the police had 
withdrawn their protection, Kouao returned to the hospital and left with Victoria.
3.39     The first agency they visited on leaving hospital was Ealing Social Services’ Acton 
Area Office. Kouao left Victoria in the waiting room on her own for over an hour, 
much to the annoyance of a social worker named Pamela Fortune. They spent that 
night in a hotel in Wembley before returning to Somerset Gardens the next day. 
3.40     On the way, they stopped off at the Camerons’ house to collect Victoria’s clothes. 
Mrs Cameron tried to speak to Victoria but she would not answer her. Mr Cameron 
was also there and recalled that Victoria seemed “totally different” from other 
times he had seen her. She would not smile at him and she did not respond when 
he said hello to her in French. The clothes were retrieved and Kouao and Victoria 
left. Apart from one occasion when Mrs Cameron saw Kouao and Victoria walking 
together down the street, the Camerons never saw either of them again.  
Victoria’s second visit to hospital
3.41     Just over a week later on 24 July 1999, Victoria was back in hospital. This time 
it was the North Middlesex Hospital and Kouao who brought her in. Her most 
urgent injury was a serious scald to the face, which Kouao said was caused by 
Victoria placing her head under the hot tap in the bathroom to try and relieve the 
itching caused by scabies. According to one of the versions of events put forward 
by Kouao, she had been asleep in bed at around midday when a scream from 
the bathroom woke her up. Victoria’s burns were so serious she was admitted to 
the paediatric ward – known as Rainbow ward – where she stayed for the next 
13 nights.
3.42     At about 11pm on 24 July 1999, Dr Simone Forlee, the senior house officer who 
first examined her, explained the position to Haringey Social Services. A more 
detailed referral was made three days later by Karen Johns, an Enfield social worker 
based at the hospital. As a result, a strategy meeting was held at Haringey’s 
offices on 28 July 1999 and Victoria’s case was allocated to a social worker 
– Lisa Arthurworrey.
3.43     A number of medical staff who cared for Victoria during her stay on Rainbow ward 
noticed marks on her body which they considered were signs of serious deliberate 
physical harm. Nurse Beatrice Norman saw what she thought was a belt buckle 
mark on Victoria’s shoulder, and Nurse Millicent Graham noticed a mark which 
made her suspect Victoria had been deliberately burned. Nurse Grace Pereira, who 
bathed Victoria the following day, saw marks which led her to believe Victoria had 
been hit with a belt and bitten.
3.44     It seems Victoria had started to suffer serious deliberate harm by late July 1999. 
This is also indicated by her behaviour when Kouao and Manning came to visit 
her on the ward. She gave the impression of being frightened of them. When 
Kouao came onto the ward, Victoria changed from being lively and vivacious to 
withdrawn and timid, and the relationship between her and Kouao was recorded 
in the ward’s critical incident log as being like that of “master and servant”. 
On one occasion she was seen to wet herself while standing to attention in front 
of a seated Kouao, who was apparently telling her off.3 Victoria’s  story
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3.45     Her reaction to Manning when he came to visit seems to have been similar. He said 
Victoria seemed “wary of his presence” and was anxious to keep her distance from 
him. Neither he nor Kouao ever brought Victoria anything in the way of clothes, 
food, toys or treats throughout the fortnight she spent in hospital.
3.46     When Kouao was not around, Victoria seems to have enjoyed her time on Rainbow 
ward. She certainly became something of a favourite of several of the nurses, 
including Nurse Lucienne Taub, a French speaker whom Dr Mary Rossiter, the 
hospital’s named doctor for child protection, had asked to befriend Victoria. She 
liked to dress up and was given clothes to dress up in by the nursing staff. Nurse 
Taub would take her to see the babies in the neo-natal ward and bought her 
sweets and treats. According to Dr Rossiter, she was a “little ray of sunshine”.
3.47     Apart from Kouao and Manning, the only other visitors Victoria received while in 
the North Middlesex Hospital were Ms Arthurworrey and PC Karen Jones. They 
visited on 6 August 1999 and, after speaking briefly to Victoria, decided it would 
be appropriate for her to be discharged back into Kouao’s care.
3.48     The brief interlude in her life in this country during which Victoria was safe, happy 
and well cared for ended. She left the North Middlesex Hospital with Kouao at 
approximately 8pm on 6 August 1999. They went straight back to Manning’s flat 
in Somerset Gardens where Victoria was to spend the remaining seven months of 
her life.
The first social worker visit
3.49     During the course of those seven months, Victoria’s contact with the outside world 
was limited and sporadic. Professionals saw her on only four separate occasions 
during this period. The first two times were home visits made by Ms Arthurworrey 
to Somerset Gardens. The other two occasions were at the beginning of November 
when Kouao took Victoria to Haringey Social Services’ North Tottenham District 
Office. Here Kouao made, then later retracted, allegations that Victoria had been 
sexually harmed by Manning.
3.50     No representative from the Tottenham Child and Family Centre, to which she had 
been referred by Haringey Social Services on 5 August 1999, ever visited Victoria 
at Manning’s flat. She was registered in November at the health centre that stands 
approximately 100 yards from Manning’s flat, but she never attended it and none 
of the medical staff who worked there ever saw her. 
3.51     The first of Ms Arthurworrey’s two visits to Somerset Gardens took place on 
16 August 1999, shortly after Victoria was discharged from the North Middlesex 
Hospital. She found her to be smartly dressed and well cared for. Victoria spent most 
of the visit playing with a doll – one of a number of toys seen by Ms Arthurworrey. 
Although Ms Arthurworrey did not talk to Victoria during the course of this visit, 
she formed the impression that Victoria was happy and seemed like the “little ray of 
sunshine” described by the nurses. As far as Ms Arthurworrey was concerned, the 
priority was to move Kouao and Victoria to alternative accommodation, because she 
did not think their current living arrangements were satisfactory.
3.52     Ms Arthurworrey did not ask Kouao how Victoria was spending her days at this 
stage. She was not enrolled in a school and there is no indication she participated 
in any form of daycare activity. Kouao no longer worked at the Northwick Park 
Hospital (her employment had been terminated due to prolonged absences) and 
so Manning’s assumption that Kouao and Victoria spent most of their time in his 
bedsit seems correct.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Mr and Mrs Kimbidima
3.53     Some time in July, probably just before Victoria was admitted to the Central 
Middlesex Hospital, Kouao approached a man on the street and engaged him in 
conversation. They discovered that they both spoke French and the man, Julien 
Kimbidima, invited Kouao back to his house so that she could meet his wife, 
Chantal. Kouao visited the Kimbidimas again on 2 August 1999 (to celebrate their 
daughter’s birthday) and appears to have struck up a friendship with Mr Kimbidima 
in particular.
3.54     Shortly after Victoria’s discharge from the North Middlesex Hospital, Kouao took 
her to meet Mr and Mrs Kimbidima for the first time. Victoria appeared quiet and 
withdrawn, although she started to cry when Kouao told Mrs Kimbidima that 
Victoria was not her real daughter. Judging by the strength with which Kouao 
complained to the Kimbidimas, Victoria’s incontinence had become serious by 
this stage.
3.55     The Kimbidimas saw Victoria several times over the following months, and 
Mrs Kimbidima sometimes looked after Victoria when Kouao was otherwise 
engaged. When at the Kimbidimas’ house, Victoria would, on Kouao’s instruction, 
sit quietly in the corner unless instructed to do otherwise. Once or twice she wet 
herself while at their house but she was never incontinent of faeces. According 
to Mrs Kimbidima, Kouao would shout at Victoria all the time and never showed 
her much affection. At one stage, Kouao told her that Victoria was possessed by 
an evil spirit.
Victoria and the church
3.56     Kouao visited church towards the end of August and this helps explain why she 
began to believe Victoria was possessed. Since her arrival in the UK, Kouao had 
shown an interest in attending church. According to Pat Mensah, a Baptist pastor 
based at a church in north west London, Kouao started visiting her church on a 
fairly regular basis from the middle of May 1999. The move to Manning’s flat in 
early July may have prompted her to look elsewhere. On 29 August 1999, Kouao 
and Victoria attended the Mission Ensemble pour Christ, a church which meets in 
a hall close to Borough High Street.
3.57     The pastor here was Pascal Orome. He had a detailed recollection of Victoria’s 
appearance at this stage. Despite the season, Victoria was dressed in heavy clothing 
that covered all of her body apart from her head and hands. He noticed wounds 
on both and advised Kouao to cut Victoria’s hair shorter so that the injuries to 
her scalp could “breathe”. Kouao told him about Victoria’s incontinence and he 
formed the view that she was possessed by an evil spirit. He advised that the 
problem could be solved by prayer.
3.58     Two weeks after her first visit to his church, Kouao phoned Pastor Orome and told 
him that, following a brief improvement, Victoria’s incontinence had returned. 
He claims he reproached her for being insufficiently vigilant and allowing the evil 
spirit to return. Whatever its cause, the incontinence appears to have continued 
throughout the rest of September because it was in October, according to 
Manning, that the sofa bed Victoria had been sleeping on was thrown out and 
she began to spend her nights in the bathroom.3 Victoria’s  story
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The second social worker visit
3.59     The bathroom in Manning’s flat was small and the door opened out onto the living 
room. There was no window and, although there was a heater, it was either broken 
or unused. When Victoria was inside, the door was kept closed and the light was 
switched off. She began to spend her nights alone, cold and in pitch darkness.
3.60     However, Ms Arthurworrey noticed nothing untoward when she made the second 
of her two pre-announced home visits to Somerset Gardens on 28 October 1999. 
The purpose of her visit was to explain to Kouao that the housing application, 
made after the previous visit in August, had been turned down and to discuss the 
remaining options. Victoria seems to have been all but ignored during this visit as 
she sat on the floor playing with a doll. The fact that she was still not attending 
school was raised during the conversation, but no questions seem to have been 
asked about how Victoria was spending her days.
3.61     At his trial, Manning described this second visit of Ms Arthurworrey’s as “a put up 
job”. It seems that the flat had been made especially clean and tidy in preparation 
for the visit. This seems to be consistent with Ms Arthurworrey’s evidence: she said 
she neither saw nor smelt any evidence of Victoria’s incontinence. According to 
Manning, Victoria was told how to behave in front of Ms Arthurworrey. Victoria 
was said to be sleeping on the remaining sofa bed, with Manning and Kouao 
sharing a newly-purchased bed on the other side of the room. At the end of the 
visit, Victoria suddenly jumped up and shouted at Ms Arthurworrey. She said words 
to the effect that she did not respect her or her mother, and that they should be 
given a house. This behaviour surprised Ms Arthurworrey at the time.
3.62     During the course of their conversation, Ms Arthurworrey told Kouao that the 
council only accommodated children who were “at risk of serious harm” and that, 
in the council’s view, Victoria was not at such risk. It may be no coincidence that 
within three days of this conversation, Kouao contacted Ms Arthurworrey to make 
allegations which, if true, would have placed Victoria squarely within that category.     
3.63     On 1 November 1999, Kouao telephoned Ms Arthurworrey and told her that 
Manning had been sexually harming Victoria. Ms Arthurworrey told Kouao to 
come to her office. Kouao arrived with Victoria and Manning later that morning. 
Understandably, Ms Arthurworrey thought it would be better if Manning left. 
Kouao then cited three separate instances of sexual abuse. Victoria was then 
spoken to alone and repeated what Kouao had said, almost word for word. She 
appeared very anxious to be believed and both Ms Arthurworrey and the other 
social worker present, Valerie Robertson, thought she had been coached. However, 
in Ms Arthurworrey’s view, Victoria did not seem to be “a particularly nervous, 
frightened or fearful child” on this occasion.
3.64     The short-term solution devised by Ms Arthurworrey to deal with the sexual 
harm allegations was to arrange for somewhere else for Victoria to stay while the 
allegations were investigated. A call was made to Mrs Kimbidima whom Kouao 
had identified as a friend who might be willing to help. It is unclear what precisely 
was agreed to by the Kimbidimas as a result of this telephone call. Mrs Kimbidima, 
whose English is far from perfect, may have initially agreed but later changed her 
mind having spoken about the matter to her husband. In any event, the result was 
that Victoria and Kouao left the office in a taxi bound for the Kimbidimas’ house, 
but by the end of the day they were both back at Somerset Gardens.
3.65     The next day, Victoria and Kouao returned to north Tottenham to withdraw the 
allegations of sexual harm. They spoke to Rosemarie Kozinos who told Kouao that, 
despite the retraction, she and Victoria would have to live elsewhere while the matter The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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was investigated. Kouao told Ms Kozinos that she and Victoria could continue to stay 
with the Kimbidimas. In fact, they simply returned to Somerset Gardens.
3.66     This was the last time any of the professionals involved in Victoria’s case saw her 
before her admission to hospital on the night before her death. This fact, together 
with the incoherence of much of Kouao’s evidence – both at her trial and before 
the Inquiry – means that any account of the last four months of Victoria’s life must 
partly be guesswork.
Victoria’s last four months alive
3.67     It is likely that Victoria spent most of this four-month period in the Somerset 
Gardens flat. However, there is some evidence to suggest she made two trips to 
France towards the end of 1999. Manning recalled that he, Kouao and Victoria 
all went to Paris on or about 11 November. They stayed for a long weekend 
at Kouao’s son’s house where Victoria was allowed to sleep in a bed. Manning 
recalled no particular problems concerning Victoria’s incontinence during the visit.
3.68     A second visit to France seems to have been made at the end of November. 
Following her arrest, a Eurostar ticket in Kouao’s name was found at Manning’s 
flat showing that she had travelled to Paris on 29 November 1999 and returned 
on 12 December 1999. No ticket was found for Victoria, but Manning was clear 
that she had accompanied Kouao on the trip. As he understood it, they had again 
stayed with Kouao’s son.
3.69     Whatever the nature or purpose of these two visits to France, they appear to 
have made little difference to the pattern of Victoria’s life when she returned to 
Somerset Gardens. She continued to be forced to sleep in the bath and, from 
November onwards, she was tied up inside a black plastic sack in an effort to stop 
her from soiling the bath. We know that these were her circumstances on New 
Year’s Eve due to the disturbing entry in Manning’s diary. In it he describes an 
argument with Kouao which ended by her returning to his flat in order to “release 
satan from her bag”. 
3.70     This refinement of the torture meant that Victoria spent extended periods lying in 
her own urine and faeces. The obviously corrosive effect this was having on her 
skin may have prompted Kouao and Manning to abandon this policy in January 
2000. In his interview with the police, Manning suggested he and Kouao became 
worried that the condition of Victoria’s skin might cause social workers to ask 
“undue questions”. However, in his evidence to the Inquiry he was unable to 
remember the thinking behind the change.
3.71     Despite no longer being kept in a bag, Victoria began to spend more and more 
of her time in the bathroom in January 2000. Not only did she continue to sleep 
in the bath, but she also began to spend some of her days in it as well. This could 
explain why she was not with Kouao and Manning when they met Mr Kimbidima 
at a tube station around 16 January 2000. They told him they had left Victoria at 
home because her incontinence made it difficult to get things done.
3.72     At the start of the new year, Kouao and Manning began to serve Victoria her meals 
in the bath. This was done by placing the food on a piece of plastic, or a plastic bag, 
and placing it in the bath next to Victoria. She would generally be given whatever 
Manning and Kouao had cooked for themselves, but by the time it reached her it 
was usually cold. Given that her hands were kept bound with masking tape, she was 
forced to eat by pushing her face towards the food, like a dog. 3 Victoria’s  story
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3.73     As well as being forced to spend much of her time in inhuman conditions, Victoria 
was also beaten on a regular basis by both Kouao and Manning. According to 
Manning, Kouao used to strike Victoria on a daily basis, sometimes using a variety 
of weapons. These included a shoe, a hammer, a coat hanger and a wooden 
cooking spoon. The forensic examination of the flat after Manning’s arrest revealed 
traces of Victoria’s blood on the walls, on his football boots and on the undersole 
of one of his trainers. He also admitted to sometimes using a bicycle chain.
3.74     It is unclear what Kouao’s intentions were at this stage. During the course of 
Ms Arthurworrey’s home visit on 28 October 1999, they discussed the option of 
returning to France. However, despite the two visits to Paris, Kouao seems to have 
had little inclination to return permanently. Manning was under the impression 
that Kouao’s intention was to send Victoria back to her parents in the Ivory Coast, 
but despite his obvious distaste for Victoria, he said he did not push the issue.
3.75     If this was Kouao’s plan, she did little to advance it and Victoria’s parents were not 
approached to see if they would be willing to have their daughter back. Instead, 
Kouao kept them in complete ignorance of Victoria’s condition. In early 2000, they 
received a Christmas card from Kouao containing several photographs of a smiling 
Victoria. On the back of one photograph was written in French, “She’s growing up 
well and she finds herself … well”. 
3.76     Given the very limited contact Victoria had with the outside world in the weeks 
leading up to her death, it is difficult to identify with any accuracy the speed 
with which her condition deteriorated to the state she was in when admitted to 
the North Middlesex Hospital on 24 February 2000. The pastor from north west 
London, Pat Mensah, recalled that Victoria seemed “a bit poorly” when she visited 
Somerset Gardens on 12 February. Although she neglected to mention it in her 
statement, during the course of her oral evidence Ms Mensah indicated that she 
was sufficiently concerned about Victoria’s health at this point to advise Kouao to 
take her to a hospital. She also advised her to take her to a church.
Victoria returns to church
3.77     There is evidence to suggest that by 19 February 2000, Victoria was very ill. 
On this day, which was a Saturday, Kouao took her to the Universal Church of 
the Kingdom of God housed in the old Rainbow Theatre on Seven Sisters Road. 
This was the church recommended to her by Ms Mensah during the course of her 
visit earlier that month. Audrey Hartley-Martin, who was assisting Pastor Alvaro 
Lima in the administration of the 3pm service, noticed the two of them coming 
up the stairs. They were shouting at each other and Victoria seemed to be having 
difficulty walking.
3.78     Kouao and Victoria were disturbing the service, so Ms Hartley-Martin took Victoria 
downstairs to the crèche. She noticed Victoria was shivering and she asked her if 
she was cold. Victoria replied that she was not cold but she was hungry. Ms Hartley-
Martin obtained some biscuits for her and Victoria hid them in her pocket when 
Kouao came down to collect her. Ms Hartley-Martin said in evidence that she did 
not seek to ensure Victoria received any medical attention because she “was not 
aware that the child was ill”.
3.79     At the end of the service, Pastor Lima spoke to Kouao about the difficulties she 
said she was having with Victoria, particularly her incontinence. He expressed the 
view that Victoria’s problems were due to her possession by an evil spirit and said 
he would spend the week fasting on Victoria’s behalf. He believes he made it clear 
that Victoria was not expected to fast herself. Kouao was advised to bring Victoria The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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back to church on the following Friday morning. According to Pastor Lima, Friday 
was the day on which prayers are said for deliverance from “witchcraft, bad luck 
and everything bad or evil”.
3.80     The events of the next week unfolded as follows. On the Sunday, Kouao and 
Victoria returned to the church where they were seen by Pastor Celso Junior. 
Apparently, Victoria was quiet and well-behaved during the visit. On Wednesday, 
Kouao phoned Pastor Lima in the evening and told him Victoria’s behaviour had 
improved in that she had ceased to cover the flat in excrement. On Thursday, 
Kouao phoned Ms Hartley-Martin and told her that Victoria had been asleep for 
two days and had not eaten or drunk anything. By the evening of the same day, 
Kouao was sufficiently concerned to bring Victoria to the church and ask for help. 
Pastor Lima advised them to go to the hospital and a mini-cab was called.
Victoria’s final visit to hospital
3.81     Mr Salman Pinarbasi, the mini-cab driver, was sufficiently concerned about the 
condition Victoria was in to take her instead to the nearby Tottenham Ambulance 
Station. She was then taken by ambulance to the North Middlesex Hospital and 
admitted to the casualty unit. On arrival, Victoria was unconscious and very cold. 
Her temperature was 27 degrees Celsius. Initial attempts to warm her up were 
unsuccessful and a paediatric consultant, Dr Lesley Alsford, was called in to take 
responsibility for Victoria’s treatment.
3.82     Dr Alsford arrived around midnight. Her examination of Victoria was limited 
because her first wish was to increase Victoria’s temperature, which at this point 
was 28.7 degrees Celsius. In any event, she could not have recorded all the injuries 
she saw because they were “too numerous”. She formed the view that Victoria 
needed the type of intensive care facilities unavailable at the North Middlesex 
Hospital. She tried to find space in another hospital and was eventually successful. 
A team from the paediatric intensive care unit at St Mary’s Hospital Paddington 
arrived at 2.30am.
3.83     Victoria was transferred to St Mary’s Hospital Paddington where she remained in 
a critical condition with severe hypothermia and multi-system failure. The medical 
staff were unable to straighten her legs. Over the hours that followed, Victoria 
suffered a number of episodes of respiratory and cardiac arrest. Her respiratory, 
cardiac and renal systems began to fail. At about 3pm, Victoria went into cardiac 
arrest for the last time. Cardio-pulmonary resuscitation was attempted but Victoria 
did not respond. She was declared dead at 3.15pm on 25 February 2000. She was 
eight years and three months old.
The post-mortem examination
3.84     A post-mortem examination was carried out the following day by Dr Nathaniel 
Carey, a Home Office-accredited pathologist. He found the cause of death to 
be hypothermia, which had arisen in the context of malnourishment, a damp 
environment and restricted movement. He also found 128 separate injuries on 
Victoria’s body, showing she had been beaten with a range of sharp and blunt 
instruments. No part of her body had been spared. Marks on her wrists and ankles 
indicated that her arms and legs had been tied together. It was the worst case of 
deliberate harm to a child he had ever seen.3 Victoria’s  story
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The arrest
3.85     Kouao was arrested on suspicion of neglect at the hospital around 11.35pm on 
25 February 2000. She told the police, “It is terrible, I have just lost my child.” 
Manning was arrested the following afternoon as he returned to his flat. Both were 
subsequently charged with Victoria’s murder and were convicted at the Central 
Criminal Court on 12 January 2001. Kouao and Manning are currently serving 
sentences of life imprisonment.38Part two: Social services4  Ealing Social Services
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4 Ealing Social Services
The managerial context
4.1       Between the end of April and early July 1999, Kouao attended Ealing Social 
Services on no less than 18 different occasions. She was accompanied by Victoria 
on at least 10 of these visits. Together they had dealings with six social workers, 
one group support assistant and one housing officer. Yet by the time Ealing closed 
Victoria’s file on 7 July 1999, they knew virtually no more about Victoria than when 
Kouao first visited the Ealing Homeless Persons’ Unit on 26 April 1999 to seek help 
with her housing needs.
4.2       Ealing Social Services have acknowledged from the outset that the quality of their 
social work in Victoria’s case was unacceptable. In particular, they “failed to address 
Victoria’s needs as an individual and instead treated her as a part of ... Kouao’s 
homelessness case”. To Ealing’s credit they did not lay the blame on a lack of 
resources. Indeed, Judith Finlay, senior commissioning manager at the time, was 
quite clear when she said, “I cannot say that resources were an issue because we 
paid more than probably we would have if we had done a proper assessment and 
we certainly took longer about it.”
4.3       Even more disturbing, Ealing could not be sure that the total inadequacy of 
Victoria’s assessment was a one-off because they had no proper systems in place 
for tracking cases through the referral and assessment stage. This was a serious 
failing. I strongly believe that Victoria’s case could and should have started and 
finished in Ealing – a conclusion to which I shall return later.
Referral and assessment weaknesses
4.4       To a large extent, the weakness in Ealing’s referral and assessment process in early 
1999 had been highlighted in a highly critical Social Services Inspectorate (SSI) 
report that Ealing received in December 1997 relating to the safety of the children 
they looked after. Ealing Social Services were subsequently placed on special 
measures in June 1998. Significantly, that report concluded that children in care 
and on the child protection register “were not considered by any measure to be 
adequately safeguarded”. The SSI commented on the “culture of hopelessness” 
within the social services department, the serious deficiencies in assessment and care 
planning, and the fact that 45 per cent of the staff were temporary agency staff.
The need for radical change
4.5       The report led to a radical shake-up of senior management and organisational 
structures. The director of social services at the time resigned and was replaced, 
initially on an interim basis, by Norman Tutt in June 1998. Together with a new 
assistant director for children’s services, John Skinner, Mr Tutt oversaw the creation 
of a new specialist children’s team structure by the end of 1998. The team brought 
together fieldwork and residential and daycare services. However, the housing and 
social services departments were at that time two separate directorates and were 
not finally to merge until January 2001.
4.6       Two specialist referral and assessment teams – one in each district office – were 
established to build up an expertise among staff in short-term assessment work. 
In addition, there were a number of long-term teams split between the two 
districts, the most relevant to the Inquiry being the ‘child in need’ teams, which 
focused on work with children in need of protection and support services. During The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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the relevant period, Ms Finlay was the operations manager responsible for all 
children’s services provided from the Acton area office.
4.7       In preparation for the restructuring, initiatives were taken to audit ‘child protection’ 
and ‘looked-after-children’ files to assess the quality of work done. Managers who 
were performing poorly were not reappointed. Any action taken was quick and 
decisive. “In all, the restructuring took some three months. It was a very difficult 
and demanding time,” said Mr Skinner, “for both the organisation and for staff. 
A massive amount of change took place within a very condensed timetable”. There 
was “enormous drive to improve standards within children’s services”. Although 
the disruption caused by such wholesale restructuring did have an impact on staff 
morale, Mr Tutt told the Inquiry that he believed the overall effect was positive. 
He said he targeted those managers whose performance was below standard:
“They were recognised by their colleagues as not performing, so having 
somebody deal with it raised morale ... The unions were not at all happy 
about it ... I made it quite clear that in the light of the SSI report, my 
job was to make sure children were safe in the borough of Ealing, and 
if members of staff were not able to be compatible with that aim or 
objective I was quite happy to defend my position in whatever forum 
might be appropriate.”
4.8       That it was achievable in such a short timescale Mr Tutt put down to political 
backing: “[The leader of the council] ... met me, I think, on the first day and said 
that he would back whatever needed to be done.”
Evidence of progress
4.9       It paid dividends. A further SSI inspection in March 1999 noted a significant 
improvement in services, recognised that there was a strategy for development 
and that basic systems were in place at least for children being looked after. The 
SSI commented, “We found that the culture of hopelessness we referred to in the 
previous report had been replaced by one of expectation.”
4.10     There had also been an impressive turn around on staff recruitment and retention. 
According to Mr Tutt, Ealing social workers were paid less than comparable 
boroughs and they progressed up the salary ladder more slowly. That was 
addressed in June 1998 and continued to be addressed. By spring 1999, 85 per 
cent of staff in the department were permanent, and some teams had virtually no 
agency staff. The referral and assessment team that Victoria was referred to was 
“a reasonably solid team of social workers”. Although there were some locum 
workers, there was no great turnover and staff sickness was not an issue.
4.11     Mr Tutt attributed the improvement to greater managerial responsibility for 
employment, improving culture and speeding up the recruitment process. 
He put great emphasis on the work ethos of the children’s services department:
“The way we have tried to tackle it is by stressing that we believe in a 
very high standard of work and we do not accept less than that, and 
most social workers actually want to work in a department which will 
support them to achieve the best for children.”
Improving competence
4.12     However, gaps remained. In particular there were gaps in the competence of staff, 
problems in the identification of potentially serious child protection matters with 
further training required, and an “inadequate management information system”. 
Significantly, problems remained with regards to assessment. There were also a 
number of steps in the authority’s action plan, dated March 1999, that were still 4  Ealing Social Services
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waiting to be carried out by the time Victoria arrived in Ealing in late April 1999. 
A review of the deployment of staff in the referral and assessment teams was still 
incomplete and not all cases held on duty had “a named worker to progress the 
work within identified timescales”. Ms Finlay went on to state:
“We were working intensively with managers to ensure that cases were 
allocated quickly. That involved a change in culture and a change in 
understanding of the work, and we did not get there straightaway ... 
We should have had work allocated immediately, but we did not.”
4.13     In practical terms, Mr Skinner told the Inquiry, he thought it was virtually 
impossible in the spring of 1999 to have allocated all work coming into the 
referral and assessment team. He said, “We had a backlog of work and also we 
were overwhelmed with new referrals, so the possibility of allocating all that work 
immediately was unrealistic.”
4.14     Failure to allocate Victoria’s case early was almost certainly to prove critical 
in contributing to a lack of any clear focus and continuity in handling. Most 
importantly, and surprisingly, only allocated cases were the subject of supervision. 
Yet Ms Finlay said that at the time, “We relied on the team managers and senior 
practitioners to undertake the assessments, to undertake the supervision of social 
workers and to make sure that the assessments were completed.” She admitted 
that by April 1999 senior managers had not got to the stage of auditing the 
referral and assessment team. As a result, there were no arrangements in place 
to ensure that assessments were properly carried out by those teams. Therefore, 
I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Managers of duty teams must devise and operate a system which enables them 
immediately to establish how many children have been referred to their team, 
what action is required to be taken for each child, who is responsible for taking 
that action, and when that action must be completed.
4.15     Mr Tutt confirmed that assessment processes were poor before the introduction 
of the National Assessment Framework: “One of the problems until the framework 
was produced was that there was no clear definition of how assessment should 
be undertaken at the point of entry.” Discussing assessments in April 1999, 
Ms Fortune said, “To be quite honest with you, we did not have any kind of 
grounding for assessments.”
Practice guidance
4.16     In fact, social workers had little by way of up-to-date manuals to guide them in 
their day-to-day practice. The fieldwork manual ‘current’ in early 1999 which dealt 
with matters other than child protection (and was therefore relevant to Victoria 
at the time she made contact with Ealing Social Services), amazingly predated 
the Children Act 1989. Understandably, it was described by Mr Tutt as “grossly 
inadequate” and “indefensible”. This was particularly so in relation to agency 
staff, who might have expected to place heavy reliance on up-to-date manuals, 
and to new staff who could not be sure of receiving proper induction training. 
New child protection procedures were implemented in February 1999 and the 
eligibility criteria for children’s services were being developed, but a manual of 
child protection practice guidelines, which should have been finalised in April 
1999, was marked “interim”. Significantly, it was to retain that status through 
to at least the end of the Phase One hearings of this Inquiry, in February 2002. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Mr Skinner acknowledged that a new member of staff to the Department, such as 
Sharmain Lawrence in spring 1999, who received no induction training when she 
arrived, would have had “an incomplete set of procedures” and “would struggle as 
a consequence”. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that staff in their children and families’ 
intake teams are experienced in working with children and families, and that 
they have received appropriate training.
4.17     The Area Child Protection Committee (ACPC), chaired by Mr Skinner from January 
1999, ought to have been the driving force for regeneration and renewal among 
the child protection agencies. However, according to Mr Skinner its agenda had 
been dominated by Part 8 reviews and other responsibilities, and so this received 
little or no attention. It appears that the ACPC had all but become detached from 
front-line staff, and its policies, procedures and guidelines were out of date. In fact, 
it was the social services child protection procedures that were adopted by the 
ACPC in 1999 as a temporary measure – and there was little or no real investment 
in developing an effective inter-agency child protection partnership. This was the 
first of several concerns I was to hear about the ACPC arrangements.
Gaps remained
4.18     When the SSI returned for a follow up children’s services inspection in December 
1999, some five months after Ealing had closed Victoria’s case file, they found that 
progress had continued but they highlighted, yet again, the need to continue to 
improve standards in the referral and assessment teams. Initial assessments were 
seen as being “of variable quality, particularly for lower priority cases”.
4.19     It was accepted to be fair criticism. In evidence, Mr Tutt was quite clear that his 
first and second priority had to be children in need of protection and children 
looked after because “the most serious criticism of the SSI had been that no child 
could be guaranteed to be safe in the borough”. That meant that other areas, such 
as referral and assessment team initial services, received a lower priority. As Mr Tutt 
said, this area of work “was not the highest priority, certainly”.
4.20     Along with other social services departments, Ealing struggled with the quality 
of some of its front-line staff. According to Mr Tutt, “Many of the staff coming 
into post were relatively inexperienced in that they had not many years post 
qualification experience and/or were from [overseas].” In the referral and 
assessment teams, managers knew that “a lot of work had to be done with 
individual members of staff around core basic skills”.
Homeless families
4.21     The intake team was dealing with a wide range of referrals, not least homeless 
families like Kouao and Victoria, coming from abroad. Mr Tutt told the Inquiry, 
“They come with a whole range of health and other problems and present in our 
offices although they have no status legally within our country.” Many were asylum 
seekers. Some, like Kouao, were travellers under the Treaty of Rome – people 
without a documented history. Pamela Fortune, the social worker eventually 
allocated to Victoria, thought that perhaps 60 to 70 per cent of referrals came 
from abroad. The difficulty, according to senior practitioner Ms Lawrence, was that 
“there were not very clear protocols and guidance for dealing with people that 
were presenting from abroad and presenting as homeless, and quite often I felt 
that people were left to rely on ... professional judgement”.4  Ealing Social Services
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4.22     The policy at the time was to give a weekly subsistence sum to those who came 
from abroad without the means to support themselves. Ms Fortune explained, “If 
there were issues about accommodation, if they could not get any help via housing 
services, we would have to offer a service.” Financial assistance would continue if 
they appealed their habitual residency status and those appeals could take years.
Management arrangements
4.23     By 26 April 1999, the Acton referral and assessment team, which consisted of one 
team manager, Sarah Stollard, one senior practitioner, Ms Lawrence, nine social 
workers, one social work assistant and three group support assistants, had already 
received 388 referrals that month. Ms Stollard said:
“It was a very busy team ... There was varied experience in the team. Some 
of the social workers had hardly any experience, and some had quite a 
number of years experience. It was also a new team and a new structure, 
so people did not have experience of working in a referral and assessment 
team, necessarily ... when I took over that team, we had a backlog of 200 
cases ... we continued to take in cases, so I would say it was a team that was 
under quite a lot of pressure, and we did have a number of agency staff.”
4.24     There were no workload management systems in place in 1999. The general 
expectation was that social workers would carry between 12 and 15 allocated 
cases on top of their duty commitments. An audit in July 1999 indicated that 
staff in the Acton referral and assessment team had on average 11.25 allocated 
cases. Ms Fortune described workloads as “high but not unmanageable”. Deborah 
Gaunt, another social worker in the Acton referral and assessment team, thought, 
“The workload was challenging but I felt that it was appropriate for my level of 
experience and that I could handle it.”
Duty rota
4.25     Social workers took turns being on duty for one week in three. In theory, they were 
supposed to work on duty for the whole week. However, Ms Stollard explained 
that “reality and practicality dictates that they are not always the same three 
workers on for the whole week”. It was explained that social workers on duty 
worked on duty cases, assigned daily, downstairs in the Acton office. Social workers 
not on duty worked upstairs on ‘allocated’ cases.
4.26     A referral could be by letter, telephone or in person. According to the level of risk 
or concern, the referral would either be taken straight to the duty manager or 
would be dealt with on the spot by the duty social worker. If the duty manager 
was not available, social workers would go to a more senior manager, such as the 
operations manager (Ms Finlay). If not dealt with immediately (and not urgent), 
the social worker would write an action plan and leave that, together with the 
referral form, in a basket on the duty manager’s desk.
4.27     Ms Stollard alternated with her senior practitioner, Ms Lawrence, as duty manager 
on a “one week on, one week off” basis, although she also line managed 
Ms Lawrence. As a result, accountability for case management decisions was 
not clear. It was demonstrated in Victoria’s case that it was possible for the two 
managers to take opposed views when it came to their ‘turn’ to manage the case.
4.28     Ms Stollard summarised the differences in their roles as follows:
“I was the overall manager ... I suppose the last decision would be mine 
if it was felt necessary to come to me, to seek my view on something. 
In terms of ... the practicalities of how it worked, Sharmain was, I suppose, 
like a deputy team manager ... and I would not get involved in her The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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decision making unless something was brought to my attention where 
I thought I needed to, or where she wanted to ask me what I thought 
about something.”
The duty manager
4.29     It was the job of the duty manager to review all the work in the duty basket on a 
daily basis, but according to Mr Skinner, assistant director of children’s services, 
“That was an aim not always achieved.” Regular payments, similar to those made 
to Kouao, had to be signed off and managers would take the opportunity to 
consider those cases as the payments fell due – although there was no formal 
review. However, Ms Stollard acknowledged that some files were not reviewed 
as regularly as they should have been. The safety net, such as it was, was almost 
totally reliant on her memory of the case details as well as the paper tracking 
system that she devised and only she felt fully confident in using. It was certainly 
no way to run a busy duty system that began the year with a backlog of 200 cases 
and where case allocation, if it happened at all, was such a hit-and-miss affair.
4.30     If no further action was required for the time being on a particular file it would be 
stored in the A–Z cabinet. Cases requiring action were placed in the ‘pend’ cabinet 
to be allocated to the duty social workers on the relevant dates. Progress was 
certainly made in moving cases on. Of the backlog of cases Ms Stollard inherited at 
the beginning of the year, only 30 or so were left on the duty system by the end 
of 1999. However, there was nothing in place to gauge whether the scope and 
timeliness of the intervention offered was in any way appropriate to the needs of 
the children concerned.
4.31     Mr Tutt told the Inquiry that the A–Z system was almost totally reliant on the 
memory of one manager. Ms Stollard said that the entire system depended on her 
initiative, intellect, memory and physical review of the files in the cabinet. Although 
Ms Finlay’s understanding was slightly different, the difference was more a matter 
of semantics. Ultimately in the absence of a proper, electronic tracking system, 
knowledge of those priorities relied once again on the diligence, hard work and 
memory of the duty managers.
Use of IT systems
4.32     By December 1999, according to Mr Tutt, an electronic database that could track 
cases was in place. But in March 1999 Ms Stollard relied on a manual paper system 
which she had devised and which amounted to no more than “simply a sheet of 
paper where details of up to 10 cases could be summarised – that is updated on a 
weekly basis and you hope that cases fall off by the end of the week because they 
have either been disposed of finally or allocated”.
4.33     It was a system described variously as “adequate”, “basic and had flaws”, “on a 
basic level ... barely adequate” and “fairly crude”. However, Ms Lawrence was 
quite clear that she did not find it easy to use.
4.34     At the end of the duty week, cases were supposed to be reviewed and possibly 
closed or allocated. According to Ms Stollard, cases were allocated “if the case 
was looking more complex or it appeared that a longer piece of work needed to 
be carried out, or if a case conference was needed or the child became a looked 
after child”.
Staff supervision
4.35     Allocation was the key to whether or not a case was discussed in supervision. 
Each member of staff in the referral and assessment team was to be supervised 
once a month as a minimum. Ms Stollard aimed for fortnightly supervision but 
at least once every three weeks for allocated cases. Supervision records relating 4  Ealing Social Services
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to individual cases were placed on each case file. In relation to duty cases, I was 
told by Ms Finlay that “supervision was informal in that social workers would 
approach the duty manager to discuss aspects of a duty case upon which they 
[my emphasis] felt they needed support or guidance”. That meant there might be 
no supervision at all if a case was open and shut while a social worker was on duty. 
Significantly, in Victoria’s case it took over two months to allocate her case, and it 
was subsequently closed one week later. Therefore, there was no formal supervision 
discussion and no supervision record appears on the file.
4.36     Handover between the two managers at the end of the duty week was only 
thought necessary for cases that were of particular concern. Where a conversation 
was not possible, notes would be left or conversations would be had on another 
day or simply not at all. Nonetheless, Ms Finlay regarded the system as adequate 
and Ms Lawrence felt the whole process was assisted by her and Ms Stollard’s 
“professionalism”.
4.37     But this, too, was to come under some strain during 1999. Ms Stollard had 
concerns about Ms Lawrence “as a result of [her] poor performance and a lack 
of commitment”. In particular she was concerned about Ms Lawrence’s frequent 
absences, and she felt Ms Lawrence was undermining her as team manager.
4.38     Matters came to a head in September 1999. Ms Stollard returned from annual 
leave to find the referral and assessment services in what she considered to be a 
“dangerous state”. She pursued the matter with Ms Finlay in writing.
4.39     During the management investigation which lasted from October 1999 to March 
2000, Ms Lawrence was removed from her role as senior practitioner and invited 
to remain at home “in her own interests”.
4.40     The outcome of the management investigation led ultimately to Ms Stollard 
leaving Ealing Social Services in July 2000. Ms Lawrence in the meantime returned 
to work and was subsequently promoted to the position of team manager.
4.41     It is far from clear what impact the process of investigating these complaints had 
on service delivery. Ms Stollard said the interviews with the team were lengthy and 
“very disruptive”. She did not think there was any impact on the way service users 
were dealt with, although she later said:
“Inevitably team members found the investigation distressing and of 
interest. It was a matter of significant office gossip and although I never 
spoke to staff about the investigation, it was a matter of considerable 
discussion which was a diversion to the task at hand. Time was obviously 
spent encouraging people to make complaints and all of this would have 
had an impact on the provision of service to clients.”
4.42     Mr Skinner was not aware of any “visible impact” on service delivery, although 
there was a “degree of tension” among staff as they became more aware of 
the difficulty.
4.43     All, however, were at pains to point out that the problems between Ms Stollard 
and Ms Lawrence arose after Victoria’s time at Ealing, and so had no adverse 
impact on the way her case was handled. I am unwilling to accept such 
firm assurances.
Victoria
4.44     Although Ms Lawrence, as senior practitioner, would not have been the allocated 
social worker for Victoria, Victoria’s case remained on the duty system for some The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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two months. If Ms Lawrence had any concerns about her management of the case, 
which she undoubtedly did, supervision would have provided the opportunity for 
her to air those concerns with her team and line manager. But as Ms Lawrence 
admitted, supervision arrangements with Ms Stollard were a bit “ad hoc” and at 
least initially were not “adequate”. Therefore, it seems possible that the worsening 
relationship between the two, and which senior managers were certainly aware of 
from the spring of 1999, might have hindered the effective duty system handover 
at the end of each week and could have contributed to the prolonged and 
differing approach that each took in relation to Victoria’s case.
4.45     It certainly provided added reason, if reason was needed, to get a management 
grip of a duty system that was seriously deficient. The senior management team 
at the time failed to do this. When asked to identify defects in the duty system 
team, Ms Stollard referred to “changes in plan, different people getting involved ... 
situations getting slightly lost”, while Ms Lawrence said she was “perturbed” by the 
number of unallocated cases. She thought it was “Very difficult to work with the 
volume of cases there was on the duty system ... it was difficult to monitor all the 
cases on duty.” Victoria’s was just one of those cases.
4.46     There is no excuse for failing to have in place a system for efficiently managing the 
workload in a social services team dealing with children and families.
Victoria in Ealing
4.47     On 26 April 1999, just two days after Kouao and Victoria arrived in the UK, 
they attended Ealing Homeless Persons’ Unit. Kouao was seen by Julie Winter, 
a homeless persons’ officer, to whom she spoke in English. She indicated that 
Victoria spoke only French. According to Ms Winter, Kouao preferred to conduct 
the interview in English because she did not want Victoria to listen in.
4.48     Ms Winter’s impression of Kouao was that she appeared “tidy, clean, presentable, 
not a rough sleeper, not someone who was street homeless”.
4.49     However, Ms Winter recalled nothing of Victoria’s appearance other than the rather 
unusual fact that she was wearing a wig. But she made no note of this at the time.
The housing application form
4.50     Together, Kouao and Ms Winter completed a housing application form. Kouao 
gave her date of birth as 17 July 1956, her age as 43 years old and said that she 
had lived in France since birth. Initially she said she had three older children with 
her, but subsequently informed Ms Winter that they were in France, staying with a 
friend and were being educated there.
4.51     She told Ms Winter both she and Victoria were in good health, that neither of 
them were registered with a GP and that she was currently unemployed. Kouao 
said she did not intend to stay in the UK permanently. Her purpose in coming here 
was to spend a year improving her English. Kouao told Ms Winter that she had 
made some inquiries with an airline company in France and was advised that if she 
could communicate well in English, her chances of being offered a job were high. 
Ms Winter also recorded that while in France, Kouao had been a housewife, and 
that her husband had died in October 1998 following a road traffic accident. In 
fact, Kouao divorced her husband, the father of two of her children, in December 
1978 and he died in June 1995. She had been evicted from her home because of 
rent arrears.4  Ealing Social Services
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4.52     Rather than applying for assistance with rent in some less desirable accommodation 
in France, Kouao told Ms Winter that she had sought, and been given, assistance 
with the fare for her and Victoria to come to England. She had obtained seven 
nights’ bed and breakfast accommodation as part of the flight package deal, but 
had no other accommodation once that period expired at the end of the week, on 
30 April 1999.
4.53     Ms Winter did not question that the French authorities apparently had contributed 
to Kouao and Victoria’s fare, although she thought it unusual. She told the 
Inquiry: “We have no knowledge of how the French authorities work. It seemed a 
reasonable situation, that she could either have money towards rent or a one-off 
payment to travel elsewhere ... I had not come across it before, but I had no 
reason to disbelieve that this was in fact the case.”
4.54     Kouao’s explanation for why Victoria was wearing a wig, which they discussed 
while completing the health section of the form, but which was never recorded, 
was that it was Victoria’s choice. It was because she had “short or very short hair”. 
Ms Winter had no concerns about this: “I accepted her reasons – she was a very 
plausible person.” In fact, Ms Winter’s overall impression was that Kouao was 
forthcoming with her answers, she did not appear to be withholding information 
and the material she provided seemed accurate.
4.55     Ms Winter, not surprisingly, concluded that Kouao was not habitually resident 
in the UK. Her ties at that stage were with France. She had no settled plans 
for staying in this country. Kouao had provided documentation to confirm her 
identification and proof of the date of her arrival into the UK. Although Ms Winter 
was shown both Kouao’s travel documents and her passport, which included 
Victoria’s ‘details’ and her ‘photograph’, she paid no further attention to them, 
believing Kouao’s application to be ineligible on the grounds of habitual residence.
4.56     As it happens, it would have been helpful for social services to have sight of the 
passport, as they may have noted that the photograph was not that of Victoria, 
as did the police when conducting their murder inquiry following Victoria’s death. 
Detective Inspector Keith Niven said in his statement to the Inquiry that the child 
on the passport was “clearly not Victoria” and he later confirmed in oral evidence 
that there “were distinct differences”.
Housing application refused
4.57     Ms Winter confirmed her decision with her duty senior and then told Kouao 
she was not eligible for housing. It was a reasonable decision for the housing 
department to have come to in all the circumstances. Nevertheless, Kouao was 
clearly distressed and was emphatic to Ms Winter that she and Victoria would 
very soon have nowhere to live. It appears that Victoria understood the gist of 
that response because this was the first time she spoke and implored Ms Winter, 
in French and referring to her as “Madame” to find “une maison” for her. She 
was tearful, but Ms Winter did not think Victoria’s behaviour was unusual. She 
said, “Often the children get distressed when they see their parent upset in 
the interviews.”
4.58     Ms Winter advised Kouao that she might obtain assistance from social services 
under the National Assistance Act 1948, as someone who was destitute and 
responsible for a dependant child, and she noted in her interview record that an 
appointment had been arranged for Kouao to attend the social services office on 
30 April 1999.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
48
The referral to social services
4.59     In the meantime, she quite properly telephoned the referral across to Ms Fortune, 
a social worker in Ealing’s Acton office referral and assessment team. Although 
there were forms in use at the time for making such referrals, and Ms Winter 
‘imagined’ there was guidance on how to complete them, she usually preferred 
not to put her trust on the internal post but to speak directly to an officer. Her 
lack of confidence in the internal mail is noteworthy. But the net effect was that 
no written or electronic referral to social services was ever made and no copy of 
the relevant documentation passed across when it should have. As a result, social 
services were not in a position to double check inconsistencies in the details Kouao 
gave about her and Victoria’s life either here in England or in France. As a result, 
I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
When a professional makes a referral to social services concerning the well-being 
of a child, the fact of that referral must be confirmed in writing by the referrer 
within 48 hours.
4.60     Ms Winter was clear in her evidence that her sole reason for making the referral to 
social services was that the family were going to become destitute in a matter of 
days. They had no income and were unlikely to have any in the immediate future. 
But she told the Inquiry, “She did not place any emphasis on the child’s needs.” 
After all, Victoria’s circumstances were not unusual: “Cases that are found to be not 
eligible ... persons from abroad, they have no jobs lined up here, they have only 
the money they travel with, quite often they are refused benefits because again 
they are not habitually resident.”
4.61     She acknowledged she was not familiar with the Children Act 1989. All she knew 
was that if the housing department could not assist a family with rehousing and 
the family was shortly to become ‘roofless’, then the authority had obligations 
towards the welfare of the child under the Act. Ms Winter said, “I took that to 
mean shelter and subsistence.” This illustrates well the importance of social services 
being clear about the responsibilities they carry in law and ensuring other agencies 
understand this also.
4.62     In evidence, Ms Fortune conceded that from the very start she believed she was 
being asked to focus on Victoria’s needs. On the first level assessment core form 
she noted, “Ms Winters would like S/S [social services] to undertake an assessment 
of Ms Kouao and her daughter’s needs.”
4.63     At the time she understood these centred on the family’s housing needs. She also 
noted down the name of the solicitor that Kouao had already found to act on 
her behalf. She believed she had been told by Ms Winter that Kouao had enough 
money until 1 May 1999. But she did not record this on the referral form.
4.64     She recorded the nature of the concern to be assessed by the duty social worker 
as a “mother and child who were (pending) homeless” and a “child in need”. An 
appointment was made for Kouao to attend social services on 29 April 1999 – not 
30 April as noted by Ms Winter – and this information was given to Ms Winter over 
the phone to pass to Kouao. Nothing else on the first level assessment core form 
– including the recommendations and management decisions arising from the 
assessment – was recorded by Ms Fortune that day. She placed the referral form in 
the duty basket for the duty senior to allocate to a duty social worker on 29 April. 
Her expectation was that the duty social worker on the day would complete the 4  Ealing Social Services
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assessment and record the management decisions on the form. In fact, no such 
assessment was undertaken on 29 April, or any day thereafter. Ms Fortune, who 
ultimately became Victoria’s allocated case worker, was to have no further contact 
with Kouao or Victoria until 1 June 1999.
Kouao returns to Ealing Homeless Persons’ Unit
4.65     Early in the evening of the following day, 27 April 1999, Kouao and Victoria 
returned to Ealing Homeless Persons’ Unit. Kouao requested money for food and 
essential items. She was referred to William Martin, an approved social worker 
under the Mental Health Act 1989, who was working in the out-of-office-hours 
team. At that time, this team covered both the London boroughs of Ealing and 
Hounslow. Kouao gave Mr Martin her French social security number and he 
telephoned the out-of-hours Department of Social Security (DSS) number to 
request a payment for her, as his team held no funds. The usual procedure, which 
Mr Martin followed that evening, was to leave Kouao’s details, including her 
telephone contact number and his own, on a recorded message to the DSS. If the 
DSS had any further queries they would contact Mr Martin in the first instance. 
No such call was received that evening and Mr Martin assumed that the DSS 
responded to Kouao’s request by contacting her directly.
4.66     Mr Martin also advised Kouao to attend Ealing Social Services the following day, 
describing Victoria on the out-of-office-hours team referral report as a “child in need”.
4.67     When asked why he did this Mr Martin replied, “I used the term as a precautionary 
measure, more of an alerting mechanism, to ensure that there was some follow up 
on the following day. I thought that was good practice really. I had no particular 
concerns at that time.”
4.68     Indeed Mr Martin knew very little about Kouao and Victoria. He had been told 
by Kouao that she needed money to buy food and essential items and she and 
Victoria were living in temporary accommodation. He said it was not his role to 
ask Kouao why she was in this position – Mr Martin believed his task as an out-of-
office-hours team worker was to deal with the emergency, to “hold things together 
until the day services can take over”. The typical response to an urgent request for 
cash was via the DSS, and this he pursued. This may well be established practice 
for out-of-office-hours teams. However, it raises a number of questions about 
access to services which I return to in Phase Two of this Inquiry.
Kouao returns to Acton area office
4.69     Kouao did as she was advised and returned with Victoria to the social services office 
the next day on 28 April 1999. She spoke to Godfrey Victor, a social worker on 
duty in the Acton area office. He recalled that Victoria seemed rather small for her 
age and described her as “stunted in growth”, though he made no record of this 
in his notes. He could not be sure, but he did not think Victoria was wearing a wig 
at the time though he remembered that her hair was very short.
4.70     This is the first of numerous observations disclosed as evidence to this Inquiry 
but not at any time recorded on Victoria’s case file. The importance of accurately 
recording observations about children cannot be over-emphasised. The importance 
of accurate case recording will form a recommendation for general application later 
in this Report.
4.71     The interview with Mr Victor lasted 15 to 20 minutes. Mr Victor found on the 
computer the earlier referral made to Ms Fortune on 26 April 1999 – a hard copy 
was also in the duty manager’s basket. But he did not know about the family’s 
contact with the out-of-office-hours team. This is alarming given Mr Martin’s 
evidence that the role of the out-of-office-hours team was “to hold things together The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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until the day services can take over”. Nor did Mr Victor do any other statutory 
checks because the family had just arrived from France and he presumed such 
checks would reveal nothing. It is clearly never safe to make such assumptions. 
Checks against Ealing’s own housing department files, as the referrer, may have 
led to a trail which, if vigorously pursued in France, as it would likely have been if 
Victoria had come from another part of the UK, may have resulted in information 
coming to light. Such information did come to light after Victoria’s death – she was 
known to French social services and Victoria’s school in Paris had registered a Child 
at Risk Emergency Notification with the French education authorities on 9 February 
1999, because of Victoria’s repeated absences from school.
4.72     Kouao again requested financial assistance for food and other essentials for Victoria. 
She spoke reasonable English. She told Mr Victor that the DSS had refused her 
benefits because she had failed the habitual residency test. Mr Victor was aware 
that Kouao had other children in France but she refused to provide any details 
about them. This did not cause him to be suspicious and he assumed this would be 
probed further when Kouao returned for a fuller family assessment. His only anxiety 
was to ensure that Victoria was provided with a service that day.
Accommodation arranged
4.73     Mr Victor spoke to his manager, Ms Stollard, who agreed the provision of 
short-term financial assistance, amounting to £10 for food for Victoria, until Kouao 
could return to the office for an assessment on 30 April 1999. In the meantime, 
bed and breakfast accommodation for the family was arranged at 6–8 Nicoll Road, 
Harlesden. Mr Victor said he had no reason to believe Nicoll Road was unsuitable 
for Kouao and Victoria, but he made no checks to find out, and he was not aware 
of any complaints about the premises. It would seem that Mr Victor was also 
entirely unaware that Ms Fortune had already arranged for Kouao and Victoria to 
be assessed just one day earlier, despite the information recorded on the first level 
assessment core form.
4.74     Ms Stollard’s perception of the case from the outset was that Victoria was in need 
only in so far as she needed food and accommodation. Nothing was brought to 
her attention at the time to suggest that Victoria might be in need of any other 
assistance. As no inquiries had been made it is understandable that there was 
nothing more to share. As a result, neither she, nor any of the six social workers 
in her team who were to come into contact with Victoria during her time in Ealing, 
did more than respond at this superficial level. Ms Stollard stated:
“[Victoria] did not present with injuries, she did not present as a child 
that other agencies were concerned about, it was an accommodation 
issue and a finance issue and that was how it presented at the time. 
We did not go looking for child protection issues.”
4.75     This ignores the important fact that the only justification for the involvement of 
social services was Victoria’s needs, which were not being assessed.
4.76     Kouao next returned to the office on 30 April 1999. Again Mr Victor saw Kouao 
and Victoria and he admitted that once again he did not speak to Victoria: 
“I attempted to speak to her, but mum was always talking to me.”
4.77     It was agreed, a decision authorised by senior commissioning manager Judith 
Finlay, that accommodation costs would be met by social services funding, 
and that the bed and breakfast accommodation at Nicoll Road, Harlesden 
would continue until Kouao’s habitual residency appeal had been determined. 
Ms Finlay said she assumed the accommodation was satisfactory because it had 
been used previously. However, at no stage did she investigate or question 4  Ealing Social Services
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whether the accommodation was in fact suitable for Victoria. She accepted that 
Ealing’s approach to determining the suitability of Nicoll Road was not adequate. 
Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
If social services place a child in temporary accommodation, an assessment 
must be made of the suitability of that accommodation and the results of that 
assessment must be recorded on the child’s case file. If the accommodation is 
unsuitable, this should be reported to a senior officer.
4.78     Although Nicoll Road is not far from Ealing’s offices, it does in fact fall under 
Brent council – a fact Mr Victor knew all too well because he had come across the 
premises when he had been employed by Brent in the early 1990s. Yet it appears 
that none of the relevant Brent agencies were informed of this placement. This is 
despite the spirit of a pan-London agreement of social services directors, clearly set 
out in Ealing’s own child protection procedures manual, that states:
“With families placed in bed and breakfast, it is considered good practice 
for the placing borough to provide social services support immediately 
following the placement, until and unless such support is specifically 
assumed by the receiving borough.”
4.79     That was an obligation that Brent, of course, could not possibly have assumed if 
Ealing decided to cease supporting Kouao and Victoria (which ultimately they did), 
unless Brent were first made aware of the family’s presence within their area.
4.80     However, Mr Victor saw no reason for him to notify Brent because:
“The child was not at risk, the child was not under child protection. The 
child was not being looked after. The child was not under a supervision 
order. It was a case of just placing the family within Brent.”
4.81     Ms Finlay believed (wrongly) that the continuing support obligations applied only 
to children on the child protection register, and while senior managers thought the 
principle “admirable”, they believed it would be impossible to implement. Mr Tutt 
shared this view and voiced concerns about the sheer quantity of information that 
would need to be exchanged and the systems needed to support and maintain 
that process.
4.82     The problem, however, may well get worse as the supply of affordable housing 
shrinks in parts of London. Unless greater weight is attached to such agreements, 
the risk of ‘losing’ vulnerable children somewhere in the system may well increase 
too. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
If social services place a child in accommodation in another local authority 
area, they must notify that local authority’s social services department of the 
placement. Unless specifically agreed in writing at team manager level by both 
authorities or above, the placing authority must retain responsibility for the child 
concerned.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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4.83     Mr Victor did not manage to complete an assessment of Victoria and Kouao on 
30 April 1999. Kouao told him that Victoria had not eaten that day. He said in 
evidence that “because the department was child centred, we allowed her to 
go in the belief that she would be back”. Kouao and Victoria left, but not before 
collecting £17.50 subsistence, which was to last until the following Thursday 
– 6 May 1999.
4.84     It seems probable that Kouao and Victoria moved into Nicoll Road on 1 May 1999
immediately after their bed and breakfast booking at Twyford Crescent in 
Acton expired.
4.85     Kouao’s next two visits to Ealing Social Services were on 7 May 1999, to collect 
a further payment of £17.50, and again on 11 May. On that second occasion, 
Ms Stollard agreed further subsistence funding of £64.44 per week – an amount 
equivalent to 90 per cent of the DSS rate for a mother and child. This appears to 
have been local policy at the time.
Social services record keeping
4.86     Some time before 24 May 1999, but after Kouao’s visit to the area office on 
11 May, Ms Lawrence, the duty senior that week, made the following, undated, 
entry on Victoria’s case file. It reads:
“i)  This lady came to England to learn English
ii)  she has no connection with this country and has been found not habitually 
resident so is entitled to no benefits
iii)  she has a 17yr/16yr and 7yr and she intends to return to France for 2 other 
children in June
iv)  she has no skills and has made clear she has a 2 yr plan to be in this country
v)  she has not even sought assistance from a solicitor yet ... I advised her to do so 
yesterday [although had Ms Lawrence taken the trouble to read the First Level 
Core Assessment form she would have noticed that Ms Fortune had already 
noted down the details of Kouao’s solicitor]
vi)  what do we do with this case, there will inevitably be a long-term financial 
implication for this department if she remains.”
4.87     Ms Lawrence wrote a note to herself to speak to Ms Finlay, the senior 
commissioning manager, or Mr Skinner, assistant director of children’s services, 
for their view of this case.
4.88     As stated in paragraph 4.21, Ms Fortune thought 60 to 70 per cent of the cases 
they were seeing on duty at the time were housing type cases. Families coming 
from abroad and who were ineligible for benefits were not uncommon. Despite 
this, when asked why this case should have prompted a discussion with senior 
management, Ms Lawrence said, “There was no specific guidance around how 
we approached cases or referrals where the presenting issue was homelessness or 
destitution and there was no particular assessment framework for approaching 
the case.”
4.89     Asked if Victoria’s case stood out in any way from the average, she replied, 
“[Kouao] ... did come from France and she did have a family or part of a family 
in France.” Ms Lawrence thought that needed exploring but was unclear as to 
how to go about it. She thought an assessment was called for, yet Ms Winter’s 4  Ealing Social Services
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recorded referral on 26 April 1999 had already requested that social services do 
an assessment of Victoria’s need so there was no progress in decision making here. 
Ms Lawrence “supposed” the assessment ought to be a full family assessment. In 
fact, Ms Lawrence could no longer clearly recall whether that was what she meant 
or whether she intended a short assessment in accordance with a format that the 
team had devised for dealing with this particular type of case. Nor could she recall 
whether she in fact spoke to either Ms Finlay or Mr Skinner. There is no record of a 
conversation with either, though she expected she would only have gone to them 
directly if Ms Stollard had not been available. According to Ms Lawrence, all cases 
with long-term financial implications for the department would have necessitated 
discussion with senior managers.
4.90     In the event, whatever assessment Ms Lawrence thought might have been 
appropriate, according to her statement to the Inquiry, her discussions with senior 
managers were heading in a completely opposite direction and were to culminate in 
a “final decision of the social services department ... to withdraw financial support”.
Kouao complains about accommodation
4.91     On 24 May 1999, Kouao and Victoria came to the Acton area office without an 
appointment. They were interviewed by Ms Gaunt, one of the duty social workers, 
who had been in post in Ealing for just four months. She admitted that she knew 
very little about the family other than Kouao had failed the habitual residency 
test, that she and Victoria were living in Nicoll Road and that they had come from 
France. She was not aware that Ealing housing services had already referred the 
family for an assessment to be made of Victoria’s needs.
4.92     The interview lasted about 20 minutes and was conducted in English, although 
Ms Gaunt thought there were sufficient lapses in understanding to have required 
an interpreter.
4.93     Kouao voiced a number of complaints about her accommodation in Nicoll Road 
which Ms Gaunt recorded. Kouao complained that the rooms were being burgled 
and the police were often involved. She complained of the noise, drinking and 
“weed smoking”, the violence in the corridors and the toilets that were often 
vomited in. If true, Nicoll Road could hardly be described as accommodation 
suitable for a mother and seven-year-old child, yet Ms Gaunt never alluded to 
Victoria in her record of the interview nor to the fact that Victoria was resident in 
the hostel.
4.94     Ms Gaunt explained to Kouao that the department would pursue her concerns 
and decide whether the bed and breakfast accommodation was indeed suitable for 
women and children. She arranged for Kouao to return to the office that afternoon 
to collect her subsistence money.
4.95     In the meantime, she telephoned Peter Pandelli of Star Lettings, the letting 
agency, to pass on Kouao’s complaints in the confident expectation that he would 
investigate them with the manager of the accommodation and report back to the 
duty team. Although this was the first complaint about temporary accommodation 
that Ms Gaunt had dealt with, it did not occur to her that there was anything 
inappropriate in leaving the checks for the letting agency to follow up. They clearly 
had an interest in maximising the take up of hostel places and ensuring that those 
places were suitable for as wide a range of local authority client groups as possible.
4.96     It is, of course, questionable whether social services should be involved in the 
management of temporary accommodation. I suggest they should confine their 
activities to supporting vulnerable families placed in such accommodation.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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4.97     Before leaving the office, Ms Gaunt discussed Victoria’s case with Ms Stollard 
and a decision was made to provide Kouao and Victoria with subsistence and 
accommodation for one more week, after which they would be invited to 
return to France. The decision was relayed to Kouao and it was this, according 
to Ms Gaunt, that prompted Victoria to start crying. She stopped when Kouao 
gave her some sugar.
4.98     To Ms Gaunt, the whole episode appeared to have been “stage-managed”. 
It seemed odd to her that the prospect of returning to France – where Victoria had 
other siblings and where life by Kouao’s account had been reasonable – should 
have provoked such a response.
4.99     Sadly, Ms Gaunt made no record of Victoria’s reaction, or of her own observations 
about it, but she was clear that the incident had happened and that she had not, 
in hindsight, confused this with a similar incident recorded by Bernadette Wilkin 
later that same day.
4.100   In her evidence, Ms Gaunt made some other observations as to Victoria’s 
appearance and her relationship to Kouao. Had these observations been 
recorded at the time they might well have prompted closer scrutiny of their true 
relationship. Ms Gaunt told the Inquiry that there was a marked difference between 
Kouao’s appearance and that of Victoria. Whereas Kouao’s hair was well styled, 
Victoria’s was dull, short, unhealthy and generally less well groomed. Victoria’s 
skin colour was also darker than Kouao’s and was noticeably blotchy. She vividly 
described Victoria as looking like one of the “adverts you see for Action Aid”.
4.101   To Ms Gaunt’s eye there seemed to be no obvious mother/daughter relationship 
between them. When asked what she thought was lacking specifically, Ms Gaunt 
replied, “When Victoria began to cry I may have expected a mother to comfort her 
child in some way and that did not occur.”
4.102   This, coupled with the differences in skin colour, led her to doubt whether the 
two were indeed mother and daughter. But she made no record of any of these 
observations, nor did they prompt her to initiate any further assessment of 
Victoria’s needs. She said, “I can see in hindsight that it may well have been a truly 
important piece of assessment, but nevertheless at the time it was not. It did not 
raise concerns. It did not make me concerned.”
4.103   Ms Gaunt said she was sufficiently concerned to raise her doubts with colleagues 
on her return to the duty room. But she could no longer remember with whom 
she raised the possibility that Kouao and Victoria were unrelated or what responses 
she received.
4.104   Unlike some of her colleagues, Ms Gaunt seemed to have a clearer understanding 
that Victoria was a “child in need” within the meaning of the Children Act 1989, and 
she knew that the local authority had a duty to complete a full assessment of the 
family. Ms Gaunt said, “She had no roof over her head, unless we were providing it 
for her at the time. She had no recourse to public funds, and therefore her health or 
well-being would have been hampered had we not provided those things.”
4.105   Nonetheless she allowed Kouao to leave the office that day knowing that no such 
assessment had yet been completed, an assessment that she now conceded would 
“have made the management of the case clearer, earlier”.
Kouao continues to collect subsistence
4.106   As instructed, Kouao returned with Victoria to the Acton area office later the same 
day to collect her subsistence monies. On this occasion she was dealt with by 4  Ealing Social Services
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Ms Wilkin, a support assistant in the referral and assessment team. This was not the 
first time that Kouao had had her subsistence cash paid out in the reception area 
by Ms Wilkin. The two women first met on 28 April 1999 when Kouao collected 
the first of her weekly payments. Ms Wilkin, who had a daughter the same age 
as Victoria, had also observed the differences between Kouao and Victoria. She 
told the Inquiry that Kouao “was a very pretty lady with clear shiny skin and well 
dressed. Victoria was petite with really short hair”.
4.107   She observed Victoria a few times wearing little short dresses and a leather jacket 
which seemed “a bit old fashioned for a little girl. It was burgundy, it was gathered 
at the waist and it had lapels on it”. She also noticed that Victoria always stood 
very close to Kouao. Ms Wilkin recalled saying “hello” to Victoria but “she just 
smiled and that was it”.
4.108   Ms Wilkin repeated to Kouao what Ms Gaunt had already told her, that this would 
be her last payment and that the council would pay only for her accommodation 
until Monday 31 May 1999. It was the first time that Ms Wilkin had had to 
convey such information to a client. According to her file note, Kouao asked her 
what she should do. Ms Wilkin explained that it was a management decision and 
that perhaps she should take legal advice. Kouao proceeded to say something 
to Victoria at which, for the second time that day, Victoria began to cry. Unlike 
Ms Gaunt, Ms Wilkin did record this reaction in her file note. She said she also 
relayed it back to a social worker but she could no longer remember to whom.
Accommodation complaint investigated
4.109   In a late additional statement to the Inquiry, Ms Gaunt recalled another material 
event that she failed to record at the time and omitted to mention in her original 
statement for the Inquiry. This concerned her visit to the Nicoll Road premises, 
which she believed she made some time after Kouao had lodged her complaints 
on 24 May 1999. It is Ms Gaunt’s hazy recollection that she volunteered to do the 
visit in response to a suggestion by Ms Stollard that she lived in that direction and 
could pass the address on her way home. The visit, according to Ms Gaunt, was 
only partly in response to Kouao’s complaints. She believed other complaints may 
have been made about the same premises and she said it was for this reason that 
no write up of her visit appeared on Victoria’s file.
4.110   In the absence of any record, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when this visit 
occurred. Ms Stollard told those who conducted Ealing’s Part 8 management 
review following Victoria’s death that the visit to Nicoll Road had taken place 
before Kouao made her complaints. But in evidence to this Inquiry she thought 
it must have taken place at around the same time. The Part 8 review also noted 
that Ms Stollard asked “two social workers to make an unannounced visit to the 
accommodation and inspect it all”. In fact, Ms Stollard could only recall with any 
conviction that an unannounced visit did take place at Nicoll Road and that it 
happened while Kouao was living there. She thought it was “regrettable” that 
there was no record of the visit on the case file. When pressed, she could not deny 
that the only response to Kouao’s complaints may well have been the phone call to 
Mr Pandelli at Star Lettings, as recorded by Ms Gaunt at the time.
4.111   In fact, unbeknown to Ms Gaunt, it appears that another visit was made to Nicoll 
Road by Ealing Social Services. On this occasion the visit was announced and 
conducted by two social workers – Ms Fortune and Cecilia Schreuder. I shall return 
to this later and its implications in the evidence given by Ms Stollard and Ms Gaunt 
in respect of the visit to Nicoll Road.
4.112   Ms Gaunt said that when she visited the premises she asked the manager 
whether Kouao and Victoria were in their room but was told they were not. As a The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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result, it was not possible for her to assess the suitability of Room 13 for Victoria. 
She proceeded, nonetheless, to check out the common parts of the house 
– the corridors, toilets and bathroom – those areas that Kouao had mentioned 
specifically. Ms Gaunt found nothing to cause her concern. She came away with 
the general impression that the accommodation was adequate and she conveyed 
this to Ms Stollard.
4.113   On 28 May 1999, four days after Kouao had been told that her board and lodging 
would be paid up until 31 May, Ms Stollard reviewed Victoria’s case. She said she 
may have read through the file but she probably would have been influenced 
more by the decisions made by the senior practitioner than by what was on the 
file. Ms Stollard decided to close the case one week later pending any further 
contact. When asked if she was satisfied that there had been a proper assessment 
of Victoria’s needs she said,
“I was satisfied we had looked at the accommodation issues ... I have to 
say that I did not make any of the management decisions on this case. 
Sharmain [Lawrence] made the decisions [yet it was Ms Stollard who 
closed the case], and she made them with Judith [Finlay] so the details of 
the discussion and the assessment did not actually involve me.”
4.114  The  ‘assessment’ would not, it would seem, have involved Victoria either. 
Ms Stollard wrote a brief description of the case on her review note: “French 
woman homeless over here learning English. Has been told to go back to France.”
4.115   Victoria, ostensibly Ealing Social Services’ client, did not get a single mention. Nor is 
it clear from the case file that it was Ms Lawrence who had made the decisions in 
Victoria’s case. Her last recorded, but undated, entry showed that she was anything 
but certain as to what to do next and needed to discuss the case with senior 
managers. By contrast, Ms Gaunt’s case note for 24 May 1999 shows quite clearly 
that the decision to offer Kouao board and accommodation for one more week 
followed from “discussion and decisions with Sarah Stollard”.
The involvement of solicitors
4.116   Kouao, in the meantime, had instructed her solicitors and they wrote to Ealing on 
27 May 1999. They pointed out that their client had come to the UK in March 
1999, although Ealing housing department already knew from Kouao’s flight 
tickets that she had arrived in England in April 1999. They also claimed that Kouao 
had exhausted her savings as she was required to pay £166 per week for a room 
for herself and daughter – again an assertion that Ealing could have questioned 
as they had been funding Kouao’s accommodation since the beginning of May. 
The solicitor restated Kouao’s position that she would have nowhere to live from 
31 May 1999 as she had been asked to leave the hostel accommodation provided 
by Ealing. Nor did their client have any money to feed herself and Victoria. They 
reminded Ealing of their duty under sections 17 and 20 of the Children Act 1989, 
seeking on Kouao’s behalf financial assistance and help with accommodation and 
care for “her child”.
4.117   The letter came to Ms Fortune while on duty on 1 June 1999. She said she was 
brought up to date on the case in the duty team discussion and knew that Ealing’s 
funding of Kouao’s stay at Nicoll Road had come to an end the day before. On 
reading the solicitor’s letter, Ms Fortune said she was anxious to discuss this with 
her duty manager, Ms Lawrence, and to seek legal advice. If there had been a 
clear strategy previously to close Victoria’s case the solicitor’s letter appears to have 
turned that on its head. Ms Lawrence’s unsigned and undated instruction on the 
case record contact sheet, was to extend the accommodation booking at Nicoll 
Road and for the case to be allocated for assessment as “no thorough assessment 4  Ealing Social Services
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has been carried out as yet”. Ms Lawrence also raised the possibility that Ealing 
could consider paying for return tickets to France.
4.118   Ms Lawrence accepted it was unusual for housing cases to be allocated at all, 
particularly in the light of Ms Stollard’s ‘decision’ the previous week that Kouao 
be given one more week’s assistance before going back to France. But on this 
occasion Ms Lawrence said:
“There appeared to have been some drift in that although there was a 
process of information gathering and there was information recorded on 
the file, the assessment format that we were using at the time had not 
been used, and I felt that it needed to come off the duty system and be 
given to one worker to carry out the task.”
4.119  However,  by  “thorough assessment”, Ms Lawrence said she meant no more than 
completing the three-sided assessment template for families who have failed the 
habitual residence test. This is an assessment which she admitted with hindsight 
could not be described as “thorough”. The solicitor’s letter, it seems, had merely 
been the prompt for her to review the case file and ensure that the paperwork was 
up to date.
4.120   Despite being told that Kouao had no money for food – the last subsistence 
cheque for £64.44 had been paid on 24 May 1999, just over a week previously, 
though Ms Fortune did not know this because she did not check – Ms Fortune said 
she had no concerns as to where Victoria’s next meal was to come from because 
Ms Lawrence had also instructed that the subsistence money should continue for 
another week. The monies were not paid out, however, until the next day, though 
nothing was done by Ms Fortune on 1 June 1999 to ensure that Victoria did not go 
without food.
4.121   Ms Fortune also had the impression that Kouao and Victoria looked very dissimilar:
“Kouao always dressed immaculately. Her clothing and jewellery seemed 
expensive and her hair was very well done. She did not in any way look 
destitute, contrary to what she always claimed. In contrast, Victoria was 
poorly dressed. I cannot recall exactly what she wore but there were 
times when she did not seem to be dressed appropriately. She always 
appeared to look as if she was in hand-me-down clothes. I thought she 
looked shabbily dressed. I also thought she looked very small for her age. 
She was very slim and very dark skinned. She had very short dark hair.”
4.122   Yet again, none of these observations were recorded by Ms Fortune on the case 
file. It serves to support the general recommendation I make on the importance of 
case recording.
4.123   By chance, Kouao’s solicitor spoke to Ms Fortune the same day, 1 June, that 
she received their letter. Apart from reiterating what was in the letter, they told 
Ms Fortune that Kouao was destitute and that she had asked Brent Social Services 
for assistance. Brent Social Services asked her to return to the Acton area office.
4.124   Ms Fortune told Kouao’s solicitor that “social services had been given variations 
of her [Kouao’s] circumstances” and that social services had a duty to undertake a 
“thorough” assessment of their client.
4.125  Kouao’s solicitor promptly advised Kouao to return to social services and she 
arrived with Victoria at the Acton area office at about 4.45pm. Kouao was told that 
she could stay at Nicoll Road one more night and that she would be telephoned The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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the next day and informed whether social services could continue to assist her. 
Although she agreed to stay at the hostel, according to Ms Fortune, she seemed 
unhappy at Nicoll Road. Kouao complained that for the last three days she and 
Victoria had been sleeping in the kitchen area because of water leaking through 
the ceiling. When she had complained to the manager he had been abusive to her 
and that had upset Victoria. It had also upset Kouao sufficiently that she took her 
complaint about the manager to Harlesden police station the next day. She also 
mentioned again that the place was dirty and the toilets were filled to the rim with 
vomit and excrement.
4.126   Those complaints notwithstanding, the very next day on 2 June 1999, Ealing Social 
Services extended Kouao’s booking at Nicoll Road for another week until 9 June. 
An interpreter was also booked and an appointment was made for the assessment 
interview to take place on 7 June.
Inspection of accommodation
4.127   Asked how she responded to Kouao’s complaints about the premises, Ms Fortune 
said, “I know that there was a phone call made to Nicoll Road and that they said 
Kouao had ripped up the carpets.” In fact, this was a reference to a telephone call 
received by Ms Wilkin on 4 June 1999 from the accommodation agency through 
which Kouao and Victoria had been placed in Nicoll Road. The member of staff 
at Star Lettings, Mr Pandelli, told Ms Wilkin that he had personally inspected the 
accommodation the previous day and found it adequate. However, he was angry 
because following Kouao’s complaints, she had been moved to a new room the 
previous night but had removed all the carpets and put them outside her room.
4.128   Ms Fortune told the Inquiry that social services had checked out the premises. 
She recalled that she herself had made an earlier visit to Nicoll Road – her 
diary confirmed this visit on 1 March 1999 – and that she had made a second 
‘announced’ visit with another social worker, Ms Schreuder. But, like Ms Gaunt, 
she could not remember when that was. She thought it was “somewhere between 
May and June”. Ms Fortune stated that she could not remember whether the visit 
took place before or after her conversation with Kouao. Therefore it is not clear 
whether the visit was a direct response to Kouao’s complaints or complaints by 
other residents. She made no mention of it in her witness statement and she did 
not record it on the case file. Asked why not, she said, “I was called to go out 
with another duty social worker to see another family. I presumed she would have 
written the information. She obviously presumed I would have.”
4.129   She said that if she had recorded her visit she would have noted that the bedrooms 
and toilets that she saw had basic amenities and were reasonably clean.
4.130   Having heard their evidence and that of Ms Stollard, I am prepared to accept that 
Ms Fortune and Ms Gaunt probably did visit Nicoll Road on two separate occasions 
and may well have done so during the time that Kouao and Victoria lived there. 
However, their and Ms Stollard’s recollection as to precisely when these visits 
occurred was vague and inconsistent. On neither occasion was any serious attempt 
made to see Kouao’s accommodation, particularly in the light of Kouao’s complaint 
on 1 June 1999 that she and Victoria had been forced to sleep in the kitchen area 
because of a water leak. There was also a failure to record anywhere on the case 
file the outcomes of these visits. Therefore it seems unlikely that either visit was a 
direct response to, or was designed to follow up specifically, Kouao’s complaints. 
As a result, Ealing Social Services left unresolved the question of whether the 
accommodation they were providing at Nicoll Road was in any way suitable for 
Victoria to live in.4  Ealing Social Services
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4.131   Kouao and Victoria paid another visit to Ealing Social Services on 4 June 1999 
without an appointment. Kouao made further complaints about Nicoll Road to 
Louise Jones, another social worker in the referral and assessment team who was 
on duty that day. She complained that there were no carpets in her room and that 
she had not had a bath for a month because the place was so dirty.
4.132   Ms Jones said she knew that complaints had been made before about the state of 
Nicoll Road so she asked in the duty room whether anyone had visited. She was 
told – though she could not remember by whom – that the accommodation had 
been checked and approved by social workers recently, and she passed on this 
information to Kouao.
4.133   In her unsigned case file note, Ms Jones recorded that Kouao was due to attend 
a job interview and that if she was successful she would arrange childcare 
for Victoria.
4.134   She also noted that Victoria had some rough skin on her arm. Kouao explained 
that Victoria had eczema and that she was registered with a Dr Emias, but Kouao 
was unable to give any contact details for Victoria’s GP. Ms Jones accepted and 
recorded these details without question.
4.135   In the meantime, Kouao had instructed her solicitors to write to Ealing a second 
time which they did on 2 June 1999. Their letter, received in the social services 
office two days later, noted that Kouao’s room in Nicoll Road had flooded on 
28 May 1999 as a result of a burst water pipe and that her mattress was sodden 
– a matter that the manager of the hostel had yet to resolve. They also advised 
Ealing that neither Kouao nor Victoria had eaten in the last couple of days because 
Kouao had run out of money. It is not evident that either Ms Jones or anyone else 
in the Acton area office referral and assessment team ever responded to, or sought 
to check out, this new information that Victoria was going for long periods of time 
without food.
4.136   Kouao did not attend her appointment for the assessment interview on 7 June 
1999. Instead she turned up again unannounced with Victoria, on 8 June 1999 
for her subsistence monies. She explained to Ms Jones that she had missed her 
appointment the previous day because she had gone for a job interview. She 
had been successful and was due to start work at Northwick Park Hospital that 
afternoon. She promised to telephone once she knew her shift rota so that she 
could fix up a new assessment interview date and an interpreter could be booked. 
In the meantime, she needed a letter from social services so that she could open a 
bank account – her first pay cheque was due at the end of the month. Kouao then 
collected another week’s subsistence cheque for £64.44.
4.137   Altogether, Ms Jones’s involvement with Kouao and Victoria while on duty 
amounted to no more than two unannounced office visits, each lasting between 
10 and 15 minutes. Yet she too recalled noticing the differences in the appearance 
of ‘mother and daughter’, that Kouao “appeared to be well dressed and she had 
very nice make-up and very nicely presented and [Victoria] by comparison did not 
seem to be well presented in her clothes and appearance”.
4.138   She observed that Victoria appeared to be a little short for her age and that she 
seemed “to stand quite quietly, a little behind Ms Kouao and to be extremely quiet 
and reserved”. She did not play with the toys in the Wendy house like the other 
children did. On the second of the two visits, she described Victoria’s posture as 
“submissive, very quiet and timid”.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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4.139   However, like her colleagues before her, Ms Jones recorded none of these 
observations about Kouao and Victoria’s physical appearance. She told the Inquiry 
that in a busy duty system, the need to write down events and contacts as they 
happened did not allow time for proper reflection and evaluation. Nonetheless, she 
said she discussed what she had seen informally within the team shortly afterwards:
“We maybe had feelings – a gut feeling about the observations we had 
made but ... this was not a level of concern that would mean we would 
instigate child protection procedures, or any level of concern that we felt 
that we would follow up.”
4.140   This cumulative failure to record basic information about Victoria over a period of 
weeks denied Ealing the benefit of assembling what was becoming a substantial 
body of information which could and should have been used to inform the 
assessment of Victoria’s needs and future care. By not completing the simple 
task of assessing Victoria’s needs, the original reason for the referral, two and 
a half months of limited reactive and ineffective social work followed. It was 
the start of a pattern of response Victoria was to receive in the months ahead. 
Ms Finlay’s admission that less effort may well have been used in completing 
a basic assessment of Victoria’s needs is correct, and it illustrates the degree of 
disorganisation in the Ealing office at the time and that poor work can waste 
scarce resources.
4.141  Kouao’s next contact with Ealing Social Services was not the telephone call she had 
promised to make but an early morning unannounced visit on 14 June 1999. She 
spoke to Ms Wilkin as soon as the office opened to ask whether the department 
would pay the £30 a week costs of a childminder she had found to look after 
Victoria while she was at work. It is not clear whether she was given an immediate 
answer to her question. She did, however, collect her weekly subsistence money 
and she was given a further assessment interview appointment for 1.30pm on 
17 June 1999. She was told that failure to attend on that occasion would cost her 
her place at Nicoll Road and her financial support would stop.
Kouao turns up for assessment
4.142   On 17 June 1999, Kouao attended Ealing’s offices for the assessment. On that 
occasion, Victoria, who ought to have been the focus of the assessment, did not 
accompany her. Ms Fortune, as the duty social worker, saw Kouao and was told 
that Victoria was with a childminder. She was not particularly concerned by this, 
even though by this stage Victoria had been in the country almost two months and 
was still not at school. Kouao’s explanation was that she wanted to bring over her 
other children from France, to settle the family’s accommodation and then make 
arrangements for Victoria’s schooling.
4.143   Ms Fortune did nothing to alert the education authorities to Victoria’s presence in 
Ealing, nor did she ask any questions to establish whether Victoria was going to a 
registered childminder. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Where, during the course of an assessment, social services establish that a child 
of school age is not attending school, they must alert the education authorities 
and satisfy themselves that, in the interim, the child is subject to adequate 
daycare arrangements.4  Ealing Social Services
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4.144   According to Ms Fortune, it was a difficult interview. Kouao seemed anxious 
and distressed and said that she had only a limited time as she had to be at 
work later in the afternoon. Kouao also refused to speak any English and would 
only talk to, and allow information to be written down by, the French-speaking 
interpreter, Ouafa Choufani. So Ms Choufani, rather than Ms Fortune, completed 
the assessment of families who have failed the habitual residence test form. This 
was the assessment form that Ms Lawrence had instructed to be completed by an 
‘allocated social worker’. It is questionable whether Ms Fortune learned anything 
new that day – certainly nothing about Victoria – and what she was told bore little 
relation to the information Kouao had given in the past.
4.145   Kouao described her previous employment as a “manager at Roissy Airport”, 
yet she had told Ms Winter that she had been a housewife. She gave the name 
and contact details of Dr I Patel as her GP – the same name as she had given to 
Ms Winter. She had previously told Ms Jones that Victoria was registered with a 
Dr Emias whose address she did not know. In fact, none of these details relating to 
the registration of either Victoria or Kouao were entirely correct. When asked about 
Victoria’s education, she gave details of her own, which included “A levels in science 
and three years study at a medical centre”. When asked about the general health 
of the family, the recorded answer was “none”. When asked about her reasons 
for coming to the country and staying here, Kouao again provided her French 
national insurance card details and repeated her intention to improve her English. 
Ms Fortune was able to complete the only remaining details on the form from 
information she already knew, namely the name of Kouao’s solicitor and that she 
had been supported by Ealing Social Services with accommodation and funding.
4.146  Ms  Fortune’s assessment was limited by the fact that important sections of the 
form – her conclusion, assessment and management decisions – were left blank. 
Her assessment at best only partially considered Victoria’s needs. Ms Fortune told 
the Inquiry that it was difficult to undertake an assessment if a person gives various 
accounts: “We can only work with the information that we have ... I asked Kouao 
to bring Victoria, she did not bring her at all. It was difficult.”
4.147  Ms  Fortune’s case file note of the interview appears in two separate places. The first 
note, which appears in chronological date order on the contact sheets for 17 June 
1999, outlines Ms Fortune’s action points for the next day, 18 June, when she was 
away on leave. The action points were:
• to contact Kouao’s solicitor to find out when the result of Kouao’s habitual 
residency test appeal would be known;
• to write to Kouao and arrange a home visit so that the assessment could be 
completed;
• to discuss with the duty team manager if financial assistance should continue 
pending the outcome of the assessment.
4.148   There is no record on the file to suggest that any manager endorsed Ms Fortune’s 
action plan. Managers remained unaware that a visit to Victoria in Nicoll Road was 
ever made. Ms Fortune said that she later contacted Kouao’s solicitor but she did 
not receive an answer to her question about Kouao’s appeal.
4.149  Ms  Fortune’s second entry on the case file relating to her interview with Kouao on 
17 June 1999 appears on the contact sheets after an entry by her duty manager, 
Ms Lawrence, for 30 June. Ms Lawrence’s entry instructs Ms Fortune to “complete 
the assessment and write to Ms Kouao, invite her into the office to discuss the 
management decision”. It is in this entry that Ms Fortune describes Kouao’s 
anxious state and her insistence on only speaking through the interpreter. She 
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cease as she was now in work – in effect pre-empting the management decision 
that Ms Lawrence referred to. When Kouao again repeated her request for help 
with childminding fees, Ms Fortune told her that social services would “probably 
not assist”.
4.150   When asked if she could have written this entry on the case file after 30 June 1999, 
and indeed after Ms Lawrence’s instruction to her, Ms Fortune replied, “It could 
be. I do not know.” In my view, this is the most plausible explanation.
4.151   On 22 June 1999, Ms Fortune discussed the case with her duty manager who 
informed her that Kouao’s accommodation would not be funded after 30 June 
1999. The next day Ms Lawrence made an entry on the file to the effect that the 
duty social worker should contact Kouao’s solicitors to check the outcome of what 
Ms Lawrence called “her housing appeal” (that is, her habitual residency test). That 
social services should consider paying her return fare to France, that they should 
withdraw funding once the outcome of the appeal was known and they should 
write to Kouao informing her of the outcome of the assessment.
4.152   Ms Lawrence said that she could not recall if she ever saw Ms Fortune’s assessment. 
She believed the only reason she recorded “something on the file” was because 
Ms Fortune brought it to her attention for some direction. She said, “I did not 
see the assessment. I was given feedback, I was told the assessment had been 
completed; I did not check it.” As a result, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
All social services assessments of children and families, and any action plans 
drawn up as a result, must be approved in writing by a manager. Before giving 
such approval, the manager must ensure that the child and the child’s carer 
have been seen and spoken to.
4.153   When asked if it was her responsibility to read the file and to make sure that the 
case was properly directed, she replied, “Overall responsibility would have been 
with the team manager. However, I played a part in that I managed duty on a 
fortnightly basis.”
Case allocation
4.154   That same day, Ms Lawrence finally allocated Victoria’s case to Ms Fortune, or so she 
thought. The process involved making the papers up into a file and logging the details 
on the computer – a task that was to take a week before Ms Fortune finally received 
the case papers. As a result, the case allocation date was subsequently changed to 
30 June 1999 and Ms Fortune was instructed to “complete the assessment”.
4.155   It might seem bizarre that the decision to allocate Victoria’s case should have 
come more than two months after Victoria was first referred to Ealing and after 
an assessment had supposedly been completed which was to lead to Ealing 
Social Services discontinuing their support to Kouao and Victoria. Ms Lawrence’s 
explanation was “for the assessment that Pamela [Fortune] said she had completed 
to be put down on paper ... to take it off the duty system, to ensure that that 
person got it done”. It would seem that the process of allocation on this occasion 
was no more than a vehicle for ensuring that Ms Fortune, the person who 
conducted the assessment interview such as it was, also wrote it up.
4.156  By  “completing the assessment” Ms Lawrence certainly meant no more than 
that Ms Fortune should write it up. Ms Fortune, on the other hand, believed she 4  Ealing Social Services
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was being asked to “complete” the assessment. She said she told Ms Lawrence 
that she had found the assessment “difficult”, which no doubt accounts for why 
Ms Fortune’s account of her interview with Kouao appears after Ms Lawrence’s file 
instruction for 30 June 1999. Ms Fortune also knew that a decision had been made 
“from quite early on that Mrs Kouao should go back to France or the child should 
be accommodated”.
4.157   Ms Fortune was instructed to write to Kouao to invite her into the office to discuss 
the decisions that had been reached. The decisions, as they appear on the case file 
in Ms Lawrence’s handwriting, unsigned and undated, were:
“i)  client has no connection with this country, has no significant family/friends
ii)  there has been no appropriate/adequate planning prior to coming to this country
iii)  reasons for coming are weak – to learn English
iv)  she has family/friends in France, has access to housing and state benefits 
in France
v)  she has children who she left back in France whom she intends to return to 
France to collect and bring back to this country, who will subsequently become 
dependent on social services funding
vi)  based on the above the department has decided that we can no longer 
fund Ms Kouao as it is apparent that she will need intermittent funding for 
a long period of time. Ms Kouao has left a stable lifestyle to come to this 
country where she has no recourse to public funds or accommodation and 
has therefore placed herself in a vulnerable situation. We are in a position to 
provide Ms Kouao with return tickets for herself and child to France.”
4.158   What is extraordinary about these decisions was the basis for making them. As 
Ms Lawrence recorded, they reflected almost precisely the reasons Ms Winter gave 
back in April for Kouao failing the habitual residency test. All the emphasis was 
on Kouao’s lack of significant ties in this country, the fact that she had left family 
and friends in France and that her stay in the country was intended to be short 
term. There is not a single mention of Victoria. Indeed, there can be no doubt that 
the “client” referred to was Kouao. Nothing more had been learnt about Kouao, 
let alone Victoria, in the two months since the case had been referred to Ealing 
Social Services.
4.159   Ms Lawrence said she fully accepted that the focus of the assessment was on the 
adult and the presenting issue, which was homelessness. She admitted that she did 
nothing to assure herself that the assessment was complete, let alone adequate. In 
fact, she never read Ms Fortune’s account of what had happened on 17 June 1999:
“I was not the person who closed the case – perhaps if I had closed the 
case I would have referred back to the assessment before closing it as I 
had directed that it be done ... I had been informed by Pamela [Fortune] 
that it had been carried out and I informed Judith Finlay that it had. 
I accept that I should have actually looked at that form and signed it off 
and ensured that it was completed before I reported to Judith Finlay.”
4.160   Her only concern, it appears, was that the form had not been properly completed. 
Asked if a different conclusion might have been reached if someone had read the 
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“I do not think there would have been a different approach. I think we 
could have come to the conclusions that we came to at an earlier point 
in our involvement with the family, but I am not convinced that the 
outcome would have been different.”
4.161   In a telephone call with Ms Lawrence, Ms Finlay ratified the management decisions 
that had been made. She did not know at the time that Victoria had never been 
seen or spoken to. She was told that a comprehensive assessment had been 
undertaken: “My understanding of a comprehensive assessment is that the child is 
seen and spoken to.”
4.162   But she also did nothing to check this was the case. On average, Ms Finlay said she 
was consulted about once a week on similar cases where the presenting issues were 
homelessness. Had she known the truth, she said she would not have endorsed the 
management decisions.
4.163   Kouao returned to the Ealing office on 30 June 1999, again without Victoria. 
She saw Ms Fortune and told her that Victoria was with the childminder. 
Ms Fortune gave her a letter setting out the reasons why social services would no 
longer fund her stay in England. Kouao was told that her accommodation would 
be paid for until 7 July 1999 and she and Ms Lawrence went through the letter 
with Kouao. Before leaving the office, Kouao made it clear that she did not want to 
return to France and that she would be contacting her solicitor. To Ms Lawrence’s 
eye, Kouao appeared “forceful” and “manipulative” and that she seemed to 
understand only what was being said when it suited her. However, she never 
recorded these observations on the case file.
Ealing council’s legal department
4.164   On advice, Ms Fortune contacted Ealing council’s legal department (interestingly the 
only authority to make use of its legal section) and spoke to Phillip Joseph. Mr Joseph 
told the Inquiry that he found the circumstances of Victoria’s case “slightly bizarre”. 
He said, “It just struck me as peculiar that a lady would come from France with a 
child and leave her other children in France merely to learn English.”
4.165   Regrettably, this was not a perception shared by his social work colleagues, and in 
particular by Ms Fortune or her managers.
4.166   Mr Joseph was told by Ms Fortune that a section 17 assessment had been done 
of Victoria’s needs. In his view it was perfectly reasonable to fund return tickets 
to France for Kouao and Victoria if the child’s needs could best be met there. 
He thought there had been some preliminary inquiries as to Kouao’s circumstances 
in France, though he was reliant on what Ms Fortune had told him, and she in turn 
had simply accepted at face value what Kouao had chosen to tell social services. 
At no stage had Ealing Social Services attempted to verify independently any aspect 
of Kouao’s life before her arrival in England.
4.167   On 2 July 1999, Mr Joseph had a second telephone conversation with Ms Fortune. 
Kouao’s solicitors had written another letter to Ealing Social Services expressing 
surprise at the decision to repatriate their “client”, and asking them to review 
that decision or face judicial review proceedings. Mr Joseph repeated his earlier 
advice and suggested as an alternative to the family returning to France, that social 
services could offer to accommodate Victoria in their care until Kouao had found 
full-time work. Ms Fortune passed this on to Kouao’s solicitors.
4.168   On 7 July 1999, Kouao again visited the offices alone. She was seen by Ms Fortune 
who confirmed that social services would no longer pay for her accommodation 
or continue to offer financial assistance. Kouao, who according to Ms Fortune was 4  Ealing Social Services
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quite emotional at the time, was adamant that she would not return to France nor 
would she agree to Victoria being accommodated separately from her. Ms Fortune 
advised her to return to her solicitors but Kouao indicated that they were “no 
good”. She also asked if she could have the money for the tickets, but Ms Fortune 
repeated her offer of purchasing the return tickets if Kouao would give her a travel 
date. Kouao did not respond and left the office.
The file is closed
4.169   That day, Ealing Social Services closed their files on Kouao and Victoria. They did so 
in the full knowledge that funding for their accommodation at Nicoll Road would 
cease the same day and that Kouao had no intention of returning to France. It was 
a poor decision that lacked any sound professional basis. Ms Fortune said she was 
not unduly concerned about Victoria because “[Kouao] had a part-time job at that 
time so I knew she had money to be able to look after her”.
4.170   Ms Fortune conceded, however, that by the time Victoria’s case was closed, Ealing 
had done nothing to determine Victoria’s future or safeguard and promote her 
welfare. During the nine or so weeks Victoria had been Ealing’s responsibility, none 
of the social workers who had come into contact with Victoria had got beyond 
saying “hello” to her. No assessment of her needs had been completed.
Brent Social Services
4.171   On 14 July 1999, barely a week after closing Victoria’s case, Ms Fortune learned 
that her team manager, Ms Stollard, had “received a message from Brent Social 
Services” to the effect that Victoria had been admitted to the Central Middlesex 
Hospital with suspected non-accidental injuries. There was also a message to 
ring Elzanne Smit, a social worker in Brent. Ms Fortune did so the following 
day. Ms Smit told Ms Fortune that Victoria’s childminder had noticed injuries 
to Victoria’s body and had taken her to the hospital. Although admitted with 
suspected non-accidental injuries, Kouao’s explanation that they were self-inflicted 
had been accepted by another doctor. Victoria was diagnosed as having scabies 
and the injuries were thought to have been caused by Victoria scratching herself.
4.172   Ms Fortune explained to Ms Smit that Ealing had closed the case. When asked if 
Ealing could send over a copy of their assessment – an assessment that never of 
course existed – Ms Fortune said, according to her contact note, that she would 
speak to her manager and unless there was a problem she would send across a 
summary. That ‘summary’, which ought to have chronicled Ealing’s involvement 
with Kouao and Victoria since April and the outcome of their assessment, was no 
more than a copy of the letter handed over to Kouao on 30 June 1999, which set 
out Ealing’s decision to cease their support for the family and their reasons for 
coming to that decision.
4.173   Ms Fortune believed that she did pass on more information to Ms Smit over 
the telephone about Ealing’s involvement though she made no record of this. 
At the very least, according to Ms Smit’s record of the conversation on the Brent 
file, Brent learned that Kouao had come to England in April, that she had been 
referred to social services by Ealing Homeless Persons’ Unit after failing the habitual 
residency test, that she had sought legal advice and been offered accommodation 
in Harlesden until 7 July 1999. Indeed, this would have been the first time that 
Brent had confirmed knowledge of Kouao’s placement within their borough. 
Ms Smit was told that Kouao planned to stay in the UK.
4.174   Kouao returned again to the Acton area office with Victoria later on 15 July 1999, 
the very same day that Victoria had been discharged from the Central Middlesex 
Hospital. It seems that Kouao left Victoria alone in the reception area. According 
to Ms Wilkin she was told by reception staff that Kouao was waiting, but when she The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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went out to tell Kouao that a social worker would be out shortly she found Victoria 
alone sitting in a chair. Ms Wilkin said she returned several times to check on 
Victoria. She also told Ms Fortune that Victoria had been left alone.
4.175   Ms Wilkin could no longer recall anything about Victoria’s appearance on that 
occasion. Ms Fortune went out to speak to Victoria and said “hello” just as Kouao 
ran back in. Ms Fortune noticed at once that Victoria had a rash and blisters on 
her face and arms. She presumed that this was the scabies that the consultant 
at the Central Middlesex Hospital had diagnosed the day before. Ms Fortune 
recalled that she felt quite angry and told Kouao it was unacceptable for her to 
leave Victoria in the reception area. Kouao said that she had been to the toilet and 
left Victoria for just five minutes. The reception staff were unable to say how long 
Victoria had been sitting alone although Ms Wilkin said she was told it could have 
been up to an hour. Nonetheless, uppermost in Ms Fortune’s mind were health 
and safety concerns for the staff. If, as seemed likely, Victoria had yet to recover 
from her scabies infection then she should have been at home. But this was not an 
observation, nor an incident, that Ms Fortune thought worthwhile to mention to 
Brent Social Services, despite their recent child protection concerns.
4.176   Ms Fortune informed Kouao that her case was closed at Acton and that she would 
have to return to Brent. She also suggested that Kouao seek independent legal 
advice from the Acton Law Centre, which was housed in the Acton area office 
next to the reception area. Ms Fortune’s case file note for 15 July 1999 refers to a 
telephone call that she received from a Mr Armstrong, whom she believed to be 
from the law centre, asking for information and expressing some concern about 
Kouao’s case. Ms Fortune told him that the case was closed and that Kouao was 
now being seen by Brent “due to concerns about Anna”. Yet these were the 
very same concerns which, according to Ms Fortune, had all but been dismissed 
because “the information that we got from Elzanne [Smit] was that it was scabies, 
and the doctor had made a decision”.
4.177   There was therefore no reason, in her view, to let Brent know that Victoria had 
been left alone in the Ealing Social Services office on the day of her discharge 
from the Central Middlesex Hospital. I strongly disagree. Ms Fortune knew that 
as recently as the day before, Brent were investigating potential child protection 
concerns. The proper course of action for Ms Fortune to have taken, while Kouao 
and Victoria were still in the Ealing office, was to telephone Brent Social Services 
there and then to let them know where Victoria was and what had just happened. 
One telephone call ought to have prompted a discussion about what to do next, 
leading ultimately to a meeting between social services officers as to who should 
take on case responsibility in the immediate future. Most likely it would also have 
been the trigger for Ealing to share all the information they already had about the 
family, including Kouao’s lack of co-operation with the assessment process and the 
observations of the Ealing staff as to the relationship between Kouao and Victoria.
4.178  Ms  Fortune’s final action note for 15 July 1999 makes a clear reference to Brent 
having “resumed the case due to their involvement with ‘Anna’ when she was 
admitted to hospital”. Thereafter, neither Ms Fortune, nor anyone else from Ealing 
Social Services, saw Victoria or Kouao again.
4.179   The only reason Kouao was referred to Ealing Social Services was because of 
Victoria’s needs. Yet throughout contact, her needs were largely ignored and 
instead the focus was on Kouao. Victoria was never seen as the client and 
never became the focus of the work in Ealing. This was the start of a pattern of 
social work practice that was to disadvantage Victoria repeatedly over the next 
11 months.4  Ealing Social Services
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Analysis of practice
4.180   This first appearance by Kouao and Victoria at the childcare offices was the start 
of a process which illustrates just how poorly organised the ‘front door’ services in 
Ealing were. The case was passed from worker to worker with differing assumptions 
being made about who had done what and what remained to be done. The 
practice ensured that no supervisory overview was given to Victoria, other than a 
rather brief reactive analysis being offered by the duty senior manager in passing.
Organisational failures
4.181   The capacity of the team to keep track of each of the referrals they were dealing 
with appears to have been dependent upon the memory and diligence of the 
senior staff and a defective system involving baskets, books, A–Z cabinets, pending 
trays, diaries and logs. The case recording throughout was grossly inadequate 
and the likelihood of cases drifting or being lost was high. Indeed, I wonder what 
would have happened had Kouao not repeatedly been knocking at the front door 
of social services? By Ealing’s own admission, the threat of legal action was the 
only reason the case was kept open. Ealing’s main intervention was to give money 
to Kouao for subsistence and to finance her accommodation once she had been 
deemed ineligible for housing by the housing department. Although this response 
was under the Children Act 1989, the reality was that the needs of the child, 
Victoria, were never considered. In fact it was said that homeless families were 
dealt with administratively and not allocated to a social worker. This is entirely 
unacceptable and is bad practice.
4.182   I found it hard to understand the evidence I heard from qualified social workers 
about what they described as a lack of clarity on how they should assess the needs 
of a child and its family. While the National Assessment Framework was published 
more recently, and welcomed, I would have expected qualified social workers at 
the time Victoria needed protection to be capable of completing an assessment of 
her needs. The Children Act 1989 had been implemented in 1991. The forms for 
this purpose were available and senior managers accepted that the tasks had been 
completed. In reality, however, the conversations with Victoria were limited to 
little more than “hello, how are you?”. The only ‘assessment’ completed involved 
the writing down of limited and sometimes contradictory information provided 
by Kouao.
4.183   The overall picture of what happened to Victoria while in Ealing serves to illustrate 
well the effect of drift in social work. No plan of action was ever devised and no 
sense of direction could be identified. Little wonder that the information recorded 
on the file in June 1999 was precisely that which was in the referral two months 
earlier. This ineffective work was no doubt not helped by the confusion in the 
managerial responsibilities and the ad hoc weekly handover arrangements and 
irregular supervision between the team manager and the senior practitioner. 
This is certainly something which should have been sorted out by senior managers. 
The decision was made to close Victoria’s case without seeing or speaking to 
Victoria, and without any indication of how her welfare was to be safeguarded or 
promoted. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that no case involving a vulnerable child 
is closed until the child and the child’s carer have been seen and spoken to, and 
a plan for the ongoing promotion and safeguarding of the child’s welfare has 
been agreed.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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What Ealing Social Services could have recorded
4.184   It is useful to reflect on what Ealing knew, or suspected, about Victoria despite their 
failure to undertake an assessment of her needs. From the documentary evidence 
and other evidence put to this Inquiry that did not always find its way onto the 
case records, the following picture would have emerged under the four areas 
for concern.
4.185   1: The credibility of the story as told by Kouao:
• Kouao and Victoria arrived in London on a travel package, which included 
seven days’ bed and breakfast accommodation. (I suspect an unusual route by a 
homeless family.)
• Kouao had no means to support herself and Victoria for more than a few days.
• Within two days, Kouao had presented herself as a homeless person with 
a young child.
• Kouao said she had left three other children in France, a matter which should 
have resulted in contact with the French authorities.
• Kouao said the reason she came was to improve her English.
• Kouao made it clear she had no immediate intention of returning to France.
• Kouao provided the Ealing duty team social worker with a French social security 
number. Had the social worker contacted the authorities in France, they may 
have heard about the quite serious concerns the school had about the welfare 
of Victoria.
• Kouao claimed she was given financial assistance by French social security to 
travel to London with Victoria, which was never checked.
• Kouao gave a different story to different members of staff in housing and 
social services.
4.186   2: Concerns about Victoria’s appearance:
• Victoria was wearing a wig.
• The photograph of Victoria on the passport was a questionable likeness of her.
• Kouao was very well dressed.
• In contrast, Victoria was shabby and resembled one of the “adverts you see for 
Action Aid”.
• Victoria was said to be small and of “stunted growth”.
• Kouao and Victoria appeared to have a different skin colour.
4.187   3: Concerns about Victoria’s behaviour:
• Kouao was “forceful” and “manipulative” and did not allow Victoria to answer 
questions staff directed to her.
• Social services believed that Victoria was being coached in her reactions.
• When Victoria cried it seemed to be “stage managed”.
• In the office it was noted that Victoria stood silently and did not play with the 
Wendy house or the toys like the other children.
4.188   4: The apparent lack of Kouao’s concern for Victoria’s welfare:
• There did not appear to be any parental warmth from Kouao toward Victoria.
• When a meeting was fixed to perform an assessment of Victoria’s needs, 
unusually Kouao attended without Victoria and she was less than co-operative.
• Despite being in this country for some two months, Victoria still had not been 
registered with a school.
4.189   Each of the above is not of itself a determining factor, but together they indicate 
that Victoria was probably in need of safeguarding. I accept that in a busy office 4  Ealing Social Services
69
dealing with a high number and a wide range of referrals, decisions have to be 
made about likelihood of deliberate harm and urgency. The fact remains that the 
initial reason for Victoria’s referral was for an assessment of her needs and in my 
view enough was known, or was observed about the family during the months 
they spent in Ealing, to have triggered a full assessment of those needs. It is a 
duty placed on social services to assemble and analyse information about children 
who may need to have their welfare safeguarded and promoted. This needs to be 
done in a rigorous way, viewed, as far as possible, through the eyes of the child. 
It certainly needs to be both tough-minded and with an awareness of the ability 
of some adults to mislead and to use children to satisfy their own needs. Had a 
proper assessment been done at that point, it is possible that Victoria would have 
received the necessary protection in Ealing and the other authorities may never 
have been involved. That being so, I reject the implications of a key conclusion 
of the Part 8 review, undertaken in response to the death of Victoria, that “staff 
in Ealing were not aware of any indicators suggesting that Victoria was at risk of 
serious abuse or any indicators of serious deficits in Kouao’s parenting”. Ealing 
were not aware because they undertook no proper assessment of Victoria so that 
they could become aware of her needs.
4.190   Doing the basic things well saves lives. In my view, Ealing failed to meet even 
the elementary standards of childcare practice, and as a result Victoria went 
unprotected. It could have been so different.705 Brent  Social Services
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5 Brent Social Services
The managerial context
5.1       Brent Social Services had the opportunity to help Victoria on two separate 
occasions. The first was on receipt of an anonymous telephone call expressing 
concern about Victoria’s safety in June 1999, while Kouao and Victoria were 
living at 8 Nicoll Road and supported by Ealing Social Services. The second was 
almost a month later, after Kouao and Victoria had moved in with Carl Manning 
at 267 Somerset Gardens. This was when Victoria was taken to the Central 
Middlesex Hospital by her childminder’s daughter, Avril Cameron, with suspected 
non-accidental injuries. Regrettably, at no time during Brent’s brief involvement 
with Victoria did social workers make any connection between these two referrals. 
Indeed, the first time senior managers acknowledged that there had been two 
referrals in relation to Victoria was in February 2001, a year after her death and 
in the month following the criminal trial of Kouao and Manning for her murder. 
Had the link been made at the relevant time it seems highly likely that events in 
Victoria’s life would have taken a very different turn.
5.2       The two referrals found their way to a duty team. The Social Services Inspectorate 
(SSI) in May 2000 assessed this team to be “failing to meet basic requirements for 
an initial response to referrals.” They were operating administrative systems the SSI 
considered to have “broken down” and to be “creating serious risks”. Overall, in 
May 2000 the inspectors found a situation that was “very serious” and a children’s 
services department that “lacked any clear vision or sense of direction”. This did 
not happen overnight.
5.3       Brent has accepted there were serious shortcomings in the practice and in 
professional judgements made at the time, which resulted in missed opportunities 
to help Victoria. If the criticism could be fairly made that senior management took 
its eye off its ‘front door’ children’s services in Ealing, the position in Brent was far 
more deep-rooted – as the SSI May 2000 inspection was to reveal. Mike Boyle, the 
director of social services until April 1999, accepted that he had ‘taken his eye off 
the ball’ in respect of children’s services from 1998.
5.4       In fact, at one stage children were so low in Brent’s priorities that children’s social 
work was not even mentioned in the 1999 Corporate Strategy Update. It was not 
surprising, then, that in May 2000, the SSI could find no up-to-date children’s 
plan. The most recent was dated 1995 and referred to the period 1995–1998. 
The interim child protection procedures were still considered ‘interim’, despite 
being over four years old. Jenny Goodall, Brent’s new director of social services 
appointed in April 2000, went further and said, “I think there was a period when 
social services [my emphasis] somehow slipped below the horizon.” Therefore, 
I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Chief executives and lead members of local authorities with social services 
responsibilities must ensure that children’s services are explicitly included in 
their authority’s list of priorities and operational plans.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
72
5.5       Responsibility for this sorry state of affairs rests squarely with Brent’s council 
members, chief executive Gareth Daniel, and his senior social services officers. 
Mr Daniel said in evidence both politicians and management accepted that in 1999 
they had plainly not done enough for children in Brent. This does little more than 
state the obvious – especially as the SSI May 2000 inspection was preceded by 
critical SSI inspections into the safety of children looked after in February 1998 and 
Brent’s child protection services in September 1996. The latter inspection warned 
of serious deficiencies in child protection practice and urged a “re-prioritising of 
management endeavour” so as to “increase the level of direct support, advice and 
direction to team managers and social workers until such time as practice achieves 
a consistently good standard”.
5.6       In 1998, the SSI identified an absence of workload management systems in the 
social work teams and said workload pressures had worsened. They warned, 
“These pressures could, if allowed to continue or deteriorate, reduce workers 
ability to identify and address safety issues for children.”
5.7       Mr Daniel, who was appointed to his position in September 1998 after being the 
acting chief executive from May 1998, said of himself, “I am a general strategic 
manager for the authority and that is my discrete role. It is not my role to be a 
surrogate for the people that I directly manage.” Mr Daniel then explained that 
he discharged his responsibilities by “making sure that the resources are available, 
the proper checks are in place and that we appoint people in whom we have 
confidence to discharge the statutory responsibilities which I have to reinforce”.
5.8       In my view, other parts of the evidence of Mr Daniel cast some doubt on this 
assertion. Looking specifically at social services and children’s social work, 
Mr Daniel said that he thought the leadership at a high level in the social services 
department during 1998, 1999 and 2000 was “seriously defective”, with staff 
being “poorly managed and poorly led”. He said, “My impression of the social 
services department from a professional distance [my emphasis] in the town 
hall is [that] there were a lot of good front-line staff working in that department 
putting in very long hours, and there were senior managers who were certainly 
doing all of those things, but I did not feel confident that they were providing 
the strategic leadership for the department that it needs.” As to how the lack of 
good management affected the way children in Brent were looked after and cared 
for, Mr Daniel said, “I do not think it assisted the process. I mean, I think the 
endeavours of front-line staff probably rescued us from a lot of crises which may 
potentially have arisen. We were very heavily dependent on the integrity and the 
commitment of those front-line staff.”
5.9       In my view, the chief executive can exercise considerable influence on the quality 
and effectiveness of front-line social work, and indeed has a responsibility to do so. 
In the particular circumstances in which Mr Daniel found himself in Brent, he failed 
(during the period with which I am concerned) to address the shortage of staff in the 
children’s services and to implement the recommendations of the SSI reports of 1996 
and 1998. He also failed to ensure these services were adequately funded. These were 
all matters which had a major impact on the children’s services, for which Mr Daniel 
must take personal responsibility. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
The Department of Health should require chief executives of local authorities 
with social services responsibilities to prepare a position statement on the 
true picture of the current strengths and weaknesses of their ‘front door’ duty 
systems for children and families. This must be accompanied by an action plan 
setting out the timescales for remedying any weaknesses identified. 5  Brent Social Services
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5.10     A fair assessment of the performance of front-line staff in Brent at the time Victoria 
needed protection has to be made against the backdrop of the dysfunctional and 
administratively chaotic children’s service in which they were expected to work.
Structure of children’s social work
5.11     In 1999, Brent senior management team was structured as follows:
• Gareth Daniel, chief executive
• Mike Boyle, director of social services (and later Ronald Ludgate)
• Lucille Thomas, director of children’s social work services
• Branton Bamford, assistant director for finance and administration
• David Charlett, service manager for the duty team and the child protection and 
investigation team.
5.12     Brent children’s social services had two initial assessment teams. These were the 
duty team and the child protection investigation and assessment team (child 
protection team) – and six teams that were allocated cases on a long-term basis. 
The duty team was the first team to consider referrals received about children, 
though this was complicated by the fact that many of these came through Brent’s 
One Stop Shops. If the referral raised issues of ‘a child in need’, the case would 
remain in the duty team for initial assessment. But if it was agreed that it contained 
child protection concerns, it would be transferred to the child protection team. 
Both of these teams were assisted by a duty administrative team, which would log 
the referrals into a database and complete checks to find out whether the child was 
known to the borough. 
5.13     The duty child protection and duty administrative teams shared an open-plan 
office on the ground floor of the children’s social work building. I heard evidence 
that the building was “overcrowded”, “grotty”, and “neglected”. The SSI in 2000 
said the accommodation for duty work needed to be improved to meet health 
and safety requirements. The manager of the duty team, Edward Armstrong, and 
the manager of the child protection team, Tina Roper, shared a small office at the 
end of the room. The seven duty social workers including Lori Hobbs, Kate Thrift 
and Yolande Viljoen (née Hurter), worked at one side of the room and the six child 
protection social workers were stationed at the opposite side of the room.
5.14     At the time Victoria’s case was handled by Brent, all the duty social workers 
had received their training abroad and were on temporary contracts. Several 
workers in the child protection team were also recruited on a temporary basis. 
The fact that so many staff in the initial assessment teams were agency staff had 
important consequences to which I shall return later in paragraphs 5.59 to 5.61. 
The two duty senior social workers were Monica Bridgeman and Pauline Phillips, 
and the two child protection seniors were Michelle Hines and Christina Austin. 
The group administrative officer was Robert Smith. Martin Punch was one of the 
administrative support workers. Unlike other boroughs, Brent did not deploy any 
of its social workers at local hospitals.
The duty team
5.15     Mr Boyle was frank in his evidence to the Inquiry on the state of the duty team. 
Looking back, he said it was clear to him now that “the duty team began to 
unravel during 1998 and 1999. The attention of senior managers was elsewhere 
and as a consequence the service declined to a point that was unacceptable”. 
He believed Victoria’s case demonstrated “individual, collective and institutional 
failures in the system [which were] intended to ensure that the needs of the most 
vulnerable children are met”.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Workload
5.16     Counsel for Brent acknowledged that the duty team was undoubtedly “a team 
under pressure, over busy, very short of permanent and experienced staff” and 
Mr Armstrong pointed out that in 1999 the pressure was particularly acute because 
of the increase in the number of asylum seekers. Ms Viljoen described the duty 
team as “very busy”. She said, “The phones would ring constantly.” Mr Punch said 
the duty team was “very, very swamped with work”. Mr Armstrong said, “It was 
concerning to look at working with between 200 to 300-odd cases per week that 
was in the backlog system.” Given the caseload in June and July 1999, he said that 
he barely had time for lunch, let alone to stand back within his office and look at 
the systems the duty team worked under.
5.17     Mr Armstrong dated the beginning of the influx of unaccompanied asylum seekers 
to 1999. By then, he said, “We lost our ability to be social workers [my emphasis] 
because of the time we had to spend dealing with asylum seekers – there were no 
additional resources to cope with it.” Mr Armstrong estimated that in June and July 
1999 he was dealing with at least 15 referrals in relation to intentionally homeless 
people and asylum seekers each week, and that at least 50 per cent of social 
workers’ time would be spent working on cases of unaccompanied minors. By May 
2000, the SSI found that duty staff were overwhelmed with cases of homeless 
people and were required to spend up to 80 per cent of their time working on what 
might be considered housing and homelessness issues. I can only question, and not 
for the first time as will become clear, why Brent’s senior management team failed 
to act more quickly to protect the ‘front door’ of their children’s services.
Bottleneck of cases
5.18     Even more significant than the increase in numbers coming through social services’ 
door was the inability of the duty team to pass cases on to the long-term teams, 
after the initial work had been completed. Mr Armstrong described how every 
Wednesday morning he would attend allocation meetings with the assistant 
directors and the child protection team to refer cases for allocation to the long-term 
teams. He said, “It had become a common theme for me to go to the allocation 
meeting with cases for allocation to a ‘long-term’ team, only to return with the 
same cases because there was insufficient resource availability in long-term teams to 
deal with the cases.” He added, “It was something that went on, not for months, 
for years.” Ms Roper confirmed that the relevant assistant directors and occasionally 
Ms Thomas would attend the allocation meeting, so they were perfectly well aware 
of the difficulty and the bottleneck in allocating cases to the long-term teams.
5.19     The effect on the duty team staff was immense. Ms Hobbs said it was a “major 
problem”, which “was frustrating because there was little let-up”. This bottleneck of 
cases meant that duty workers would have to carry out work that should have been 
done in the long-term teams in addition to each day’s new referrals. For Mr Armstrong, 
the pressures reached such a pitch that he said, “It got to the point where I actually 
filled the boot of my car every Friday evening to take cases home, in order to get them 
up to date, bring them up to date and still report to senior management about what 
was happening.” To do this Mr Armstrong said he needed Ms Thomas’s permission.
Management knowledge
5.20     Mr Armstrong did not, however, suffer in silence. He raised his concerns about the 
workload pressures and staffing with his superiors on a number of occasions. He 
said, “I would mention it to all the senior managers that I came into contact with, 
but it got to the point where I felt it was because I kept on doing the work, and was 
not falling off sick or going off sick for months on end, that it became acceptable 
to senior management.” Ms Bridgeman said she also reported her concerns to 
members of the senior management team on numerous occasions. She said, 
“We were constantly working in a crisis situation. Senior management knew this.”5  Brent Social Services
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5.21     Mr Charlett, when discussing the problem of allocating child protection cases 
to the long-term teams, said, “We could not stop work coming into the office, 
but on the other hand, it seemed to be blocked at that point, and there was no 
way I could – I had no authority to order people in the other teams to take on 
cases.” It is difficult to credit a more ineffectual management response, despite 
Brent’s action plan following the 1996 SSI inspection stating that they should take 
measures to reduce pressures on team managers. Mr Armstrong said, “Nothing 
was done to relieve the pressure. Instead the pressure increased.”
Faxed referrals
5.22     During the summer of 1999, the duty team also appeared to have let slip vital 
administrative functions. Although the administrative team was a separate unit, 
there was considerable overlap between the functions and operation of the two 
teams, and often a confusion as to which team bore the responsibility for particular 
tasks. One area of contention was the collection and distribution of faxed referrals 
and other important communications received by the children’s social work team. 
In his evidence, Mr Armstrong painted a graphic picture of faxes at times streaming 
on the floor and nobody picking them up. It was not a description that others in 
the duty team recognised, though Ms Bridgeman acknowledged she was aware of 
significant delays in the distribution of faxes on one or two occasions. When asked 
why he himself did not do something about it, Mr Armstrong said, “It was not my 
job to pick up the fax from the fax machine. It was not my role. I had other things 
to do.” He did, however, complain to administrative colleagues about the problem.
Cases going missing
5.23     The evidence relating to the tracking of cases within the duty and administrative 
teams raised further serious concerns. According to Mr Armstrong, more than one 
case was going missing every day and it was obviously difficult to monitor what 
was going on in the missing cases: “Some files were misplaced and some were 
never found.” Mr Smith believed that it had been known for files to go missing and 
never reappear, though this was not his personal experience. Mr Punch wrote in a 
later memo: “Retrieving files has become like the ‘National Lottery’ with the same 
odds for finding files.” It was Mr Punch’s view that the high number of systems in 
use at the time only contributed to the problem. There were just too many routes 
and locations in which files could be lost.
5.24     There can be little doubt the duty system was in administrative chaos in 1999. 
Instead of senior management taking urgent steps to remedy the sources of the 
problems, the duty team was left to devise its own ad hoc solutions that included 
introducing a number of manual logging systems. Mr Armstrong said there was no 
way in which information could be matched up between the books they used. For 
example, the duty book “would not give us as much information as we require, 
but it will let us know that that file has been in the system, is in the system, but is 
now missing”. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must devise and implement a system which provides 
them with the following information about the work of the duty teams for 
which they are responsible:
• number of children referred to the teams;
• number of those children who have been assessed as requiring a service;
• number of those children who have been provided with the service that 
they require;
• number of children referred who have identified needs which have yet to be met.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Supervision and monitoring
5.25     With the heavy work pressure and the presence of so many agency staff, good 
supervision and support was essential. The agency social workers spoke highly of 
the supervision and support they received from their seniors and team manager 
while at Brent, but this was not carried through at more senior levels. In relation to 
his supervision of the senior social workers in his team, Mr Armstrong said, “Due 
to the volume of cases which we were handling, supervision arrangements slipped 
and certainly did not occur on a monthly basis.” He was supposed to have monthly 
supervision meetings with Mr Charlett but Mr Armstrong said he could not say 
how often these actually occurred, other than to point out they were less regular 
than monthly. Ms Roper said she found Mr Charlett’s supervision to be supportive, 
but pointed out that his recent experience of child protection matters was limited.
5.26     In view of the regular turnover of staff, the monitoring of the quality of the 
work carried out should, in my opinion, have been a top priority. In fact what 
actually occurred in Brent was just the reverse. As Mr Armstrong pointed out, 
it was obviously difficult to monitor work in the cases that were lost. In his 
written statement Mr Charlett said, “Monitoring arrangements included case 
records monitoring, the system of regular staff/case supervision through the line 
management system, random monitoring of cases by supervisors/managers, 
statistical analysis of referrals and caseloads.” However, when specifically 
questioned on this, Mr Charlett made a somewhat unconvincing attempt to 
outline these processes in practice and it became clear that there were no formal 
procedures in place, or at least none used by him, to monitor cases. On the other 
hand, Ms Roper said that she would monitor the progress of cases in the child 
protection team and that she carried out an audit of cases once every fortnight.
5.27     Despite written procedures in the Brent Quality Protects Management Action Plan 
1999–2000 requiring assistant directors to produce quarterly reports on individual 
cases, Mr Charlett said he could not recall producing such reports routinely for the 
director of children’s social work. When it was suggested to him that the systems 
of monitoring and supervision of cases within his department were inadequate, 
Mr Charlett said that he would have to agree, up to a point. He said, “Certainly 
they were not what I would have liked, and what would have been desirable, but 
as I have pointed out, there were lots of difficulties with regard to covering just the 
day-to-day work.” Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that senior managers inspect, at least 
once every three months, a random selection of case files and supervision notes.
Child protection team
5.28     Despite a very heavy workload and several temporary social workers, in contrast 
to other teams in the children’s social work unit, Mr Charlett observed, “The child 
protection team was always more stable, it had ... more of a team quality about 
it, and it was a team where other social workers wanted to join.” Mr Charlett said 
he had a great deal of confidence in Ms Roper and the other workers in the team. 
Child protection team members themselves said they thought it was a supportive 
team, with a good manager. Mr Charlett was also of the opinion that the team 
was capable of managing its workload. This may in part have been because the 
administrative and the long-term teams would prioritise the cases above those 
concerning children in need. In fact, Ms Roper said that on occasion she would 
volunteer at allocation meetings to keep some of her cases, in an effort to allow 
some duty cases to be allocated. 5  Brent Social Services
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5.29     Mr Charlett said that all child protection workers were meant to follow a seven-
day modular course, but that agency workers were less able to pursue training 
courses. Although it was not something he agreed with, Mr Charlett said, “There 
was certainly a feeling that it was sometimes a waste of time training agency 
staff.” Yet these were the very same workers whose task it was to assess the most 
vulnerable of Brent’s children, those for whom it had already been decided, rightly 
or wrongly, that there were clear child protection concerns.
5.30     Ms Roper said that she would meet with any new worker to the team and talk 
them through the processes and systems of the child protection team and they 
would initially co-work with other members of the team. However, there was no 
formal induction process in place. Ms Hines said she personally had not received 
any induction and whether or not locum workers who joined more recently 
received an induction depended upon the staffing of the department at the time. 
Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that all staff who work with children 
have received appropriate vocational training, receive a thorough induction in 
local procedures and are obliged to participate in regular continuing training so 
as to ensure that their practice is kept up to date.
Effect of workload on administration
5.31     The increased workload in the two initial assessment teams, particularly the duty 
team, had a knock-on effect on the duty administrative team. Yet Brent’s response 
was to understaff this department as well. According to Mr Bamford, there were 
three members of the administrative team during the relevant period, but one 
of these three was off sick. He said that the previous fourth position had been 
notionally frozen. When the third staff member went on sick leave, Mr Bamford said 
he discussed whether to get in additional temporary help. But after considering the 
time it would take to train someone and that they might stay only a short time, 
Mr Smith agreed to cover until Brent Social Services’ Finance and Administration 
Department had a better idea of the length of the sick leave.
5.32     Mr Bamford said he was unaware of any administration problems at the time, 
other than the staffing issues. While he acknowledged that “things were not run 
as smoothly as one would hope”, he seemed totally unaware of any backlog at the 
time in question and thought that if there were any problems these should have 
been brought to his attention.
5.33     I found Mr Bamford’s ignorance of the problems facing the team to be surprising. 
The administrative problems were numerous and glaring. In addition to the 
backlog of referral details waiting to be inputted because of staff shortages, 
the absence of a common database in social services meant that administrative 
staff had to complete checks on five or more different databases. As the duty 
administrative team staff did not have direct access to most of these, the time 
taken to complete a check was unnecessarily lengthened, which just added to the 
workload. Child protection cases were prioritised but the backlog meant that cases 
not yet on the system could not be easily searched. Mr Armstrong said referrals 
that were initially or wrongly categorised as ‘child in need’ but later transpired to 
have child protection issues, were almost inevitably caught up in this administrative 
delay, making it harder and slower to detect and remedy any mistake, as happened 
in Victoria’s case.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Administrative backlog
5.34     According to Mr Punch, “People were struggling in a very difficult environment.” 
Ms Hobbs said she could remember cases piled high and thought the 
administration staff were under more stress than anyone. Others described the 
team as “relentlessly overworked” and “overburdened”. Records for June 1999, the 
month of Victoria’s first referral to Brent, showed that only 107 referrals (42 per 
cent) were logged onto the system within one working week, and 41 (16 per cent) 
took between four and 12 weeks. Mr Armstrong said, “I complained week in, week 
out to the administrative officers about the backlog, about getting people to come 
in and clear the backlog, because the backlog was getting so high it was actually 
hiding the administrative staff from the rest of the team.” Nor did this situation 
appear to be temporary either. In May 2000, the SSI inspected a duty area where 
there were “hundreds of case files that had not been administratively processed, 
going back four to five months”. Staff, therefore, had to rely on their memories 
to link new contacts with past contacts, and there was no system to ensure that 
repeat contacts were linked and patterns of referrals identified and responded to.
5.35     Other problems relating to the duty administrative team were raised in abundance. 
Ms Bridgeman said that due to work pressures, the administrative team did not 
make up a whole file for the duty workers. Instead they just received the duty 
manager’s action sheet, the administrative checks sheet and the referral.
5.36     Mr Punch also identified the problems of inadequate filing space and the unusual 
system of filing by problem type, rather than by the person’s name. On the 
basis of the evidence of Mr Armstrong, there appears to have been almost a 
complete absence of filing closed cases. Mr Armstrong said that when a file was 
closed and the administrative officers had input the necessary information on 
the database, “Instead of the files being taken from the duty room direct to the 
archive room, they were just put in a corner or on desks around the office, until 
the administrative officers had time available on their hands to get them up there, 
which could take months. I have known files which took years to get upstairs.”
Management responsibility
5.37     As team manager for the duty team, Mr Armstrong was clear that he had no 
management responsibility for the administration team or over its systems, yet he 
was dependent on them for the logging in of referrals, the checking of databases, 
and the issuing of appointments, which were fundamental to the smooth operation 
of his duty team. Mr Armstrong said, “Looking back, maybe I should have taken 
the view to go above the heads of my senior managers, and possibly maybe as far 
as the chief executive.”
5.38     I heard much evidence in support of his opinion. Although the administration 
failings in Brent deserve my criticism in full, I do not direct this at the individual 
administration workers. Mr Punch, for one, appears to have been conscientious 
and hard-working and to have tried his best in the impossible situation 
management put him in. Mr Punch considered the position so fragile that even 
as late as September 2000, seven months after Victoria’s death, he wrote a 
lengthy plea to Mimi Konigsberg, the new assistant director for children’s services, 
Mr Bamford and Mr Smith. He outlined his grave concerns and suggested ways 
in which improvements could be made. In general, he spoke of a particularly 
“difficult, frustrating and depressing period of work” during which he had become 
disheartened because he felt he was part of a function rather than a team. He said, 
“The work of duty admin has generally been under-resourced, unsupported, 
unappreciated and not fully understood by other staff members and even by 
management.” It was not until the instigation of this Inquiry, and some 14 
months after he sent his memo, that he finally received a substantive reply from 
Ms Konigsberg. It therefore came as no surprise to me that the SSI wrote in 2000, 5  Brent Social Services
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“Communication in the past had been too much top down and staff needed 
to be listened to and their contribution to the development of the department 
recognised and supported.”
Financial pressures
5.39     Part of the explanation of how and why Brent children’s social work teams had 
fallen into such a state of disarray must lie with the legacy of past council decisions, 
and a corporate structure designed to deal with their persistent financial pressures.
5.40     Mr Daniel said, “I think children’s social work was under-funded, I think social 
services were under-funded, and I think Brent council was under-funded.” Mr Boyle 
believed that the primary difficulties were Brent’s historic debt that had to be met 
from revenue funds, the under-funding by government of adult community care 
services, the inadequate level of council reserves, and the failure of the government 
grant to keep pace with the real costs of inflation. As such, Mr Boyle said he 
thought the council was effectively bankrupt. It had no ability at all to respond to 
any significant variations in service demands and was managing in a “financially 
impossible position”.
5.41     The implications were severe. In 1997/1998, the overall social services budget 
was fixed at 4.4 per cent below the Government’s Standard Spending Assessment 
(SSA), while the average total spending on social services in England was 
8.3 per cent above the SSA. Brent was the second lowest spending authority in 
London. Children’s services were particularly badly hit. In the financial year 
1998/1999, Brent had a children’s SSA of £28.12m (as against £26.5m in the 
previous year), but the actual spend was only about £14.5m, up barely £250,000 
on the year before. Mr Boyle, who was the director of social services at the time, 
said he felt “extreme concern and unhappiness” about only being allowed to 
spend half the SSA. In 1999/2000, the SSA itself decreased by almost £7.5m to 
£20.65m as a result of the Government’s decision to remove ethnicity from the 
assessment formula. This sorely affected Brent, which has a substantial ethnic 
minority population. Mr Daniel described his oversight of the budget as a “baptism 
of fire” because of the reduction of £7.5m and a budget deficit of £17.5m that he 
had to try to bridge. Yet he could not dispute that, even with the reduction, the 
council was still not spending the SSA on children’s social work.
5.42     Politicians and management were keen to submit that the SSA was a notional 
figure or formula for distributing money, rather than being prescriptive as to 
what the council should spend. Councillor Mary Cribbin said that there was 
real deprivation in the borough and that the budgeting process was therefore 
a “balancing act” between competing concerns. As a result, while spending on 
children’s social work was under the SSA, other units were being funded in excess 
of their designated SSA. I address the issues concerning spending in relation to 
Government-set SSA’s elsewhere in this Report. It is enough to say here that I 
heard no evidence from Brent’s senior managers or lead council members to show 
that they could justify spending so little on children’s services during the relevant 
period. In fact, it became clear that wherever the money was going, the adequate 
provision of children’s services was certainly not one of the council’s priorities. 
5.43     The social services committee certainly could not claim it was unaware of the 
implications of budget decisions or of the problems surfacing in children’s social 
work. Mr Boyle said, “There was a corporate understanding that social services 
was financially very challenged indeed.” There were the critical SSI reports in both 
1996 and 1998 and the committee regularly received information from its officers. 
Mr Boyle, as director of social services, wrote to the social services committee on 
4 March 1999. In his letter he outlined the likely impact of the council’s decisions, 
since September 1998, to reduce the spending plans of the committee by £4m. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Mr Boyle pointed out that the managed reduction in spending had resulted in 
“severe pressures and stresses” including long-term illnesses and absences among 
a number of service unit directors and front-line staff. He said that social services 
were carrying vacancies in all teams and the Area Child Protection Committee 
(ACPC) had been advised for the first time in many years that there were 
unallocated child protection cases. Mr Boyle’s letter continued:
“Your officers advised that it is not possible for these savings to be 
achieved from ‘salami-slicing’ and there will be significant and serious 
implications for service delivery. I[n] some instances, we may be 
expecting staff to manage risks which are unacceptable and dangerous. 
Your officers fully appreciate the circumstances facing the Council 
but setting unachievable savings targets will not assist you, or the 
Committee, in meeting the objectives of the Council.”
5.44     The message could not have been clearer. However compelling the financial 
pressures may have been at the time, they could not, in my view, excuse the 
failure of Brent’s council and senior management to address the problems in 
their children’s services that had become so evident in the late 1990s.
Structure and business units
5.45     I was told that alongside the financial pressures, Brent’s other legacy from the 
previous administration was its corporate structure. The council had been split 
into ‘core units’ with corporate and strategic responsibilities, ‘commissioning 
units’ that dealt with needs analysis and service planning, and most importantly 
‘business units’ that were responsible for service delivery. Ms Goodall said that this 
structure “did away with everything that I think you would recognise as traditional 
local government”. She said at one point there were nine different business units 
in children’s social work and they were all semi-autonomous, operating without 
traditional line management responsibilities. Although the new administration 
sought to alter this framework, Ms Goodall observed: “Brent Social Services really 
had not sort of thrown off the old business unit culture. And to a great extent 
there was not a departmental culture, there were lots of separate managers, really, 
doing their own thing.” In Mr Boyle’s view, “Many of the difficulties, financial 
and operational, encountered in later years arose from the inherent weakness in 
these structures established during 1993/1994 and 1994/1995.” He said, “Over a 
period, the lack of accountability became apparent, complex cases were not dealt 
with properly, and financially many social services units were not able to make a 
corporate contribution without compromising the safety of the service.”
5.46     A clear example of the failings of the independent business units was the absence 
of a common database throughout the whole of social services, let alone the 
whole council. In 1993, the main system in use was the Social Services Information 
Database (SSID) and this continued to be the predominant database used by 
adult social services and the One Stop Shops. In May 1996, when Mr Bamford 
arrived in children’s social work, the department had no connection to SSID after 
a corporate decision had been made to discard it. He believed that parts of social 
services were meant to make their own alternative arrangements. In so doing, and 
because SSID was not generally considered by Brent to be an easy system to use 
nor did it lend itself to reporting information on children, Mr Bamford decided that 
children’s social work would use Filemaker as their primary database. This database 
was only accessible by administration and not practitioner staff. In addition to 
Filemaker, Mr Punch, who was responsible for inputting practically all the child 
protection referrals, had his own system specifically catering for child protection 
cases. Mr Bamford explained that the operation of five or more different systems in 
social services “was not an ideal situation”, with the consequence that telephone 
calls would have to be made to different departments to find out whether or not 5  Brent Social Services
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a family was known. Worse still, the out-of-office-hours team, which operated the 
out-of-office hours social work, could only consult the child protection register 
and had no access to either the SSID or Filemaker database to find out whether 
children not on the register were known to Brent. It was not until September 1999 
that SSID was actually reintroduced to children’s services, and the out-of-office-
hours team and practitioner staff could access this information. Therefore, I make 
the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Local authority chief executives must ensure that only one electronic database 
system is used by all those working in children and families’ services for 
the recording of information. This should be the same system in use across 
the council, or at least compatible with it, so as to facilitate the sharing of 
information, as appropriate.
Staff reductions
5.47     Accompanying the introduction of the business units was a reduction of general, 
non-operational support services. Mr Daniel described the devolved culture in 
Brent by saying:
“On the whole we have a minimalist corporate centre – as a deliberate 
policy choice between 1991 and 1996, support services in the authority 
were stripped down to the bare minimum, and that meant quite a lot 
of central support functions, particularly in areas like HR or information 
gathering, were either reduced to a skeletal basis or eliminated 
altogether ... a lot of our capacity to gather information about the 
organisation became somewhat limited.” 
At a departmental level, by the late 1990s Mr Ludgate said that social services had 
lost all of its human resources and training staff. 
5.48     According to Mr Boyle, “A further feature of the new arrangements was a general 
belief that the council, and social services, was over-managed. Consequently, 
significant reductions were made in non-operational budgets resulting in the loss 
of a number of key management posts.” The effect was to significantly reduce the 
strategic and management capacity of the organisation. The posts of both senior 
policy manager for children’s services and the service development director were 
frozen or deleted in late 1997. According to Mr Boyle, by 1997 the effects of this 
policy prompted the then chief executive to describe the council as suffering from 
“institutional anorexia”. Reductions nevertheless continued and as a result, when 
practice began to deteriorate, Mr Boyle said, “The management infrastructure was 
not in place to identify that that was happening.”
5.49     Front-line children’s services did not escape the cutbacks. Despite increasing 
pressures on the department, in August 1997, service reductions resulted in 10 
children’s social work posts being deleted and a further 13 vacancies frozen. The 
SSI in 1998 recognised that “Staff reductions had had a debilitating effect.” From 
inside, Ms Roper observed, “The whole of Brent children’s social work was running 
with a large number of vacancies.” In June 1998, the director of social services 
reported to the Committee: “Eight social workers have been recruited to ease 
caseload pressures and to reduce the number of unallocated cases.” However, 
overall that only placed the council, in the words of Councillor Cribbin, “down 
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Difficulties of senior management
5.50     In his evidence, Mr Daniel was critical of the strategic leadership of the directors 
of social services and of children’s social services at the time.
5.51     Certainly Ms Thomas, as director of children’s services, held a key position in the 
management framework. The absence of a witness statement and her inability 
to give evidence to this Inquiry due to ill health has made it more difficult to 
assess fairly her contribution to the state of affairs in Brent’s children’s services. 
Ms Thomas’s ill health also caused her to be absent from work on sick leave for five 
or six weeks during the summer of 1999. I heard evidence that as non-front-line 
posts were deleted from children’s social work, Ms Thomas, along with other 
managers, were consequently expected to carry a much larger and more varied 
workload, in her case a workload that was both strategic and operational. Brent’s 
Management Action Plan in mid 1999 was heavily criticised by the SSI, in particular 
reflecting that the service “lacked any clear vision or sense of direction”. The 
previous post of senior policy officer for children’s services had been deleted, 
and Mr Daniel considered this to have created a “critical weakness” in the senior 
structure of the department. I can only assume this was a view he held with 
hindsight, otherwise once again I am left asking why he did nothing about it once 
in post as chief executive.
5.52     Mr Boyle, talking of his time as director of social services, said, “Throughout 
1998/1999, most senior management time was spent on financial matters, either 
in trying to align actual spending with the budget available, or in making plans to 
deal with the financial shortfall in 1999/2000.” Mr Boyle said that he thought the 
turning point came in 1998 when “Social services senior managers began to take 
on more and more work and took their eye off the ball, I think particularly with 
the director of children’s social work services ... because of the extra work that she 
was required to do ... as a consequence ... strong management attention on the 
service, which the SSI pointed out in 1996 was required, did not occur and the 
service deteriorated from that point onwards.” Mr Boyle said that he had “very 
serious concerns” about what was happening in social services in 1998/1999, “not 
just with children’s services ... but also with the increasing effect of concentrating 
social services provision, both in children and on adults, on those at the most 
risk”. Looking back, he said, “In truth, the funding problems for Brent and in social 
services were there even before I arrived. I was just unable to stop the position 
deteriorating year on year.”
5.53     Despite his own admission that it took him some time to “come up to speed” with 
children’s social services as it was not his “area”, Mr Ludgate (appointed acting 
director of social services in April 1999) appeared to be well aware of the problems 
facing children’s social services. The level of children’s services they were able to 
provide caused him concern because of:
• the very high proportion of agency and temporary workers;
• the imbalance of too many complicated cases and too few experienced social 
workers;
• not having the training and development staff to bring locum workers up to 
speed fast enough on policies and procedures;
• the fact that child protection and children-looked-after cases were being held by 
teams without appropriate manpower. 
Mr Ludgate said, “Managers and social workers were responding to the highest 
need and highest risk presenting at the time.” 5  Brent Social Services
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Staffing problems
5.54     In March 1999, following a series of meetings between the SSI, council members 
and senior managers, Brent council accepted proposals involving the release of 
£170,000 from reserves in 1999/2000 and £250,000 in 2000/2001 into children’s 
social services. The extra funds were in part to improve the infrastructure of 
children’s services, to re-establish the post of assistant director for children’s 
services and positions within human resources, to appoint three family support 
workers, and to pay for scarcity and honorarium payments. Mr Daniel said, “At the 
time, I have to say that was a very difficult decision for the members to take, given 
the overall financial position of the council, and the low level of our reserves, so 
it was a very significant tide of political commitment, I think, to start at least the 
process of addressing the problems that were beginning to be identified.” In fact, 
as shall become clear, it was a matter of ‘too little too late’.
Recruitment difficulties
5.55     In view of the staffing crisis, Mr Ludgate said that during his tenure as acting 
director he “was willing to pay for any social worker we could get hold of. So no 
posts were being frozen in terms of operational staff”. But the decision to recruit 
was only the start. Filling posts was not so simple. Difficulties in recruiting social 
workers was a London-wide problem, but Brent was particularly badly affected 
because of the terms and conditions offered. Also, according to Mr Charlett, 
“There was a residual kind of perception of Brent as not a very attractive place to 
come to, so I think you were starting with a disadvantage anyway.”
5.56     In May 1999, the issue was discussed by the Area Child Protection Committee 
(ACPC) as the staffing crisis was contributing to the number of unallocated cases. 
Dr Bridget Edwards, the Brent ACPC vice chair, subsequently wrote to Councillor 
Cribbin on 8 June 1999 “to express serious concerns about children’s social work 
unit’s ability to recruit and retain qualified and experienced social workers”. 
Dr Edwards said:
“You’ll be aware that recruitment and retention of staff in children’s 
social services have been a problem for quite some time now. However, 
it seems there has been a particularly high level of staff turnover in 
the past few weeks, not helped I think by the introduction of new pay 
and conditions of services, on top of the already low level of London 
weighting payments in Brent.”
Dr Edwards continued:
“As safety of children is an important issue when cases remain to be 
allocated, I wonder if you would consider improving the existing package 
of pay and conditions to enable children’s social services to attract new 
staff as well as to keep experienced staff.” 
Dr Edwards could not recall receiving a reply to her letter. This was further 
evidence of the lack of impact of ACPCs.
Uncompetitive salaries
5.57     It appears that Brent council did little to help itself ease the problem. In 1999, along 
with other local authorities across the country, Brent was required to implement 
the ‘single status agreement’ which equalised the terms and conditions of existing 
manual and office staff. However, the decision was taken that new staff coming to 
Brent should not receive the higher London weighting. Instead the inner-London 
weighting was preserved for existing staff by way of “honorarium payments”. 
Mr Charlett said, “This was obviously not very attractive to people from outside ... 
I thought it was plainly ridiculous, but that was part of the council’s cost cutting The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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– saving strategy. So that made it difficult with agencies who frankly told us we were 
uncompetitive in the job market.” He added, “It meant there was a kind of two tier 
system ... but it also meant that compared to neighbouring boroughs, Brent was 
paying less money and expecting people to work longer hours, in arguably worse 
conditions. It seemed to me quite a potent factor, if I had been looking for a job 
myself.” Councillor Cribbin disagreed: “We made a political decision because of 
financial restraints, and it was a method of saving money.” She said that she did 
not think “that a matter of a few hundred pounds would be a deterrent to a social 
worker coming to work in a borough”.
5.58     Brent was not alone in experiencing problems with the recruitment and retention 
of social workers. Evidence as to the scale of the problem emerged clearly in Phase 
Two of this Inquiry, as well as from looking at social services provision in Ealing and 
Haringey. While pay and conditions were clearly a factor, albeit not the only factor, 
I question whether this at least might be addressed through the implementation of 
a national pay structure.
Agency staff
5.59     The approach taken by Brent, ironically designed to save money, led to the 
recruitment of a large number of agency staff, costing approximately 30 to 
40 per cent more per employee than permanent staff. When asked about the 
recruitment of temporary staff, Councillor Cribbin said, unconvincingly, one of 
the reasons Brent was not able to fill the vacancies was because “we had decided 
we were only going to employ the best staff”. This was perhaps an unrealistic 
goal for a council offering among the worst pay and conditions in London. 
A comprehensive recruitment package was not finalised in Brent until October 2001.
5.60     The teams most affected were the duty and child protection teams because Brent 
Social Services had made a policy decision in 1996 that in an effort to ensure that 
all long-term cases were held by permanent social workers, it would manage the 
initial duty response through agency and temporary staff where necessary. As a 
result, Mr Armstrong said the duty team he managed, in mid 1999 at a time of 
high workload pressures and when the two referrals relating to Victoria passed 
through his team, was staffed entirely by agency workers who had not qualified 
in England. He agreed it was not acceptable to have people on short-term 
contracts at the front-line of contact with very vulnerable children but said, “It was 
what we were doing and what we were working. There were occasions where a 
person will get off a plane in the morning, arrive in the office just after lunch, be 
interviewed and start work either in the duty team or the child protection team. 
It was happening very, very often.” Mr Charlett said, “I thought the fundamental 
problem was there were just not the resources available. There were just not the 
people there that stayed long enough for the continuity that was desirable, and 
to familiarise themselves properly with the work, and become a true team ... it 
seemed to me that there were obvious disadvantages in having a team composed 
of people who are purely agency staff.” 
5.61     Mr Charlett’s concerns at the time were well justified. Because of the bottleneck 
in passing cases on to the long-term teams, the very same short-term agency staff 
were left holding cases on a long-term basis. Also, as agency staff they did not 
stay long enough to be trained and their induction was varied or non-existent. 
Inevitably, as both Mr Armstrong and Mr Charlett pointed out, the agency staff 
were less familiar with the procedures and the local area and therefore took longer 
to carry out their tasks. Although hesitant on the subject, Mr Charlett said that it 
was likely that the reliance on agency workers caused the service in the duty team 
to suffer. Mr Armstrong said that he was told by one of the assistant directors 
within children’s services that the financial cost of a week’s worth of induction 
outweighed the financial cost of the workers being allocated cases immediately.5  Brent Social Services
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Poor inductions
5.62     If help was needed, the newly arrived duty workers would and did turn to the 
support of other staff members and their seniors. Ms Hobbs said that she felt 
well equipped to do the work, but that was mainly due to the extra support she 
received from her seniors and manager. She said, “I think they had to provide a lot 
more than they should have if there had been a more formal induction process.” 
Ms Thrift also spoke very highly of the help from those around her, but said, 
“I did feel, though, maybe I should get a little bit more time to understand Brent 
procedures.” 
5.63     In fact, the length and complexity of the procedures and policies existing at 
the time, namely the interim child protection periods of 1996 and Volume C of 
Brent Social Services’ Children’s Services Manual of Procedures, meant they were of 
limited help. Dr Edwards said the local authorities’ child protection procedures and 
guidance could be voluminous. She found them quite daunting and thought it was 
“quite difficult to grapple with so many sheets of paper”. Ms Hines said she would 
not say the procedures were “user friendly”, while the SSI in 2000 found them to 
be “inadequate and in need of a major revision”. 
Conclusion
5.64     Overall, it is difficult to draw any other conclusion than front-line staff in Brent 
Social Services, whose actions and decisions affected Victoria in mid 1999, were 
working in an under-resourced, understaffed, under-managed and dysfunctional 
environment. The SSI in 2000 and again in 2001 remained highly critical about 
a number of the deep-rooted problems that were apparent in 1999, such as the 
over-reliance on agency staff, the tracking of cases and the transfer of cases to the 
long-term teams. Senior managers and elected members were either unaware of 
or unable to tackle these deep-rooted deficiencies within the organisation, and for 
that they must take responsibility.
Victoria in Brent
The first referral
5.65     Esther Ackah, a distant relative of Kouao, made the first of two telephone calls 
to Brent Social Services from a telephone box on the afternoon of Friday 18 June 
1999. She gave details about a child called ‘Anna’. She said she was aged about 
seven, her mother’s name was Marie-Therese Kouao, their address was Room 10, 
8 Nicoll Road, Harlesden, London, and that they were French. She said she was 
worried about the unfit state of the accommodation that Kouao and ‘Anna’ were 
living in, the problems the child was having with incontinence, that she had a scar 
on her face which her mother had said was due to a fall from an escalator, and 
that others had expressed concerns about the well-being of ‘Anna’. Ms Ackah said 
at that stage she believed Victoria’s life was in danger, not because of physical 
harm, but due to the dangers posed by her living conditions. She said she made 
this clear to the person on the other end of the telephone. She wanted social 
services to make an urgent visit. As the coins for the telephone ran out, Ms Ackah 
was cut off before she could give, or was asked for, her own name as the referrer.
5.66     Samantha Hunt, a temporary customer services officer in the call centre at the 
One Stop Shop at Brent House, said she received an anonymous call from a lady 
concerning a child aged eight years. The caller gave the child’s first name as ‘Anna’ 
but gave no surname. She described herself as a neighbour and wanted to report 
her concern about the child.
5.67     The caller said she had seen ‘Anna’ repeatedly wetting herself and that she had 
also previously seen her with cuts and bruises to her face, although the mother The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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had said that this was caused when she fell down an escalator. Other neighbours 
had expressed their concern and had asked this neighbour to call social services. 
The caller said that as far as she was aware, ‘Anna’ was not attending school and 
was living in a home “surrounded by drug addicts”. She did not think that ‘Anna’ 
was being treated by a doctor. The caller then hung up without giving any further 
information. 
5.68     Ms Hunt believed she made a note of the conversation by hand and typed it up 
immediately after the telephone call. Although she could no longer remember the 
conversation, she was confident that if she had been given the child’s surname or her 
place of origin she would have recorded those details. Similarly, if she had been told 
that the child’s life was in danger, that also would have been recorded on the referral.
5.69     Notwithstanding these discrepancies in the detail of the concerns relayed to 
Brent Social Services about ‘Anna’, it is clear that the first telephone call made 
by Ms Ackah and the anonymous telephone referral received by Ms Hunt on 
18 June 1999 were one and the same. Whether or not Ms Ackah told Ms Hunt that 
Victoria’s life was in danger, the referral, as Ms Hunt recorded it, was clearly a child 
protection referral and should have been dealt with as such, even if it did not fully 
express the weight of Ms Ackah’s concerns.
5.70     Ms Hunt responded promptly and did exactly what she was trained to do. She had 
been told to put all calls regarding children through to the children’s social work 
department. However, at times this would prove impossible because all the lines 
were busy. In that situation the customer services officers, and she was one of two 
dealing mainly with social services, were expected to take down the referral details 
themselves and then pass them on. This is what Ms Hunt did on this occasion.
5.71     One can only speculate about what other potentially important details Ms Hunt 
might have found if she had had the time to question Ms Ackah further. What 
is clear is that social services should do as much as possible to access such 
information at the earliest opportunity, particularly in relation to child protection 
concerns where these have been relayed by members of the public whose chosen 
means of communication is by public telephone. I therefore make the following 
recommendation:
Recommendation
Local authorities with responsibility for safeguarding children should establish 
and advertise a 24-hour free telephone referral number for use by members of 
the public who wish to report concerns about a child. A pilot study should be 
undertaken to evaluate the feasibility of electronically recording calls to such 
a number.
5.72     Ms Hunt also checked the client database system for any previous referrals 
matching the name ‘Anna’ and the address of 8 Nicoll Road but drew a blank. 
At 4.21pm that same afternoon, Ms Hunt faxed the referral across to the children’s 
social work department. According to Ms Hunt, all children’s social work was 
deemed as urgent. She said, “It was not for us to ascertain the urgency, so all the 
children’s social work referrals, from what I can remember, were faxed through.” 
There was therefore no need in her mind to attach a cover sheet to Victoria’s 
referral to signify that it was urgent, nor was it the practice to check whether 
anyone in the children’s social work department had received the fax. 5  Brent Social Services
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5.73     Sadly, nobody picked up Ms Ackah’s referral that Friday afternoon and what 
actually happened to it was to prove the subject of some of the most bizarre and 
contradictory evidence this Inquiry was to hear.
Logging the referral
5.74     The next agreed sighting of the 18 June referral was some three weeks later on 
6 July 1999. Robert Smith, the group administrative officer, undertook the index 
check for Victoria that day. His team was responsible for completing checks for the 
duty intake and child protection teams on all new referrals. As the team supervisor, 
he had stepped out of his usual role on that occasion to assist his staff because the 
office was understaffed and busy with a backlog of work.
5.75     Notwithstanding these staff shortages, he said it was unusual for a delay of as 
much as three weeks before a case was logged, although other documentary 
evidence to the Inquiry clearly suggested the contrary. By way of explanation, 
Mr Smith thought it possible that if some work had already been done on the case 
before his office received it, the administrative staff might have only just seen the 
referral on 6 July 1999.
5.76     That, unfortunately, does not appear to have been the situation in relation to 
Ms Ackah’s referral. Whether the fault lies with the administrative team or the 
duty team that failed to pass it on, a delay of three weeks in processing any child 
protection referral can never be acceptable and Brent accepted this. In Victoria’s 
case, inquiries under section 47 of the Children Act 1989 should have begun 
immediately on 18 June 1999. The failure to do so constituted a significant missed 
opportunity to protect her.
5.77     To my surprise, Mr Smith and others confirmed that there was no system for 
ensuring that faxes that arrived in the building went to the people for whom they 
were intended. In a case such as this, the fax from Ms Hunt should have gone to 
the duty manager or duty senior social worker, who would log it in the referrals 
log book and complete the necessary paperwork. They, in turn, would pass it to 
the administration team who would log it onto the database and complete index 
checks to find out whether the child was known to Brent. Referrals marked as ‘child 
protection’ were usually passed to one particular administrative officer, Mr Punch, 
for processing.
5.78     Mr Smith entered the details of Ms Hunt’s referral onto the database, creating 
a new, ‘unique’ record reference number: 1009966. This reference number was 
important. It contributed the crucial evidence to show that while the social workers 
involved with Victoria’s case may not have made a link between the 18 June 1999 
referral and the later referral by the Central Middlesex Hospital, the computer 
certainly did.
5.79     Mr Smith summarised onto the computer the details of the case as:
“Sees the child constantly wetting herself and has seen her previously 
with cuts and bruises around the face. Others have expressed concerns. 
As far as the referrer knows the child is not attending school.”
5.80     Importantly, one printout of the computer record created by Mr Smith as it 
appears on the case file, and as it might well have been seen by those social 
workers involved with Victoria, shows no more than the first line of case detail and 
reads, “Sees the child constantly wetting herself and has seen her.” Social workers 
should, however, also have had access to other records with the complete referral 
information.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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5.81     It is clear that the information inputted by Mr Smith was edited from the details 
of Ms Hunt’s referral. There can therefore be no doubt that it was this referral that 
was seen by Mr Smith on 6 July 1999. Mr Smith also had sight of a duty manager’s 
action sheet, which enabled him to fill in on the same day and as part of the status 
section of the same computer record the following facts:
• the initial action date as 21 June 1999
• the duty manager’s name as Eddie Armstrong
• the action to be taken as a home visit on 14 July
• the social worker’s name as Lori Hobbs
• the decision – ‘open on duty’.
5.82     The duty manager’s action sheet also asked for the details to be logged in and 
checked. The box marked ‘other advice and assistance’ was ticked but not the 
child protection box. Mr Smith therefore logged in the referral under what he 
understood to be the default classification of a child in need. He did this despite 
the detailed references to cuts and bruises.
The team manager
5.83     Edward Armstrong was the team manager of the intake duty team at the time 
Victoria’s case was handled by Brent Social Services, and his involvement is of 
central importance to an understanding of this part of Victoria’s story. His evidence 
merits particular close scrutiny, not least because it is out of line with that of 
other Brent witnesses on almost every count, and the quality of it leaves much to 
be desired. Mr Armstrong’s memory proved to be highly selective about events 
of seemingly equal importance and his insistence on how things appeared to be 
could rarely be substantiated by any rational explanation of why they should be so.
5.84     It was Mr Armstrong’s view that there was another referral on 21 June 1999 and 
that it was this referral, not the 18 June referral taken down by Ms Hunt, that he 
handled and for which he completed a duty manager’s action sheet. This later 
referral was not a child protection referral. It is Mr Armstrong’s evidence that all 
the papers for this 21 June referral, except the duty manager’s action sheet, have 
gone missing. But he said that a social worker in his team, whom he could no 
longer identify, did receive a telephone call in relation to a child named ‘Anna’ 
in temporary accommodation who was wetting herself. He said the child in this 
referral was about eight years old. By an extraordinary coincidence, Mr Armstrong 
claimed that this less serious referral was also not logged onto the system until 
6 or 8 July 1999.
5.85     Given that, by his own admission, the papers for the 21 June 1999 referral 
went missing some time after July 1999, it is almost impossible to accept that 
Mr Armstrong could have pinpointed so precisely the date of this second referral 
as well as the date on which it was logged onto the system. Victoria was one of 
many ‘child in need’ cases. Indeed, Mr Armstrong stated that his team would hold 
around 300 cases open. Not surprisingly, Mr Armstrong had no real answer to this 
point in evidence. Nor did he make any mention of a referral on 21 June in his 
interview for Brent’s Part 8 management review of Victoria’s case, nor as part of his 
own disciplinary process. More importantly, there is no evidence whatsoever that 
any referral received on 21 June was ever logged onto Brent’s client-based system.
5.86     Despite giving vivid accounts of an office in chaos where files went missing and 
faxes spilled out regularly onto the floor, Mr Armstrong was adamant that the 
18 June 1999 referral taken by Ms Hunt was never received in his office. He said 
that there were three floors in children’s social work and that the fax from Ms Hunt 
could have gone to any of these floors. He said that if he had received that referral 
he would have discussed it immediately with the child protection team. When 5  Brent Social Services
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asked whether the fact that the fax came through late on Friday afternoon meant 
that it would have been left to the following Monday 21 June to be dealt with, 
Mr Armstrong replied that the referral would have been dealt with by his team 
unless it was received after 5pm, in which case it would have been referred to the 
out-of-office-hours team. Out-of-office-hours teams are not necessarily staffed by 
people with expertise in services for children. Since children are not exposed to 
risk only during normal office hours or at times of administrative convenience, the 
timing of a referral should not determine the quality of the service provided. I return 
to the organisation of out-of-office-hours social services at paragraph 6.172.
5.87     To add to the confused picture, Ms Ackah said in evidence that a few days after 
she spoke to Ms Hunt – she thought less than a week later – she rang Brent Social 
Services again on exactly the same telephone number. Her reason for doing so 
was to make “absolutely sure” that social services had taken some action following 
her earlier call. She spoke to a different person, briefly repeated her story about 
‘Anna’ and was asked to hold on while they went to check. When the person on 
the other end of the telephone eventually came back to Ms Ackah, she told her 
that she “thought the first call was received, and probably they [social services] had 
done something about it”. In my view this was no way to respond to a member 
of the public who had behaved responsibly in contacting the authorities about her 
concerns for a child.
5.88     I cannot be certain when Ms Ackah made her second telephone call. It could have 
been on 21 June 1999 and it might have been this second call which was dealt 
with by someone in Mr Armstrong’s team. What is clear is that the call did not 
trigger a new referral by whoever picked up the telephone in the One Stop Shop 
and no separate referral was ever logged onto the computer system.
5.89     According to Mr Armstrong, the social worker who took the referral found out that 
the family had moved from Ealing to Brent and it was Brent’s housing department 
that revealed that Nicoll Road was used by Ealing to place temporary residents. 
Yet the case file evidence presented to the Inquiry suggests that Brent knew 
nothing about Ealing’s involvement until 14 July 1999. As a result of this referral, 
Mr Armstrong claimed he made a telephone call to Ealing Social Services to 
establish whether they had placed a child called ‘Anna’ in Nicoll Road. Surprisingly, 
neither he nor anyone else thought to ask Ealing for ‘Anna’s’ surname or, if he 
did, no surname was recorded at the time. There is no record of this telephone 
conversation in the Ealing case file for Victoria to support Mr Armstrong’s claim.
5.90     Mr Armstrong also said he decided that inquiries should be made to Brent council’s 
housing and health departments, and to the General Medical Practitioner’s Board. 
Those instructions, he said, were put in written form and attached to the case 
papers, which he claims have now gone missing. Mr Armstrong’s initial assessment, 
based on the information he said he had that the child was wetting herself, was 
that Victoria was a ‘child in need’. As a result, he authorised two unannounced 
home visits by social workers he could now no longer identify. No records exist of 
any of these steps being taken, nor of their outcome. The only available recorded 
instruction by Mr Armstrong are the words “home visit” on the duty manager’s 
action sheet, as noted by Mr Smith when he inputted the details of Ms Hunt’s 
18 June 1999 referral.
5.91     Asked why it was that a child wetting herself would have of itself justified a ‘child 
in need’ label, two unannounced home visits and many inquiries with other 
agencies, Mr Armstrong replied, “Because a child is wetting herself, and secondly 
because the culture in Brent at the time was that people who were in temporary 
accommodation, and came to the borough, we just tried to get them out of the 
borough for financial reasons.”The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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5.92     This might be thought to be an unconvincing explanation. According to 
Mr Armstrong, Brent also knew Victoria had been placed by Ealing Social Services. 
Establishing that Ealing was funding the placement was only a telephone call away.
Contact with Ealing Social Services
5.93     Mr Armstrong recounted a number of telephone conversations that were supposed 
to have taken place some time after 21 June 1999 between himself and members 
of his team and Ealing Social Services, all of which it seemed were aimed at shifting 
responsibility for Victoria’s case back to Ealing.
5.94     The first was between Ms Viljoen, a social worker in Mr Armstrong’s team, and 
Godfrey Victor, a social worker at Ealing Social Services, who reportedly said that 
as the family was living in Brent the case was Brent’s responsibility. Mr Armstrong 
said in evidence that he then rang Mr Victor to press the case for Victoria being 
transferred back to Ealing but that he was unsuccessful.
Home visits
5.95     Mr Armstrong said that it was at this point he decided that his team should carry 
out an unannounced visit to the family, pending agreement by Ealing to retake 
responsibility for the case. He also said that he discussed the case with Ms Roper, 
the manager of the child protection team, or one of the two seniors in the team, 
though he could not recall with whom. It was agreed that the case properly 
belonged to Ealing and should be dealt with as a ‘child in need’.
5.96     Within one or two weeks of 21 June 1999, Mr Armstrong said he spoke to John 
Skinner, assistant director for children’s services at Ealing, who accepted that case 
responsibility rested with Ealing as the family was only temporarily resident in 
Brent. In the light of his conversation with Mr Skinner, Mr Armstrong said he then 
contacted Mr Victor again to inform him of the agreed decision. He also said he 
faxed across the information that Brent held, including details of the two home 
visits. Rather bizarrely, as Ealing had by now accepted case responsibility according 
to Mr Armstong’s version of the events, Mr Armstrong said he told Mr Victor that 
Brent would make an appointment for a home visit to Nicoll Road and report back 
to him. 
5.97     When asked why this was thought necessary when his team could barely cope 
with the pressures for which they did have responsibility, Mr Armstrong tried 
to explain his actions by saying, “It’s something we do for other boroughs.” It 
seems more than a passing coincidence that the two people Mr Armstrong said 
he had spoken to at Ealing Social Services were both known to him as former 
employees of Brent Social Services. Yet neither Mr Victor nor Mr Skinner, nor for 
that matter Ms Viljoen, Ms Roper or either of her two seniors could recall any 
of the conversations recounted by Mr Armstrong. There are no records of these 
conversations or of the fax that Mr Armstrong said he sent to Mr Victor in the 
Brent file, or more importantly, in the Ealing case file. In short, there is not a 
shred of written documentation to support any aspect of Mr Armstrong’s version 
of events this far. If Mr Armstrong is to be believed, the implication must be, 
and Mr Armstrong asserted as much but was unable to point to any evidence 
to support his allegation, that the papers in both the Brent and Ealing case files 
relating to just the 21 June 1999 referral must have been tampered with or they 
were lost in both offices.
5.98     It remains Mr Armstrong’s contention that he never saw Esther Ackah’s referral 
of 18 June, but instead dealt with a less serious referral which he appropriately 
identified and responded to as a ‘child in need’ case. I find this version of events 
wholly unbelievable. I am left in no doubt that Mr Armstrong’s evidence to this 
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existed – is an attempt to cover up his team’s inept handling of a genuine child 
protection referral that slipped through the net. The duty manager’s action sheet 
dated 21 July 1999 does not in my opinion support the existence of a new referral, 
but merely proves the delay in dealing with the referral recorded by Ms Hunt on 
18 June. Inevitably, my conclusion as to Mr Armstrong’s credibility in relation to 
this matter will have some impact on the weight to be attached to the rest of his 
evidence to the Inquiry.
5.99     On 7 July 1999, a computer-generated letter was sent from the duty manager to 
the occupant of Room 10, 8 Nicoll Road, arranging a home visit for 14 July 1999 
at 3pm to discuss the referral about ‘Anna’. Although it looked to an inexpert eye 
suspiciously like his writing, Mr Armstrong denied that he wrote the date 14 July 
1999 next to the name “Lori” at the top of the duty manager’s action sheet 
that he signed off on 21 June. Yet Mr Smith was equally clear that, although the 
administrative staff were responsible for making appointments for social worker 
visits and recording those on the system (hence the computer-generated letter), 
they would not have written these dates. Mr Smith assumed that either the duty 
manager or senior social workers had written the date of 14 July on the action 
sheet because that was when they wished the visit to take place.
5.100   According to Mr Armstrong, Lori Hobbs, the social worker who had been asked 
to visit Nicoll Road, went to the address twice on 14 July 1999. On his account, 
despite knowing that an appointment had been made for 3pm, he said Ms Hobbs 
inexplicably went to the premises ahead of the appointment time, found no one 
in and returned to the office. She later went back to Nicoll Road at 3pm in the 
company of Monica Bridgeman, one of the senior social workers in the duty team.
5.101  Ms  Hobbs’s recollection, though hazy some two years after the event, was that she 
made no other visit to Nicoll Road other than in the company of Ms Bridgeman 
for the 3pm appointment. She explained that she was with Ms Bridgeman only 
because she did not feel confident to do the visit scheduled immediately after 
Nicoll Road on her own.
5.102   Ms Hobbs said that the premises they came to looked like houses that had been 
converted into bedsits. There was no reception area, as Ms Hobbs might have 
expected of a bed and breakfast, and they found no one who appeared to be in 
charge. Ms Hobbs said, “There was nothing to indicate that it was anything other 
than bedsits.”
5.103   Ms Bridgeman and Ms Hobbs spoke to a number of people hanging around 
outside the premises, some of whom were drinking. They asked where Room 
10 was, if anybody knew who lived there, and if there was anyone upstairs. 
The people they spoke to informed them that the family had moved away about 
a week ago. This was of course true, as Kouao and Victoria had moved in with 
Manning on or about 6 July 1999. However, Ms Bridgeman agreed in evidence 
that she should not have relied on this information. They went upstairs to Room 10 
and knocked on the door. There was no answer. They asked the people they had 
spoken to earlier if they had any concerns about the family, but none were raised. 
5.104   Ms Hobbs and Ms Bridgeman learned nothing from their abortive visit and they 
carried out no further investigation while on the premises. The premises did not 
look like a hostel, so they made no attempts to find out what sort of premises they 
were in or whether any of the occupants had been placed there by local authorities. 
Nor did they knock on any other door. It did not occur to them to try to find a 
manager of the property who would have been the most obvious source of the 
information they were seeking. Had they pursued any one of these lines of inquiry 
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5.105   In fact, Ms Bridgeman and Ms Hobbs had come to Nicoll Road with only the 
haziest idea of the nature of the referral they were supposed to be investigating, 
a referral which was at least three weeks old judging by the duty manager’s action 
sheet, and without having done any background checks first. They did not even 
know whether the family was being accommodated by Brent. Ms Bridgeman said 
she was sure that Ms Hobbs would have done the necessary checks on the address 
beforehand. She should have checked rather than presumed. Ms Hobbs said in 
evidence:
“I do not recall doing any checks prior to the visit, mainly due to the lack 
of information that was on the form. I probably would have made the 
decision that it would be more fruitful and economic with my time to do 
that afterwards, to see if the visit itself brought some light.”
5.106   Ms Hobbs thought that before the visit she would have seen the duty manager’s 
action sheet with the instruction to do a home visit, as well as the administrative 
checks form. There would also have been the referral itself plus anything else that 
was documented on the computer. But she admitted that she had little to go on. 
She recalled knowing that the referral was about an eight-year-old girl, she had an 
address but no surname, no date of birth, no referrer’s details and the substance of 
the referral was about the suitability of the girl’s accommodation. This was indeed 
exactly the issue that Ms Ackah was so keen to stress in her referral to Ms Hunt 
almost a month earlier. She had no specific memory of a child wetting herself.
5.107   Ms Bridgeman could not assist with any clearer recollection of what she knew 
when she went to Nicoll Road. However, despite the passage of time, she was 
“definite” that she knew nothing about a child wetting herself, or references to 
cuts and bruises or being told the child was not at school. She was clear: “If I was 
taking a referral like that, the referral details, that would have not gone to Child in 
Need.” If she had seen Ms Hunt’s referral sheet she said, “There is no way that I 
would have taken that on.” Like Ms Hobbs, she was not aware of any earlier visits 
to Nicoll Road by any other social worker. If there had been any unannounced 
visits she expected they would have come to her attention and they had not.
5.108   If, as seems likely, Ms Hobbs and Ms Bridgeman were in fact responding to the 
18 June 1999 referral, then it is deeply troubling that they believed they were 
dealing with accommodation issues rather then responding to concerns about a 
child who had been seen with cuts and bruises. It is possible that they are now 
seeking to minimise the nature of the concerns they were responding to, that they 
have forgotten, or they were sent out with incomplete information. Nothing on 
the file allows me to trace what information they had at the time of the visit. What 
is clear, and admitted by Brent, is that the home visit lacked any sort of social 
work focus and the inquiries made, such as they were, fell far short of an adequate 
investigation of a child in need, let alone a child in need of protection. Therefore, 
I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Social workers must not undertake home visits without being clear about the 
purpose of the visit, the information to be gathered during the course of it, 
and the steps to be taken if no one is at home. No visits should be undertaken 
without the social worker concerned checking the information known about the 
child by other agencies. All visits must be written up on the case file.
5.109   By the time Ms Hobbs returned to the office after completing the second of the 
visits scheduled for that afternoon, it was too late to do any further checks. She 5  Brent Social Services
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said that she intended to make some inquiries of the housing department as well 
as write up a note of her visit the following morning.
5.110   When asked what form her report would take, she replied that it would have been a 
running case note. She said, “I would have just outlined that a visit was completed 
with Monica [Bridgeman], that the child was no longer at the address according to 
the information we received, and that is all I really remember about it.”
5.111   She thought she would have passed her note directly to either Ms Bridgeman or 
Mr Armstrong.
5.112   If indeed such a report of her findings or of any notes of follow-up discussions with 
her manager existed, they are now all missing. All that is left on the file annotated 
on the bottom of the 7 July 1999 appointment letter are Ms Hobbs’s handwritten 
notes stating no more than “Not at this address. Have moved.” Ms Hobbs disputed 
that this was the sum total of her recorded note of the visit on 14 July 1999 and 
Ms Bridgeman agreed. Ms Bridgeman was adamant that she had seen the report 
prepared by her colleague. The lack of any corroborating evidence, however, 
suggests the contrary. I am of the opinion that no such report ever existed and 
that the ‘write-up’ contained in Ms Hobbs’s annotated 7 July appointment letter is 
all that might have been anticipated, given the vagueness of the referral she and 
Ms Bridgeman say they were responding to. It is an appalling reflection of Brent’s 
children’s social work team that from 18 June to 14 July 1999, the only information 
additional to the referral was, “Not at this address. Have moved.” This was a 
dreadfully inadequate response to the serious concerns expressed by Ms Ackah 
and to the needs of Victoria.
The referral from the Central Middlesex Hospital
5.113   Events were then to overtake both Ms Bridgeman and Ms Hobbs. At the time they 
were making their unsuccessful visit to Nicoll Road, Victoria was admitted to the 
Central Middlesex Hospital. At 4pm that same day, according to the form she 
completed at the time, Ms Thrift, a duty social worker in Mr Armstrong’s team, 
received a referral from the Central Middlesex Hospital in respect of a child named 
‘Anna’, about whom the hospital had serious child protection concerns. ‘Anna’ had 
been brought to the Central Middlesex Hospital by Avril Cameron, the daughter 
of ‘Anna’s’ childminder, Priscilla Cameron. ‘Anna’s’ address was said to be 6 or 8 
Nicoll Road. Ms Thrift marked the referral as ‘child protection’ and took down the 
following details:
“Anna is a recent arrival in the UK. Her mother lives in a bed and 
breakfast in Nicoll Road (believed to be housed by Ealing Council – to 
be checked.) For five weeks Anna has been cared for during the day by 
a lady named [Priscilla] Cameron (aged 63) ... Avril hadn’t seen the child 
since last Wednesday then mother dropped her off yesterday evening 
due to problems at the B&B. This morning mother dropped off some 
items for Anna and said she would return at 7pm today.
Avril noticed bruising on the feet (2–3 days old), arms, legs, buttocks and 
infected bruises on the fingers. Also noticed Anna’s eyes were bloodshot. 
She took her to the CMH. (Please see fax) 
Child currently at the CMH with carer. Will await contact from Brent 
CSW [children’s social work].”
5.114   The referrer was Dr Ajayi-Obe. Ms Thrift was quite clear that all the information that 
she had taken down by telephone that day, including the suggestion that Kouao 
had been placed in Brent by Ealing council, must have come from Dr Ajayi-Obe. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Minutes before 4pm, the hospital also faxed across Dr Ajayi-Obe’s body map. 
The body map showed the distribution of marks on Victoria’s body as well as her 
medical report on “a child thought to have suffered abuse”.
5.115   At 4.20pm, Ms Thrift passed on the referral, most probably to Mr Armstrong or one 
of her seniors, who in turn passed it to Ms Hines, a senior social worker in the child 
protection team. In accordance with the Brent Child Protection Procedures Manual, 
Ms Hines should have consulted with her team manager and the assistant director 
of child protection on receipt of the referral. Ms Hines said that she attempted 
to do so, but that her manager, Ms Roper, was at a child protection conference 
on another case and Mr Charlett, the assistant director for child protection and 
duty service manager for the duty team and the child protection investigation and 
assessment team (CPIAT), was not in his office. Ms Roper was adamant that she had 
arranged for one of the assistant directors to cover her responsibilities, but could not 
remember whom. Quite clearly it was Ms Roper’s job to ensure that proper cover 
arrangements were in place for her team and that her staff were aware of these, if 
only so that they could meet the requirements imposed on them by Brent’s own 
child protection procedures. On 14 July 1999, Ms Hines was either unaware of what 
those cover arrangements were or none had effectively been put in place.
Failure to spot previous referral
5.116   At this stage, or prior to passing the case to Ms Hines, administrative checks on 
the databases should have been made by a member of the administration team to 
ascertain whether ‘Anna’ was known to Brent. Martin Punch believed that he may 
have inputted the new child protection referral details from the Central Middlesex 
Hospital. He said, “I think the case came in directly as a child protection case, and 
I would have done that check.” He could not confirm when he did the checks but 
said that he may have done them on 14 July 1999. Although I cannot rule this out 
completely, it is, however, more likely these checks were done at the same time as 
the case was logged onto the database, and a link with the previous referral was 
made electronically. Scrutiny of the computer printouts supplied by Brent show 
this in fact occurred the following day, on 15 July, and not on the day when the 
hospital referral was received. It was on 15 July that the computer system provided 
Victoria with a second ‘unique’ reference record number. In fact, during Victoria’s 
brief involvement with Brent Social Services, and partly as a result of the children’s 
social work department running both manual systems and a completely separate 
client-based computer system from the rest of Brent Social Services, Victoria 
acquired five different identifier numbers, creating ample scope for information loss 
and case mismanagement. 
5.117   On this occasion, the computer records made on 15 July suggest that a link was 
made between the Central Middlesex Hospital referral and the 18 June referral 
taken by Ms Hunt. Against the child protection referral category and description 
Mr Punch had typed in, the computer printout displayed the following:
“See also URRN 1009966. Carer Avril Cameron noticed bruises on Anna 
Kouro’s body & that she had bloodshot eyes.”
5.118   The link was there for anyone who had access to these printouts to see, but it 
seems likely that as the administrative staff were struggling to cope with the 
backlog of work at the time, it was simply overlooked. As a result, the link was 
not at any time drawn to the attention of Ms Roper, the child protection team 
manager, or either of the seniors. The papers were never brought together and 
the link was never followed. This had serious consequences for Victoria.
5.119   Ms Hines therefore had to make decisions about Victoria’s case without the benefit 
of information from the previous referral. As far as she was concerned, the family was 5  Brent Social Services
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not known to Brent Social Services at that time. Although she could not recall what 
happened, Ms Hines said that she could have seen a copy of the computer printout 
log that specifically said “See also URRN 1009966”, but in evidence she confused this 
reference number as referring to the same Central Middlesex Hospital admission. In 
any event, she was clear that her attention was not specifically drawn to any earlier 
referral. Ms Hines accepted that if she had been aware of an earlier child protection 
referral it would have altered her approach to handling Victoria’s case entirely.
5.120   The only witness who gave direct and first-hand evidence that a match was 
made and recognised between the telephone referral from the Central Middlesex 
Hospital and the unsuccessful home visit by Ms Hobbs and Ms Bridgeman, 
was Mr Armstrong. He said that later on 14 July 1999, after Ms Hobbs and 
Ms Bridgeman returned to the office to report there was nobody present at 
Nicoll Road, he took the paperwork to Mr Punch who made the match. As a 
result, Mr Armstrong said he was satisfied that ‘Anna’ had been identified and 
her whereabouts were known.
Contact with the Central Middlesex Hospital
5.121   Having received the referral, Ms Hines first telephoned Barnaby ward and was 
told by Dr Haviland that Victoria had been admitted for what was believed to be 
non-accidental injury. Although she should have had Dr Ajayi-Obe’s body maps 
and medical report on the file, Ms Hines said in evidence that she never saw these. 
Despite the reference in Ms Thrift’s referral form to “please see fax”, Ms Hines never 
followed this up. Indeed, failure to follow up critical information faxed to Brent Social 
Services was fast becoming the hallmark of Brent’s poor handling of Victoria’s case.
5.122   The timing of the Central Middlesex Hospital referral, too, seems to have made a 
difference to Ms Hines’s management of the case, though in practice it should not 
have done. It was late afternoon when Victoria’s case found its way to Ms Hines’s 
desk. She knew that for the moment at least, Victoria was safe in hospital having 
been taken there by her childminder’s daughter. Ms Hines also knew that the 
hospital had serious child protection concerns but that the whereabouts of the 
‘mother’, who at that stage must have been a prime suspect, was unknown. 
Ms Hines and her colleague Elzanne Smit then made a number of telephone calls.
Contact with Ealing Social Services
5.123   Ms Smit first made contact with Ealing Social Services at 4.55pm. It is not clear 
to whom she spoke on this occasion, though she recorded in her contact note a 
telling comment: “Case was never opened to them in a Social Services capacity.” 
This would seem to illustrate the fact that Ealing viewed Victoria’s case as 
concerning only the family’s housing needs.
Placing Victoria under police protection
5.124   In the meantime, at about 5.15pm, Ms Hines, promptly and quite appropriately, 
telephoned the Brent police child protection team and spoke to PC Rachel 
Dewar. The decisions taken following the conversation were, however, less than 
appropriate. Ms Hines told PC Dewar that Victoria’s injuries were felt to be serious 
enough for the hospital to admit her. Together they agreed to take Victoria into 
police protection, which they did at 5.20pm. Ms Hines colluded in this decision 
without seeing and speaking to Victoria or her childminder. She did so without 
making any sort of assessment as to the likelihood of Kouao removing her from 
the hospital. She did so without ever establishing that the grounds for taking 
a child into police protection were properly made out. She also did so without 
authorisation from her senior colleagues. In my view, placing Victoria in police 
protection was a serious step that could have been safely deferred until, or if, it 
became necessary. Mr Anderson, who was working that night in the emergency The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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duty team, said he felt confident he could arrange police protection out of hours if 
it was required.
5.125   Ms Hines admitted that police protection on this occasion was no more than a 
holding measure designed to keep Victoria in a safe place. However, the practical 
consequence of this action appears to have been that neither the police nor social 
services felt they needed to begin their respective inquiries that evening. Instead, 
Ms Smit briefed Mr Anderson to alert him that Victoria was in police protection 
and should Kouao turn up at the hospital, she was to be told that Victoria was 
under police protection and could not be removed.
5.126   Ms Hines said in evidence that she fully intended seeing Victoria the next day. 
She said:
“The child was in a safe place, in hospital, all the safeguards had been 
put in place, we had phoned the emergency duty service ... the police 
had been informed ... the hospital had been informed that the child was 
in police protection, so the child was felt to be safe and it was late in the 
evening and our investigation would have started the following day.”
5.127   Looking at the times of the telephone calls made by Ms Hines and Ms Smit that 
evening, it is doubtful that “late in the evening” could have meant any later than 
6pm. Whatever Ms Hines’s intentions may have been, the fact was that she failed 
to see Victoria either that evening or at any time thereafter. I regard prompt action 
in cases such as this to be vitally important and therefore make the following 
recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that children who are the subject of 
allegations of deliberate harm are seen and spoken to within 24 hours of the 
allegation being communicated to social services. If this timescale is not met, 
the reason for the failure must be recorded on the case file.
5.128   Ms Hines painted an entirely different picture of how she might have responded if 
she had received the referral at, for example, 10am. She said she would have tried 
to make contact with whoever had parental responsibility and seek their permission 
to speak to the child. If she could not track down that person, or permission to 
speak to the child was denied, she said she would have discussed the problem with 
her legal section and possibly sought an emergency protection order. However, 
Ms Hines did not consider an emergency protection order to be an option in this 
case because the legal services unit went into answer-phone mode at 5pm every 
day. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
No emergency action on a case concerning an allegation of deliberate harm to a 
child should be taken without first obtaining legal advice. Local authorities must 
ensure that such legal advice is available 24 hours a day.
5.129   As well as speaking to PC Dewar, Ms Hines rang Priscilla Cameron. Her purpose in 
ringing was not to question her about what had happened to Victoria, but instead 
to ask her to act as a messenger to Kouao. Incredibly, she wanted Mrs Cameron 
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removed from the hospital or the police would be called. In fact, it is a police 
responsibility to do this. 
5.130   Ms Hines agreed that Mrs Cameron was an important source of information in any 
assessment of Victoria’s circumstances and a person she would have interviewed if 
she had been carrying out inquiries under section 47. However, no such inquiries 
under section 47 were under way on the evening of 14 July 1999 because 
the matter had been put on hold until the next day. In the event, Brent never 
interviewed Mrs Cameron, either as part of the section 47 inquiries or any other 
inquiries. Indeed, Mrs Cameron was an unregistered childminder, and Brent did 
not make inquiries about this either.
5.131   As it happens, Kouao was with Mrs Cameron when Ms Hines telephoned, and 
they spoke over the telephone. Kouao explained to Ms Hines that Victoria’s injuries 
were all self-inflicted. Ms Hines was surprised by this and thought that Kouao 
sounded “quite cold and matter-of-fact”. However, she took the matter no further 
that evening. As with Victoria and the childminder, Ms Hines did not consider it 
necessary to interview Kouao there and then. Although Ms Hines agreed that time 
is of the essence in child protection cases, this was one child protection investigation 
where time seemed to be anything but of the essence. Instead she gave Kouao an 
appointment to attend the Brent Social Services office the next morning at 9.30am.
Police protection lifted
5.132   Events were to overtake Ms Hines too, with the result that no section 47 inquiries 
were ever begun by Brent Social Services the next day, let alone completed. 
Furthermore, Victoria was placed in, and then taken out of, police protection in 
less than 24 hours, without ever being seen by either the police or social services. 
I comment further on the use of police protection in section 13.
5.133   When Kouao failed to turn up at the office on 15 July 1999, Ms Hines telephoned 
the hospital and spoke to Dr Charlotte Dempster, only to be informed that Kouao 
was at the hospital. This was her second visit to the ward since Victoria had been 
admitted and placed under police protection, giving her ample opportunity, 
if opportunity was needed, to coach Victoria as to how she should respond to 
questions from a police officer or social worker.
5.134   According to Ms Hines, Dr Dempster told her that Victoria’s case “was not child 
protection at all, and more or less it was not to be seen as child protection, it was 
actually a child in need”. It was for this reason that Ms Hines said she did not 
feel unduly concerned that Kouao had failed to turn up for her appointment. She 
presumed that the doctors had already passed this information on to Kouao and this 
was why Kouao had stayed at the hospital rather than attending the appointment. 
It was an assumption that she never checked, as she should have done.
5.135   In her contact note at the time, Ms Hines wrote:
“Dr Schwartz who has now seen the child does not feel that the injuries 
are non-accidental. Dr Dempster said that the child possibly has scabies 
and that they would like child protection to withdraw and treat this 
as a child in need because the family need urgent housing. I advised 
Dr Dempster that this would be dealt with by our duty team.”
5.136   This was a medical diagnosis that was to have important consequences for 
Victoria, well beyond the confines of this single admission to the Central Middlesex 
Hospital. That it was Dr Ruby Schwartz who had made the diagnosis appears to 
have elevated Victoria’s case beyond the realm for questioning by social services. 
As a result, an important opportunity was lost to verify directly Dr Schwartz’s true The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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concerns. Subsequently, Dr Schwartz acknowledged that although she had ruled 
out non-accidental injury, she believed that Victoria must be suffering “other 
forms” of deliberate harm.
5.137   Ms Hines did nothing to question what factors had been taken into account in 
the hospital’s coming to its diagnosis. She did not speak to Dr Schwartz directly. 
She said in evidence, “I was told this child was seen by Dr Ruby Schwartz, who 
is a consultant paediatrician who is highly respected in Brent, she is a member of 
the ACPC ... I felt that if Dr Schwartz had seen the child, her diagnosis would have 
been correct, and I did not feel I could have disputed that.”
5.138   Yet Ms Hines knew that at the time Victoria was admitted she had been observed 
to have suffered bruising over her feet, arms, legs and buttocks, to have infected 
bruises to the fingers and to have bloodshot eyes. All she knew about scabies was 
that it was some form of skin disease and that it could be caused by unhealthy 
living conditions. Faced with these glaring discrepancies, however, she was still 
content to rely completely on what she understood Dr Schwartz’s diagnosis to be, 
as conveyed to her by a third party. She was also content to rely on Dr Schwartz’s 
opinion that there were no longer any child protection issues. This was an opinion 
that no one in the hospital, including Dr Schwartz, acting on their own, was 
qualified to give. Social services are charged with the responsibility for investigating 
and assessing child protection concerns in conjunction with their partner agencies. 
Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
The training of social workers must equip them with the confidence to question 
the opinion of professionals in other agencies when conducting their own 
assessment of the needs of the child.
5.139   In evidence, Dr Dempster disputed that she had asked social services for the child 
protection order to be lifted. She said that she did no more than relay Dr Schwartz’s 
diagnosis and outline some concerns about housing and other issues to the duty 
social worker and to Ms Hines. Ms Viljoen, who was working in the duty team, 
logged this as a separate ‘child in need’ referral on 15 July 1999. Dr Dempster was 
clear that she did not request that child protection be lifted for Victoria, although 
she kept no record of her conversation. While Ms Viljoen’s referral summary makes 
no mention of child protection, Ms Hines’s note completed at that time and 
the written confirmation subsequently faxed by Dr Dempster to social services, 
communicated only too clearly that the hospital had ruled out child protection 
concerns. Whether or not Dr Dempster had also expressly used the term ‘child in 
need’, in Ms Hines’s mind there was now no longer any other track to pursue.
5.140   This was not the first or only occasion when there were conflicts in the evidence 
as to who said what between staff working on Victoria’s case. 
5.141   Ms Hines rang PC Dewar to tell her that the injuries were no longer thought to 
be non-accidental and the police protection could now be discharged. PC Dewar 
confirmed: “I was told that they were all as a result of scabies. It was very clear.” 
Victoria was duly discharged from police protection, such as it was, at 10.40am 
that morning (15 July), without Victoria or her carer ever having been questioned 
and without any further explanation of the issues that had been deemed important 
enough, according to both the police and social services, to put Victoria into police 
protection in the first place.5  Brent Social Services
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Communication with the hospital
5.142   Ms Hines spoke to her team manager, Ms Roper, when Ms Roper returned to the 
office at about midday on 15 July 1999. She fed back to Ms Roper the medical 
opinion that Victoria’s was no longer a child protection case but was now a case 
about a medical condition. Ms Roper agreed that the section 47 inquiries, which 
had never got off the ground, could be safely aborted. Although Dr Ajayi-Obe’s 
medical report and body maps had been faxed the day before, Ms Hines said she 
had not seen them and Ms Roper did not consider these in reaching her decision. 
Ms Roper said she was not aware of these documents at the time and their 
existence only came to her attention in 2001. She said she had had difficulty in 
reading them, but said that even if she had been able to read them, they contained 
nothing that would have caused her to rethink her decision. This is remarkable 
given the graphic representation of widespread injuries in Dr Ajayi-Obe’s notes. 
However, Ms Roper was clearly influenced by the information from Dr Dempster, 
as relayed by Ms Hines and subsequently confirmed in writing from the hospital, 
that the marks on Victoria’s body were caused by scabies. Ms Roper understood 
that the reportedly self-inflicted marks were the result of Victoria scratching the 
scabies. She did not query the inconsistency of these reports.
5.143   If the hospital had any other concerns, Ms Roper would have expected the 
examining doctor to have referred to those in his or her report and they had not, 
except to mention issues of housing and schooling – neither of which on their own 
would constitute grounds for continuing with child protection inquiries.
5.144   Ms Roper conceded, however, that it was social services’ job, not that of the 
hospital, to pull together what information existed and ensure that it was properly 
evaluated as part of any such inquiries. The duty to assess the needs of children 
is clearly placed on social services. The paediatric assessment notes taken by 
Dr Rhys Beynon demonstrated that the hospital possessed information that would 
have been relevant to an assessment of Victoria’s needs. Not unreasonably, 
Ms Roper said she would have expected the hospital to have faxed across a copy 
of those notes. However, what use she would have made of them had they been 
sent is questionable.
5.145   Ms Roper said if Brent Social Services had known – and to my mind there can be 
no doubt whatsoever that it was social services’ job to find out – that Kouao had 
asked Mrs Cameron to look after Victoria for good or that she had suggested that 
Victoria had cut herself with razor blades, she would have expected her team to 
have continued with the section 47 inquiries that day. With hindsight, Ms Roper said 
that a joint visit by a child protection social worker and a duty social worker should 
have been undertaken before closing the section 47 inquiries. It was, however, her 
expectation at the time that all the key parties, including Victoria, Kouao and the 
childminder, would be interviewed as part of a ‘child in need’ assessment.
5.146   Instead, Ms Roper agreed with Ms Hines that Victoria’s case should be re-labelled 
‘child in need’. The primary focus was once again housing and the case was 
transferred back to Mr Armstrong’s duty team. This illustrates well the dangers 
which attend the premature classification of ‘child in need’ and ‘child protection’. 
In my opinion, the correct application of the Children Act 1989 requires a proper 
assessment to be completed before such a decision is taken.
5.147   Ms Roper wanted to have the hospital’s diagnosis in writing. Dr Dempster duly 
faxed a letter across to the duty team on 15 July 1999, the content of which 
Dr Schwartz was subsequently to describe as “very superficial”. The key passage 
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by Brent Social Services but also by Haringey Social Services thereafter reads 
as follows:
“She [Victoria] was admitted to the ward last night with concerns 
re possible NAI [non-accidental injury]. She had however been assessed 
by the consultant Dr Schwarz and it has been decided that her scratch 
marks are all due to scabies. Thus it is no longer a child protection issue.”
5.148   Dr Dempster went on to record several social welfare issues that needed to be 
sorted out urgently, including the fact that Kouao and Victoria were homeless and 
that Victoria was not attending school.
5.149   Dr Schwartz mentioned for the first time in evidence that she was “almost positive” 
that she had spoken to someone from social services that morning about her 
concerns for Victoria, and that possibly it was to Ms Hines. However, Ms Hines 
firmly denied this. She believed she faithfully recorded in her contact notes the 
names of all the doctors she had spoken to, together with a brief summary of the 
conversations. There is no record of any conversation with Dr Schwartz on the 
Brent case file, nor anything to support Dr Schwartz’s claim in the hospital records. 
In these circumstances, it seems unlikely to me that any such conversation took 
place. As a result, Brent Social Services were left with Dr Dempster’s letter and 
telephone conversation with Ms Hines, themselves an interpretation by one doctor 
of a second doctor’s notes of Dr Schwartz’s evaluation of Victoria, as the final 
summary of the hospital’s concerns.
5.150   Ms Hines passed Victoria’s file through to Ms Roper for her to sign off on the 
morning of 16 July 1999. Owing to a careless error, Ms Roper’s own closure 
summary note would appear to have reduced still further what started out as 
serious child protection concerns to little more than a minor medical complaint. 
She wrote:
“This child has been examined by Dr Dempster and Dr Schwartz. It is not 
felt to be a child protection case as the marks on the child are noted to be 
eczema [my emphasis]. Dr Dempster has faxed a letter to that effect …
Dr Schwartz wishes the case to be looked into for a child in need 
assessment particularly as the family are homeless.
Family were originally placed in Brent by Ealing.
Case passed back to duty in order to complete an assessment or agree 
transfer of case to Ealing.”
The internal transfer of case responsibility
5.151   According to Mr Armstrong, Ms Roper had already discussed with him her 
recommendations to transfer the case back to the duty team the day before, and he 
had acted on that by telephoning Ealing to agree the transfer of the case to them. 
It seems an unlikely coincidence that Pamela Fortune at Ealing Social Services should 
have received a telephone call on the same day, also from a Mr Armstrong, whom 
she thought worked at the Acton Law Centre. It was her recollection, as recorded in 
the Ealing case file, that Mr Armstrong had expressed concerns about Kouao’s case. 
However, she said she told him that Ealing had closed the case and that Brent Social 
Services were dealing with it because they had some concerns about Victoria.
5.152   In evidence, Mr Armstrong relied on Ealing’s record of the telephone conversation 
as support for his claim that he made the telephone call on about 15 July 1999, 
but his recollection of the outcome of that call was wholly different. It was his 5  Brent Social Services
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contention that Ealing accepted case responsibility, though this, he said, was 
by verbal agreement with Mr Victor. As a result, Mr Armstrong faxed over the 
papers to Ealing on 15 or 16 July. Although Brent’s duty manager action sheet 
purports to record that the case was transferred to Ealing on 16 July, there is no 
other documentation evident in either authority’s papers to suggest that a formal 
transfer of the case was properly executed and recorded. In my judgement, the 
likelihood is that it was not. If it wasn’t for Victoria’s later admission to the North 
Middlesex Hospital and the subsequent involvement of Enfield and Haringey Social 
Services, concerns about Victoria may well have been left unresolved with neither 
Brent nor Ealing taking any direct action. This leads me to make the following 
recommendation to ensure that local authority social services departments are 
absolutely clear as to who has case responsibility at any one time: 
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that the transfer of responsibility of a 
case between local authority social services departments is always recorded on 
the case file of each authority, and is confirmed in writing by the authority to 
which responsibility for the case has been transferred. 
5.153   Quite by chance, Ms Hines saw Kouao and Victoria for the only time when they 
appeared in reception at social services on 15 or 16 July 1999. By that stage 
Ms Hines’s involvement in the case had already ceased and the case had been, 
or was in the process of being, transferred back to the duty team. She saw a little 
girl who was sitting down while Kouao was making a bit of a scene. Ms Hines 
understood that she had asked for the taxi fare to take her back to Ealing but duty 
staff refused this. She saw enough of Kouao to observe, as others had done before 
and were to do again in the future, that she “was very well turned out, dressed up 
very nicely”. Interestingly, Ms Hines could not really say what Victoria looked like, 
or comment on her demeanour or her clothes.
Kouao’s housing application
5.154   A housing application to Brent council was a two-step process, first involving an 
assessment of a person’s eligibility for housing, and second an assessment of points 
to determine whether an offer of housing can be made.
5.155   Kouao attended Brent’s One Stop Shop in Harlesden on 1 September 1999 and put 
in an application for housing in the borough. Two days later, Faithlyn Anderson, a 
senior officer in Brent’s housing resource centre, received Kouao’s application and 
made the initial assessment of Kouao’s eligibility.
5.156  Kouao’s application indicated that none of the family suffered from any medical 
condition, but was in fact accompanied by a nearly two-month-old letter from the 
Central Middlesex Hospital indicating that Victoria had been treated there for an 
infection. The letter also stated that Victoria and Kouao were homeless.
5.157   Kouao stated in one section of the form that the people to be included in the 
application were herself, Victoria, and her son Jean. However, later in the form, 
when describing her current housing conditions, she stated that only she and 
Victoria were living in Nicoll Road – an inconsistency that was later picked up by 
Rachael Green, a transfer and registration officer, when assigning points. Kouao 
stated on the form that the living conditions at Nicoll Road were very poor and 
that the family was occupying one room.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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5.158  Kouao’s application met the local eligibility criteria, but it was judged by 
Ms Anderson to be non-urgent for the following reasons. Although the letter from 
the Central Middlesex Hospital indicated that Victoria and Kouao were homeless, 
Kouao stated on her accompanying application form that she was not homeless 
and was not expecting to become homeless. Kouao had also waited nearly two 
months from the date of the letter from the Central Middlesex Hospital to make 
her application; to qualify for urgent treatment applicants must be threatened with 
homelessness with 28 days. Ms Anderson stated that applicants often say that they 
are homeless but are still in accommodation several months later.
5.159   Over the course of the next seven weeks Kouao’s application was registered by the 
finance and systems section – a not unusual delay given the non-urgent nature of 
the application. Ms Green made the second-stage assessment on receipt of the 
application on 20 October 1999. She found that Kouao had insufficient points 
to qualify for housing. A letter to this effect was sent to Kouao on 28 October. 
At the same time, Ms Green sought clarification about the whereabouts of Kouao’s 
son and about the condition of Nicoll Road. These two issues could potentially 
affect the number of points Kouao had already been awarded. The letter advised 
Kouao she would be informed about this at a later stage, presumably after she had 
provided Brent with the additional requested details. However, as no response to 
this was received, no further action was taken.
Closing the case
5.160   Brent Social Services closed Victoria’s case on 3 September 1999. It might 
be thought odd that despite the agreed transfer to Ealing Social Services, 
Mr Armstrong should have marked the case as pending from mid July, a practice 
that he said was common, particularly if the cases were out of the borough. On his 
first day back from a month’s annual leave, Mr Armstrong marked on the action 
sheet “Client referred to Ealing” and closed the case.
5.161   There were, in my view, strong grounds for believing that Victoria’s needs could 
and should have been met in Ealing, and I have commented upon this earlier. That 
did not happen and an opportunity to safeguard and promote her welfare was 
clearly missed. A second opportunity arose in Brent but once again no assessment 
was made of Victoria’s needs, despite the clear indications that her safety was at 
risk. Had Brent met their responsibilities to Victoria, it may be that Haringey would 
not have become involved.
Analysis of practice
5.162   It is plain from the sequence of events that I have just described that the handling 
of Victoria’s case by Brent Social Services is littered with examples of poor practice 
and a consistent failure to do basic things competently.
5.163   While there can plainly be no excuse for the failure of the front door duty system, 
it was not helped, in my view, by a structure that was far from conducive to 
efficient social work intervention. In particular, I regard the following aspects of the 
system to have contributed to the failure by Brent Social Services ever to undertake 
a proper assessment of Victoria’s needs:
• The taking of referrals by the One Stop Shops
• The lack of efficient IT and administrative support
• The division between ‘child protection’ and ‘child in need’ intake teams
• The disproportionate use of agency workers in the duty teams.
I consider each in turn.5  Brent Social Services
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The role of the One Stop Shop
5.164   The manner in which social services receive and process information concerning 
vulnerable children can be critical to the effectiveness of the services that those 
children eventually receive. The process used to deal with Ms Ackah’s referral on 
18 June 1999 was unnecessarily complicated and carried with it too great a chance 
that important information would be lost or misinterpreted.
5.165  Ms  Ackah’s call was first received by the council’s main switchboard, which then 
passed it on to a One Stop Shop. The One Stop Shop, for these purposes, would 
seem to have acted as nothing more than a staging-post for such referrals, which 
were then passed on to the social services duty team.
5.166   The aspect of this system that causes me most concern is that a person in 
Ms Ackah’s position who wishes to pass on information about a child who 
is potentially in need of protection, speaks, in the first instance, to someone 
who has little or no training or experience in the taking of referrals concerning 
vulnerable children. The majority of the work of a One Stop Shop of the type in 
operation in Brent, will be the handling of routine inquiries about various aspects 
of the council’s work. The handling of sensitive information about a child, perhaps 
coming from a hesitant referrer, requires skills of a different nature.
5.167   The problem is compounded when, as in Victoria’s case, the administrator who 
takes the call is expected to classify the referral as being of a particular type. 
Cases involving vulnerable children do not come with convenient labels attached, 
particularly when the referrer is a member of the public who may have only a 
sketchy knowledge of the child’s circumstances.
5.168   In my view, the solution lies in the establishment of a dedicated 24-hour telephone 
number manned by specialist staff in children and families’ services in accordance 
with the recommendation I made earlier in paragraph 5.71. I recognise, however, 
that such arrangements may take time to implement and that even after their 
implementation, referrals will continue to be made to various points in the local 
authority network. In such cases, it is vital that proper and efficient use is made of 
the information provided.
5.169   The fact that the first referral to Brent Social Services concerning Victoria was 
handled in the first instance by a One Stop Shop, not only caused unnecessary 
delay in its being picked up by the relevant team within children’s services, but 
it contributed to the fact that the referral was effectively ‘lost’ afterwards. The 
management of referrals from members of the public must proceed in accordance 
with procedures that are simple, clear and universally understood by all front-line 
workers. The procedures in Brent met none of these criteria. In an effort to ensure 
that they are met in the future in Brent and elsewhere, I make the 
following recommendation: 
Recommendation
All front-line staff within local authorities must be trained to pass all calls about 
the safety of children through to the appropriate duty team without delay, 
having first recorded the name of the child, his or her address and the nature 
of the concern. If the call cannot be put through immediately, further details 
from the referrer must be sought (including their name, address and contact 
number). The information must then be passed verbally and in writing to the 
duty team within the hour.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Lack of IT and administrative support
5.170   Once the handling of Ms Ackah’s referral got off to a bad start, the prospects of 
ever redeeming the situation and realising that much still needed to be done to 
ensure a proper response to the concerns she had highlighted were significantly 
reduced by the lack of any effective administrative system in operation in Brent at 
the time.
5.171   The overriding impression I received from the evidence that I heard on this issue 
was of a lack of any ‘system’ worthy of the name for the logging and tracking of 
referrals. I was told, for example, that it took an average of three weeks for a new 
referral to be logged onto the relevant database, and that a delay of 12 weeks was 
not unheard of. I also heard evidence of files going missing and faxes containing 
important information concerning vulnerable children arriving in offices in which 
there was no system in place for recording their arrival, or distributing them to the 
correct member of staff.
5.172   The haphazard and chaotic nature of the administrative systems which were 
supposed to assist Brent’s social workers in the efficient discharge of their 
responsibilities is perhaps most graphically illustrated by the fact that Victoria 
managed, during the time that her case was open in Brent, to acquire five different 
‘unique’ identification numbers on the various systems that were designed to 
ensure that the progress of her case was effectively monitored.
Division of teams
5.173   Further confusion was created, in my view, by the division of Brent’s intake team 
into separate ‘child in need’ and ‘child protection’ teams. Later in this Report I 
consider the validity of such a distinction and whether it serves any useful purpose in 
the safeguarding of children. For the present, it is sufficient simply to observe that the 
organisation of Brent’s intake teams in this manner meant that there was often doubt 
as to whether a particular case was in the right place. As Ms Roper put it, “What we 
found ... was that there was a considerable overlap between the two teams and what 
that meant was that a large number of cases ... were classified as child protection 
cases when really what was required was a child in need assessment.”
5.174   One of the consequences of the overlap she described would seem to have been 
that children would be transferred between the two teams depending upon the 
existing view as to the child’s appropriate classification. The two most unfortunate 
side effects of such an approach are risk that important information concerning the 
case will be lost in the transfer, and the disruption in the continuity of care that will 
inevitably result when a case is passed between social workers.
5.175   In addition, at times of heavy workload and stretched resources, the temptation to 
reclassify a case so that responsibility for it could be transferred onto another team 
could result in social workers being too eager either to downgrade or play up the 
seriousness of a particular case.
Use of agency staff
5.176   Finally, the effectiveness of the service offered by Brent’s front door teams was 
further undermined, in my view, by the policy to assign the majority of permanent 
staff to the long-term teams, with the result that there was a disproportionately high 
number of agency staff working in the duty teams. While I am in no position to 
judge the general competency of individual agency workers employed by Brent at 
the time, I was told that many had recently arrived from abroad and were inevitably 
unfamiliar with local procedures. Regular briefing sessions had to be held in order to 
familiarise recently arrived agency workers with basic elements of their roles.5  Brent Social Services
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5.177   As was pointed out in the SSI May 2000 inspection report, intake work is highly 
skilled and demanding. Important decisions have to be taken, sometimes in the 
absence of detailed information about the child concerned, and there can often 
be limited time available for careful reflection and consideration as to how best to 
respond to the child’s immediate needs. The use of agency staff unfamiliar with 
basic aspects of the work only increases the chances of mistakes being made and 
important information being missed. 
Impact of structural deficiencies
5.178   Overall, the evidence I heard leads me to the view that the procedures adopted by 
Brent for the taking of referrals, together with the manner in which its intake teams 
were structured and resourced, contributed to the chaotic and haphazard manner 
in which the two referrals concerning Victoria were dealt with and, in particular, 
the failure to adequately monitor the progress of her case during the period for 
which it was open in Brent.
5.179   The effective safeguarding of children is a difficult and highly pressurised task. It is 
rendered virtually impossible if those who are charged with achieving it are not 
supported by proper systems and structures to work within. I take the view that 
the chaotic procedures for the monitoring and tracking of cases adopted by Brent 
Social Services during the period with which I am concerned, contributed greatly 
to the inadequate response made to both of the referrals they received concerning 
Victoria. 
Poor practice
5.180   Although the front-line staff who came to deal with Victoria’s case were not helped 
in their task by the structure within which they operated they were, in many cases, 
guilty of inexcusable failures to carry out basic elements of their roles competently. 
In Brent, as elsewhere, the social workers involved would have needed only to 
do the simple things properly in order to have greatly increased the chances of 
Victoria being properly protected.
5.181   Despite the poor quality of the systems in place for the taking, recording and 
monitoring of referrals in operation in Brent at the time, both of the referrals 
concerning Victoria eventually came to the attention of staff who should have 
been in a position to have responded properly to them. With regard to Ms Ackah’s 
referral, for example, two qualified social workers went out to visit Victoria at her 
home. Properly handled, this visit could have been the first step in the formulation 
of an effective plan to safeguard and promote Victoria’s welfare. In the event, the 
planning of the visit was so poor that the social workers concerned arrived in Nicoll 
Road without any real idea of what they were doing there. This, together with their 
failure to make even the most basic inquiries when they discovered that Kouao and 
Victoria were not at home, meant that the opportunity to protect Victoria afforded 
by the visit, and by the referral that prompted it, was squandered.
5.182   Also, basic failures undermined the effectiveness of Brent’s response to the second 
referral. The fact that Victoria was placed under police protection on the evening 
that the referral was received, clearly demonstrates that the matter was considered 
to be a serious one that required a positive response. In fact, no assessment 
of Victoria’s needs was ever undertaken in response to this referral. In the first 
instance, such an assessment would have involved nothing more taxing than 
speaking to those involved. As it turned out, neither Victoria nor Kouao nor Avril 
Cameron nor Priscilla Cameron nor the referrer (Dr Ajayi-Obe) were ever spoken to 
by Brent Social Services for the purpose of gaining an understanding of Victoria’s 
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5.183   Time and again the written record of Brent’s handling of Victoria’s case 
demonstrates a complete absence of any proper reflection or analysis of the 
information available to them. Perhaps the most glaring example is provided by 
the failure to speak to Ms Cameron. Taking another person’s child to a hospital 
and expressing the suspicion that the child is being deliberately harmed is not 
something that anyone would undertake lightly. It seems inconceivable that 
anyone who applied their mind to Victoria’s case file in any meaningful way could 
have failed to pick up the fact that the lady who had brought Victoria into hospital 
in the first place had yet to be spoken to.
5.184   In my view, the proper handling of Victoria’s case would have involved at least the 
following basic steps:
• Victoria should have been seen and spoken to.
• The accommodation in which Victoria and Kouao were living should have been 
visited and assessed for its suitability.
• Whatever background information was available from Ealing Social Services and 
the French authorities should have been obtained.
• Legal advice as to Kouao and Victoria’s status and the options available to social 
services in dealing with them should have been sought.
• Avril and Priscilla Cameron should have been spoken to in order to understand 
why they had come to the view that Victoria had to be taken to hospital.
• Kouao should have been interviewed about the injuries to Victoria and the 
concerns that had been expressed by the Camerons.
• A multi-agency discussion should then have taken place involving representatives 
from the Central Middlesex Hospital, Brent Child Protection Team and Ealing 
Social Services, at which a plan to promote and safeguard Victoria’s welfare 
should have been agreed.
Lack of supervision
5.185   The steps listed above amount to no more, in my view, than standard social work 
practice of a type that should reasonably be expected in every case of alleged 
deliberate harm. Their impact on the outcome of Victoria’s case is likely to have 
been very significant indeed. The fact that none of them were taken in Victoria’s 
case is attributable not just to poor practice on the front line, but also, in my view, 
to a lack of clear managerial direction and, in particular, effective supervision. 
5.186   As far as the deficiencies in the supervision offered to those working on Victoria’s 
case is concerned, it is necessary to do little more than observe that her case file 
was never read thoroughly by any manager for the duration of the time that her 
case was open in Brent. Effective supervision takes time. It involves reading the case 
file and applying some thought to the decisions taken on the case. In Brent, such 
supervision would appear to have been one of the primary casualties of an intake 
team which was simply unable to cope adequately with the work required of it.
5.187   It is little wonder, therefore, that basic omissions such as the failure to speak to 
Victoria or Ms Cameron before the case was closed were never picked up and 
challenged by the managers involved in the case. There can be no excuse for the 
closure of a case before the basic steps necessary to secure the well-being of the 
child have been taken. I therefore make the following recommendation: 5  Brent Social Services
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Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that no case that has been opened in 
response to allegations of deliberate harm to a child is closed until the following 
steps have been taken:
• The child has been spoken to alone.
• The child’s carers have been seen and spoken to.
• The accommodation in which the child is to live has been visited.
• The views of all the professionals involved have been sought and considered.
• A plan for the promotion and safeguarding of the child’s welfare has been 
agreed.
Low priority of children’s services
5.188   A lack of priority was given to the standards of the day-to-day work of front-line 
social workers by the managers responsible for the operation of the intake teams. 
This was replicated further up the organisation by the low priority accorded to 
children’s services by Brent’s senior officers and elected councillors.
5.189   Despite the efforts of central government to move the protection of children 
further up the local government agenda through the Quality Protects initiative, 
I heard much evidence to indicate that children’s services in Brent were significantly 
underfunded at the time that Victoria arrived in the borough. I have set out in 
detail in paragraphs 5.40–5.41 the extent to which Brent spent less on children’s 
services than the sums allocated to it for that purpose by central government in 
the Standard Spending Assessments for the periods up to and including the one 
with which I am primarily concerned. I have also made reference to the various 
arguments deployed by witnesses from Brent in an effort to persuade me that 
underspending of this nature should not be interpreted as being indicative of a lack 
of focus on the protection of children. I do not seek to rehearse those matters here.
5.190   For present purposes I wish simply to record my conclusion on this issue which 
is that the lack of priority and resources accorded to children’s services by Brent 
over several years leading up to Victoria’s arrival in the borough, contributed 
significantly to the deterioration of the service offered to vulnerable children by 
the intake teams which handled her case. I found those teams to have been in 
a deplorable condition in mid 1999. An almost total lack of effective supervision 
meant that poor practice went unnoticed and unchallenged. A lack of sufficient 
numbers of staff with the skills and training necessary to perform the tasks required 
of them, meant that the systems in place were on the verge of collapse.
5.191   As I have already made clear, a lack of resources and management attention 
cannot provide an excuse for front-line workers for failing to perform basic aspects 
of the job for which they have been trained and employed. That said, the fact that 
the teams with which I am concerned were allowed to deteriorate into the state 
in which I found them during the course of this Inquiry can only be the result of 
wholly inadequate monitoring by those who were ultimately responsible for the 
provision of a proper service to vulnerable children in Brent.
5.192   As I stated at the outset of this section of the Report, I have little regard for the 
concept of what Mr Daniel referred to as “professional distance” between those 
at the top of the organisation and those working on the front line. It is the job of 
senior officers and elected councillors to inform themselves about the quality of 
services being offered by their front-line staff, and to take appropriate action to 
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5.193   Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the evidence I heard regarding Brent Social 
Services was the lack of concern, and even interest, that the senior figures in 
the council appeared to show in the condition of their children’s services intake 
teams. I regard the regular monitoring of front-line work by senior managers and 
elected councillors to be an essential component of the effective delivery of services 
to children. In an effort to ensure that such monitoring takes place, I make the 
following recommendation:
Recommendation
Chief executives of local authorities with social services responsibilities must 
make arrangements for senior managers and councillors to regularly visit intake 
teams in their children’s services department, and to report their findings to the 
chief executive and social services committee.6  Haringey Social Services
109
6 Haringey Social Services
The managerial context
6.1       Victoria spent some 308 days in England. For 211 of them, and in response to 
a clear child protection referral, she had an allocated social worker from the 
North Tottenham District Office (NTDO) of Haringey Social Services. Their single 
responsibility to Victoria throughout this period was to safeguard and promote her 
welfare in accordance with the Children Act 1989. Their clear and overwhelming 
failure so to do is the subject of this section.
6.2       As with the other agencies involved in Victoria’s care, it is not enough to 
consider the omissions and failings of individual practitioners in Haringey without 
considering the context in which they were working at the time. It is also necessary 
to understand the extent to which the organisation in which they served, and 
the working practices of the organisations, can, and must, shoulder the blame for 
serious lapses in individual professional practice. The evidence on this in Haringey 
is, in my judgement, overwhelming. 
6.3       Although the failings in Lisa Arthurworrey’s (Victoria’s social worker) practice were 
many and serious, she was badly let down by her managers and the organisation 
that employed her. In particular, council members and the senior management 
of Haringey must be held to account for the yawning gap between safe policies 
and procedures, and poor practice in their children and families’ services. 
As Pauline Bradley, a social worker at Haringey, observed, they “were way out 
of touch with what was happening at the grass roots and did not really seem to 
care”. Yet Gurbux Singh, chief executive at the time, felt able to distance himself 
from these failures. He told the Inquiry, “It is absolutely clear that Haringey has 
messed up and it is absolutely clear that there were fundamental failures ... but I 
am not clear in my own mind as to where the line of responsibility lies. That is my 
own dilemma.” It is not a dilemma I share, as I have already made clear in respect 
of Gareth Daniel, chief executive of Brent council. For Mr Singh to seek to hide 
behind the cloak of corporate responsibility and to say that beyond making sure 
that effective systems and processes were in place – which they clearly were not 
as this section will demonstrate – he “could not honestly think of what else I could 
have done to ensure that the tragedy which happened did not happen” entirely 
misses the point. As chief executive, Mr Singh carried overall responsibility for the 
way in which the council operated and performed. If there was a gap between 
local policies and practice it was exactly his job to know about it, to keep his 
members informed and to take timely and corrective action. 
Haringey 
6.4       Haringey is an outer London borough with many of the characteristics and 
problems of an inner city area. In its 1998 position statement to the Joint Review 
of Social Services in Haringey Council, Haringey noted that it is the thirteenth most 
deprived authority in England. A large proportion of its residents were described 
as experiencing: 
“Severe poverty, unemployment and deprivation, which manifests itself 
in all areas of their lives, such as the lack of adequate affordable housing, 
poor levels of educational attainment, poor health and high numbers of 
children in need.” The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.5       I heard evidence that Haringey has one of the most diverse populations in the 
country, with 160 different languages spoken locally, a long tradition of travellers 
settling in the borough and a high proportion of asylum seeking families (nine 
per cent of the total population). The pressure this places on all departments 
within the local authority is inevitable – none less so than for the children and 
families’ services.
Haringey Children and Families Service
6.6       The NTDO was one of two district offices in the borough accommodating the 
Haringey Children and Families Service. The other area office was some five 
miles away in the west of the borough in Hornsey. Based in north Tottenham, in 
cramped and rather dingy premises, were two investigation and assessment teams 
(IAT A and IAT B) and four children and families’ long-term teams. Members of 
each of these teams would staff the duty team on a rota basis. It was the duty 
team that handled in the first instance most of the referrals – including Victoria’s 
– that came into the office, although they operated a completely different system 
from the duty team in Hornsey.
6.7       Once the social worker on duty had conducted an initial assessment of referrals, 
cases were transferred to an IAT. It was generally understood, but not made explicit 
in local guidance, that cases should not be held open for more than three months 
by an IAT, and usually not beyond a case conference, before being transferred to 
a long-term team for implementation of a care plan. Despite this, Victoria’s case 
remained throughout her seven-month period in Haringey with the IAT and the 
social worker to whom it was originally allocated. This adds further weight to the 
recommendation made in paragraph 4.14 that managers of duty systems must 
be aware of how many cases are open on duty, what is being done on them and 
by whom, and when the action needs to be completed. It also demonstrates the 
need for managers to be aware of when key deadlines in the progress of a case 
are missed. The fact that a case spends an excessive amount of time open on duty 
can often indicate that it has been allowed to drift. In an effort to ensure that such 
signs are not missed, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that where the procedures of a social 
services department stipulate requirements for the transfer of a case between 
teams within the department, systems are in place to detect when such a 
transfer does not take place as required.
6.8       Within each IAT there were six social workers and a senior practitioner accountable 
to a team manager, who was in turn responsible to the commissioning manager 
for children and families. Until the changes brought about by restructuring in early 
November 1999 (to which I shall return), Angella Mairs managed team A and 
her senior practitioner was Rosemarie Kozinos. Carole Baptiste managed team B 
and her senior practitioner was Barry Almeida. Both team managers reported to 
David Duncan, commissioning manager, who in turn reported to Carol Wilson, 
assistant director of children’s services and chair of the local Area Child Protection 
Committee (ACPC). Both team managers took turns managing the duty team. 
Accordingly, following Victoria’s admission to the North Middlesex Hospital in July 
1999, it was Ms Baptiste who allocated Victoria’s case to Ms Arthurworrey, a social 
worker in her team.6  Haringey Social Services
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Induction and training
6.9       At the time she was allocated Victoria’s case, Ms Arthurworrey had been employed 
in Haringey for nine months. Although she told the Inquiry that she was not given 
“any sort of induction” when she started with Haringey other than to be shown 
around the building and told to read the department’s child protection guidelines, 
Ms Arthurworrey was not wholly inexperienced because this was her second 
children’s services post since qualifying as a social worker in 1997. Surprisingly, 
though, she had yet to conduct and see through to completion a joint section 47 
inquiry of suspected deliberate harm to a child with the police.
6.10     In Bernard Monaghan’s subsequent review of staff involved in Victoria’s case, 
he concluded, “All the staff directly concerned with the VC case had received 
appropriate training to equip them to deal with the practice matters that arose 
during their involvement.” Mr Monaghan found “no basis to believe that a lack of 
appropriate training of staff was a contributing factor”. Indeed, Ms Arthurworrey 
told this Inquiry that by June 1999 her training was adequate and it was not 
a factor relevant to Victoria’s case in terms of her conduct of it. I do not share 
that view. Setting aside Ms Arthurworrey’s limited experience in child protection 
inquiries, she was not trained in the Memorandum of Good Practice and could not 
therefore take a section 47 child protection inquiry through to its conclusion.
6.11     Common sense dictates that before any social worker conducts section 47 inquiries 
they should:
• be trained in how to complete such an inquiry;
• have had experience in participating in section 47 inquiries while shadowing a 
more experienced colleague;
• ideally be trained in the Memorandum of Good Practice.
6.12     Ultimately it was the responsibility of Ms Wilson to ensure that staff in her 
department carrying out section 47 inquiries were competent to do so. In order 
that this happens in future, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
No social worker shall undertake section 47 inquiries unless he or she has 
been trained to do so. Directors of social services must undertake an audit of 
staff currently carrying out section 47 inquiries to identify gaps in training and 
experience. These must be addressed immediately. 
Caseloads
6.13     The atmosphere within the NTDO duty and IATs was hectic in 1999. Shanthi Jacob 
spoke of the “bombardment factor” and Mary Richardson, director of social services 
in Haringey at the time, stated:
“Undoubtedly North Tottenham was the busiest social work office. 
As a consequence of that, by definition staff probably held, on average, 
slightly more cases than their Hornsey counterparts ... there was regular 
and fairly unremitting pressure on the north Tottenham office.”
6.14     It was an issue recognised by the Joint Review team in early 1999, who referred in 
their report to potential staff “burn out”, which needed to be addressed quickly.
6.15     Ms Arthurworrey told the Inquiry that initially her caseload at Haringey was 
manageable, but it slowly increased. By the end of August 1999 she was The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
112
responsible for 19 cases (of which half were child protection). This is seven 
more cases than the maximum laid out in the Duty Investigation and Assessment 
Team Procedures devised by Ms Mairs. Mr Duncan argued that it was hard to 
imagine how a social worker could work on more than 12 cases at a time. 
Yet Ms Arthurworrey said she was unaware of the guidance, and during 1999 
Mr Duncan said he knew, though Ms Wilson said she did not, that staff in the 
NTDO IATs were dealing with a high number of cases and that the average 
caseload was in excess of the recommended maximum. 
6.16     Haringey Social Services admitted that Ms Arthurworrey’s caseload in the second 
half of 1999 was higher than they generally considered desirable, but they argued 
that this did not affect her ability to deal with Victoria’s case. Ms Arthurworrey 
did not, they said, identify any tasks at the time that she could not carry out 
because of workload pressures. However, the fact remains that Ms Arthurworrey 
failed to complete a number of key tasks in relation to Victoria’s case, and she 
worked considerably in excess of her scheduled hours, notching up by the end of 
1999 some 52 days of time off in lieu, which could not easily be taken because 
of workload pressures. It also overlooks entirely the additional need for effective 
supervision – so demonstrably absent in Victoria’s case – when social workers carry 
active caseloads of this size. 
6.17     Ms Bradley, a social worker in one of the long-term teams and a UNISON 
representative, described the situation as “conveyor belt social work”. She said that 
the “ethos seemed to be particularly about getting the cases through the system 
and meeting the targets, meeting the statistics, getting them through the system”, 
rather than doing the work that needed to be done.
The management of the IATs
6.18     The personalities of those in charge of the two IATs contributed much to the way 
the teams worked. Marina Hayes, a social worker in IAT B, recalled that the team 
was “very divided, and there were a lot of deep conflicts. At times the working 
environment felt hostile, and it was not a comfortable place to work constructively 
in”. Ms Hayes stated that there seemed to be “two camps in the I and A team. 
It felt to me that there were insiders and outsiders within the office.” Ms Hayes 
also said, “There were historical conflicts that were just never resolved. Probably 
nobody knew what they were about. They were just part of the culture. They were 
part of the dynamic.” Ms Hayes found the atmosphere less than supportive, in fact 
she found work in the NTDO a struggle. 
6.19     Similarly, Ms Arthurworrey recalled that there always appeared to be conflict in 
the IATs. She said it reminded her of a school: “Angella Mairs was the headmistress, 
Rosemarie Kozinos was the head girl. There were also other head girls [the senior 
practitioners] and we the social workers were the children.” Ms Arthurworrey stated 
there was a clear division of the team into camps. “The basis of the split was the 
headmistress and the head girls against the social workers ... It was very difficult to 
rebel among the schoolgirls because we were regarded as children who should be 
seen and not heard.” Others, including Ms Bradley, agreed.
6.20     I heard different and often conflicting views expressed about Ms Mairs’s 
management style. Ms Arthurworrey and Valerie Robertson, another social 
worker in IAT B, both considered Ms Mairs a powerful and assertive manager 
with a reputation for being a bit of a bully. However, Ms Robertson said she felt 
more comfortable in her social work role once Ms Mairs took over as manager 
of the combined IAT in November 1999, because she received more and clearer 
direction. Ms Kozinos, on the other hand, found her an approachable manager 
and Mr Almeida described her as hard working and loyal.6  Haringey Social Services
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6.21     Whether or not Ms Mairs’s management style verged on the bullying, the evidence 
suggested that she was a tough, if controlling and autocratic, manager whose 
reputation was known and valued by Haringey’s senior management team and 
whose skills were considered necessary to run an efficient duty system. Mr Duncan 
confirmed that twice in the past three or four years Haringey had got itself into a 
crisis in the management of its duty teams, once in the NTDO and more recently 
in Hornsey. On both occasions Haringey called on Ms Mairs to pull it out of a 
tight spot, because she was clear and set up safe, strong systems. According to 
Mr Duncan, that was one of the things that Ms Mairs was good at. He described 
her style as “controlling, she wants that team run in her way”. In his opinion 
Ms Mairs would not be everyone’s favourite manager, but she may come out on 
top as being the manager that gives the closest and clearest instructions on what 
to do. Certainly her management style was to have an influence on relationships 
between the NTDO IATs and those external agencies that could and should have 
played a critical role in Haringey’s child protection system. 
6.22     Relations with health colleagues were, on the whole, reasonable but not without 
their difficulties. At the time Victoria was admitted to the North Middlesex Hospital, 
Haringey had no social work presence at the hospital, which raised concerns for 
hospital staff over gaps in the service provided to Haringey patients. Dr Mary 
Rossiter, consultant paediatrician at the North Middlesex Hospital, said that prior 
to Victoria’s case there had been occasions when Haringey Social Services had not 
fully appreciated the paediatric team’s concerns or fully respected her views about 
cases. She felt there were occasions when Haringey Social Services had not reacted 
properly to her expressions of concern about children that she believed might be 
the victims of deliberate harm. She said, “It was more that we did not have a good 
working relationship. I really felt that I had not been able to get through to them 
to explain my concerns.” Dr Rossiter felt social workers were not appreciating her 
point in more complicated cases. When asked whether race made any difference 
to the way social workers responded to her concerns, she replied, “Maybe 
some social workers felt they knew more about black children than I did.” The 
minutes of a meeting between hospital social workers and the North Middlesex 
Hospital paediatric consultants on 11 February 1998 concluded, “There are a lot 
of problems with North Tottenham District Office and referring to them (which 
is done by the clinical staff in some circumstances). This causes negative feelings 
about social services in general which can be unjustified.” It was not a problem 
that Ann Graham, manager with responsibility for liaison between Haringey Social 
Services and the North Middlesex Hospital, or more importantly the ACPC on 
which Dr Rossiter sat, ever properly addressed. 
6.23     Tensions also existed between Haringey Social Services and the police. 
Ms Arthurworrey described a general feeling of hostility towards the police and 
other agencies, which stemmed from Ms Mairs’s view that, “Social services knew 
best ... we worked the hardest and we knew our procedures. There was just very 
little consultation.” This was not Ms Graham’s impression, but this may only serve 
to highlight the disparity in perception between those on the ground and those 
operating one step removed. Detective Sergeant Michael Cooper-Bland of the 
Haringey Child Protection Team summed up relations as a bit like “the curate’s 
egg, partly good and partly bad”. He thought that on an individual basis, social 
worker to police officer, there were many examples of good working relationships. 
Conversely there were examples of poor working relationships and “in a very few 
cases, downright rudeness”. 
6.24     Evidence emerged that the police felt pressurised about their role within child 
protection inquiries. There were differences of opinion on how cases should 
proceed, despite the existence of a protocol for inquiries between the police and 
social services. The police felt social services blocked or frustrated steps that the The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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police wanted to take. Sergeant Alan Hodges did not believe that the work carried 
out in Victoria’s case in July and November 1999, could be said to have been an 
independent, thorough investigation by the police: “I believe in Haringey the 
working practices there were difficult for the police officers.”
6.25     In a letter to Highgate police staff dated 8 March 2000, Detective Chief Inspector 
Philip Wheeler mentioned the “difficulty of working with what seems to be an 
‘aggressive’ social services unit”. In a report of the same date, DCI Wheeler stated 
that Haringey Social Services “seems to have its own particular culture and ways 
of working within the child protection framework. It seems that they are extremely 
powerful within the protection network and some social workers work hard to 
actually prevent police involvement”. Detective Inspector David Howard said 
that some of the working relationships were difficult, but relationships had to be 
maintained and difficulties overcome to prevent a possible total breakdown. Once 
again the ACPC appeared to have done little to broker good relations between its 
partner agencies.
Carole Baptiste
6.26     In contrast to Ms Mairs, the main issues arising out of Ms Baptiste’s management 
of IAT B were her lack of availability and her incompetency as a team manager. 
Ms Baptiste worked two and a half days a week from the end of 1998, following 
her return from maternity leave, until the summer of 1999. In July 1999, before 
Victoria’s referral to Haringey, the members of IAT B raised a number of persistent 
and serious concerns with Mr Duncan about Ms Baptiste’s management of the 
team. In particular, the B team felt that Ms Baptiste did not know her cases 
properly, and care planning suffered as a result of this. Staff also informed 
Mr Duncan that it was hard to seek Ms Baptiste’s advice on cases, given the 
uncertainty about when she would be in the office. 
6.27     As front-line manager of the B team and Ms Arthurworrey’s immediate supervisor, 
the extent to which Ms Baptiste’s managerial competency fell short of the mark 
and was known to be deficient, or ought to have been known to be such by her 
managers, is of critical importance and deserves careful consideration.
6.28     Ms Baptiste had been temporarily promoted by Haringey as a team manager for at 
least four and half years. This was not a satisfactory situation but was not unusual 
according to Joe Heatley, Mr Duncan’s predecessor as commissioning manager. 
He claimed that acting-up managers were not uncommon in the late 1990s. 
Indeed, most managerial posts were filled that way. He believed this was partly 
due to the general shortage of experienced social workers at that time.
6.29     While there will always be a need for staff to be temporarily promoted to 
fill unforeseen vacancies, directors of social services must ensure that such 
arrangements are subject to routine review at no later than six-monthly intervals, 
and the reasons for continuation or termination should be recorded on the 
appropriate personnel file. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
When staff are temporarily promoted to fill vacancies, directors of social 
services must subject such arrangements to six-monthly reviews and record 
the outcome. 
6.30     Prior to joining IAT B, Ms Baptiste had moved to one of the long-term children 
and families’ teams as an acting team manager. Dawn Green (née Cardis), a 6  Haringey Social Services
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child protection adviser for the NTDO, recalled Ms Baptiste as being a chaotic 
manager with lots of files and unallocated cases on her desk. She said Ms Baptiste 
“presented as not focused and chaotic. She seemed less competent than other 
managers”. 
Previous problems
6.31     Mr Heatley, manager for children’s services, was equally concerned about 
Ms Baptiste’s lack of management and this came to a head in connection with an 
under-performing social worker in the children and families’ team who was known 
to this Inquiry as Ms B. Not only had Ms Baptiste failed to pick up Ms B’s poor 
performance, she had failed to respond when asked to deal with it. Ms Wilson 
was fully aware of the situation and an independent human resources consultant, 
Alister Prince, was asked to prepare a report into the matter. 
6.32     Its terms of reference were extended to consider not only the performance of 
Ms B but also that of Ms Baptiste, her team manager, as well as that of Mr Heatley 
because of his handling of the whole affair. Although the report was commissioned 
in early 1998, the 15-page report was not finally received by Haringey Social 
Services until March 2001. That was some 21 months after Ms Baptiste joined 
IAT B as its manager after returning from maternity leave. Given the scope of the 
report, in particular its focus on the performance of both a first and second tier 
manager, by any standard this was an unacceptably long delay. Significantly, 
no decision was made to pursue the findings of the report with any of the 
individuals concerned. 
6.33     Although Ms Baptiste failed to co-operate with Mr Prince’s report, it is clear 
from the evidence given by others including Ms B, a new inexperienced social 
worker, that supervision with Ms Baptiste closely mirrored the later observations of 
Ms Arthurworrey and others about their supervision experience with Ms Baptiste 
in the IAT B. Ms B said that she was an unsupportive and unfocused supervisor 
and that she would spend supervision sessions talking about feeling oppressed by 
a sexist and racist department. Ms B said she “felt at sea”. 
6.34     Mr Prince’s report contained a number of other, relevant observations, namely: 
• Ms Baptiste had had management responsibility for one of Ms B’s cases for in 
excess of two years and was not aware that the social worker had made only 
three visits in that time. Mr Prince concluded that Ms B was a problem for 
Ms Baptiste to manage and consequently a number of children and their families 
failed to receive a service. Indeed Ms B had presented problems as a social 
worker from the outset and these had not been vigorously addressed. As with 
Ms B’s caseload, they were allowed to drift. Mr Prince found that even a cursory 
view of Ms B’s files “from her earliest involvement in a case evidences little or no 
social work input of any meaning, simply gaps exist”. It is a comment that could 
apply equally well to Victoria’s file.
• Ms B subsequently transferred to Ms Mairs’s IAT and under vigorous 
management her performance as a social worker turned around. Her new 
practice manager, Ms Kozinos, “was very positive about her abilities”.
• In the face of a near revolt by Ms Baptiste’s old children and families’ team, 
she was transferred on return from maternity leave to IAT B team in the NTDO 
in 1998, but still in an acting-up capacity. Mr Prince was highly critical of the 
“ostrich like” management response in this regard, and suggested that no 
consideration was given to returning Ms Baptiste to her substantive grade as 
a senior practitioner. He argued that the corporate response was in effect to The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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avoid a difficult decision rather than to take positive action. “This lack of positive 
action meant ... unacceptable ‘supervision’ of the C&F team by Ms Baptiste and 
the potential passing on of that particular problem to duty, investigation and 
assessment workers.” It was a telling conclusion. 
6.35     The validity of Mr Prince’s conclusions was called into question by Haringey. 
In particular I was told that any subsequent improvements in Ms B’s performance 
were not sustained. Also that it was only one worker from the children and 
families’ team, and not the whole team, who threatened to leave in the summer 
of 1998 if Ms Baptiste returned to manage that team. Nonetheless, I am firmly of 
the view that enough was known in 1997, or ought to have been known, about 
Ms Baptiste’s management style for alarm bells to be ringing.
6.36     According to Mr Duncan, Ms Baptiste had recognised the difficulties she had had 
with the children and families’ team and it was she who requested a transfer to the 
IAT on her return from maternity leave in August 1998. Ms Wilson and Mr Duncan 
agreed the transfer. According to Mr Duncan, the thinking was to wipe the slate 
clean and let Ms Mairs, who was considered a strong manager and who had earlier 
been Ms Baptiste’s line manager in another social work team, act as her mentor. 
6.37     If this had been the managerial intention, it certainly rendered invalid any notion 
that the managers of the two IATs in 1999 carried equal responsibility for the 
running of the teams. Indeed, the overwhelming impression from the evidence 
of the social workers in Ms Baptiste’s team was that Ms Mairs was very much in 
control. Ms Mairs was equally clear that it was not her understanding that she had 
any mentoring role for Ms Baptiste. Certainly, no such support was offered by her. 
Nor was any additional support given to Ms Mairs to take on this task.
Problems with supervision
6.38     The tensions that had featured during Ms Baptiste’s time in the children and 
families’ team began to resurface in IAT B. As a result, according to Ms Baptiste, 
she found it hard to engage some social workers, Ms Arthurworrey included, in the 
regular supervision so fundamental to good practice. Although Ms Arthurworrey 
has denied ever refusing supervision when it was offered, there clearly was an 
issue about the quality and timeliness of the supervision that was provided in 
Ms Baptiste’s team. This was confirmed by the director of social services at the 
time, Mary Richardson. 
6.39     Ms Arthurworrey understood she would get supervision every two to three 
weeks, “but this never happened”. In practice she received supervision about 
once every seven weeks. “When I asked about drawing up a supervision contract 
Carole [Baptiste] told me that I was responsible for doing that.” Ms Arthurworrey 
said she experienced serious problems in arranging supervision sessions with 
Ms Baptiste because of her continued unavailability. Often Ms Baptiste would 
cancel or rearrange sessions or simply not appear without an explanation. 
6.40     Of equal concern, Ms Arthurworrey said she found supervision with Ms Baptiste 
frustrating because, more often than not, they would start discussing cases 
and then Ms Baptiste would go off on a tangent. Ms Arthurworrey stated that 
Ms Baptiste often talked about her experiences as a black woman and her 
relationship with God. The result was that they would not have time to finish 
discussing the cases. Ms Arthurworrey said she just tried to manage. Generally it 
was Ms Baptiste’s practice to agree with whatever suggestions Ms Arthurworrey 
put in front of her. Ms Arthurworrey found this disturbing in the sense that it led 
her to question Ms Baptiste’s knowledge base. 6  Haringey Social Services
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6.41     Two other social workers in Ms Baptiste’s team gave evidence as to the irregularity 
and variable quality of her supervision and complained that she referred to her 
religious beliefs and gave religious guidance during supervision sessions. However, 
her senior practitioner Mr Almeida was unaware of any complaints as to the 
content of Ms Baptiste’s supervision sessions, as was Mr Duncan. Ms Baptiste 
denied using supervision sessions to talk about her own personal religious beliefs 
saying that any talk of religion “was definitely relevant to the casework”. However, 
she admitted mentioning her religious beliefs during the course of her work 
because during the period when she was dealing with Victoria’s case Ms Baptiste 
had started attending the Rahema church.
6.42     The extent to which supervision sessions, when they occurred, were preoccupied 
with talk about religion or matters unrelated to the casework in hand has been 
difficult to gauge some two years after the event. As pointed out by Haringey 
council, the record of the meeting with Mr Duncan in July 1999 confined itself to 
a discussion of Ms Baptiste’s poor timekeeping, lack of availability for supervision, 
poor case management and case allocation. This, together with the assertion 
by Mr Duncan that he knew nothing of the complaints about the quality of 
Ms Baptiste’s supervision, may suggest that the experience of Ms Arthurworrey 
and others was not universally shared by other members of the team. 
6.43     One outcome of the July meeting was that Ms Baptiste agreed to work full time 
from July 1999 and it was hoped that this would ease the problem of availability. 
But, as the restructuring interviews took place throughout the autumn of 1999 and 
Ms Baptiste’s job looked increasingly insecure, her timekeeping became even more 
erratic. I shall return to the restructuring interviews later at paragraph 6.124.
6.44     Ms Arthurworrey recalled, “Some days she was in the office, most days she was 
not [and] she did not record her movements in the movement book.” Cases would 
appear on social workers’ desks without any guidance from Ms Baptiste about the 
issues. When she was in the office, Ms Baptiste was not readily available, which 
became problematic when cases required an urgent response. Ms Arthurworrey 
said she felt unsupported and isolated at Haringey.
Allocation of cases
6.45     Complaints from IAT B about the lack of any formal allocation system for new cases 
met with little response. Managers ultimately had discretion as to who was given 
which cases – a discretion that should have systematically taken into account a 
social worker’s experience and capacity for taking on more work. Typically, cases 
were just ‘plonked’ on social workers’ desks without prior knowledge, often with 
very little consideration to a social worker’s experience, current commitments or 
workload. There would be no conversation between manager and social worker 
as to what work needed to be done on a case. Peter Lewington, assistant branch 
secretary of Haringey UNISON, stated, “Team managers seemed to be under 
pressure to get cases allocated and it seemed as if their main priority was just to 
get a worker’s name against a case.”
6.46     Once again, Ms Wilson said she was not aware that cases were allocated without 
the team manager reading the case beforehand or that cases were just left on 
social workers’ desks. Ms Richardson, however, accepted that case allocation 
was not done in the most rational way and that this may have had an impact 
on Ms Arthurworrey at the time.
6.47     Following the July 1999 meeting, a new system of case allocation was introduced. 
Social workers were expected to attend weekly meetings so that cases could 
be allocated to them involving issues in which they had a particular interest. 
The experiment was extremely short-lived. Ms Arthurworrey recalled, “One The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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case allocation meeting chaired by Carole [Baptiste] was held in July or August 
1999 and this appeared to work quite well. The second meeting was due to be 
chaired by Carole but was never held because Carole arrived at work late ... and 
the following week we were informed that the case allocation meetings had 
been scrapped because there was ‘no commitment from the social workers’.” 
Ms Baptiste blamed the social workers for failing to attend and said, “Eventually 
we reverted to the old system of allocation, as there was simply insufficient 
commitment to the new system.” The problem remained unsolved.
6.48     When Ms Baptiste was not available, Ms Mairs, Mr Almeida and Mr Duncan would 
provide guidance and supervision to social workers in IAT B. This put additional 
strain on Ms Mairs and Mr Duncan. Ms Mairs stated that the quality and depth of 
support she was able to provide would have been less than what would have been 
available had there been a manager there full time.
6.49     Mr Duncan said he had serious doubts about Ms Baptiste’s availability to manage a 
team after July 1999. Mr Almeida felt that Ms Baptiste could be a capable manager 
but at the time there were outside factors that affected her capability to a degree. 
Even more worryingly, Ms Wilson acknowledged that Ms Baptiste “was one of our 
weaker managers. She was not the weakest”. 
Restructuring
6.50     At interview in September 1999, Ms Baptiste was deemed unappointable. 
According to Ms Wilson, “[her] practice responses were not inappropriate and her 
presentation and performance was just about adequate. In one or two areas she 
achieved higher marks than other managers. However, she appeared to have little 
confidence.” Ms Wilson admitted, however, in her statement to Mr Monaghan 
as part of Haringey’s own internal inquiry that she became very concerned about 
Ms Baptiste’s performance at interview and said she did not feel that she had 
a “management grip”. Ms Baptiste was subsequently moved from front-line 
services to Quality Protects funded project work in November 1999. She was 
formally suspended on 15 February 2000 and made redundant on 25 February 
(the very day of Victoria’s death), though she had been absent on sick leave from 
20 December 1999. 
6.51     Ms Baptiste’s suspension was entirely unrelated to her handling of Victoria’s case 
or to her work in Haringey. However, the issue for this Inquiry is whether the 
deterioration in Ms Baptiste’s mental health culminating in her suspension was 
one that had been developing in the preceding months and, more particularly, 
while Ms Baptiste was the team manager responsible for Victoria’s case. If so, did 
it manifest itself in ways that were or should have been noticeable to Ms Baptiste’s 
managers? The evidence on this is far from clear.
6.52     Mr Duncan said that he thought Ms Baptiste’s mental state was entirely stable 
throughout 1999. Further, Mr Duncan stated that he saw Ms Baptiste more than 
any other manager and he saw no mental or physical symptoms in her. “No more 
so than any of the other managers.” Ms Baptiste was asked whether she was 
treated or diagnosed with any mental disorder prior to January 2000. Ms Baptiste 
stated, “not that I am aware of, no”. Ms Baptiste advised that she had not been to 
a doctor about a mental disorder before January 2000 and nobody had diagnosed 
her as suffering from any mental disorder before January 2000.
6.53     Ms Baptiste stated that she did suffer memory losses during the period August to 
December 1999 and had discussed this with her manager, Mr Duncan. Ms Baptiste 
recalled “not being able to conceptualise things … I was not able to visualise 
things … I remember that I found it very difficult to do simple calculations and 
particularly leading up to the restructuring where it was said that there was 6  Haringey Social Services
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going to be … a mathematical exercise … I was really struggling with numbers.” 
Ms Baptiste confirmed that this was around summer 1999. Ms Baptiste spoke to 
Mr Duncan informally about how she was finding it difficult to remember things 
and to remember how to do things.
6.54     Asked whether her illness in January came out of the blue, Ms Baptiste said 
that, “probably in hindsight … I am probably able to say that there was a lot of 
forgetfulness, absentmindedness, not remembering things, but not being aware 
that I was not remembering things, which was something that I had mentioned 
to my manager but it was not something that was taken particularly seriously.” 
Ms Baptiste stated that it was difficult to say whether these early signs were 
affecting her competence as a team manager during the period from July to 
November 1999. She confirmed, however, that there was nothing that led her to 
suspect she might be suffering from any form of mental disorder before January 
2000 nor did she report her difficulties to her GP. “I thought at the time it was just 
because of the additional pressures of what was going on … I did not think it was 
out of the ordinary.”
6.55     Whatever Ms Baptiste’s precise mental state may have been during the second 
half of 1999, it seems clear to me that her managers, in particular Ms Wilson and 
Mr Duncan, knew enough about her weakness as a manager by the time she left to 
go on maternity leave in November 1997 to at least seriously question the wisdom 
of putting her in charge of a pressured investigation and assessment team.
6.56     Indeed, not only were the additional supports entirely absent for Ms Baptiste, but 
the restructuring process that was to occupy the time of managers throughout 
so much of 1999 actually limited the capacity of Ms Baptiste’s manager to do 
his job properly.
6.57     Mr Duncan now believes that he may not have dealt sufficiently rigorously with 
the concerns raised by staff at the July 1999 meeting. In his closing submission 
he said, “I clearly should have taken a more controlling approach to Carole and 
her team.” As a temporarily promoted manager himself – Mr Duncan was acting 
commissioning manager for the NTDO from April 1998 to September 1999 – his 
substantive grade remained that of team manager. As part of the restructuring 
process, Mr Duncan was expected to compete for both positions – in effect putting 
him in direct competition with Ms Baptiste, at least for the team manager post. 
This, he said, may have caused him to take his eye off the ball and led him to 
feel disempowered in supervising Ms Baptiste from March 1999. While I accept 
Mr Duncan’s evidence as to how he felt at the time, I am of the view that a 
stronger manager would not have let their acting-up status interfere with the way 
they did their job. The net effect was that there was no adequate supervision of 
Ms Baptiste’s practice and her supervision at all times. 
Local guidance
6.58     This was particularly significant because, at the time, social workers in the NTDO 
and their first-line managers were simply not following local guidance, and senior 
managers either knew and condoned this or remained blissfully unaware of 
its consequence. 
6.59     Among the several sets of guidance that IATs were subject to, were the following:
The undated Child Protection Guidelines
• These were rewritten in 1997 and outlined the duties and responsibilities of 
social workers undertaking investigative and assessment work. The introduction 
states, “It is expected that these will be followed by all staff involved in 
child protection investigations.”The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Duty Investigation and Assessment Team Procedures
• These were devised by Ms Mairs in June 1998 and covered “the overall 
framework for the provision of a Duty Children and Families Service for the North 
Tottenham District Office [and] work in conjunction with existing procedures”. 
These procedures were intended to operate as a pocketbook enabling social 
workers to be clear about their duties at a glance. Ms Arthurworrey was aware 
of the Duty Investigation and Assessment Procedures, which she said influenced 
her practice. But according to Ms Bradley, “There was a practice manual and 
other procedures available to social workers. However, social workers were 
never directed to it and practices developed which were separate to the practice 
manual. There was a lot of confusion about what the relevant procedures were.”
Haringey ACPC handbook
• In addition, there was a handbook prepared by the Haringey ACPC, dated 
June 1997, outlining each agency’s role in the child protection process. These 
provided a guide to inter-agency procedures and a working tool for professionals 
involved with children. Ms Arthurworrey, however, had never heard of the ACPC 
handbook. Likewise, Ms Kozinos said that she had no idea that there were ACPC 
child protection guidelines to assist her. Ms Mairs said that she had seen the 
ACPC guidance but she did not think they had much relevance to the day-to-day 
operation in Haringey. Asked how she expected her team to be able to take into 
account the ACPC guidelines if she was not familiar with them, she replied that 
she could not answer. Ms Mairs stated that the guidelines were not something 
her team would use. 
• Not for the first time, senior managers were to express surprise at what 
they learned during the Inquiry’s evidence stage. Speaking about the ACPC 
guidelines, Ms Richardson said, “I find it difficult to believe that people were 
not aware of them. They were widely circulated and available in area offices.” 
Ms Richardson said she would expect them to use the guidelines in relation to 
the inter-agency work that was going on. Ms Wilson advised that copies of the 
ACPC handbook were available although they were not given out to individual 
social workers. Further, Ms Wilson said that in January 1999 she “personally 
spent time in Tottenham and at a large group meeting ... went over each of 
the relevant plans, documents and procedures which were available to staff, 
confirmed their existence, accessibility and staff familiarity with them and in 
relation to procedures and their obligations in law. Managers and social workers 
concerned in the Inquiry were all members of staff at this time and participated 
in preparation and review of the services policies and procedures”. Ms Wilson 
said that she was satisfied that the guidelines were available: “I was assured 
that staff knew they were available. I had feedback through the child protection 
adviser on reinforcement of access to those guidelines.” Ms Wilson said she 
was very surprised to hear that Ms Kozinos had never even seen a copy of the 
ACPC guidelines because Ms Wilson had personally seen it on the shelf in that 
office. While Ms Wilson may well have had grounds for being impressed by the 
availability of the ACPC guidelines, it is less clear that she had any grounds for 
being impressed as to their use.
Case Recording Practice Guidelines
• Both Ms Kozinos and Ms Mairs said they had limited familiarity with the Case 
Recording Practice Guidelines, dated January 1998, and that they were not 
followed because they “did not have the appropriate resource to enable us to 
follow it.” The truth of that statement was all too visible in Victoria’s case and 
more generally as to merit repeated criticism in Social Services Inspectorate (SSI) 
inspections and the Joint Review of 1999. But senior managers had a different 
slant on the problem and one that, if correct, needs to be addressed across the 6  Haringey Social Services
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social work profession as a whole. Ms Wilson observed, “We had some staff who, 
although qualified as social workers, did not always appear to achieve that level 
of literacy on paper.” Ms Richardson commented that there was “resistance from 
some staff in Haringey about using the written word at all”. 
Supervision policy of Haringey Social Services
• More astonishing still was the admission by Ms Kozinos that they did not follow 
the supervision policy of Haringey Social Services. Specifically, she claimed that 
the supervision policy was regarded as having been superseded by the custom 
and practice in Haringey of not reading the case files. The tragic consequence 
of this was that nobody in Haringey – not even Ms Arthurworrey – ever read 
Victoria’s case file in its entirety.
  Ms Mairs said that while there was a written policy that managers should read 
files, it was simply not practicable to read every file unless there were concerns 
about the competence of the social worker. There was a lack of resources to 
do this and no system in place to facilitate it. Ms Mairs agreed that proper 
supervision necessitated the reading of case files, if not routinely then at least 
periodically, and she accepted that it was a rather hopeless system if managers 
did not look at the files to test the way in which social workers were going about 
their work.
  Mr Duncan knew that managers were not systematically reviewing files, but he 
claimed he did not know that Ms Mairs was not reading them at the crucial 
points of supervision. Ms Mairs disputed this, stating that Mr Duncan was aware 
that managers were not reading files before supervision because it was discussed 
at team management meetings.
  Ms Wilson acknowledged that a manager could not participate fully in 
supervision unless they had read the file: “I think files were an intricate part 
of good supervision management.” Once again, Ms Wilson was surprised to 
learn that Ms Mairs’s team did not read files or adhere to the supervision policy 
during 1999. Ms Wilson stated she knew as a certainty that other parts of north 
Tottenham used the policy and did not accept that was the general practice in 
the NTDO. I am left questioning just how she could be so certain in the face of 
the evidence from Duty Investigation and Assessment Team (DIAT) witnesses and 
the clear failings in practice in Victoria’s case. Therefore, I make the following 
recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that the work of staff working directly 
with children is regularly supervised. This must include the supervisor reading, 
reviewing and signing the case file at regular intervals. 
Child protection advisers
6.60     If local guidance was not routinely being followed in 1999 – and I have no doubt 
that had it been, the standard of some of the work done in Victoria’s case would 
have been raised substantially – the child protection advisers (CPAs) ought to 
have provided a necessary and effective safety net. As part of the child protection, 
quality and review section of children and families’ services, they reported direct to 
Ms Graham and worked independently of the children and families’ teams. Petra 
Kitchman was one of two CPAs that covered the NTDO and had a room in that 
office, which she used for two days each week. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.61     Typically, social workers or team managers would invite CPAs to give consultations 
and advice. CPAs had no case responsibility and would not offer advice in a case 
unless asked to do so, despite Child Protection Guidelines stating that all work in 
relation to child protection must be carried out in consultation with CPAs. 
6.62     It was Ms Wilson’s “clear expectation” that “access to a child protection adviser 
was the right of every social worker who was concerned on a case”. It was also her 
expectation that advice offered by a CPA would be followed, though Ms Kitchman 
acknowledged that CPAs would not necessarily know whether that was the case 
or not. Where there was any conflict over the advice offered, it was for the team 
manager and CPA to resolve, and if necessary, refer the matter up through their 
respective line managers. 
6.63     Ms Arthurworrey’s understanding of the role of CPAs was less clear-cut. She 
acknowledged they were not routinely used in all child protection cases and 
believed they were only used at the specific direction of team managers. In 
Ms Arthurworrey’s experience, a team manager would involve a CPA if there were 
issues that could not be resolved in supervision. While Ms Arthurworrey had used 
CPAs in the past, she did not make regular use of them and she did not initiate 
contact with Ms Kitchman in Victoria’s case. Ms Arthurworrey understood her 
manager was responsible for her cases and she felt she “needed to get directions 
from her manager so that she could work in a logical way”. This was not a view 
shared by Ms Baptiste or Ms Mairs.
6.64     Any confusion as to the role of the CPA appeared to extend to what they did when 
they were consulted. Ms Kitchman advised that she did not have a quality control 
role in relation to casework, although she acknowledged there was an element of 
quality assurance in relation to undertaking audits and chairing case conferences. 
Ms Kitchman said that it was not part of her responsibilities to monitor and 
evaluate the work of a social worker who approached her for advice or to ensure 
that they were dealing with the case properly, unless obvious concerns were noted.
6.65     Ms Wilson disagreed. She said CPAs “were an independent audit of good practice”. 
She was quite clear that CPAs had a role in supervising the quality of the work on 
those cases with which they become involved. In particular, she considered CPAs 
“had an individual responsibility and accountability in relation to cases and that 
the service as a whole had a formalised quality assurance role in relation to good 
practice”. CPAs had a “responsibility to determine what was good practice on the 
case in giving advice. [Ms Wilson] would not expect them to dip in and out unless 
they were satisfied that the way they had left the position was one of safety”.
6.66     Ms Mairs believed there were no politics in using a CPA. Yet Ms Wilson observed 
that there was opposition to CPA involvement among a number of team managers. 
CPAs and team managers worked at the same operational level, but Ms Wilson was 
philosophical about this, stating, “It was something that we recognised as being 
inherent in the role and that needed to be strongly managed.” Those tensions are 
“built into the role if you have an inspector, but that does not mean you should 
not have it and that it is not a very important aspect of monitoring practice”. 
According to Ms Wilson, the fact that some team managers were undermining 
CPAs and that this was causing tension was not a continuous problem. There were 
individual issues that arose where team managers took a different perspective from 
a CPA, which was resolved in 95 per cent of the cases, but which needed to be 
confronted in a small minority of cases.
6.67     If the CPAs’ role within Haringey Social Services was less than clearly defined or 
understood, the position was considerably worse in relation to outside agencies.6  Haringey Social Services
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6.68     Ms Kitchman was also the link worker with the North Middlesex Hospital. Besides 
a general duty to liaise with other agencies, there were no established procedures 
or written documentation setting out what Ms Kitchman’s role in relation to the 
North Middlesex Hospital was to be. As a result, Ms Kitchman thought her role 
as a link worker to the North Middlesex Hospital was rather tenuous, but believed 
in practice it amounted to attending liaison meetings at the North Middlesex 
Hospital with Dr Rossiter, Enfield Social Services and the North Middlesex Hospital 
social work team manager once every two months. Ms Kitchman saw her 
relationship with Dr Rossiter as involving liaison over specific cases, for example, 
at planning meetings. 
6.69     Dr Rossiter said she saw Ms Kitchman as the appropriate person in social services 
with whom she should liaise and to whom she should report concerns. However, 
Ms Kitchman said she did not see herself as the sole point of contact, nor did she 
believe that referrals from external agencies should be made to CPAs, in effect 
bypassing the district offices. 
6.70     Ms Mairs thought differently. She advised that CPAs were there as consultants to 
the public. If agencies wanted to make a referral, they could bypass the district 
and go straight to the CPAs, but it was important that the CPAs inform the district 
of that. If a CPA received information on a case that was already in a social work 
team, Ms Mairs would expect the CPA to discuss it with the social worker and the 
team manager. 
6.71     Ms Green, another CPA, viewed her role as both intra and inter-departmental. 
Ms Green believed CPAs offered a resource to everybody, including the general 
public. Anybody could phone up about a child protection concern, including other 
agencies. Outside agencies, for example paediatricians, would contact the CPAs for 
advice on child protection issues or because they were concerned a case they had 
referred to social services was not progressing. If external agencies were frustrated 
with trying to work things out with social services, CPAs were a safety net and 
were seen as a centralised team of people who would intervene, hear the case, and 
make a decision about the best way forward. Sadly no such constructive action was 
forthcoming when Dr Rossiter sought to involve Ms Kitchman in Victoria’s case, nor 
was it ever likely to be if managers were relying on the flawed and misunderstood 
guidelines and protocols operating between CPAs and DIAT social workers 
and CPAs and the North Middlesex Hospital. Therefore, I make the following 
recommendation:
Recommendation 
Directors of social services must ensure that the roles and responsibilities of child 
protection advisers (and those employed in similar posts) are clearly understood 
by all those working within children’s services.
Management information
6.72     Haringey’s management information system provided managers with very limited 
help with keeping them up to date with what was going on in their teams in 1999. 
Its client index system, originally created as a management tool, was later adapted 
for team managers and service managers to manage caseloads but had yet to 
achieve its purpose by the time Victoria arrived in Haringey. 
6.73     Mr Duncan said that in 1999 the information on the system was often inaccurate. 
But he accepted that was the fault of the people putting information into the 
system rather than with the system itself. His business plan for the NTDO, The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
124
dated February 1999, stated, “Among other things, inaccurate statistics make 
performance targets hard to set and reach, and plans hard to develop.” Dinos 
Kousoulou, deputy director of housing and social services, who was responsible for 
the management information system across the directorate, said that he was not 
aware of this at the time. However, the Joint Review into Haringey in 1999 noted, 
“The authority is aware that its current client index system is not able to support 
its service planning and business planning arrangements.” Mr Kousoulou could not 
explain this inconsistency:
“Certainly if there were these levels of problems then yes I should have 
been made aware, and if it was to do with the system itself, the IT 
system rather than the information that was meant to be put into it, 
then clearly that was my responsibility ... It was for managers like Dave 
Duncan to make sure that front-line staff used the system effectively 
that was there. If it was a problem with the actual technology then that 
should have been brought to my attention.”
6.74     Ms Mairs was frustrated with the system and told the Inquiry that she did not rely 
on the client index system because it was always difficult getting accurate records 
from it and she had always used a manual system. According to her, there were 
monthly printouts informing managers what cases the workers had, but she said 
9 out of 10 times these were not the cases that were allocated to them, or cases 
that were closed were still on the system. She thought there were various reasons 
why the system was not working in terms of the input: “It is a problem that 
Haringey has had for years and still has.” In response, Mr Kousoulou said he was 
surprised and concerned that Ms Mairs had abandoned the client index system 
altogether during 1999 and kept some manual system of her own. 
6.75     Ms Wilson said she thought the system was improving in 1999 and said, “It was 
coming into its own as it were in the autumn.” Despite Ms Mairs’s independent 
stand, Ms Wilson said she took the view that the client index system was no 
longer an optional extra: “I took a very firm and clear line that whatever the good 
bits or the bad bits about the system, it was the one we must use and we must 
get it as accurate as possible.” Ms Richardson thought that, by the time she left 
Haringey, the client index system was still in a non-user friendly state but it could 
provide most of the information they had needed up to that point. Mr Kousoulou 
accepted, however, that the improvements that were put in place at the end of 
1999 did not resolve all the difficulties, and that by April/May 2000 Haringey still 
had a system that was producing inaccurate results and was unable to support 
service planning.
Unallocated cases
6.76     One performance measure intrinsic to basic, safe, childcare practice and which, 
if accurate, would have provided Haringey with an instant gauge of the pressures 
facing its DIATs in 1999 related to its unallocated children’s cases.
6.77     In May 1999, Mr Duncan reported that in the NTDO there were 61 unallocated 
cases and in the Hornsey office there were 48, making a total of 109 unallocated 
cases for which Haringey had responsibility at the time. The Joint Review from 
its field work in early 1999 found little evidence of unallocated cases in both 
district offices, although there were reports of managers holding responsibility 
for unallocated cases. Ms Wilson stated that it was policy for team managers to 
assume responsibility for unallocated cases as and when the occasion demanded it, 
and to delegate work on those cases to social workers where it was appropriate in 
light of their workloads.6  Haringey Social Services
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6.78     The state of play on unallocated cases in May 1999 apparently was not known 
about at the top of office, nor were members apparently kept informed. Gina 
Adamou was lead member of social services at the time and she thought that the 
children’s service was in good shape. However, Councillor Adamou said she had 
not seen Mr Duncan’s report and she was not informed of this situation: “In May 
1999 I just came in after a lapse of two years as a lead member of social services 
and, no, I could honestly say that I was not told at the time of this [nor did I see] 
this Report, but there are reports that never come to members.”
6.79     Chief executive, Mr Singh, said that the information around unallocated cases was 
something that was routinely collected through the performance management 
framework. Had there been a problem he would have picked it up. It was Mr Singh’s 
understanding that unallocated cases was not an issue at that time, further casting 
doubt on the value of the performance management framework he relied on. 
Finances
6.80     Remedying an unreliable and inaccurate management information system 
was clearly an essential prerequisite to sound business planning for Haringey, 
particularly in the face of persistent and severe financial pressures. In 1999, these 
were directly linked to its decision to write off over a 10-year period a sizeable debt 
expended on the redevelopment of Alexandra Palace, high levels of homelessness 
and numbers of asylum seekers coupled with pressure from the Government to 
protect and increase education funding.
6.81     In fact, education had all but taken centre political stage in Haringey in 1999, 
following a devastating OFSTED review of Haringey’s education services, which 
“completely condemned” the local education authority and suggested the whole 
of the local education authority function should be externalised. 
6.82     As a result, and bowing to Government pressure, by the year 2000/2001 
councillors agreed to ‘passport’ the entire education standard spending assessment 
(SSA) figure to its education services. It is not for me to judge the merits of 
Haringey’s financial deliberations between its spending departments except to 
observe that children’s services fared badly by comparison. For the years 
1997/1998 to 2001/2002, Haringey council spent substantially less than the 
sum allocated in the SSA for children’s social services. In 1998/1999 the gap was 
approximately £10m, declining thereafter not because of any significant increase 
in Haringey’s spending on children’s services, but because of changes in the 
way the Government estimated children’s services SSA across the board. This 
led to a reduction in Haringey’s own children’s services assessment figure of just 
under £8m. The cut was sufficient to prompt Haringey to make complaints to 
Government ministers about its effect. 
6.83     In the evidence of its senior managers, and in their closing submissions, Haringey 
council was at pains to point out that in the years 1997 to 2000 it did not consider 
the SSA as a valid assessment of an authority’s need to spend, nor that it was a 
Government instruction to spend at that level. The SSA, it was said, is no more 
than a formula used by Government to distribute the total national spend on the 
basis of relative need (allowing for differences in population profiles), which can 
then be topped up by local authorities from council tax. Its limitations have been 
recognised by Government, not least the fact that it cannot take account of all the 
pressures facing a local authority. For example, the SSA formula took no account of 
the £7m a year Haringey had to spend on its statutory duty to homeless families. 
Accordingly, the fact that Haringey council spent considerably less than its SSA 
for the period 1997 to 2000 does not, in the council’s view, indicate what priority 
Haringey council accorded children’s services nor does it reveal how well resourced 
Haringey’s children’s services were compared with its needs.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.84     I disagree. While the SSA may not be capable of encompassing all the cost 
pressures facing a local authority at any one time, it is unlikely to have substantially 
underestimated these, and certainly not to the extent of £10m for services to 
children and families. Arguably elements of the SSA should represent no more than 
the starting points in council budget deliberations, and any departures from these 
should be justified on the basis of local intelligence about population needs. In my 
view, any alternative approach to determining children’s services budgets has to be 
at least as good as that offered by the SSA.
6.85     Haringey council claims it had such an alternative approach. The process involved 
the council’s senior social services officers providing information to elected 
members about local need and local service requirements and ensuring members 
fully understood the council’s statutory responsibilities. To do this, officers held 
discussions and had extensive contact with service users, other stakeholders in the 
borough locally, and other agencies, for example, the health service. In Haringey’s 
view, this “local knowledge and discretion” provided a more sophisticated view of 
need and was therefore a better method than simply following the product of a 
national formula.
6.86     It would seem that neither the Joint Review of 1999 nor the SSI inspection of 
children’s services in June 2000 agreed. The SSI found that the children and 
families’ services were “poorly resourced in comparison to its equivalent group of 
councils ... We concluded that the service was underfunded.” The SSI commented, 
“Unless the [children and families’] service is appropriately resourced a difficult 
situation can only get worse.” The Joint Review had also recognised the funding 
of children and families’ services as an issue.
6.87     The 1999/2000 budgetary process was also affected by the publication, in the 
summer of 1998, of the first Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), which set the 
national local government spending totals for the period 1999/2000 to 2001/2002.
6.88     At the time, Haringey council had one of the highest council tax rates in London. 
In the face of an election manifesto pledge in May 1998 to keep the rate of 
increases in council tax below the rate of inflation, Haringey council had all but 
ruled out council tax increases as an extra source of revenue. In any event, the 
capping regime in place at the time imposed its own level of restraint. 
6.89     Instead, Haringey council set a three-year savings target of £26m. In setting savings 
targets for individual service areas, Haringey council allocated a ‘high, medium, 
low’ prioritisation to services. The children’s service received a high-priority rating, 
meaning it should be protected as far as possible.
6.90     According to leader of the council, George Meehan, elected members relied on 
social services officers to advise them on what the need was and the amount of 
money to spend. The Inquiry heard conflicting evidence as to whether senior 
social services officers advised members that Haringey’s statutory obligations to 
children would not be capable of being fulfilled within the budgets set. Councillor 
Craig Turton recalled that councillors were “consistently advised by senior 
Haringey Social Services staff” that “The financial allocation made to children’s 
services and to child protection was barely adequate, and unless significant year 
on year increases were made to the budget, the quality of services provided 
would inevitably suffer a significant deterioration.” However, Councillor Turton 
acknowledged that these concerns were not recorded in minutes of meetings. 
6.91     Haringey council rejected the suggestion that senior officers informed members 
that the proposed level of spending meant that the council’s statutory duties 
towards children could not be met or were at dangerous levels. Ms Richardson 6  Haringey Social Services
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confirmed that she “attempted to get ... the highest level of protection possible” 
in the 1999/2000 budget for children’s services. According to Ms Richardson, the 
amount of saving in the whole of children’s services in proportionate terms was 
better than the percentage taken out of other services and “the most vulnerable 
parts of this service we gave the maximum amount of protection to, internally”. 
She stated that while priority was given, she did not feel happy because services 
were stretched. However, “The reality was that the service was treated better than 
other services.”
6.92     Mr Singh told the Inquiry that while there were expressions of concern about 
the general tightness of budgets, none of the three directors of social services in 
post during his tenure advised him that the budgets were insufficient to enable 
Haringey council to discharge its statutory responsibility in the delivery of children’s 
services. Mr Singh told the Inquiry that if this risk had been drawn to his attention, 
there would have been some interventions. Likewise, Councillor Meehan advised 
that if the director had said children’s services needed more money, he has no 
doubt that the council would have provided more money. 
6.93     Based on the evidence before me, I accept Haringey council’s contention that there 
was no clear and explicit advice from its senior managers to spend more money on 
children’s services in order to avoid putting at risk Haringey’s proper discharge of 
its statutory duties and avert potential tragedy. 
6.94     I do not, however, accept its conclusion that “There is not a shred of evidence that 
the alleged lack of funding of the children’s services had any impact on the way in 
which Victoria’s case was handled ... There was no facility to which she might have 
been referred to which she was not referred because of lack of funds.” Victoria 
died because those responsible for her care adopted poor practice standards. These 
were allowed to persist in the absence of effective supervision and monitoring. 
Corners were cut and resources were fully stretched. There is evidence in plenty 
to support this. An easing of the financial pressures facing Haringey’s children’s 
services could only have had a positive impact on the environment in which 
Ms Arthurworrey was working in 1999.
Restructuring
6.95     One of the ways Haringey Social Services attempted to ease its financial 
pressures in 1999 was to restructure its children and families’ service. It is to this 
restructuring exercise that I now turn. It is not the role of this Inquiry to make 
judgements as to whether Haringey council should have restructured, or when or 
what form any such restructuring should have taken. It is purely concerned with 
answering two questions:
• Did the restructuring exercise undertaken by Haringey in 1999 have any adverse 
impact on the delivery of front-line children’s services and, in particular, services 
to Victoria?
• Could and should those adverse consequences have been foreseen by Haringey’s 
senior management team?
6.96     The overall effect of Haringey’s restructuring in 1999 was to produce larger teams 
with a more streamlined management structure. One of the main changes to 
emerge in children’s services was the reduction in the number of team managers 
from 12 to six, and the promotion of six out of seven senior practitioners to new 
practice manager posts with supervisory responsibilities.
6.97     After restructuring, the two NTDO initial assessment teams merged into a 
single DIAT with Ms Mairs taking up the post of team manager on 8 November 
1999. Ms Kozinos and Mr Almeida became two of the three practice managers, The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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supervising their own social workers. On 5 November 1999, Ms Baptiste ceased 
having a management role. 
6.98     In effect, there were two separate restructuring exercises: the children and 
families restructure, and the redirecting of the work of the housing and social 
services department restructure, which embraced the whole of the housing and 
social services department. The latter was influenced by a government agenda to 
modernise local government. However, Mr Lewington, a UNISON representative, 
stated that there was no clear indication of how the children and families 
restructure dovetailed with ‘Redirecting the Work of the Department’, or how 
the two separate consultation processes connected with each other. 
6.99     ‘Children and families’ was the only front-line service area that underwent any 
process of restructuring during 1999. Mr Lewington suggested that the thrust 
behind restructuring the children and families’ services appeared to be to 
rationalise some of the structures more at second and third tier management level. 
When he received the consultation document, he felt the restructuring proposal 
was principally aimed at making savings.
6.100  Ms  Bradley’s perception was that there was an unstated aim to get rid of certain 
managers whom the council considered were incompetent and wanted to 
get rid of but whom had not been dealt with directly. Mr Lewington agreed 
that it became apparent that there was a “clear strategy to weed out those 
managers regarded as under performing ... To have all these issues underlying a 
restructuring exercise, particularly having a hidden agenda, was also bound to 
make this restructure problematic.” Mr Duncan did not believe at the time that 
the restructuring was in part an attempt to get rid of some managers in whom 
Haringey had lost confidence. However, he told the Inquiry that in hindsight 
he recognised that was achieved as a by-product of restructuring the whole of 
children’s services.
6.101   Ms Wilson confirmed that the main reasons for restructuring were the modernising 
agenda of the Government, the need to have a devolved management structure, 
and the meeting of savings target. In terms of getting rid of managers in 
whom the council had lost confidence, Ms Wilson acknowledged there were 
long-standing concerns regarding some front-line management practices, including 
areas of poor performance. Ms Wilson said, “We had a layer of weak managers 
who were not making headway in the new agenda.”
6.102   In a letter to Ms Wilson dated 26 July 1999, Mr Lewington referred to 
“restructuring fatigue”. Mr Lewington wrote this letter as a result of consultations 
he had with staff following the announcement of the restructuring proposals. 
Mr Lewington indicated that restructuring was a common occurrence in Haringey: 
“Many staff are just very tired of these exercises which have been a 
regular feature of life in this department in recent years. For Children 
and Families Teams the most recent was last year when they reorganised 
their front-line duty systems ... People do become stale and exhausted 
by constant, often ill-thought-out reorganisation. I have often thought 
about this department that the management approach has tended to 
be that when there is a problem, rather than address it directly, the 
response is to have another restructuring.”
6.103   Mr Singh agreed that “restructuring can be used for solving ills which in fact 
should be dealt with through other processes and through other forms of action” 
because it gives the appearance of activity which may or may not bring with it 
changes in performance.6  Haringey Social Services
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6.104   Similarly, Councillor Turton stated, “It seemed to be a sort of annual state of 
affairs that rather than actually look at a problem in-depth and allow staff to get 
on and do a job, we would have a cosmetic restructuring state of affairs, which 
would usually happen from about fourth or first tier officers.” Further, Councillor 
Turton said, “I think it was too often the case that reorganisations are done rather 
than definitive action ... rather than actually addressing fundamental challenges 
facing social services.” Philip Peatfield, an independent chair of child protection 
conferences and children looked after reviews, said there was restructuring of some 
sort or another virtually every year during the mid to late 1990s. 
6.105   In response, Ms Richardson stated that, in her experience, “Haringey was a place 
where myths and rumours were more productive perhaps or non-productive than 
may be in other places. As far as I can see it was total myth, but it was firmly 
held from the top to the bottom of the organisation.” Senior management and 
members’ perceptions were that there had not been any major restructuring since 
the early 1990s. 
6.106   In terms of the consultation process, a notice of impending redundancies was 
sent to the trade unions at the end of 1998, advising that the restructuring of the 
team manager posts was scheduled to take place over the course of 1999/2000. 
In January 1999, Mr Lewington first had discussions with Ms Wilson. In their 
meeting Ms Wilson did not discuss what the restructuring might involve but 
agreed to produce a consultation document within a month. The document was 
not produced until mid June 1999.
6.107   What was to be a three or four month process took about seven or eight months 
to effect. The stability and continuity provided by the senior practitioners might 
have been considered crucial during this period. At the outset, senior management 
assured staff that the senior practitioners were not going to be affected by the 
restructuring. However, on 25 June 1999, staff learned for the first time that this 
process was going to extend to senior practitioners, who were going to have to 
reapply for their jobs as well. 
6.108   Ms Wilson disagreed that staff were not properly consulted. Ms Wilson said there 
was a very wide process of consultation and dissemination of information via the 
commissioning managers and the third tier managers, together with supporting 
material, department-wide meetings, change management seminars, team 
briefings, and news sheets. In addition, Ms Wilson informed the Inquiry that she 
regularly met with the trade union representatives, more or less every month. 
However, in a memorandum to Ms Richardson (copied to Ms Wilson) dated 
24 June 1999, the staff in the NTDO wrote, “We would very much welcome an 
opportunity to discuss these proposals with you directly and therefore be given 
the opportunity for a true consultation rather than receive information which has 
already been decided upon.” Further, on 7 July 1999 the senior practitioners and 
team managers wrote to Ms Wilson saying, “Our lack of clarity ... has been borne 
out of the conflicting information which we have been receiving. All decisions 
appear to be made and given to us on an ad hoc basis [and] the lack of clarity is 
beginning to have an impact on the staff morale and service users.” 
6.109   On 5 November 1999, Mr Lewington wrote to Ms Richardson saying, “I have to 
inform you that the senior practitioners are quite exasperated with the present 
situation, as am I. They are now unwilling to do anything further to assist the 
restructuring.” Mr Lewington went on to say that he wanted “unequivocal 
clarification in writing” and he continued, “I have to say that I am increasingly of 
the view that many of these difficulties could be resolved by some clear planning 
and straightforward communication.” The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.110   Ms Wilson accepted there were some issues that were much more difficult to 
resolve and that the goal posts changed throughout the negotiation. However, she 
did not accept that there was a delay in the process: “I am not trying to pretend it 
was lovely and it all worked smoothly ... in any process of restructuring it is about 
accommodation and agreement.” 
6.111   It is clear from the evidence of a number of witnesses that the restructuring process 
added considerably to the strain under which staff were working. Mr Almeida said 
that the NTDO was a stressful place for all social workers and their supervisors. 
Restructuring in 1999 and the historical restructuring added to people feeling worn 
down. According to Mr Lewington, the proposal for restructuring “generated a 
considerable amount of confusion, anger and distress in most quarters”.
6.112   In July 1999, the senior practitioners and team managers in the NTDO wrote to 
Ms Richardson, “to express our dismay and distress at the proposals that are being 
made to restructure this department”. Further, they said that the proposals were 
“potentially dangerous and detrimental to the people to whom we offer a service” 
and that the proposals were causing “a great deal of distress to staff across the 
district”. A holding reply was sent on behalf of Ms Richardson, but it appears there 
was no substantive response to the memorandum. 
6.113   Team managers were concerned because they had to apply for their own jobs in 
competition with colleagues and were being interviewed for a reduced number of 
team manager positions. For the six months between March 1999 and the end of 
September 1999, team managers did not know if they would have a job and social 
workers did not know who their long-term team managers were to be. Again, 
senior management and members were unaware of the low morale generated as 
a result of the restructuring. Mr Lewington stated that the consultation process 
was compressed, meaningless and seemingly inconsequential, thereby creating 
confusion and anxiety among staff. If Haringey had started the consultation early 
in the year with a view to creating these changes by September, this would have 
allowed a reasonably lengthy period to deal with staff concerns and to clarify the 
process with people. According to Mr Lewington, that did not happen, which 
contributed substantially to the difficulty of the process. 
6.114   There was a feeling from NTDO staff that the low morale was having a knock-on 
effect on the service to children, and that children might be put in danger, as 
expressed in a memorandum of 7 July 1999 from the senior practitioners and team 
managers. The following is an extract from the memorandum: 
“Sadly the workers in this district office have experienced at least two 
incidences where children have died. The inquiries that have been 
held subsequent to these deaths have pointed towards issues where 
improvements could be made in both practice and procedures. We 
recall very clearly one recommendation that was made from one of 
these inquiries which stated that any change in the structure of the 
department should be well organised and should not occur during the 
summer months. It was envisaged that this would cause least disruption 
to staff, would prevent low morale and would provide a supportive and 
safe working environment for practitioners, ensuring that mistakes are 
not made.” 
6.115   Mr Duncan stated he would have not put it like that at the time but agreed 
with it in hindsight. Mr Lewington said that he never received a response from 
management to the concerns raised in the memorandum. 6  Haringey Social Services
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6.116   I heard evidence that the restructuring had a negative effect on staff members in 
the NTDO. There was a high turnover of staff during this period and Haringey lost 
many of its experienced and permanent staff. Recruitment was difficult because of 
service conditions, in particular poor remuneration, and the fact that there was a 
national shortage of social workers. Ms Mairs said that towards the end of 1999 
experienced staff left and people became very unhappy. It was very stressful and 
morale was low. People were under pressure to get work done with inadequate 
numbers of staff. Haringey Social Services had to use agency or newly qualified 
staff, who were not as experienced as they ought to have been for the caseload. 
6.117   Mr Lewington said he thought the restructuring was the final straw for a lot of 
people: “There was a big exodus of staff around that time, which began in the 
latter part of 1999 and continued into 2000. Haringey had a real staffing crisis, 
particularly in the North Tottenham Office.” 
6.118   Ms Kozinos also stated that there was a high turnover of staff due to the 
restructuring and that morale was quite low. Ms Kozinos said it was a very uncertain 
and unsettling time. The restructuring exercise for the DIAT began in May 1999 and 
was not fully implemented until about February 2000. The demands of the work 
never changed but the structure did and what was in place afterwards was less 
resourced than what was in place previously, but it was the same work demands.
6.119   Ms Mairs told the Inquiry that she did not know why Haringey underwent 
restructuring. She knew what she was told the purpose was, but in terms of the 
reality at the time, she cannot see how things improved in terms of service delivery 
or work morale: “The restructuring just brought chaos.” Mr Almeida said that the 
NTDO was a stressful place for all social workers and their supervisors. Mr Duncan 
confirmed that he took a fairly dim view of the way in which the restructuring was 
handled by senior management. He advised that the restructuring process was 
flawed from the outset, although he thought it was acceptable at the time. 
6.120   Mr Singh said in evidence that he was unaware there were repeated expressions 
of serious unhappiness and worries about the direction in which the restructuring 
proposals were taking the department. Lead member Councillor Adamou never 
heard any concerns from the trade unions about the restructuring process. But 
according to Councillor Adamou, there is never going to be universal approval 
for any restructuring plan and the level of discontent that she picked up from staff 
was at an acceptable level. Likewise, Councillor Meehan was unaware that there 
was a particular problem with morale arising out of the restructuring process in 
mid 1999. 
6.121   Ms Richardson accepted the detail about the differences of opinion from staff in 
the NTDO, but stated, “In terms of the project as a whole, people were almost 
enthusiastic about it.” Ms Richardson did not see the view of NTDO staff as 
representative of everyone. She noted that the Joint Review team in 1999 was 
impressed with the willingness of NTDO staff to change. Ms Richardson stated that 
staff did not raise any informal or formal protest to the restructure of children’s 
services. Indeed, her view was that at the end of the day, the only people who 
stood to lose in this process were two team managers – and who sought voluntary 
redundancy rather than accept alternative employment. 
6.122   Haringey council submitted: “The fact that most of the problems which the staff 
now attribute to this restructuring and the stresses which it caused them were not 
raised at the time, ought to raise doubts in your minds as to whether the picture 
they are now seeking to paint actually corresponds with the reality.” Haringey 
council stated that the fact that the trade unions did not raise concerns about the 
restructuring in circumstances where they might have been expected to do so is The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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significant. However, there is evidence to show staff, both collectively and through 
UNISON, brought concerns to the attention of senior management. Haringey in 
its own chronology of the reorganisation sets out the various correspondence from 
staff and Mr Lewington to Ms Wilson. 
6.123   Ms Richardson stated that there was more than one side to the picture that was 
being painted in the evidence. Ms Richardson said she was sure the restructuring 
process had an effect on the way Victoria’s case was handled, but she does not 
think restructuring on its own was the critical issue. 
6.124   Against the backdrop of restructuring, there is plenty of evidence to suggest there 
was a lack of supervision available in the second half of 1999 because managers 
were preoccupied with preparing for their interviews. Managers were not totally 
focused on their duties because they were worried about keeping their jobs and 
the interviewing process itself. 
6.125   Ms Arthurworrey stated that the restructuring created a sense of uncertainty and 
her morale was very low at that time. Managers had to prepare a presentation 
for their interviews and this preparation took place during work hours, when 
otherwise they would have been available to social workers. The atmosphere in 
the office while this restructuring process was going on was chaotic, busy and very 
unsettling. There appeared to be no managers available and they “were seeing 
different faces in the office”. 
6.126   Ms Baptiste, was one of those who was preparing for an interview, and she was 
less available than she might otherwise have been. Ms Baptiste prepared for her 
interview during working hours and in her spare time. Ms Baptiste said that there 
was not any formal time given by her seniors, nor any formal support that had 
been identified for staff to have that time. Ms Baptiste agreed that maybe staff 
should have been doing this preparation in their own time rather than during 
Haringey’s time. With hindsight she accepted it made her less available to those for 
whom she was responsible. Mr Duncan confirmed there was a lot of revision to do 
for the interviews but no one approached him to say they needed time to prepare 
for the interviews or to ask if it could be done during work hours. 
6.127   The apparent endorsement of Haringey’s restructuring by the Joint Review in early 
1999 to which I shall return at paragraph 6.145, helps little, not least because 
it was early days in the restructuring exercise. As lead reviewer Dennis Simpson 
reminded the Inquiry, the reviewers knew none of the detail of the restructuring 
as this had not yet been worked out beyond the top management changes. The 
imperative was for implementation to an explicit timetable, for it to be consultative 
with staff and for unnecessary delays to be avoided. The Joint Review team was 
undoubtedly impressed by what they perceived as the clear sense of direction 
and vision of the senior management team, which would be fundamental to 
the delivery of a restructuring with minimum disruption for staff and users alike. 
What the Joint Review team could not have foreseen was that the driving force 
behind the restructuring exercise (Ms Richardson) would leave Haringey in March 
2000, barely one month after its completion in children’s services and before any 
monitoring and evaluation of its effects could have been undertaken. 
6.128   In fact, Ms Richardson was director of social services with Haringey for just under 
two years in total. Mr Duncan described Ms Richardson’s departure as a: “captain 
deserting a sinking ship”. Mr Duncan advised the Inquiry that, “for somebody to 
be the architect of such a major restructuring, throw all the cards up in the air 
and then run away before they all fall down” just made morale worse when it was 
already very low. 6  Haringey Social Services
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6.129   Having heard a considerable amount of evidence on this issue, I am quite 
satisfied that Haringey’s restructuring exercise during 1999, and the problems 
in its implementation, did occupy the attention of those children’s services 
managers and senior practitioners affected by the process to such an extent 
that, in Mr Duncan’s words, “it may have caused them to take their eye off the 
ball”. This was particularly apparent in the availability of managers to effectively 
supervise front-line practitioners at a time when real difficulties in recruitment and 
retention of staff were beginning to emerge and caseloads were undesirably high. 
More specifically, given the weaknesses already known about in Ms Baptiste’s 
management capability, I am sure that the restructuring process did have an effect 
on the way Victoria’s case was handled which ought to have been foreseen and 
compensated for as the delays, uncertainties and staff anxieties in the NTDO were 
making themselves known. 
Recruitment and retention
6.130   Restructuring also contributed to the problems of staff recruitment and retention 
in Haringey. Ms Arthurworrey recalled:
“During 1999 there was extremely low morale in the social services 
department. The DIATs had continual problems in recruiting and 
retaining experienced social workers. Social workers were continually 
coming and going, which resulted in the high use of locums, temporary 
and agency staff ... There were a number of permanent posts which 
were vacant due to the problems with recruitment. It was a chaotic 
work environment in which relatively inexperienced social workers were 
carrying high caseloads.” 
6.131   The minutes of the NTDO management team meeting held on 14 July 1999 noted 
that the number of vacancies in NTDO was having a major impact on services in 
terms of the cost of agency fees, the inconsistency of the service offered, and the 
instability in the staff group. Ms Wilson stated that they always had difficulties 
– and hence, presumably, these difficulties were predictable – before summer 
because staff tended to leave at that time of year. Ms Wilson did not think at that 
time that there were long-term staffing problems. However, towards the end of 
1999 a significant number of experienced practitioners left Haringey and there was 
an impending staffing crisis. 
6.132   Ms Baptiste said that during 1999 her team was short of probably one or two 
social workers, and one of the difficulties she faced as a manager was the number 
of inexperienced social workers in her team. Ms Mairs said that difficulties 
in recruiting led to the need to use agency staff and staff who were not as 
experienced as they ought to have been for the caseload. Ms Kozinos said this 
put extra pressure on managers who had to supervise them because it resulted in 
extra guidance, extra training and additional time invested in these people. As a 
consequence, services were delayed and work often had to be duplicated. There 
was less stability for team members as well as for service users. In Ms Robertson’s 
view, this affected the quality of the Haringey’s initial assessment team service in 
the second half of 1999, although she hoped that the team tried to do the best it 
could for service users. In the absence of effective and regular supervision in which 
case files were read as a matter of routine, this could have amounted to little more 
than an aspiration.
6.133  Mr  Lewington’s impression was that the atmosphere in the NTDO was bad, there 
was inadequate support and supervision, no clear direction from management, and 
“people just did not feel safe”. In addition, pay levels in Haringey had fallen well 
behind other boroughs. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.134   Mr Duncan held the view that people left because of restructuring, changes to 
pay and conditions, and more prospective cuts to the service making working 
conditions more difficult. According to Mr Duncan, staff leaving “was a 
consequence that senior management just simply had not foreseen”. Ms Wilson 
said that senior management could not have anticipated the unstable staffing 
situation at the inception of the restructuring. Yet while front-line managers were 
clearly concerned at the impact of staffing shortages on service delivery throughout 
1999, senior management did not see the problems of staff turnover and agency 
staffing as particularly acute until the end of 1999. 
6.135   In a leader’s briefing written by Ms Wilson in January 2000, she reported, “23 
social work staff have left children’s services since the beginning of December and 
more resignations are expected.” The vacancies were mainly in the front-line teams 
and in residential work where pressure and stress was highest. In exit interviews 
offered at the time, two social workers gave restructuring as the reason for leaving 
the department. Seven expressed resentment at potential terms and conditions 
changes and expressed the fear of further financial instability as the borough 
sought to make savings.
6.136  This  ‘resentment’ was to make itself felt in an industrial dispute involving UNISON 
members, which culminated in strike action in December 1999. At the heart of 
the dispute were discussions about proposals to implement council wide the single 
status agreement about terms and conditions. 
6.137   In Ms Wilson’s opinion, the timing of the council’s decision was most unfortunate 
because staff were in the process of emerging from a very difficult restructuring 
process only to be faced with a plan to make them work “longer hours for less 
money”. For an authority whose position in the salary league table across London 
was third from bottom, this would do little to contain a growing social worker 
recruitment and retention problem. 
6.138   Mr Duncan stated, “It was a very strange decision by the council at that time to 
try to change the terms and conditions of staff because ... the impact in terms 
of morale was huge. And even if the council had secured the cuts in terms and 
conditions they wanted, it would not have made that much difference financially 
to them, so it was really a lose-lose situation for the council.” While Mr Singh 
thought if they had achieved savings of £1m plus it would have been “a success 
story”, Andrew Travers, head of corporate finance, conceded that their discussions 
about terms and conditions would not have “resulted in significant savings 
being achieved”. 
6.139   In the event, the council never made any decision to proceed with the changes 
to terms and conditions. However, by then the damage had been done. Staff 
had reacted to the uncertainty around the proposals. It was enough to lead 
Mr Kousoulou, acting director of social services following Ms Richardson’s 
departure, to describe in a paper to the Policy and Strategy Committee in May 
2000, that the difficulties children’s services had faced in recruiting staff since 
the summer of 1999 had “become a haemorrhage from November to December 
directly linked to the industrial action after which increased numbers of staff 
tendered their resignation and others noted their intention to seek employment 
in other authorities”. 
6.140   In its handling of this issue it is difficult to argue any other conclusion than that 
Haringey was the author of many of its own misfortunes. It must remain Haringey’s 
right to consider all the means at its disposal for meeting financial pressures. 
However, to embark on a course of action with the inevitable uncertainty that the 
prospect of change brings, without first weighing up fully all the likely benefits and 6  Haringey Social Services
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costs, was nothing short of irresponsible. It seems clear to me that either no such 
exercise was done on this occasion, or equally concerning, Haringey council was so 
out of touch that it entirely misread the impact discussions on changes to terms and 
conditions would have in particular on its children and families’ social work staff.
The Joint Review
6.141   Haringey underwent a Joint Review by the Audit Commission and the Social 
Services Inspectorate (SSI) in the first part of 1999. Although the fieldwork for the 
review was completed in February 1999 and the first feedback to managers and 
lead members was in April, the report of the Joint Review was not finally published 
until November of that year. By this time Haringey had assumed case responsibility 
for Victoria for some five months. The only relevance of the Joint Review to this 
Inquiry is the extent to which it painted a clear and accurate picture of the state 
of children’s services in the months preceding Victoria’s arrival in Haringey.
6.142   Lead reviewer Mr Simpson explained that the primary purpose of the Joint Review 
was to take a strategic overview of the whole of Haringey social service functions, 
to provide an objective assessment of how well the people of Haringey were being 
served, and to contribute to any further improvements in those services. Joint 
Reviews, he said, are to be distinguished from SSI inspections, which typically provide 
a detailed investigation of one particular service for one particular care group.
6.143  Haringey’s Joint Review concluded that the “users of social services are generally 
well served”. In terms of children’s services, the reviewers formed the impression 
“of a working environment that was both challenging and rewarding for staff”. 
The report found, “Overall, this is a service with a strong commitment to good 
practice, but also one that recognises that there are some inconsistencies that need 
to be addressed before further improvements can take place.” It went on to state, 
“No single issue emerged during the Review that caused reviewers to have concern 
about the practice of child protection.” 
6.144  Of  Haringey’s senior management, the Joint Review report found:
“There are clear signs of both management and strategic grip. The 
Senior Management Team gives obvious leadership, led by a chief officer 
[presumably Mary Richardson] with a clear sense of purpose and who has 
quickly gained the respect of her staff since her appointment.” 
“The previous history of Haringey is a lack of strategic direction, failure 
to deal with difficult management issues and solutions found at the 
‘eleventh hour’. This position has gradually changed as greater political 
stability has been achieved, supported by senior officers seeking to give 
the service a clearer sense of purpose and direction, reinforced by the 
recently appointed Director and supported by the Chief Executive.”
6.145   Andrew Webster, the director of Joint Reviews at the time the report was 
published, was quoted as follows:
“This review suggests that Haringey has every reason to be optimistic 
about managing the change programme it has set in place. The council 
has made, and is continuing to make, positive changes in order to 
improve the delivery of services. However, while some examples of 
excellent practice are evident, greater consistency is needed in the direct 
provision of services. The authority is nevertheless aware of this and 
generally has strategies in place to take corrective action.”The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.146  Haringey’s own Joint Review press release was entitled “Praise for Haringey’s Social 
Services”. It stated that the report puts Haringey among the leading social services 
in the country, and that the residents of Haringey were receiving a good service 
from the council’s social services department. 
Reaction to the Joint Review
6.147   Not surprisingly, senior management and members were pleased with the report 
and were reassured by this positive overview. While they saw there were pockets 
of criticism and areas that needed development, overall the report concluded 
that Haringey Social Services were heading in the right direction. Ms Richardson 
said that the reviewers “were finding what we had told them was the problem, 
that was not news to us”. Ms Richardson thought that it was an overstatement 
to say that many of the positive conclusions reached by the reviewers were based 
on future promises rather than present actions. However, she accepted that in 
its assessment the review took into consideration Haringey council’s collective 
ability to take the processes forward – a collective ability that was in fact to all but 
disappear within 13 months of the report’s publication, as the chief executive, 
director of social services and assistant director of children’s services all moved on 
to presumably better jobs.
6.148   Councillor Adamou, lead member for social services from 17 May 1999 to 15 May 
2000, cited the positive report from the Joint Review as the reason she thought 
children’s services were running well. Against a background of council-wide cuts, 
she agreed that this Joint Review seemed, to Haringey, to be as good as it could 
get. Councillor Adamou said she was aware that the department had been working 
towards the Joint Review for a year. Internal audits were taking place in Haringey 
in order to assess performance. “My view was that preparation for the joint 
inspection and report had been lengthy and thorough,” said Councillor Adamou. 
Accordingly, she said she knew before the report was released that its conclusions 
were generally favourable and that where they were not so, steps were being taken 
to remedy defects. She said that she heard nothing from the senior officers, in 
particular Ms Wilson and Ms Richardson, which indicated a different picture within 
social services to the one painted by the Joint Review. Likewise, Councillor Meehan, 
leader from May 1999, stated that his view of children’s services at the end of 
1999 was as set out by the Joint Review. 
6.149   Others took a very different view. Mr Lewington, a UNISON representative, advised 
the Inquiry that the Joint Review “still sticks in my mind because it gave Haringey 
something of a glowing report”. According to Mr Lewington, “People clearly 
were expecting some fairly significant criticism as a result of the Joint Review. 
They were quite surprised when instead the Joint Review said things were just 
fine.” Mr Lewington stated that he thought “people felt the process had been 
managed in such a way that they would come up with a good report”. Likewise, 
Mr Peatfield, an independent chair of case conferences and case reviews, said 
that staff were amazed when the Joint Review gave Haringey a glowing report. 
Mr Peatfield said he thought the report was “inconsistent with the service to 
families and children that one felt was being delivered, which was patchy and at 
times not satisfactory, and one knew the staff were struggling, one knew there 
were unallocated cases so it really appeared to be one of these sort of dislocations 
that did not make any sense”. He continued, “I think workers were anxious that 
the department was presenting a picture of managing its task which did not feel 
to them to be real in terms of their struggle in performing the task.” 
An alternative view
6.150   In fact, as the evidence I have already referred to in this section makes clear, by 
November 1999, when the Joint Review was published, children’s services were 
already beginning to become derailed. Senior managers who knew or ought to 6  Haringey Social Services
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have known the position did nothing to enlighten the Review team or, it seems, 
members in the weeks leading up to the formal council feedback sessions in 
late 1999. As a result, and as events were subsequently to demonstrate all too 
graphically, the Joint Review’s “lasting impression of a service not likely to be 
blown off course as new service configurations are put in place and management 
changes are implemented” could not have been more misplaced. 
6.151   Two months after Victoria’s death in February 2000, an internal review of district 
cases highlighted serious practice failings verging on the acute and dangerous 
in the Hornsey office. These included procedures routinely not being followed, 
an absence of timescales, investigations not being recorded, little evidence of 
multi-agency planning particularly in family support cases, and cases left to drift.
6.152   Seven months after the Joint Review report came out, there was a detailed 
inspection of Haringey’s children’s services by the SSI that was highly critical. 
I have already referred to its conclusions on Haringey’s resourcing of its service. 
In addition, the SSI found “a service to be seriously understaffed at both 
practitioner and managerial level”. It found:
“North Tottenham had suffered particularly badly with 47 per cent 
vacancies overall and 33 per cent of management posts vacant. Although 
some two-thirds of social worker posts were covered by agency staff 
this had adversely affected the service. Social workers reported that 
supervision and support had been compromised when restructuring had 
initially been implemented ... The situation had improved but there was 
still a serious shortfall in front-line management availability. This was 
bound to adversely affect decision making and quality control.
“The high level of management vacancies coupled with the relative 
inexperience of many new practice managers was putting enormous 
strain on the few experienced team managers and the commissioning 
manager.
“Morale in the two district teams was reported to be poor and there was 
a risk that an already difficult staffing situation could spiral downwards. 
We also had concerns about the quality of some of the practice that 
we observed.
“On the other hand we found a significant number of managers and 
staff who were committed to the service and capable with reasonable 
resources of seeing the service through its current difficulties.” 
6.153   The deterioration in Haringey’s children and families’ service was to culminate in 
the authority being placed on special measures by the Department of Health on 
12 January 2001.
6.154   Inevitably this sequence of events raises a number of questions as to the factors 
that might account for the change in Haringey’s children’s services between the 
perceived ‘positive’ report of the Joint Review, and the more critical SSI inspection 
seven months later. 
Was the Joint Review wrong?
6.155   Haringey Social Services have repeatedly said that they were entitled to rely on the 
Joint Review as being an accurate reflection of the state of their children’s services 
in early to mid 1999, but that over the course of the next year or so the service 
deteriorated, in some areas substantially. They pointed to Victoria’s death and huge The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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staff losses during that period, including the director leaving and the effect this had 
on morale. 
6.156   Mr Singh said he depended on external reviews to tell him what was actually 
happening and “It is perfectly reasonable for me to expect a Joint Review 
conducted by two reputable bodies, SSI and Audit Commission, to actually be 
reliable and that gave myself and indeed members of the authority considerable 
comfort in a very difficult environment that we were operating in.” 
6.157   Mr Singh went on to state that despite the subsequent poor SSI report, “you 
cannot simply ignore the positive stuff which came out of the Joint Review as if 
that also has no bearing on the matter.” He continued:
“Yes, there was a clear condemnation arising out of the children’s 
inspection, but literally a year prior to that there was a glowing response 
on social services generally. Now that just cannot be disregarded as if it 
did not happen. That was also a statement about the quality of services 
which Haringey was providing in the social care area.” 
Mr Singh said that he did not rely solely on the Joint Review Report as a source of 
information. 
6.158   An alternative explanation could be that the Joint Review simply got it wrong 
in 1999 and the reality was worse than as portrayed in their report. It was an 
explanation that John Bolton, head of the Joint Review team, certainly canvassed. 
Five days after Kouao and Manning were convicted of Victoria’s murder and 
Haringey were placed on special measures, he was quoted in an interview reported 
for Community Care magazine as saying:
“It is possible that we may have made a mistake and that is a cause for 
enormous regret. We just don’t know ... At the same time, this is a huge 
tragedy, and we hope that we did not contribute to any complacency in 
the department.”
Reviewing the Joint Review
6.159   In January 2001, unbeknown to Haringey, the Audit Commission and SSI decided 
to review the processes that had been used by the Haringey Joint Review in 
order to determine whether there were areas for improvement and to “assist 
in the governance of both organisations”. The authors of the new internal 
review, David Prince (the auditor’s director of operations) and Jennifer Gray 
(a childcare specialist in the SSI), were quite clear that their task was to “follow 
in the footsteps” of the Joint Review team and examine how their judgements 
were reached relative to the evidence they had collected. It was not their role to 
re-perform the Joint Review’s work or second-guess the conclusions of the Joint 
Review team. 
6.160   Mr Prince described it as “a special light-touch quality control review” that focused 
on the methodology and not the findings of the Joint Review. Special because it 
had never been done before, light-touch in the sense that it was to be quick and 
focused on improvements, and quality control to see if anything could be learned 
from it. 
6.161   Nonetheless, whatever their initial brief, both the report of the internal review 
and the witness statements, particularly of Ms Gray, an inspector with specialist 
knowledge of childcare practice, called into question some of the initial Joint 
Review findings and raised potentially concerning aspects of Haringey’s children’s 
service, which in Ms Gray’s view were not adequately expressed in the Joint Review 6  Haringey Social Services
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report. It should be noted they were asked to look only at the children’s services, 
which were only a part of the original Joint Review exercise and report. 
6.162   The relevance of this new internal review evidence to the Inquiry (and which was 
to form the subject matter of the re-opened Phase One hearings) was three-fold: 
• First, what additional light did the internal review throw on the state of children’s 
social services in Haringey in early 1999? 
• Secondly, what did it suggest Haringey knew or ought to have known about the 
state of those services – in particular, were Haringey entitled to rely on the Joint 
Review as an accurate picture of their children’s services?
• Thirdly, should the Joint Review have been framed differently and, had it been 
written differently, would Haringey have changed the way it dealt with cases 
like Victoria’s? 
6.163   Mr Prince sought, at the end of his oral evidence, to distance himself from the 
conclusions of the internal review – a review approved by him and accepted in 
full by both the SSI and Audit Commission as the sponsoring departments. He did 
this by asking the Inquiry to disregard any judgements contained in the internal 
review about the state of Haringey’s children’s services. This was surprising and 
in no way reduced the need for this Inquiry to test the validity of the internal 
review’s conclusions. 
6.164   In his written and oral evidence, lead joint reviewer Mr Simpson went some way 
towards accepting the criticism that the Joint Review should have more clearly 
expressed concerns about practice. At several points in his statement Mr Simpson 
indicated that, were he writing the report now, he would have placed more 
emphasis on the need for more consistency in the provision of services, along with 
the need to improve some services which had fallen below an acceptable standard.
6.165   He also said that the principal deficiency with the Joint Review was that insufficient 
attention was drawn at the start and the finish of the report to the practice 
deficiencies. Nonetheless, these were identifiable on a close reading of the 
body of the report as a whole. Indeed, he felt that the Joint Review report was 
“encouraging of management, but not to the detriment of dealing with poor 
monitoring data, poor practice, the need to improve practice guidance to front-line 
staff, improve case recording, make supervision and performance appraisal more 
comprehensive, deal with significant budget problems and cope with increased 
demand for children’s services. Hardly a report which shirked from identifying 
issues related to practice and direct service provision”. 
6.166   That the Management Action Plan drawn up by Haringey in response to the Joint 
Review contained 40 action points designed to address deficiencies in practice in 
children’s services was illustrative, according to both Mr Simpson and Haringey 
Counsel, not only of the fact that the Joint Review had raised these practice 
deficiencies (and therefore the review could not be said to be overly positive), 
but that Haringey knew about them and were going to respond to them. 
6.167   The most detailed assessment of the state of children’s services in early 1999 
from Haringey’s perspective came from the evidence of Ms Wilson. She, in 
common with Ms Richardson, had no doubt that there was considerable room for 
improvement in their children’s services at the time. There was, she says, “Still a lot 
of work to be done.” 
6.168   Of the extracts from the Joint Reviewers’ notebooks on which she commented in 
her evidence, those concerning the lack of infrastructure, the delays in transferring 
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and the closure of family support cases, were all identified as broadly consistent 
with her understanding of the state of the service at the time. The findings of the 
Joint Review, she said, did not come as a surprise to her and reflected much of 
what Haringey already knew, as identified in the Position Statement prepared in 
November 1998. Yet despite in Mr Simpson’s words the “sack full of work remaining 
to be done”, she submitted that Haringey’s children’s services in early 1999 were 
successfully managing their limited resources, and fulfilling their statutory obligations 
to children and families in the borough contrary to any alternative indication that 
may have been given by the authors of the internal review.
6.169   Having considered this matter carefully, I come to the view that the internal 
review, and the evidence of its authors, did little to undermine the conclusions of 
the original Joint Review Report. As a consequence, the Joint Review, read in its 
entirety, continues to be the best available evidence as to the state of Haringey’s 
children’s services in early 1999. More significantly, I accept Mr Simpson’s view 
that the Joint Review was not as complimentary of the authority as portrayed. 
While a better balanced report would have emphasised more clearly the service 
and practice deficiencies in the summary and conclusions, these messages and the 
actions needed to address them were there in the detail of the report and should 
have mirrored what Haringey’s own management information system was telling 
them. To that extent, and that extent only, Haringey’s senior management and 
members could justifiably rely on the Joint Review. 
6.170   Despite the encouraging headlines, there were substantial detailed criticisms of 
various aspects of the services in the Joint Review Report. In my view, Haringey 
did no more than pay lip service to the detail of the report, choosing instead to 
play to the positive headlines of the Joint Review as was so clearly demonstrated 
by the evidence of the chief executive and lead members, and by their own press 
statement. That Haringey listed the concerns raised by the review team in their 
management action follow-up plan, confirms that they were aware of these issues. 
The urgency with which those actions were followed through, however, was totally 
absent. A good illustration of this, and one of particular relevance to Victoria’s 
case, was the potential ‘burn out’ of staff in north Tottenham to which Haringey’s 
attention was drawn by the Joint Review team as early as April 1999. According 
to Ms Wilson, this was addressed by a series of ‘interim’ measures and was still 
being addressed according to Haringey’s management action plan in September 
2000, some seven months after Victoria’s death. Other concerns raised by the Joint 
Review were dealt with no more speedily.
6.171   In short, it is my view that those senior managers and lead members could and 
should have known about the serious deficiencies in Haringey’s children’s services in 
early 1999. Furthermore, the gap between the reality for the front-line practitioners 
in the NTDO children and families’ service and the positive impressions of the Joint 
Review team, were left unchallenged by senior officers. The result was a lack of 
any real political will and sustained managerial drive to bring about the necessary 
improvements in the service. 
Victoria in Haringey
Referral
6.172   Haringey Social Services first learned of Victoria’s admission to the North Middlesex 
Hospital on Saturday 24 July 1999 – the day she was admitted.
6.173   That evening, it was Luciana Frederick’s turn to single-handedly cover the 
out-of-hours duty for the whole of Haringey Social Services. She started her 
12-hour shift at 6.30pm and some time between 8pm and 9pm, according to 6  Haringey Social Services
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her report form, she answered a telephone call from Dr Simone Forlee. In fact, 
the social services duty call log shows that a telephone message from Dr Forlee 
was taken at 8.42pm and was passed to Ms Frederick as the duty social worker an 
hour later.
6.174   Ms Frederick does not remember the telephone conversation, but she believes 
that the report form which she completed at the time – the only record of the 
telephone conversation that exists – is a concise summary of the information 
Dr Forlee gave her.
6.175   Ms Frederick noted: 
“– child admitted to hospital – concerns about injury caused by hot water poured 
onto face causing facial burns;
– it appeared to be an accident, however, mother may need support;
– advice given – doctor agreed to discuss case with the hospital social worker the 
following day;
– NFA [no further action].”
6.176   Dr Forlee disagreed with Ms Frederick’s summary in one material respect. She 
did not recollect describing Victoria’s injury as appearing to be an accident and 
believed she told Ms Frederick that she had admitted a child about whom she 
had concerns.
6.177   We cannot be certain what passed between the two because of the lack of 
recorded information – indeed in the case of the hospital there was none 
whatsoever – or whether Ms Frederick simply misunderstood what Dr Forlee was 
saying. That Dr Forlee had telephoned social services out of hours suggested a 
degree of concern about Victoria’s injuries. This was understandable. Ms Frederick 
told the Inquiry that she made “concise notes” but admitted it would have 
been helpful if she had made a full recording specifying Dr Forlee’s concerns. 
Ms Frederick accepted that more detail could have been put in her recording of 
the conversation, but stated, “The relevant detail is there.”
6.178   Both Dr Forlee and Ms Frederick agreed that because Victoria was “safe in hospital” 
and there appeared to be no immediate risk of her being removed, there was no 
need that evening for any further investigative action, including seeing Victoria. 
Dr Forlee was also told to contact the hospital social work team “the following day”. 
Since the referral came in late on Saturday night and there was no hospital social 
work team working on Sunday, that meant in reality a delay until Monday morning. 
Ms Frederick admitted that the following day was “probably not appropriate”. 
6.179   Working from home, Ms Frederick was in no position to do any checks to see if 
Victoria was known to social services or on the child protection register. She stated 
that she assumed – though she did not pursue this with Dr Forlee – that these 
checks would have been done by the hospital, which had access to the names of 
children on the child protection register and by the hospital social work team, as 
part of any follow-up. 
6.180   Ms Frederick subsequently faxed the report form to the out-of-hours office for 
filing. She said that if there had been a clear indication of child protection concerns 
– especially if there had been no other professional involved – she would have 
made the referral herself direct to the duty team at the NTDO and undertaken 
whatever was necessary that evening to secure the child’s safety. Ms Frederick 
stated that she had no doubts about what she should do if child protection 
concerns had been raised. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.181   As a result of the decision to take no further action and because Victoria’s injury 
“appeared to be an accident”, the out-of-hours referral report was consigned to a 
filing cabinet. No copy was forwarded to the hospital social work team to put them 
on alert, nor to the local district duty, investigation and assessment team who may 
have held information about the child and family. Also, there was no system in 
place to ensure that Dr Forlee made contact with the hospital social work team as 
advised or that, once in the out-of-hours office filing cabinet, this referral could be 
automatically linked to any future referral. Ms Frederick accepted that if Dr Forlee 
had not been on duty on Monday or had forgotten to make the referral to the 
hospital social worker, the information from Saturday evening may never have got 
to the hospital social work team or Haringey Social Services. Therefore, I make the 
following recommendation:
Recommendation
The chief executive of each local authority with social services responsibilities must 
ensure that specialist services are available to respond to the needs of children and 
families 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The safeguarding of children should 
not be part of the responsibilities of general out-of-office-hours teams.
Contacting the North Middlesex Hospital
6.182   Karen Johns, the hospital social worker, telephoned Caroline Rodgers, the duty 
social worker at Haringey Social Services, at about 4.30pm. Having accepted the 
referral, responsibility for Victoria’s case transferred to Haringey Social Services 
at that stage. She recorded key details about Victoria’s admission to the North 
Middlesex Hospital as follows: 
• mum brought Anna to the A&E at about 5.25pm on Sat 24th July;
• Anna had burns to head and face;
• mum says Anna has scabies that are being treated by the Central Middlesex 
Hospital;
• mum heard Anna scream at about 12 noon. She found that Anna had poured 
hot water over her head (from the tap) to stop the itching on her head;
• next day the nurse who had bathed Anna on Rainbow ward saw old marks on 
Anna‘s body;
• until then staff did not suspect physical abuse but they now feel sure the marks 
are non-accidental;
• Dr Forlee suggests that the marks look like they were done by a belt buckle;
• Anna seems slightly nervous of mum and “seems on edge when mum visits”. 
Ward staff described how she “jumps to attention” when mum appears;
• Anna also wets herself when mum is there;
• on admission Anna appeared unkempt, dirty dress and no underwear. Mum has 
brought no clean clothes since Anna’s admission.
6.183  Ms  Rodgers’s good sense in following up the referral with a request for full 
information from the Central Middlesex Hospital is quite clear. She could no longer 
recall whether she spoke to Dr Schwartz, the consultant in charge of Victoria’s case 
at the Central Middlesex Hospital, or someone else, though her normal practice 
would have been to go direct to the hospital social worker or possibly to staff in 
the accident and emergency department.
6.184   Two days later, the Central Middlesex Hospital faxed back several pages of relevant 
documentation. There is some doubt as to how many pages were faxed across but 
it is accepted that at the very least the documents seen by Haringey Social Services 
included a general trauma form dated 14 July 1999, a paediatric assessment 6  Haringey Social Services
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record, ongoing communication sheets, a body map and a ‘medical report on a 
child thought to have suffered abuse’.
6.185   However, it is unlikely that Ms Rodgers read any of this material because she said 
she found it illegible and “could not read it”. Regrettably, she made no attempt 
to ask the Central Middlesex Hospital for help in clarifying its contents. If she 
had, she would have learned that Victoria had been brought to the hospital by 
her childminder’s daughter, that Kouao was desperate to leave Victoria with the 
childminder “for good”, and that Victoria was not attending school. The medical 
report identified that there were scars of various sizes and ages all over the body 
from two days to possibly months old. There were also fresh scars on the face, 
infected cuts on the fingers and bloodshot eyes. Victoria was said to have cut 
herself with a razor blade in the past, that she wet herself and that when she 
arrived at the hospital she was unkempt and had a pungent smell. 
6.186   By the time the NTDO received the Central Middlesex Hospital fax – and judging 
by the date stamp this could have been as late as 2 August 1999 – Ms Jacob, the 
team manager on duty on 27 and 28 July, had already, though late in the day, 
arranged a strategy meeting in Victoria’s case. 
6.187   Having read the details set out in the referral form, Ms Jacob considered that “this 
could probably have been a child protection case” which needed to be explored 
further. As was standard practice, she then completed and signed off an action 
plan on 27 July which included:
• logging the case onto the computer – this was to be done by the duty 
administrative clerk;
• referring the case to the police child protection team;
• arranging the strategy meeting;
• completing checks with the GP and Central Middlesex Hospital and school, 
if open.
6.188   Ms Jacob completed the second and third of these herself the following morning. 
The expectation was that others in the duty team would finish the tasks, in 
particular that Ms Rodgers would continue her checks of the Central Middlesex 
Hospital, as she had already made a start on this. Health and education checks 
were done as a matter of routine – these showed no record of either a GP or a 
school for Victoria – but no similar checks would have been done of housing unless 
this had been identified as a problem.
6.189   According to Ms Jacob, once the case was logged, the file would be returned and 
placed in the specific basket labelled “urgent action”. Duty workers were expected 
to deal with these as a matter of priority and could check with the duty manager if 
actions still needed to be completed.
The July strategy meeting
6.190   Ms Jacob said in evidence that the decision to call a strategy meeting was reached 
jointly with the police and the meeting was arranged for 2.30pm on Wednesday 
28 July 1999. She was aware that another strategy meeting had already been fixed 
for 2pm at the NTDO, which the police were expected to attend. She therefore 
arranged this meeting to follow on directly at the social services office – on the 
face of it a sensible and convenient arrangement, at least for the police. However, 
Haringey’s local child protection guidelines (known as the Purple Book), clearly 
stated that “in the event of the child being in hospital the [strategy] meeting must 
be held in the hospital”. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.191   There is no record of any challenge to Ms Jacob’s decision to hold the strategy 
meeting at the social services office by the police, Ms Rodgers or Ms Johns, 
though all would, or should, have been familiar with the contents of the Purple 
Book. However, Ms Johns said that she did question the choice of location on the 
grounds that the doctors would be unlikely to attend, but that Ms Jacob said, after 
checking with her manager, that it would not be possible to change the meeting 
venue. Ms Jacob did not recall this conversation.
6.192   As it happens, the procedures drawn up by Ms Mairs for the day-to-day running 
of the DIAT in north Tottenham, already prescribed, by agreement with the police, 
that strategy meetings would take place on Tuesday and Wednesday afternoons 
and Friday mornings. According to Ms Jacob, the duty team was never fully staffed 
and rationalising the times when meetings were held was seen as a sensible means 
of managing the duty system with the resources available. She says there was 
a presumption that strategy meetings would be held in the office for the same 
reason but argues that the DIAT procedures did not preclude such meetings taking 
place in the hospital if necessary, and some did.
6.193   The Purple Book also makes clear that if there is to be any divergence from the 
procedures, this needs to be endorsed by the team manager and recorded on 
the file. There is nothing on the case file to suggest that on this occasion an 
endorsement to hold the strategy meeting outside the hospital was ever sought 
from, or given by, a manager.
Attendees
6.194   Invited to the strategy meeting on 28 July 1999 were Ms Johns, the initial referrer, 
and the police from the Haringey Child Protection Team. Ms Jacob said, ideally, she 
would have wanted the medical staff to attend too, but she cannot recall whether 
they were invited or indeed whether she asked Ms Johns to do that on her behalf. 
Ms Johns is clear that had she been asked to issue invitations to the medical staff 
she would have done so. She did not know who invited Dr Rossiter to the strategy 
meeting, but she implied in her evidence that it was Haringey. 
6.195   In fact, four people attended: Ms Kozinos, a senior practitioner in the DIAT A, 
who chaired the meeting, Ms Johns from the North Middlesex Hospital social 
work team, PC Karen Jones from Haringey police Child Protection Team, and 
Ms Rodgers. None of the nursing or medical staff at the North Middlesex Hospital 
who had had daily care of Victoria were present, and none of those who were 
there had seen Victoria, let alone spoken to her, or to Kouao.
6.196   Ms Jacob told the Inquiry that it was her expectation that Ms Johns would 
represent the hospital and that she would pass on any information that the medical 
staff wished to share and would bring with her to the meeting the relevant medical 
reports. She saw nothing unsatisfactory about this arrangement.
Running the meeting
6.197   Ms Kozinos said she was asked to chair the strategy meeting at short notice. 
She was not on duty that week and would not have expected to chair strategy 
meetings in new, unallocated cases, and she went into the meeting without first 
reading the referral completed by Ms Rodgers. Apparently, this was common 
practice. Ms Kozinos said, “We normally go into strategy meetings cold unless 
we were the person who took the referral and had knowledge of it on duty.” 
Ms Kozinos expected Ms Rodgers to update those present with any current 
concerns. These were then recorded, together with the meeting’s decisions and 
recommendations, on a paper strategy meeting record.6  Haringey Social Services
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6.198   Ms Kozinos was not aware of the substance of Victoria’s referral and so could not 
have realised that the location of the strategy meeting was inappropriate. Once 
the meeting started, she did not take steps to adjourn the meeting to the hospital 
so that the medical staff could more easily attend. She told the Inquiry, “I felt we 
needed to proceed – we had sufficient information and it needed urgent action. 
There are suggestions of physical abuse, neglect which I felt needed investigating.”
6.199   When pressed, Ms Kozinos confirmed that difficulties in getting police to attend 
strategy meetings had become an issue because, for a variety of reasons, posts 
in the police child protection team were not being covered. The stacking up of 
strategy meetings was therefore not unknown. 
6.200   Strategy meetings were supposed to be chaired by team managers or child 
protection advisers. Yet Ms Kozinos told the Inquiry it was common practice at 
the time for senior practitioners to chair strategy meetings. It is not clear whether 
what had become common practice in north Tottenham – and was endorsed by 
north Tottenham’s DIAT procedures – was indeed common practice across both 
district offices. In her evidence to the Inquiry, Ms Wilson, the assistant director 
for children’s services, said this was not her understanding of the position before 
November 1999, as it was only then that agreement was reached as to the role of 
the new practice managers, who were to replace the senior practitioners.
6.201   There is some doubt as to exactly what information was available to the strategy 
meeting on 28 July 1999. It now seems certain that the faxed material from 
the Central Middlesex Hospital arrived too late. Ms Johns said, and in this she is 
supported by PC Jones, that she brought along three copies of documents from 
the North Middlesex Hospital. These included child protection forms, accident and 
emergency notes and a body map. Ms Rodgers also recalled seeing the body map 
and Ms Johns giving them copies. However, Ms Kozinos thought Ms Johns had not 
brought any medical reports with her but could no longer recall what indeed she 
had brought. By the time Ms Arthurworrey, the social worker allocated to Victoria’s 
case, first received the file on 2 August 1999, she claimed that no such North 
Middlesex Hospital documentation was included. However, the evidence I shall 
refer to later suggests otherwise.
Concerns and recommendations
6.202   The sense of the meeting at the end, at least from the social services perspective, 
was that the cause of Victoria’s scalding injuries was uncertain and that this was a 
child protection case that needed to be investigated thoroughly.
6.203   The strategy meeting recorded the concerns as:
“Mum – Marie-Therese Kouao brought Anna to North Middlesex Hospital 
on 24th July at 5.25 saying that the child had poured hot water over her 
head. Child has scabies and is very itchy and mum said that hot water 
was supposed to stop itching. Child admitted to Rainbow ward. Nurse 
noticed old marks on body – Dr Forlee suggests that they look like old 
belt buckle marks. Skeletal survey carried out – no results as yet. Delay 
in mother taking child to hospital. Also concerns re neglect, child very 
unkempt – mother was not.”
6.204   It also agreed the following 18 recommendations: 
  “i)  Dr Forlee examining paediatrician expressing concerns re previous NAI 
(shaped like belt buckle). Obtain medical report re their concerns. Also need 
to state how old injuries are.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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  ii)  Obtain skeletal reports for further information.
 iii)  Mother to be informed of referral to social services.
 iv)  Obtain report from hospital social worker re concerns of neglect.
  v)  Hospital social worker to inform social services when child ready for discharge.
 vi)   Staff nurses/hospital to monitor contact with mother and child and report 
back any concerns.
 vii)  Once we have medical reports arrange joint visit with PCPT and explain fully 
our child protection procedures to mother.
  viii)  Need to obtain much more information re scabies – how is this obtained? 
Is it linked to issues of neglect?
 ix)  Check with Central Middlesex Hospital for further information.
  x)  Social services need to carry out a full investigation and assessment.
 xi)  Social services need to complete checks re schooling and GP.
 xii)  Hospital social worker to inquire re hospital photographs – can this be given 
to social services and police.
  xiii)  Arrange interpreter when completing assessment.
 xiv)  Interview of mother needs to address – a) recent incident, b) old injuries, and 
c) neglect issues.
 xv)  Allocate to DIAT.
 xvi)  Child to remain in hospital. If mum attempts to take her, hospital to contact us.
xvii)  Complete checks in France – international services.
  xviii)  PCPT to complete immigration checks.”
6.205   By the end of the strategy meeting, and in the absence of a clear, written, 
diagnosis of non-accidental injury by a doctor, no decision was made to proceed 
to a child protection case conference at that stage. No explicit directions were 
recorded as to who would carry out the 18 tasks agreed, no timescales were 
settled, neither was a review date set to monitor progress. Ms Kozinos said that 
it was understood by all present that tasks not allocated to other agencies would 
be done by the allocated case worker from the NTDO, though no such person 
had yet been identified. It was also not the practice in Haringey at the time 
to hold a review of strategy meetings. The expectation was that decisions and 
recommendations would be reviewed in supervision between the responsible team 
manager and allocated social worker – an expectation that was to prove misplaced.
6.206   Ms Kozinos had no further contact with Victoria’s case until November 1999.
Allocation of Victoria’s case
6.207   On 30 July 1999, Ms Baptiste, the manager for the B investigation and assessment 
team based at Haringey’s NTDO, allocated the case to Ms Arthurworrey, a social 
worker in her team. In deciding who to allocate the case to, she said she believed 6  Haringey Social Services
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Ms Arthurworrey had space for several more cases but said nothing about her 
assessment, if any, of Ms Arthurworrey’s capacity and experience to tackle such 
a case.
6.208   In fact, by the time Ms Arthurworrey picked up Victoria’s case, she had had 
19 months’ post-qualification experience and half her caseload was composed of 
child protection cases. Yet despite this, she had yet to complete a joint section 
47 child protection inquiry with the police or a section 47 inquiry about a child 
in hospital.
6.209   August was also to prove one of Ms Arthurworrey’s busiest months. She had a 
workload of 19 cases, including Victoria’s – seven more than the maximum to 
be held by staff in the investigation and assessment team according to the local 
procedures handbook. Ms Arthurworrey said that most of these cases were “active” 
and she “was on the go all day long with no time to reflect”. 
6.210   Ms Arthurworrey told the Inquiry that she was not on duty the day the case was 
allocated to her but found the papers on her desk on 2 August 1999. The case 
file contained:
• the referral of 27 July as recorded by Ms Rodgers;
• the strategy meeting notes;
• a faxed message from Dr Schwartz to Ms Rodgers, dated 28 July requesting that 
Ms Rodgers contact her urgently;
• a fax from Ms Rodgers to the medical records library;
• a first contact sheet showing no records of a GP or school.
6.211   Although not at the strategy meeting, Ms Arthurworrey did not think she needed 
to speak to either Ms Rodgers or Ms Kozinos to clarify the decisions they had 
reached. Nor did she pursue with Ms Rodgers whether she had in fact contacted 
Dr Schwartz – Ms Rodgers told us she was not aware of ever having seen the fax 
– or what response if any had been received from the medical records library.
6.212   However, she did speak to her manager, Ms Baptiste, who told her that this was 
“a case about a child who was in hospital with scabies” and that she should 
implement the strategy meeting decisions. No date was set to review her progress 
in completing these tasks, nor did Ms Arthurworrey think it was her job to suggest 
such a review.
6.213   Ms Arthurworrey said she understood from the outset that she was dealing with 
a section 47 investigation. She also knew from the papers that Victoria was ‘safe’ 
in hospital at the time of the referral the previous week and that the hospital had 
been asked to notify social services when Victoria was ready for discharge or if 
Kouao attempted to remove her prematurely.
6.214   In her case file contact sheets, Ms Arthurworrey sets out 11 of the 18 strategy 
meeting recommendations for completion. These included obtaining a medical 
report from Dr Forlee, which covered the hospital’s concerns regarding previous 
non-accidental injuries, as well as a report from the hospital of its concerns of any 
neglect. Both of these, Ms Arthurworrey told us, were necessary before visiting 
Victoria, “because social services rely on evidence from the hospital into the causes 
of a child’s injuries and we need to know what we are dealing with”. 
6.215   Ms Arthurworrey makes no mention in the contact sheets of at least four strategy 
meeting decisions that, on the face of it, she needed to complete. These were to:
• obtain skeletal reports for further information;The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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• check with the Central Middlesex Hospital for further information;
• obtain more information about scabies; and, most importantly,
• carry out a full investigation and assessment.
6.216   While I accept Ms Arthurworrey’s evidence that she was clear when she was 
allocated the case that she was dealing with a section 47 investigation and that she 
had to complete the tasks outlined in the strategy meeting, I am far from satisfied 
with the way she then went about this, and the way Haringey as an organisation 
allowed her to do so.
6.217   I heard no evidence of what I would term a section 47 inquiry ever being carried 
out by Haringey Social Services. I deal with the failure of the police to conduct 
a criminal investigation later in section 14. At the very least, after the strategy 
meeting, Ms Arthurworrey should have spoken to Ms Kozinos, its chair, to go 
through the recommendations in detail. I am also surprised that she chose not to 
speak to Ms Rodgers, especially in light of the ‘urgent’ message from Dr Schwartz 
that was on the file. I believe that this initial ‘inaction’ by Ms Arthurworrey was 
based on her assumption that Victoria was ‘safe’ in hospital.
6.218   On 3 August 1999, Ms Johns sent Ms Arthurworrey a note by fax. In it Ms Johns 
said that she had been informed by the nurse in charge of Rainbow ward (Nurse 
Isobel Quinn) that Victoria was ready for discharge, and that the ward would like 
that to happen as soon as possible. The fax also made clear that Victoria’s scabies 
had been successfully treated.
‘Fit for discharge’?
6.219   At the time, Ms Arthurworrey says she understood the phrase ‘fit for discharge’ to 
mean that the hospital no longer had any concerns about Victoria in the general 
sense. By contrast, several hospital staff in their evidence to the Inquiry said that ‘fit 
for discharge’ meant that Victoria was medically fit to leave and they assumed the 
social workers would make the necessary inquiries of her home and family before 
that actually happened.
6.220   In response to Ms Johns’s fax, Ms Arthurworrey telephoned Nurse Quinn. It appears 
to have been a fairly lengthy call. Among other things, Ms Arthurworrey said that 
she was told by Nurse Quinn (and recorded in her contact sheet for 3 August 1999) 
about Victoria’s behaviour in Kouao’s presence (“she appeared to come straight to 
attention”), that the hospital accepted the explanation that Victoria had sustained 
the burns by pouring hot water over her own head “from a kettle” to relieve the 
itching caused by scabies, that there were concerns about a discrepancy between 
the timing of the incident and Victoria’s arrival at hospital, that the hospital had 
noticed old injuries on Victoria’s body, which appeared to be non-accidental, and 
therefore the hospital had concerns about these as well as Kouao’s response to the 
accident. In evidence Ms Arthurworrey also said that Nurse Quinn mentioned that 
Dr Rossiter had carried out a ward round, possibly on 1 August, and had noticed 
signs of deliberate emotional harm – a ‘master-servant’ relationship between Victoria 
and Kouao.
6.221  Nurse  Quinn’s recollection of the telephone conversation is somewhat different in 
one material respect. Like Dr Forlee, she denied ever saying that the hospital was 
satisfied with Kouao’s explanation for the burns. Rather she claimed to have said 
precisely the opposite, in other words, that there were remaining concerns about 
how Victoria received the scalding injuries. 
6.222   Nurse Quinn recorded in the critical incident log that she had spoken to 
Ms Arthurworrey, that Ms Arthurworrey needed to make a home visit before 
Victoria could go home, and that she had requested Nurse Quinn fax through 6  Haringey Social Services
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any concerns the hospital had. Given that on 1 August 1999 Dr Rossiter had 
already come to the view that Victoria’s scalding injuries were self inflicted, it 
seems highly unlikely that Nurse Quinn, as the nurse in charge of Rainbow ward, 
did communicate to social services two days later a different hospital view to that 
of the consultant paediatrician responsible for Victoria. I therefore conclude that, 
in early August, social services were left with the impression that the hospital had 
accepted Kouao’s explanation for the scalding injuries. 
6.223   Nurse Quinn also sent across a fax which Ms Arthurworrey believed would 
address all the hospital’s concerns and meet two of the strategy meeting 
recommendations, namely to obtain a medical report from Dr Forlee and to 
obtain further information from the hospital regarding neglect.
Nurse Quinn’s fax
6.224   Contained in the fax were three of the local child protection forms (CP1, 2 and 3) signed 
by Dr Forlee, and a letter from Nurse Quinn summarising ward staff observations 
regarding emotional neglect. Ms Arthurworrey accepts that she did not notice that 
the date on which the child protection forms had been completed – 24 July 1999 
– preceded the strategy meeting and therefore could not possibly be said to meet 
the strategy meeting recommendation for an updated medical report.
6.225   Moreover, the child protection forms, a body ‘diagram’ and accident and 
emergency department notes (all on the Haringey file) were, according to 
Ms Johns and PC Jones, already available from the strategy meeting. In addition, 
the Haringey file contained a copy of the North Middlesex Hospital paediatric 
assessment form. Ms Arthurworrey maintained that she never saw any of the 
medical material until she received the fax from Nurse Quinn. However, she could 
not remember how many pages Nurse Quinn sent her. Nurse Quinn told me that 
the documentation she sent to Ms Arthurworrey consisted of a cover sheet, her 
handwritten note, child protection form CP1, and probably also child protection 
forms CP2 and CP3, making a total of six pages in all. If, as seems likely, and 
contrary to Ms Arthurworrey’s earlier evidence, she already had in her possession 
on 2 August a set of child protection forms, a paediatric assessment form, an 
accident and emergency department form and a set of body maps, only Nurse 
Quinn’s memo summarising ward staff observations about emotional neglect 
would have constituted new medical evidence.
6.226   In addition, there was some doubt as to which version of the CP3 form 
Ms Arthurworrey was sent. Judging from the timing on the fax header sheet, it 
seems probable that the CP3 form she received was the one confusingly annotated 
by Dr Rossiter on 1 August 1999 in which she drew an arrow from the box ticked 
by Dr Forlee ‘I wish to await further information before committing myself’ to the 
tick box immediately above ‘I consider the incident is likely to be non-accidental’ 
and added the following words “what is uncertain is the category”.
6.227   Ms Arthurworrey accepted that it is likely she saw this version but did not recall 
noticing Dr Rossiter’s endorsement which, although unspecific, mentioning neither 
belt buckle marks nor any suggestion of deliberate physical harm, did at least 
suggest it was “likely to be non-accidental”.
6.228   Ms Arthurworrey told the Inquiry she believed that Nurse Quinn’s fax summarised 
the hospital’s concerns in their entirety and, in that sense, superseded the 
information contained in the initial referral. But even if true, and Ms Arthurworrey 
had grounds for believing this, by 3 August 1999 she was aware from her 
conversation with Nurse Quinn that there were unresolved questions about old 
and possibly non-accidental injuries. Although I conclude that anyone reading the 
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hard pressed to find any indication that the hospital suspected deliberate physical 
harm, she had been given up-to-date information about the hospital’s concerns 
regarding deliberate emotional harm.
6.229   What she did not have were any medical photographs of Victoria. Ms Johns had 
already faxed over a memo annotated by Dr Maud Meates, which suggested 
that although ordered, none had yet been taken, and that if the police wanted 
copies of them they “should follow the usual procedures”. Ms Arthurworrey never 
pursued with PC Jones whether she understood, let alone followed, the ‘usual 
procedures’ and obtained the photographs.
Obtaining information on medical concerns
6.230   To get a better understanding of the medical concerns, Ms Arthurworrey 
telephoned Dr Rossiter. Dr Rossiter remembered a conversation with 
Ms Arthurworrey occurring some time that week, but their recollections of what 
was said are rather different. Ms Arthurworrey said she made a note at the time of 
what was said. Unfortunately, Dr Rossiter kept no such record.
6.231   Ms Arthurworrey agreed that Dr Rossiter told her Victoria may be subject to 
emotional harm but said, “I did not know she had grave concerns.” She recorded 
in her notes:
“[Dr Rossiter] believes she is displaying evidence of anxious attachment. 
Anna appears to seek attention and praise from all the nursing staff 
but when mother arrives rushes to her side as if she has been called to 
attention. Dr Rossiter described that as a master/servant relationship.”
6.232   She also mentioned to Ms Arthurworrey, as recorded in Ms Aurthurworrey’s 
notes, Victoria’s fear of being undressed and of her being frightened of Kouao’s 
partner, and that Kouao may have over-treated the scabies. But, according to 
Ms Arthurworrey, Dr Rossiter did not suggest that the marks on Victoria’s body 
were indicative of physical harm. She was “unclear whether these were caused by 
Victoria scratching herself or infection from the scratching”. She also noted two old 
– and unexplained – thumb marks on Victoria’s body.
6.233   In describing her telephone conversation with Dr Rossiter, Ms Arthurworrey said:
“It was not really a discussion. It was a very factual conversation. It was 
one-way. Dr Rossiter gave me all this information and I wrote it down 
at the time ... At the end of the conversation I agreed to update her 
following the home visit.” 
6.234   Having made no record of their conversation, Dr Rossiter was not able to dispute 
Ms Arthurworrey’s note of it. (See paragraphs 10.131 – 10.135.)
6.235   Ms Arthurworrey admitted that she never questioned Dr Rossiter as to whether 
there was any indication of physical harm. Nor did she use the opportunity to 
systematically explore with Dr Rossiter the possible causes of all the marks found 
on Victoria’s body, or resolve any outstanding concerns – particularly in relation 
to the belt buckle marks identified by Dr Forlee and the ‘new’ observations of 
thumb marks. She said she never asked about the scalding incident because 
she understood from Nurse Quinn that the hospital was happy with Kouao’s 
explanation. In any event, it was Ms Arthurworrey’s view that if Dr Rossiter, as the 
senior paediatric consultant who had examined Victoria, had had any concerns 
regarding physical harm she would have communicated those to her directly. 
I do not consider this an unreasonable view to take. On the other hand, it was 
Ms Arthurworrey’s job to pull together and evaluate all the information available 6  Haringey Social Services
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to her and, if by some oversight, she had been given no explanation – or no 
plausible explanation – for all the marks on Victoria’s body, she should have sought 
one directly.
Failure to make a home visit
6.236   Ms Arthurworrey then discussed the case with her supervisor Ms Baptiste and 
with PC Jones. Ms Baptiste told her to arrange a home visit before Victoria was 
discharged from hospital. Accordingly she arranged for PC Jones and herself to visit 
Somerset Gardens on 4 August 1999.
6.237   By this stage Ms Arthurworrey’s concerns about Victoria were beginning to 
crystallise around emotional abuse and neglect. In her statement to the Inquiry 
she said that the hospital’s “ambivalence” about the marks on Victoria’s body “left 
her with no option but to pursue this as an investigation into social issues”. The 
“ambivalence” ought to have led to Ms Arthurworrey keeping an open mind about 
the possibility of physical harm while she conducted her inquiry.
6.238   It remains unclear from her evidence just how Ms Arthurworrey expected to resolve 
this uncertainty or how, given that Victoria was still in hospital and yet to be seen 
by any social worker, emotional abuse and neglect could be properly assessed by a 
home visit.
6.239   Ms Arthurworrey said that at the time she had understood that Victoria had 
contracted scabies from her home address. Her purpose in conducting a home visit 
was therefore to check that 267 Somerset Gardens was a safe and fit environment 
for Victoria to be discharged to.
6.240   In the event, the home visit never took place before Victoria’s discharge from 
hospital. PC Jones rang Ms Arthurworrey on 4 August 1999 to report the outcome 
of a conversation she said she had with the North Middlesex Hospital about 
scabies. According to Ms Arthurworrey’s notes, she was told by PC Jones that 
scabies was highly infectious and that any contact with the family home would 
require them to wear protective clothing. PC Jones made it quite clear that she was 
not prepared to conduct a home visit.
6.241   Ms Arthurworrey did not question the advice given by PC Jones. She updated 
Ms Baptiste who, according to Ms Arthurworrey, advised that the home visit should 
be cancelled and Kouao invited to the office for an interview instead. Ms Baptiste 
claimed to have told Ms Arthurworrey to do no more than speak to the doctor and 
obtain more information about scabies. Unfortunately the case record shows no 
evidence to support either version of what was said.
Meeting with Kouao
6.242   Kouao was offered an appointment to attend the NTDO the next day, Thursday 
5 August 1999. Ms Arthurworrey also rang the North Middlesex Hospital and 
found that Kouao had not visited Victoria since Monday morning.
6.243   PC Jones met Ms Arthurworrey about half an hour before the meeting with 
Kouao was scheduled to start. Neither the police nor any social worker had yet 
visited Victoria in hospital. In evidence, Ms Arthurworrey relied on Haringey’s child 
protection procedures to explain this. She said, “We needed to interview the carer ... 
We needed to obtain permission from the carer to interview the child.”
6.244   Ms Arthurworrey saw the purpose of the interview with Kouao to explore the 
recent scalding injury, the old markings and the neglect concerns reported by the 
hospital as part of her initial assessment. She hoped to use the interview to clear up 
any ambivalence regarding deliberate physical harm. Little preparation was needed The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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beforehand because, according to Ms Arthurworrey, the topics to be covered were 
already set out in the strategy meeting recommendations.
6.245   During the course of the interview, Ms Arthurworrey and PC Jones learned, and 
recorded on a paper initial assessment form, the following:
• Kouao and Victoria came to England from France in March 1999, following the 
death of Kouao’s husband, to try to start over again.
• While in France, Kouao had been in full-time employment as an information 
assistant at the airport.
• Her purpose in coming to England was to learn English.
• Manning was a close family friend who agreed to help her by offering 
accommodation to Kouao and Victoria in his studio flat until they had 
somewhere of their own to live.
• Conditions in the studio flat were cramped. Manning shared the flat with his 
girlfriend (fiancée); however, their relationship had become rather stressed since 
Kouao and Victoria moved in.
• A couple of weeks earlier Manning had needed his flat for the weekend so Kouao 
and Victoria had booked into a bedsit. The conditions were very poor and it was 
after they had checked out that Victoria had started to scratch herself and scabies 
was diagnosed at the Central Middlesex Hospital.
6.246   Kouao went on to explain that it was while Victoria was taking a bath she 
poured a beaker of hot water from the bath tap over her head to reduce the 
skin irritation, which resulted in the burns and her subsequent admission to the 
North Middlesex Hospital.
6.247   Although in oral evidence Ms Arthurworrey says she asked Kouao whether she 
had ever hit Victoria, there is no reference to this in her record of the interview. 
The only neglect issue she addressed was Victoria’s lack of clean clothes while 
in hospital. Kouao’s answer to this was that they had entered the country with 
few belongings and Victoria had few clothes. In any event the hospital had given 
Victoria what she needed.
6.248   Ms Arthurworrey (and PC Jones) made a number of observations during the 
interview. Most significantly they noted that although an interpreter was present, 
Kouao’s command of English was good and she would often reply in English before 
the interpreter had time to do so. Ms Arthurworrey recorded, “Marie-Therese 
presented as smart in appearance, proud and a woman who articulated very well.” 
However, her grasp of the English language would fail her whenever she was asked 
specific child protection questions. Then she appeared not to understand, was 
evasive and would turn to the interpreter for support.
6.249   Kouao also made clear that she wanted help with housing, finance and finding 
a school for Victoria and she confirmed – as she had to Ealing and Brent Social 
Services, the Central Middlesex Hospital and, inadvertently, to the North Middlesex 
Hospital before – that Victoria had not attended school since her arrival in England.
Hospital visit
6.250   Ms Arthurworrey raised her concerns about Kouao’s evasiveness with her manager, 
Ms Baptiste, who told her to visit Victoria in hospital. Ms Arthurworrey also noted 
as a further action that she should do a home visit to assess the home situation. 
6.251   The next day, Friday 6 August 1999, Ms Arthurworrey and PC Jones travelled 
together to visit Victoria on the Rainbow ward at the North Middlesex Hospital. 
They took no interpreter along, despite the fact that Victoria was a seven-year-old 
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previously. Ms Arthurworrey says that any doubts she had about Victoria’s ability to 
speak in English were put aside by Kouao’s assertion that she spoke good English 
and by the hospital who had earlier told Ms Arthurworrey that “Victoria had been 
chatting in English most of the time, all of the time”. She also thought that Victoria 
might find the presence of three adults, rather than two, intimidating. Therefore, 
I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
When communication with a child is necessary for the purposes of safeguarding 
and promoting that child’s welfare and the first language of that child is not 
English, an interpreter must be used. In cases where the use of an interpreter 
is dispensed with, the reasons for so doing must be recorded in the child’s 
notes/case file. 
6.252   It is important to recall that this was the first meeting between Victoria and anyone 
from the police or social services in the 13 days since Victoria had been admitted 
to the North Middlesex Hospital. The interview lasted less than 30 minutes and is 
summarised in barely a side and a half of handwritten A4 notes on the case file.
6.253   In oral evidence Ms Arthurworrey recalled, ”Victoria presented as shy and 
withdrawn and she was reluctant to answer any of the questions that we were 
asking her. PC Jones then said a few words to Victoria in French and this seemed 
to relax and make her more comfortable.” In her note of the visit she also 
commented that Victoria had a very big smile. 
6.254   Only two matters were discussed: Victoria’s account of the scalding injury which 
seemed to tally with Kouao’s (in PC Jones’s words Victoria made ‘no allegation of 
crime’), and when she could go home.
6.255   At no time during the visit did Ms Arthurworrey raise with Victoria the other 
marks on her body – though she recorded in her notes that Victoria’s face “had 
lots of old dark marks and her hair was very dry and covered with bits of dry 
scalp”. Nor did she explore any of the hospital’s concerns about neglect. Although 
Ms Arthurworrey told the Inquiry “I did not know how to raise the issue of master/
servant relationship without sounding offensive,” the fact is she believed she 
already had a plausible explanation from Kouao. She was also beginning to form 
a view in her mind that the neglect issues needed to be looked at against this 
family’s particular social circumstances – namely a family who appeared to have no 
fixed abode, who were living temporarily with friends and struggling to find their 
feet in a new country. 
6.256   However, she did observe that Victoria seemed reluctant to talk about her 
home life, but she put this down to the fact that Victoria had recently lost her 
father and was in a foreign country, in a strange environment talking to two 
complete strangers.
6.257   By the end of the interview, Ms Arthurworrey admitted that she had learned 
precious little other than that Victoria had confirmed Kouao’s account of the 
incident by graphically playing out the actions of pouring hot water over her head.
6.258   Together, she and PC Jones decided there was no evidence of a crime, no grounds 
for seeking an emergency protection order and that any remaining social issues 
were a matter for social services alone. As the hospital had told social services that 
Victoria was ready for discharge and they would like that to happen as soon as 
possible, Ms Arthurworrey recorded in her notes: “Karen (Jones) and I agreed that The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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the injuries (in particular the scalding injury) were probably accidental and that 
discharge into the mother’s care was appropriate.” This appears to be a decision 
that was endorsed by Ms Baptiste who told Ms Arthurworrey, “OK phone mother, 
Victoria can go home”. Ms Arthurworrey duly phoned Kouao, then the hospital, 
and Victoria went back to Somerset Gardens later that same day. 
Referral to Tottenham Child and Family Centre
6.259   Meanwhile on 5 August 1999, the day of the office interview with Kouao, 
Ms Arthurworrey spoke to Mr Almeida, a practice manager in the investigation and 
assessment B team at the NTDO and duty manager for the day, about the health 
and safety issues raised by doing a home visit at Somerset Gardens. She wanted 
some advice in the absence of Ms Baptiste but she says she never asked him to 
undertake any tasks in relation to Victoria’s case.
6.260   Nonetheless, it was following this brief conversation that Mr Almeida referred Victoria 
to the Moira Close Tottenham Child and Family Centre managed by the NSPCC.
6.261   It was an extraordinary referral by any account, because Mr Almeida knew virtually 
nothing about the case at the time. He said in evidence that his reasons for making 
the referral were twofold – to obtain advice about the precautions Ms Arthurworrey 
might take when visiting Somerset Gardens, and secondly to prompt some form 
of action by the centre directed at Victoria’s welfare. However, he was unclear as 
to what action he expected the centre to take. According to the Tottenham Child 
and Family Centre records, they understood the purpose of the referral was to 
provide “help with advisory health/hygiene, meeting Anna’s developmental needs 
and antipathy with the interaction between mother and child”. They also told 
Mr Almeida that it would take up to two months for an assessment to be done.
6.262   Mr Almeida admitted that at the time he made the referral he had not read 
the file, was not aware that there had been a strategy meeting at which 18 
recommendations had been made, and did not know that there were section 47 
inquiries under way. Nor did he know that Kouao was coming into the office later 
that day to talk about the various concerns for the very first time. All he did know 
was that Victoria was in hospital and that there were ongoing concerns about 
scabies and possible issues of neglect.
6.263   Mr Almeida passed on Ms Arthurworrey’s name as the allocated social worker and 
assumed that the centre would contact her for more information. Surprisingly, he 
made no mention of the referral to Ms Arthurworrey, who says she first learned 
of it after Victoria’s death. Although there is a record of the referral signed by 
Mr Almeida and dated 5 August 1999 on Victoria’s file, Ms Arthurworrey believes 
the contact sheet with the referral details was inserted at a later date. Mr Almeida 
was not able to tell the Inquiry when he wrote his record. Therefore, I make the 
following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that when children and families are 
referred to other agencies for additional services, that referral is only made with 
the agreement of the allocated social worker and/or their manager. The purpose 
of the referral must be recorded contemporaneously on the case file. 
Fax from the Central Middlesex Hospital
6.264   On 12 August 1999, Ms Arthurworrey received the faxed information from the 
Central Middlesex Hospital that had been requested by Ms Rodgers – a fax that 6  Haringey Social Services
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was to fundamentally alter Ms Arthurworrey’s view of Victoria’s case and to provide 
a crucial turning point in Haringey’s whole approach to its handling thereafter.
6.265   The date stamp on the fax shows 2 August 1999, despite being sent on 29 July. 
I can only assume that because the fax was addressed to Ms Rodgers and she 
was no longer on duty on 2 August, it first went to her in the long-term children 
and families’ team before being returned to duty and finding its way at a snail’s 
pace to Ms Arthurworrey as the allocated social worker. That an important piece 
of information should arrive in the childcare office and take 10 days to reach the 
allocated social worker in the case is quite unacceptable.
6.266   The effectiveness of the ‘front door’ systems within children’s services is of critical 
importance in the protection of children. The ‘loss’ of such an important piece of 
information for some 10 days cannot in my view be down to coincidence alone. 
6.267   Like Ms Rodgers before her, Ms Arthurworrey found it very difficult to read the 
Central Middlesex Hospital material. She read the first page – the handwritten 
letter from Dr Charlotte Dempster – and flicked through the rest. She registered 
that Victoria had been in police protection briefly. More importantly Victoria had 
been assessed by the consultant paediatrician Dr Schwartz and, according to 
Dr Dempster’s letter, “It has been decided that her scratch marks are all due to 
scabies. Thus it is no longer a child protection issue.” However, had she spoken to 
the doctors at the Central Middlesex Hospital she might have obtained a different 
picture and one that should have prompted broad new avenues of investigation 
that would have involved Ealing and Brent Social Services, and exposed the many 
inconsistencies in the stories Kouao told in explaining the injuries to Victoria.
6.268   Ms Arthurworrey said she relied on Dr Dempster’s letter, believing it provided 
an overview and summary of the Central Middlesex Hospital’s involvement with 
Victoria. It also reinforced the need to address a number of social issues that 
Ms Arthurworrey had already been made aware of, namely help with housing 
and a school for Victoria.
6.269   She said she felt reassured by the letter because it seemed to clear up any 
uncertainty about the old marks on Victoria’s body. She also thought it offered a 
possible explanation for Kouao’s avoidance of child protection issues in interview. 
Since Victoria had previously been in police protection for a short time, it is likely 
that Kouao had already been questioned about child protection concerns by other 
agencies and was most likely reluctant to answer these questions again.
6.270   Ms Arthurworrey said she felt annoyed that the Central Middlesex Hospital 
information had not been made available to the strategy meeting. She recalled 
‘running’ with the fax to Ms Baptiste: “I gave her it, she read the letter, she 
flicked through the fax, she smiled and she said, ‘it is obvious that we made the 
right decision’.” 
6.271   Ms Baptiste remembered discussing the Central Middlesex Hospital fax, but she 
told the Inquiry that in August 1999 she was “confused about the chronology of 
the concerns” and that she asked Ms Arthurworrey to go back to the doctor and 
get a letter to confirm what was being said. Again, no record of this management 
decision appears on the case file.
6.272   The failure of both Ms Arthurworrey and Ms Baptiste to:
• read the Central Middlesex Hospital fax fully;
• seek clarification of the hard-to-read contents from the Central Middlesex 
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• discuss the implications of its contents with staff from both the Central Middlesex 
Hospital and the North Middlesex Hospital;
is poor social work practice in the extreme. Without doing any of the above, 
Ms Arthurworrey and Ms Baptiste immediately and wrongly re-framed the case 
in their eyes to one of ‘family support’. At that point, any semblance of urgency 
was removed.
6.273   Moreover, that the diagnosis provided by the Central Middlesex Hospital could 
have resolved all the concerns about old marks on Victoria’s body raised by her 
later admission to the North Middlesex Hospital makes absolutely no sense with, 
or without, hindsight. It clearly could not account, for instance, for injuries that 
may have been sustained between the two admissions. In her evidence to the 
Inquiry, Ms Arthurworrey accepted this must be the case.
6.274   She also accepted that Dr Rossiter could not have seen the Central Middlesex 
Hospital material before the strategy meeting, otherwise it would have been 
included in the information brought to the meeting by Ms Johns. Nor did she 
know whether Dr Rossiter had seen it since. Ms Arthurworrey agreed that she 
should have copied over the notes to Dr Rossiter for her opinion, especially as 
following their telephone conversation a week or so earlier, Ms Arthurworrey had 
agreed to get back to Dr Rossiter: “It would have been a perfect time, but it was 
something that I overlooked due to my other cases.” In fact it was not until mid 
October, some two months later, that Dr Rossiter was finally sent the Central 
Middlesex Hospital notes.
Dr Rossiter’s concerns
6.275   In the meantime, Dr Rossiter had mentioned Victoria’s case in passing to 
Ms Kitchman, a child protection adviser in Haringey Social Services and the 
designated link worker for the hospital. They had run into each other following a 
meeting at the North Middlesex Hospital on 17 July 1999. Ms Kitchman says she 
did not see it as her place to take down the details there and then, nor did she 
believe that Dr Rossiter was making a referral, which would normally have gone 
through the duty social worker.
6.276   On 13 August 1999, some four days after Dr Rossiter discovered that Victoria had 
been discharged, she wrote to Ms Kitchman. If Ms Kitchman had had any doubts 
before that Dr Rossiter was seeking her assistance with this case, those doubts must 
have been dispelled on receipt of the letter. It read:
“Re Anna Kouao.
This is the child I wanted to speak to you about.
I never managed to speak to a social worker face to face (you have heard 
my concerns about this) and my understanding was that there would be 
a social assessment prior to an urgent planning meeting and then referral 
to our child psychiatrist. Unfortunately the ward staff seem to think that 
social workers can discharge patients who are under the care of a doctor 
and although I probably would have let the girl go home (she was very 
eager to do so) at least the consultant should have been informed. 
I have enormous concerns about this child who is now lost to follow-up 
somewhere in Haringey. What are you going to do?”
6.277   Perhaps even more unfortunate than the four days it took for that letter to be sent 
is the fact that it took a further seven days before it was read by its addressee. 
Ms Kitchman says she saw it for the first time on 20 August 1999. Her immediate 6  Haringey Social Services
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response was to telephone Dr Rossiter and record in her ‘blue book’ the 
following details:
“Poured boiling water over her head due to scabies. Inappropriate ... 
lesions more than scratch marks. Mum turned up to the ward in 
the middle of the night 10 o’clock. Jumped out of bed and stood 
to attention. Said if she had another social worker she would leave. 
Behaviour on ward: anxious attachment, clinging to mum. Poured 
boiling water on herself due to itching.”
6.278   This entry is not dated nor did a copy of the note ever find its way to Victoria’s file.
6.279   Ms Kitchman believes she rang the NTDO on the same day and discovered that 
Victoria’s allocated social worker was Ms Arthurworrey. She says she spoke to her 
on the telephone – although she now has no independent recollection of the 
phone call – and was told that Ms Arthurworrey and PC Jones were jointly carrying 
out a section 47 investigation.
6.280   Ms Kitchman relayed this information back to Dr Rossiter by phone and in so doing 
believed she had addressed the doctor’s concerns. Most importantly Victoria was 
not, as she understood it, “lost to follow-up somewhere in Haringey”. She had an 
allocated social worker and a joint investigation was under way which would include 
a social work assessment and could result in an urgent planning meeting and a 
referral to a child psychiatrist. Ms Kitchman told the Inquiry that she had confidence 
in the management of the duty system in north Tottenham at the time – a 
confidence that was to prove woefully misplaced – and saw no reason to probe with 
Ms Arthurworrey whether each of the concerns Dr Rossiter had raised (and that she 
had recorded in the ‘blue book’) were being addressed as part of that assessment.
6.281   Ms Kitchman admitted that despite being asked to respond to the “enormous 
concerns” of a highly regarded paediatrician, she did not ask to check the file 
for herself. If she had taken the trouble to give even a quick glance at the file 
she would have quickly discovered that nothing that Dr Rossiter had expected to 
happen had happened. 
6.282   In fact it would have been rather surprising if section 47 investigations were still 
continuing by 20 August 1999, since the case had already shifted from being child 
protection to family support on 12 August, after the receipt of the fax from the 
Central Middlesex Hospital with the scabies diagnosis.
6.283   Ms Arthurworrey is confident that she never told Ms Kitchman either in August or 
any time afterwards that a joint section 47 investigation was under way. Indeed 
she can recall no such conversation at all, and in fact was out of the office on 
20 August so could not have taken Ms Kitchman’s call that day.
6.284   Resolving this conflict of evidence has not been helped by Ms Kitchman’s poor 
note taking. There is certainly no record of a telephone conversation between 
Ms Arthurworrey and Ms Kitchman in Ms Arthurworrey’s contact notes on Victoria’s 
case file. Nor did Ms Kitchman note that conversation in her ‘blue book’ as she 
would expect to and as she did with Dr Rossiter. Instead, Ms Kitchman produced 
in evidence an annotated version of Dr Rossiter’s letter in which she believed she 
noted the following words during her conversation with Ms Arthurworrey: “Central 
Middlesex, emotionally and physically abused, scabies and Karen Jones CPT.” 
6.285   However, she could not confirm the source of her information – at least the first 
three pieces of information could equally well have been provided by Dr Rossiter as 
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6.286   Nor did Ms Kitchman use the opportunity when writing to Ms Wilson in August 
2000 to correct some factual inaccuracies in the Part 8 review to confirm that she 
had spoken to Ms Arthurworrey in person. Instead she wrote:
“I received this letter [Dr Rossiter’s] on 20th August. I did telephone 
North Tottenham District and established that there was an allocated 
social worker undertaking inquiries under section 47.” 
6.287   It is my judgement on the basis of the evidence before the Inquiry, and having 
seen both witnesses, that Ms Kitchman did not discuss Dr Rossiter’s letter of 
13 August 1999 with Ms Arthurworrey in August, although she may well have 
received information – some of it misleading – from someone else in the NTDO, 
which she then fed back to Dr Rossiter. 
6.288   I am equally clear that the response Dr Rossiter received to her expression 
of concerns was significantly less than she could reasonably have expected, 
particularly from someone in the post of child protection adviser. At the very 
least I would have expected a face-to-face discussion between Ms Kitchman and 
Ms Arthurworrey, recorded on the file which should have been read through, 
reviewed and signed by Ms Kitchman. A full record of the exchanges between 
herself and Dr Rossiter should also have been entered on the file.
6.289   I am also of the view that it is not unreasonable to have expected Ms Kitchman 
to have ensured that Ms Arthurworrey, Ms Baptiste, Dr Rossiter and herself met to 
go through the concerns about the case and agree a course of action. These are 
the basic steps I would expect any professional to have taken when dealing with 
concerns raised by another professional about the way a case is being handled 
in the interests of inter-agency trust, co-operation and the safety of children. 
Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
When a professional from another agency expresses concern to social services 
about their handling of a particular case, the file must be read and reviewed, 
the professional concerned must be met and spoken to, and the outcome of this 
discussion must be recorded on the case file. 
An announced visit
6.290   On 16 August 1999 – some 10 days after Victoria was discharged home 
– Ms Arthurworrey visited Kouao, Manning and Victoria at Manning’s flat in 
Somerset Gardens. It was an announced visit and an interpreter was present.
6.291   Ms Arthurworrey said in her statement to this Inquiry that with the benefit of 
hindsight, she now realises that she was completely “set up” during this visit. 
She believes that Kouao and Manning purposely presented a positive image of 
Victoria’s home in order to mislead her. Manning told the Inquiry that Victoria 
had indeed been coached in how to behave during the course of the visit. He also 
agreed that he and Kouao had deliberately set out to persuade Ms Arthurworrey 
of certain facts to help to bolster Kouao’s housing claim, namely that he was a 
hard-working, respectable young man with a steady job, a home and a fiancée 
who was helping Kouao and Victoria out in the short-term until they could find 
accommodation of their own.
6.292   Whatever story was told by Victoria’s killers, the task facing Ms Arthurworrey was 
clear. Even though the section 47 investigation had been inappropriately closed, 6  Haringey Social Services
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this visit was still part of the ‘full investigation and assessment’ Ms Arthurworrey 
was expected to undertake under recommendation 10 from the strategy meeting. 
A golden opportunity for a first home visit had already been missed while Victoria 
was in hospital, thus increasing the importance of this contact. This visit was 
also the first contact between Victoria and any of the agencies charged with 
safeguarding and promoting her welfare since her discharge from hospital. I deal 
with this in more detail later in this section. 
6.293   Ms Arthurworrey observed nothing during the course of her visit that gave 
her significant cause for concern. She noted that Victoria appeared happy and 
comfortable. There were toys scattered on the floor and Victoria was playing with 
a doll. She recalled:
“Victoria opened the door and I was so struck by her presentation. 
The last time I had seen Victoria at the North Middlesex Hospital she 
presented as a shy, withdrawn child. When I saw her on 16 August she 
was as the nurses have described, like a ray of sunshine. She greeted me. 
She said ‘Hello Lisa’. She had quite a high-pitched voice. She was dressed 
in a red tartan skirt, a red jumper, she had red socks on, black shoes. 
She seemed happy and the one thing that I did notice was that her face 
was heavily moisturised with cocoa butter. I thought Kouao was applying 
cocoa butter to help to reduce the scarring from the scalds and scabies.”
6.294   Ms Arthurworrey saw of Victoria what Kouao had intended her to see. We can 
only guess at what more Ms Arthurworrey might have learned had she spoken to 
Victoria on her own. But the fact is she did not speak to Victoria at all during that 
visit and now “deeply regrets not doing so”. 
6.295   Ms Arthurworrey accepted that it was her job to test out all the concerns raised 
and the explanations given and not to make any assumptions, but this she 
singularly failed to do. Far from keeping an open mind about the possibility of 
deliberate harm, the superficiality of her questioning on that day went only to 
confirm her view that she was dealing with a family struggling to find their feet 
in a new country.
6.296   During the course of the visit, Ms Arthurworrey raised with Kouao just three of the 
North Middlesex Hospital’s concerns around neglect:
• Victoria’s bed wetting: Ms Arthurworrey suggested to Kouao that she take 
Victoria to the next door medical centre for treatment (but subsequently never 
checked out that Kouao had followed her advice).
• The number of bowls of cereal Victoria had eaten during her stay at the North 
Middlesex Hospital – Kouao’s response was that Victoria had a large appetite 
anyway. Significantly Ms Arthurworrey recorded that Kouao was cooking in the 
kitchen at the time of the visit “suggesting Anna was being fed”.
• Why Kouao had brought in no clean clothes or treats for Victoria. Kouao told 
Ms Arthurworrey that finances were tight and she could not afford to buy 
Victoria treats. She also repeated what she had said in interview on 5 August 
– that they had entered the country with few belongings and Victoria had few 
clothes. As the hospital had given Victoria some clothes Kouao saw no need to 
bring in any more.
6.297   Ms Arthurworrey accepted what she was told:
“At the time I did not know I was dealing with child killers. I thought 
Kouao was a respectful adult who was child focused. She had come to 
this country to make a better life for her and Victoria.” The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.298  Ms  Arthurworrey’s misreading of the Central Middlesex Hospital fax had almost 
certainly given her a completely false sense of security with respect to Kouao. She 
admitted, “I was more trusting of Kouao when I went on that visit. I am not a 
detective. I had no reason to question what I saw and what I was being told at that 
point.” She did not believe that Kouao would harm Victoria in any way.
6.299   Ms Arthurworrey never asked Kouao, let alone Victoria, how she spent the day 
– a crucial aspect of any child assessment. She did not notice any signs of anxious 
attachment as reported by Dr Rossiter. She had also been told that Victoria was 
frightened of Manning but says he was there throughout the visit and Victoria 
seemed comfortable in his presence.
6.300   However, she did note a sense of formality between Victoria and the two adults 
but nothing to suggest a master-servant relationship or anything else to cause her 
concern. She observed Victoria was quiet in the presence of conversing adults and 
interpreted this as a sign of proper respect. She believed there can often be a sense 
of formality in the relationship between parent and child in Afro-Caribbean families 
“because respect and obedience are very important features on the Afro-Caribbean 
family script”. 
6.301   With the deliberate harm concerns apparently resolved, the discussion between 
Ms Arthurworrey and Kouao focused on housing and education and the family’s 
long-term plans. Ms Arthurworrey learned that Kouao had made an application to 
Haringey housing department on 19 July but had yet to hear anything. Once their 
housing needs had been resolved, Kouao would enrol Victoria in school.
6.302   In fact, on the housing application Kouao stated she and Victoria had been living 
at 267 Somerset Gardens since 24 March 1999, and the ‘friend’ they were staying 
with had asked them to leave. Although Kouao indicated she was threatened 
with homelessness, this was not, according to housing registration officer Maria 
Alexandrou, a “dire emergency that warranted forwarding to the homeless 
section”. Apparently many applicants tick the box indicating they are being asked 
to leave their accommodation but in fact stay on in it for some time afterwards.
6.303   Ms Arthurworrey observed for herself that the home conditions were “very good” 
although not big enough for three people. She was told that Victoria’s bedwetting 
was causing difficulties between Manning and his fiancée who had lived with him 
until Kouao and Victoria had moved in on a temporary basis.
6.304   Ms Arthurworrey said she told Kouao at the time that she thought her housing 
application would be unsuccessful because, having left her home in France, Kouao 
appeared to have made herself intentionally homeless. They discussed possible 
contingency plans and Ms Arthurworrey stressed the importance of Kouao finding 
a job and perhaps renting in the private sector.
6.305   At the end of the visit, Ms Arthurworrey agreed to chase up Kouao’s housing 
application as a matter of urgency. She believed that unless the accommodation 
needs were sorted out she could not draw up a care plan for Victoria. She also 
promised to send the family a copy of Community Care, which would provide 
information on nursing and care-work agencies, as well as sending a separate list 
of childminders in the borough.
6.306   Ms Arthurworrey said that she then updated Ms Baptiste, informing her that the 
home visit had not raised any further child protection concerns. She claims she was 
not advised to do anything else by her manager, although no such endorsement 
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Kouao’s housing application
6.307   On 25 August 1999, Ms Arthurworrey spoke to Yvonne White, a housing officer in 
Haringey’s housing department, who told her that housing applications can take 
up to eight weeks to process. She advised Ms Arthurworrey to write to Bambos 
Kakouratos, the housing registration manager, if she wanted to try to speed up 
the process.
6.308   Ms Arthurworrey wrote the very same day, explaining that a care plan could not 
be completed until the housing situation was clarified. This letter was stamped 
as received by the Haringey housing team on 26 August 1999, and was placed, 
unacknowledged, on the housing file. 
6.309   As a result of Ms Arthurworrey’s letter, Kouao’s application was passed to 
Ms Alexandrou for immediate assessment. This was in spite of the fact that Kouao’s 
application would not normally have been considered under Haringey’s housing 
allocation scheme because Kouao had not lived in the borough for six out of the 
previous 12 months and was, therefore, technically ineligible to go on the housing 
register. Although this was not communicated to Ms Arthurworrey, Mr Kakouratos 
said he overlooked the impediment because of the referral from social services.
6.310   Mr Kakouratos said he was quite sure he would have pointed out Ms Arthurworrey’s 
letter to Ms Alexandrou because this explained why the assessment had to be done 
quickly. However, Ms Alexandrou could not recall discussing the child protection 
issue with Mr Kakouratos, or whether she read Ms Arthurworrey’s letter when 
making her assessment.
6.311  Ms  Alexandrou’s initial assessment of Kouao’s application resulted in it exceeding 
the threshold required for the allocation of a two bedroomed property in the 
borough. Thus a standard letter was sent to Kouao on 1 September 1999 
informing her that her application was being taken forward.
6.312   The procedure for taking forward Kouao’s application was to make a ‘cold call’ 
visit to Manning’s flat – a duty allocated by Ms Alexandrou to Karen McGregor 
(née Brown), a home visitor from Haringey Social Services’ housing department. 
Ms Alexandrou could not recall whether she spoke to Ms McGregor about the 
child protection aspects of the application before she made her visit. However, 
Ms McGregor said she was unaware of any urgency relating to Kouao’s application 
and would only be aware of ‘complications’ if a note were written on the front 
sheet of the file. However, Ms McGregor admitted she did not always read through 
files before making home visits. 
6.313   During the course of the home visit, Kouao told Ms McGregor that she had 
left her previous accommodation in France of her own accord. Ms McGregor 
noted this and as a result, when Kouao’s application was reviewed later, she was 
deemed intentionally homeless and therefore ineligible for housing. This was 
not communicated to social services. Therefore it was not until Ms Arthurworrey 
telephoned the housing office on 9 September 1999 to chase up her letter to 
Mr Kakouratos that she was told the negative outcome of Kouao’s application, and 
that although the housing department would write to Kouao for more information, 
the decision on the application was unlikely to change.
Care plan
6.314   It was at this stage, armed with the knowledge that Kouao’s housing application 
would most likely fail, that Ms Arthurworrey drafted a care plan. She expressly 
crossed out sections relating to child protection because she did not consider that 
any longer to be an issue.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.315   Although written some time after 9 September 1999 – the care plan is undated 
– it was due to start on 16 August and had no end or review date. The plan was 
for ongoing family support, in particular to help Kouao to find accommodation 
and then to help with schools and a job in that order. The outcome of 
Ms Arthurworrey’s ‘assessment’ of Victoria was recorded as follows: 
“– initial referral received 27 July 1999. CP concerns. Anna admitted to the North 
Midd hospital with markings to her body;
– concerns investigated jointly with the police and deemed as accidental;
– correspondence also received from the central Midd hospital backing up 
mother’s scabies story;
– case then moved from CP status to family support;
– mother wanting help with housing, however not eligible for housing – made 
herself intentionally homeless in France;
– assessment completed by housing in September, therefore cannot access services 
at this stage.”
6.316   It is also in the care plan that Ms Arthurworrey suggested for the first time the 
possibility that the family may have to return to France if Kouao should fail to find 
suitable housing.
A second letter from Dr Rossiter
6.317   Meanwhile, on 2 September 1999, Dr Rossiter wrote again to Ms Kitchman. She 
told her she was pleased to hear that Victoria was still at home, had a social worker 
and appeared to be happy, but she made no mention of the ongoing section 47 
investigation. With the letter, Dr Rossiter enclosed the discharge summary from 
the North Middlesex Hospital dated 13 August 1999. It is a document that repays 
careful reading. The fourth paragraph reads as follows:
“Noted to be a very distressed child. Multiple marks on her not just 
due to scratching. Thought possibly due to chastisement eg with 
looped wire. Child protection forms completed. Photographs taken, 
rather belatedly (staffing problems). Discussed in psychosocial ward 
round. Child showing anxious attachment, seemed very frightened 
when mother visited with her boyfriend, clinging desperately to 
mother on the short times that she visited alone. Considered likely to 
be abused, probable neglect and emotional abuse, less difficult [sic] 
to prove physical abuse. Concerns shared with hospital social worker 
who attended a planning meeting at North Tottenham Social Services. 
Social worker spoke to Dr Rossiter on the phone who expressed her 
very clear views as above. Home visit for risk assessment made by social 
services. On their advice child discharged home by ward staff. Very 
worrying case ... the child is emotionally disturbed ... temporary 
resident, mother has expressed to the staff that if social services are 
involved ... she would remove child to France. No GP, not school-time, 
difficult to follow up the child further.” (The emphasis in bold is mine.)
6.318   The letter was received in Ms Kitchman’s office on 9 September 1999. As it happened, 
she was on annual leave at that time and did not see it until 23 September. 
Ms Kitchman told us she did not know whether anyone covered her post while 
she was away. She thought that an administration assistant would open her mail 
and pass it on to her manager, Ms Graham, but that did not happen. When there 
were specific issues to be dealt with then the child protection advisers would 
usually make arrangements to cover for each other, but otherwise the likelihood of 
a post being dealt with while staff were away on leave seemed largely a matter of 
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someone might walk past and have a look to see what was in there.” This is highly 
unsatisfactory. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that when staff are absent from work, 
systems are in place to ensure that post, emails and telephone contacts are 
checked and actioned as necessary. 
6.319   Thus three weeks had already elapsed by the time Ms Kitchman read Dr Rossiter’s 
second letter. She did not attach much urgency to it. It was now one and a half 
months after Victoria’s discharge from the North Middlesex Hospital and she did 
not see the letter as containing any new information other than the reference 
to the ‘possible’ looped wire mark. The fact that Dr Rossiter was now also 
saying, contrary to an impression she may have given in August when talking to 
Ms Arthurworrey, that the marks on Victoria’s body were not just due to scratching 
went unheeded.
6.320   On being taken through the discharge summary, Ms Kitchman stated that she did 
not believe that any of the factors identified by Dr Rossiter, either singly or taken 
together, put Victoria’s case at the top of the risk scale. She admitted, however, 
that she misread the expression “less difficult to prove physical abuse” as meaning 
just the opposite. This is in fact what Dr Rossiter had intended, but nonetheless it 
was a dangerous assumption to make and it needed checking out.
Ms Arthurworrey’s and Ms Kitchman’s response
6.321   Ms Kitchman waited until her next visit to the NTDO on 28 September 1999 to try 
to speak to Ms Arthurworrey. In the event, it was not until 1 October – a month 
after Dr Rossiter wrote the letter – that she discussed the letter with her. At the 
time, Ms Arthurworrey says she was rather preoccupied in preparing for her first 
set of care proceedings. Both agree that the conversation was brief – Ms Kitchman 
estimated maybe 15 to 20 minutes – and that it was not a formal consultation. 
Ms Kitchman recalled: “Lisa seemed quite keen to get me off her case basically. 
She was in a hurry and I managed to sit down and talk to her about the case and 
I thought I would have to be really, really concerned to push the matter further.”
6.322   Their accounts of what was said and done during this discussion differ at virtually 
every turn.
6.323   According to Ms Kitchman, she showed Ms Arthurworrey the discharge summary. 
They went through it together and Ms Kitchman annotated it as they were 
talking. She also said in oral evidence, and reiterated in a memo to Ms Wilson 
dated 16 October 2000, that she is “pretty sure” she photocopied the annotated 
discharge summary and gave it back to Ms Arthurworrey. Ms Arthurworrey pointed 
out to her the fax from the Central Middlesex Hospital which Ms Kitchman also 
took away to photocopy. She then told Ms Athurworrey that she would respond to 
Dr Rossiter’s letter.
6.324  Ms  Kitchman’s annotation of the discharge summary is barely legible. She 
deciphered one of the annotations for the Inquiry as “Central Middlesex have 
investigated” against the reference to the looped wire and also noted “mum has 
not got a boyfriend”.
6.325   Ms Kitchman said she, too, had difficulty reading the Central Middlesex Hospital 
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readable version. She cannot recall whether she saw all 20 pages of the fax – she 
said what Dr Rossiter received is what she would have seen and sent. However, 
she does remember seeing Dr Dempster’s summary letter, and that Brent Social 
Services and the police had completed section 47 investigations and concluded 
that the injuries were accidental.
6.326   Ms Arthurworrey also told her in October that she was undertaking a section 47 
investigation and completing a social work assessment. Yet the fact that even 
according to Ms Kitchman’s version of events, this investigation must have been 
ongoing since early August caused her no particular concerns. She was aware there 
were still concerns about neglect and emotional harm, which she thought could 
take slightly longer to assess.
6.327   In evidence, Ms Kitchman accepted that such a delay in assessing Victoria’s case 
was not justified and she admitted that she should have pursued this and probed 
as to the reasons why. She did not do this.
6.328   Ms Arthurworrey told a very different story. She said that Ms Kitchman had a brief 
chat with her about Victoria’s case on 1 October 1999 and told her that Dr Rossiter 
had expressed some concerns about the case and wanted to know what was 
happening. It was at this point that Ms Arthurworrey remembered that she had not 
updated Dr Rossiter with regard to the earlier section 47 investigation.
6.329   As she was busy preparing another case for care proceedings she said she 
gave Ms Kitchman Victoria’s file to take away, pointing out in particular the 
correspondence from the Central Middlesex Hospital:
“I felt that this was a crucial link and I knew that I had not read it, 
read the fax from page to page, but Dr Rossiter needed to see these 
notes because she had been ambivalent around the old markings on 
Victoria’s body.”
6.330   Ms Arthurworrey said she expected Ms Kitchman to “sit down and read the file 
and respond back to Dr Rossiter”.
6.331   She denied saying to Ms Kitchman in October that she was undertaking a section 
47 investigation – that had been completed by 16 August at the latest. She also 
denied that Ms Kitchman showed her the North Middlesex Hospital discharge 
summary – in fact she said she did not see this until 28 February 2000, three 
days after Victoria’s death. She said that if she had seen this summary, “I would 
have run to my manager because it would have meant that the first section 47 
investigation I had completed was completely flawed ... this discharge summary 
was giving me new, different, concerning information.” 
6.332   Instead Ms Arthurworrey said she was shown the first Dr Rossiter letter dated 
13 August 1999. She said she did not raise with Ms Kitchman why it had taken so 
long to talk to her about it because she was very busy at the time and did not take 
any specific notice of the date.
6.333   On reading the letter, Ms Arthurworrey said she asked Ms Kitchman why would 
Dr Rossiter probably have let the girl go home if she had concerns. According to 
Ms Arthurworrey, Ms Kitchman’s response was “I do not know and I do not know 
why Dr Rossiter is contacting me with this case anyway.” Ms Kitchman conveyed 
a similar sentiment when giving her oral evidence. Despite her role as link worker 
to the North Middlesex Hospital, Ms Kitchman told us: “Looking at it all now in 
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this information, I think it should have been [sent] directly, and she should have 
had some direct contact with the team manager.”
Ms Kitchman’s reply to Dr Rossiter
6.334   Ms Kitchman eventually wrote back to Dr Rossiter on 19 October 1999. Her 
letter included copies of the Central Middlesex Hospital notes and recorded 
Ms Arthurworrey’s view that Dr Rossiter’s concerns about deliberate physical harm 
and the marks made with looped wire had been satisfactorily addressed because 
Dr Schwartz, consultant paediatrician at the Central Middlesex Hospital, had found 
on an earlier occasion that Victoria had suffered from scabies and did not show 
signs of deliberate physical harm. The letter did not include any hint of an apology 
for the time taken to reply. On any view it was an extraordinary response.
6.335   She also told Dr Rossiter that: 
“– Lisa has undertaken a joint investigation with PC Pauline Ricketts from the police 
child protection team in relation to the boiling water incident.
– Lisa has visited the family a number of times and established that the mother 
does not have a boyfriend. She has no concerns about Anna’s interaction with 
her mother.
– The family’s legal status in this country is not clear and they are undergoing a 
habitual residency test. Therefore Anna does not currently have a school place.”
6.336   Ms Kitchman asked Dr Rossiter if the hospital could confirm Kouao’s explanation 
for the scalds and whether they could give any more details regarding the 
emotional abuse and/or neglect they thought Victoria might be experiencing. 
A copy of her letter also went to Ms Arthurworrey for the file.
6.337   In her reply to Dr Rossiter, Ms Kitchman made no suggestion whatsoever that any 
of the marks on Victoria’s body could postdate the Central Middlesex Hospital 
admission. Nor did she draw Dr Rossiter’s attention to the conflicting medical 
diagnoses. She told us in evidence that by sending the Central Middlesex Hospital 
material to Dr Rossiter, she was implicitly passing to her the responsibility to 
consider the implications. By any stretch of the imagination it is difficult to read her 
reply in this light. The only impression one could draw was that here was a social 
worker who had looked at the problems, who was content that everything was in 
order and was just sending back some documentation for Dr Rossiter’s information.
6.338   In the meantime, Ms Arthurworrey told us that the first time she saw Ms Kitchman’s 
letter to Dr Rossiter was the week beginning 15 November 1999, although the 
date stamp shows it was received in the NTDO on 2 November. She registered that 
there were a number of inaccuracies in the letter, for example, it was PC Jones, 
not PC Ricketts, with whom Ms Arthurworrey had undertaken a joint investigation. 
More significant was the implication that Ms Arthurworrey and Ms Kitchman had 
worked through the concerns raised by the discharge summary together – but she 
did nothing to correct these. She did not think it important to do this because the 
inaccuracies “date back to what I thought were old events”. 
6.339   Even more important, the letter should have brought to Ms Arthurworrey’s 
attention the existence of a discharge summary, which she had yet to see. She did 
not make that connection at the time but said in evidence: “I had no idea that the 
discharge summary would contain information that I did not already know.”
Ms Arthurworrey’s response to the discharge summary
6.340   If indeed Ms Arthurworrey is telling the truth about the discharge summary, then 
this would have been the first occasion that she had seen any reference to a 
looped wire mark on Victoria’s body. Yet this did not seem to cause her any undue The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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concern – all the more surprising given that she was reading this information just 
days after attending a second strategy meeting to investigate allegations made by 
Kouao that Manning had sexually abused Victoria.
6.341   Ms Arthurworrey told the Inquiry:
“I saw the reference to the looped wire mark as another pre-diagnosis 
concern. I knew that there had been a number of pre-diagnosis issues, 
for example, Dr Rossiter had made mention to thumb marks, there 
had been mention of a belt buckle mark ... It did not really bother me 
because I knew that Victoria had been seen by two hospitals.” 
6.342   It was a view that Ms Arthurworrey had already formed when she spoke to 
Ms Baptiste about Ms Kitchman’s visit. Ms Baptiste had no recollection of 
Ms Kitchman’s involvement in Victoria’s case while she had case management 
responsibility – indeed she said that she thought the case ought to have gone to 
a child protection adviser but she did not remember whether she passed on this 
advice to Ms Arthurworrey.
6.343   She recalled that they talked at some stage about Dr Rossiter’s concerns. According 
to Ms Arthurworrey, Ms Baptiste’s response was: “Oh, Dr Rossiter, she always gets 
it wrong, she got it wrong in a child death that I was working on, Baby W1.” 
6.344   Ms Baptiste denied that she expressed an opinion of this sort or that she had any 
doubts about Dr Rossiter’s professional competence. She believed she implied to 
Ms Arthurworrey that she needed to be clear about the information and asked her 
to get Dr Rossiter to put her concerns in writing – presumably the very concerns 
that Dr Rossiter had put in writing to Ms Kitchman.
6.345   It now seems clear that Ms Arthurworrey did not believe that Dr Rossiter was 
raising anything new, albeit that she was writing some two and a half weeks after 
Victoria’s discharge. If a looped wire mark had been observed on Victoria’s body, 
she expected that the hospital would have mentioned it, either in the medical 
report sent by Nurse Quinn, or in the initial referral, or in her conversation with 
Dr Rossiter on 3 August 1999, and they did not.
6.346   Ms Arthurworrey said she felt reassured by Ms Kitchman’s letter because she knew 
that the Central Middlesex Hospital notes, which she saw as the ‘crucial link’, had 
been sent to Dr Rossiter. If the Central Middlesex Hospital fax could explain away 
the old marks on Victoria’s body, then presumably it could also explain away the 
looped wire mark. If not, then she expected Dr Rossiter or Ms Kitchman would get 
back to her. Either way, Ms Arthurworrey thought that the enormous concerns 
that Dr Rossiter had expressed were to do with the fact that she had not updated 
her on the outcome of the section 47 investigation. Irrespective of Ms Kitchman’s 
covering letter, and the inaccuracies she claims it had, she mistakenly believed that 
the Central Middlesex Hospital material would fulfil that purpose. 
Disagreement of diagnosis
6.347   On 2 November 1999, the same day that a copy of Ms Kitchman’s letter to 
Dr Rossiter arrived at the NTDO, Dr Rossiter endorsed her copy of the letter 
with the words “we disagreed”. She was referring specifically to the comments 
in Ms Kitchman’s letter, which noted that Dr Schwartz at the Central Middlesex 
Hospital had confirmed that the marks on Victoria were due to scabies.
6.348   Dr Rossiter, in her statement to the Inquiry, said that she communicated this 
to Ms Kitchman but in evidence thought she may have made a mistake about 
this and she had no record of any such conversation taking place. Ms Kitchman 6  Haringey Social Services
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denied receiving any such telephone call – she said she would have followed it up 
if she did – and there is no record of one in her diary, notebook or in the team 
message book. 
6.349   It therefore seems unlikely that Dr Rossiter ever made that phone call and 
Ms Kitchman therefore received no response to her letter. As a result, Haringey 
Social Services were left in the position of having two diagnoses from two 
consultant paediatricians, in two different hospitals in relation to two different 
incidents. The ambiguity around the old markings were anything but resolved. 
Yet despite the concerns Ms Kitchman said she had about this, and despite asking 
Dr Rossiter for more information, she did nothing to follow the matter up, nor did 
she direct Ms Arthurworrey to do so.
6.350   Like Ms Arthurworrey, she was relying on Dr Rossiter to get back to her if she still 
had concerns. She said:
“Knowing Mary as I know her ... she would have, if she had been 
really worried, I do believe that she would have phoned me or spoken 
to somebody at ACPC or mentioned to me after a case conference or 
something. She would have been back in touch with me.” 
Disagreement between Ms Arthurworrey and Ms Kitchman
6.351  Ms  Arthurworrey’s and Ms Kitchman’s accounts of what was said when they met in 
early October differed profoundly in two key respects. First, as previously discussed, 
whether or not Ms Arthurworrey told Ms Kitchman that she was engaged in a 
section 47 investigation – although had she read the file, Ms Kitchman would have 
realised no such investigation was under way.
6.352   Second, whether or not Ms Kitchman showed and discussed with Ms Arthurworrey 
the North Middlesex Hospital discharge summary. From all the evidence available, 
and having heard the witnesses, it is difficult to draw any satisfactory conclusion 
about this. In Ms Kitchman’s letter to Dr Rossiter of 19 October 1999 she wrote, 
“Although Lisa had not previously seen the discharge summary...” This implied that 
while Ms Arthurworrey had not seen it before, she had by the time Ms Kitchman 
came to write her reply. On the other hand, if Ms Kitchman, as she claimed, had 
photocopied the summary and annotated it before handing it to Ms Arthurworrey, 
then a copy of the annotated version should have been placed on the Haringey 
case file. No such copy appears. 
6.353  Ms  Arthurworrey’s brief record of their conversation on the case file assists little. 
Dated 4 October 1999 – although Ms Arthurworrey confirmed to the Inquiry that 
the discussion took place on 1 October and Ms Kitchman did not dispute this – it 
reads as follows:
“Discussion with Petra – CPA – making inquiries into Anna on behalf 
of Dr Rossiter who is concerned for Anna. Outcome: informed Petra of 
current visit. She will now contact Dr Rossiter.” 
6.354   Ms Kitchman said she made separate notes which she used to draft her response 
to Dr Rossiter but unfortunately then threw these away. Apart from the 19 October 
letter itself, no other record of the conversation exists.
6.355   Whether or not Ms Arthurworrey had sight of the discharge summary is important 
only because it might have affected Haringey’s handling of Victoria’s case from 
October 1999. Although Ms Arthurworrey said that if she had seen it, “she would 
have run to her manager” and steps would have been taken to “refocus Victoria’s 
case”, I have to doubt this in the light of her comments to the Inquiry about The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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the looped wire mark and its perceived lack of importance. While Victoria had 
been a patient in two hospitals, it would appear that receipt of a medical report 
subsequent to that obtained from the Central Middlesex Hospital, which suggested 
a rather different cause for Victoria’s injury, was disregarded by Haringey social 
workers who preferred instead to rely on the older diagnosis. On that basis I come 
to the view that even if Ms Arthurworrey had seen the North Middlesex Hospital 
discharge summary in October 1999, it would have had little impact on her 
handling of the case.
6.356   Ms Kitchman agreed that the involvement of a child protection adviser in Victoria’s 
case was of no benefit. Whereas one might have expected a person in such a post 
to have reacted to some of the many basic casework errors in the management of 
this case, the sad fact is that Ms Kitchman’s involvement merely served to further 
entrench the authority’s woeful misreading of Victoria’s situation.
Ms Arthurworrey’s supervision
6.357   On 20 September 1999, Ms Arthurworrey had her first supervision session with 
Ms Baptiste since being allocated Victoria’s case at the beginning of August. Among 
the agenda items they discussed was the considerable amount of time off in lieu 
(52 hours altogether) that Ms Arthurworrey had accumulated. Ms Baptiste told 
us, “It was impossible to prevent – the nature of the work and the pressure of the 
working conditions would often require workers to ... work out of the nine to five.” 
6.358   Ms Arthurworrey reported to Ms Baptiste a number of cases during the course 
of that supervision, including Victoria’s. Ms Baptiste admitted that she did not 
read Victoria’s file either before or during supervision. But on the basis of a 
5 to 10 minute discussion of the case, and Ms Baptiste’s earlier recall of the 
information contained in the Central Middlesex Hospital fax, she agreed with 
Ms Arthurworrey that the case had been investigated, and endorsed on the file 
that this was a ‘family support’ case. That she, too, could have come to the view 
that Dr Schwartz’s diagnosis of Victoria’s injuries at the Central Middlesex Hospital 
could account for the marks observed on Victoria two weeks later at the North 
Middlesex Hospital is extraordinary – unless she had muddled the chronology of 
the two hospital admissions and thought that the Central Middlesex Hospital visit 
came after the North Middlesex Hospital admission. This was a mistake Ms Baptiste 
admitted to in her oral evidence when she said that she thought that the fax by 
which the Central Middlesex Hospital notes were sent to Haringey was from the 
North Middlesex Hospital.
6.359   It was just as important to review each of the 18 recommendations from the July 
1999 strategy meeting. Ms Kozinos told the Inquiry she expected this would be 
done as part of Ms Arthurworrey’s regular supervision with her team manager. 
Ms Baptiste said she started to review the recommendations, but Ms Arthurworrey 
admits that she never drew them to her manager’s attention. It seems clear that 
the recommendations were simply abandoned when the focus of the case switched 
from child protection.
6.360  Ms  Baptiste’s supervision notes on Victoria’s case, which she says may have been 
typical of the quality of her supervision notes at the time, add up to just eight lines 
of handwritten material:
“The case identified as family support as CP concerns investigated – NFA. 
Are issues of housing (Habitual Residence Test). Lisa has given mum a list 
of childminders. Action:
i)  awaiting response from housing – Lisa to chase up;6  Haringey Social Services
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ii)  to continue to offer family support until early October.”
6.361   Although Ms Baptiste said in her evidence that other decisions were taken and 
she discussed with Ms Arthurworrey the competing diagnoses of Dr Rossiter and 
Dr Schwartz and the details of the care plan, there is nothing recorded on the case 
file to support this. It is my view this did not happen.
6.362   That Ms Baptiste placed much reliance on Ms Arthurworrey’s assessment of Victoria 
is somewhat surprising. She told the Inquiry that she did not think Ms Arthurworrey 
was particularly diligent in providing feedback and she needed to develop her skills 
in working with children. She said, “It ... was apparent that she was not always 
confident in formulating probing questions ... did not appear to be insightful about 
the situation she was going in to ... not sufficiently analytical ... did not make the 
right inquiries.” Indeed, Ms Baptiste gave in evidence a very different impression 
to that which might have been gleaned from the competency assessment she 
completed on Ms Arthurworrey just days before Victoria’s case was allocated to 
her. If true, it should have led Ms Baptiste to rigorously probe Ms Arthurworrey’s 
assessment of Victoria throughout August and September 1999. The supervision 
session on 20 September provided an obvious but missed opportunity to do just 
that. I am driven to the conclusion that Ms Baptiste simply failed to apply her mind 
to the issue. I deal with the practical implications of Ms Arthurworrey’s supervision 
in more detail later in this section of the Report. 
A second announced visit
6.363   On 30 September 1999, Ms Alexandrou wrote to Kouao saying that Haringey 
housing department believed she had given up secure accommodation in France. 
The letter went on to invite Kouao to put forward, in writing, any special factors or 
mitigating circumstances to be taken into account before Haringey reached a final 
decision on her application. 
6.364   On 18 October 1999, Ms Arthurworrey telephoned the housing department yet 
again for information of Kouao’s housing application. This telephone call confirmed 
that what had been anticipated had in fact occurred. Ms Arthurworrey was told 
that Kouao’s application had been unsuccessful because she had made herself 
intentionally homeless. Ms Arthurworrey was also told that Kouao had the right 
of appeal, but so far no response had been received from her to the housing 
department’s letter of 30 September explaining this.
6.365   On 28 October 1999, Ms Arthurworrey paid a second, announced, visit to 
Somerset Gardens. Kouao, Manning and Victoria were all present. In evidence, 
Ms Arthurworrey described the meeting as “very routine, a very business-type 
meeting”. It had a single purpose, according to the case notes, namely to discuss 
the options open to the family, given their housing situation.
6.366   Ms Arthurworrey informed Kouao that her housing application had been 
unsuccessful, although Kouao had already been informed of this by Haringey 
housing department. As the housing department was still waiting for a response 
from Kouao to its letter of 30 September, her application was placed in the 
housing department’s ‘deferred section’ on 30 November while they waited for 
further contact from Kouao that never materialised. In the event, Ms Arthurworrey 
discussed with her the possible alternatives. These were threefold:
• to find employment and rent a flat in the private sector;
• to stay as they were;
• to return to France and if there were any financial difficulties here, Haringey 
Social Services could offer assistance.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.367   Kouao told Ms Arthurworrey that she had not been able to find a job and that she 
did not consider the first two options viable. She also told her that she had spoken 
to friends in France about getting the money together for her and Victoria’s fare 
home – the option that Ms Arthurworrey most favoured at the time as best serving 
Victoria’s interests.
6.368   Ms Arthurworrey says she stressed the importance of Kouao making a decision 
soon because Victoria had not been in school since March and she needed some 
stability. She said she would be back in a week’s time to see what arrangements 
Kouao had made. In the meantime, Kouao told Ms Arthurworrey that she would 
register Victoria at Bruce Grove Primary School, a school round the corner from 
Somerset Gardens, until the funds from France came through.
6.369   Other than to say “hello”, Ms Arthurworrey did not speak to Victoria at all during 
this meeting. She observed that Victoria was appropriately dressed and seemed 
bright and happy: “Victoria did not present as a frightful, fearful child; she 
presented as articulate, she presented as confident.” 
6.370   Indeed, Manning said in evidence that he could not remember anything being said 
or done during the course of the visit which would have indicated that Victoria was 
frightened of him or that the two of them did not get on.
6.371   However, Ms Arthurworrey did refer to one instance of Victoria behaving in a 
manner which recalled the observation made by some of the staff at the North 
Middlesex Hospital that the relationship between Kouao and Victoria was one of 
‘master and servant’. At one point during the visit, according to Ms Arthurworrey, 
Victoria ran up to Kouao’s side ‘as if being called to attention’. This did not cause 
Ms Arthurworrey undue concern because, as she had observed, Victoria “did not 
present as a fearful child”.
6.372   The home appeared perfectly normal – Manning confirmed that the flat had been 
made especially clean ahead of the visit – and Ms Arthurworrey observed nothing 
that would indicate a child being deliberately harmed. She said, “There was no 
evidence of soiling. I did not smell bleach. I did not smell urine. There was no 
evidence at all.” 
6.373  Victoria’s sleeping arrangements were discussed. According to Manning, 
Ms Arthurworrey was told that Kouao and Victoria slept on the bed while he had 
the sofa bed – although by this stage the truth was very different as Victoria had 
already begun to spend every night in the bath.
6.374   However, Ms Arthurworrey did note that Kouao seemed rather agitated throughout 
the interview about the outcome of the housing application. She could not 
understand why social services could not help in finding her a house. At one stage 
Victoria joined in the conversation. According to Ms Arthurworrey, “She pointed her 
finger aggressively at me and said, ‘You do not respect me, you do not respect my 
mother, why can you not find us a home?’” It was an outburst that Ms Arthurworrey 
says she did not expect from a seven-year-old child. She discussed it with Ms Baptiste 
subsequently, but according to Ms Arthurworrey, she did no more than smile, say 
“oh yes” and walk off.
6.375   During the course of the conversation Ms Arthurworrey made the point that 
the council “only accommodated children who were at risk of significant harm” 
and that Victoria was not, in the council’s view, at such risk. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that the next time Ms Arthurworrey saw Kouao was because of Kouao 
making allegations, which, if true, would have meant that Victoria was at very 
real risk.6  Haringey Social Services
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Sexual harm allegations 
6.376   Just four days later at about 9.45am on 1 November 1999, Kouao telephoned the 
NTDO. It was quite by chance that Ms Arthurworrey answered the call because 
she was ‘on duty’ that week and would not normally be answering her ordinary 
office phone.
6.377   Kouao was in quite a state. According to Ms Arthurworrey, Kouao was shouting 
and screaming in a mixture of French and English: “I could not really understand 
what she was saying but I did hear the words ‘Carl Manning’ and I did hear the 
words ‘sexual abuse’.”
6.378   Ms Arthurworrey immediately asked Ms Kozinos, the duty senior that day, for 
permission to deal with the case – the policy at the time was that duty took priority 
over a social worker’s allocated cases – and for advice. On Ms Kozinos’s instructions 
she telephoned Kouao and told her to come into the office for an interview. She 
also booked an interpreter for 10.45am.
6.379   Kouao attended the north Tottenham office with Victoria and Manning. 
Ms Arthurworrey said she first saw them through a glass window in the reception 
room. Victoria was sitting with her back to Kouao, swinging her legs and watching 
other children play in the Wendy house. Kouao and Manning sat next to her and 
appeared to be having a perfectly normal conversation. Ms Arthurworrey told the 
Inquiry, “I was extremely shocked by that, given Kouao’s demeanour earlier on.”
6.380   She asked Ms Kozinos to come and have a look. Ms Kozinos told Ms Arthurworrey 
to ask Manning to leave. Of the three of them, Manning looked the most 
distressed and he told Ms Arthurworrey, “I did not do what they are saying I did, 
I do not know why they are saying this.” Such was Manning’s distress at the 
situation he now found himself in, that he later wrote in his diary for 5 November 
1999 “Judgement day”. He expected, according to what he had been told by 
Kouao or Ms Arthurworrey (although he could no longer recall who told him), 
that on that day the police would interview him about the allegations. No such 
interview ever took place on 5 November 1999 or any time thereafter.
6.381   Ms Kozinos also asked Ms Arthurworrey to take down the details of the allegations. 
She did not, according to Ms Arthurworrey, ask her to carry out a risk assessment, 
nor did Ms Arthurworrey recall being asked to interview mother and child separately.
The interview
6.382   Once Manning had left, Ms Arthurworrey spoke to Kouao in the presence of 
Ms Robertson, another social worker in the north Tottenham DIAT B team. In the 
meantime, Victoria went to play in the reception area.
6.383   According to Ms Robertson, it was a difficult interview because Kouao kept going 
off on tangents and switching between French and English. Kouao alleged that 
Manning had sexually harmed Victoria on three separate occasions.
6.384   The first time was around 20 July 1999. Kouao had spent the day in hospital 
after fainting at home. On her return to Somerset Gardens, Victoria told her that 
Manning had inserted his finger into her vagina. He then asked her to touch his 
penis. Victoria described Manning’s penis to Kouao and said that she had seen 
milky liquid coming from the tip. Manning denied the incident when confronted 
by Kouao and swore on the Bible that he had not touched Victoria. Kouao decided 
to do nothing about it.
6.385   She claimed that the second occasion was in August 1999. All three of them 
were at home that day when Victoria came to Kouao in the kitchen. She said that The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Manning had been waving his penis at her. Manning again denied this but this 
time Kouao went to her neighbour for some advice. He told her that Manning 
could not possibly have done this and again Kouao decided to do nothing about 
the allegation.
6.386   The third incident apparently happened on the morning of 1 November 1999. 
Victoria complained to Kouao that while she was having a bath, Manning had 
walked into the bathroom naked. 
6.387   Ms Arthurworrey told the Inquiry that she was “extremely concerned” when she 
heard these allegations – not least because Haringey Social Services had been 
involved with the family since July and Kouao had made no mention of them 
before. She said she told Kouao that she now had considerable doubts about her 
ability to protect Victoria.
6.388  Kouao’s response was that she had accepted Manning’s account in relation to 
the first two occasions but that morning’s incident had caused her to reconsider. 
Regrettably, these events did not prompt Ms Arthurworrey to reflect and reconsider 
the conclusions she had come to about Victoria’s case in August. She said, “With 
the benefit of hindsight, I believed I had been lulled into a false sense of security 
and this section 47 investigation was something quite separate to the first section 
47 investigation.” 
6.389   Ms Arthurworrey told Kouao that due to the seriousness of the allegations, 
the police child protection team would be involved and that Manning would 
be arrested.
6.390   Ms Arthurworrey and Ms Robertson then spoke to Victoria alone. Kouao was 
insistent that they should do so and Ms Arthurworrey was anxious to see how she 
was. In her statement she said she did not want to get a disclosure from Victoria but 
she did want to gain her perception of how life was at home. Ms Arthurworrey said: 
“I remember she was dressed in a cotton dress, but she had a thick coat 
and she was wearing thick tights and she had a pair of wellington boots 
on. She was appropriately dressed and I actually remember thinking that 
she looked quite cute that day. Although nothing matched, her clothes 
were clean ... She appeared happy.” 
6.391   Ms Arthurworrey said she spoke to Victoria in English – she recalled her English 
as being “very good” but had barely got beyond saying “hello” when Victoria 
launched straightaway into a graphic disclosure. Ms Arthurworrey stopped the 
interview when Victoria began to mimic Kouao’s gestures in describing one of 
the sexual harm allegations.
6.392   There is a note at the foot of the fourth page of the record of that interview which 
was made by Ms Arthurworrey. She wrote: “Noted by both Valerie and myself that 
Anna’s disclosure sounded rehearsed. Sounded as if she had been coached to say 
the things she did.” 
6.393   Ms Robertson accepted in evidence that the fact that Victoria’s delivery sounded 
rehearsed did not itself mean that the allegations were untrue. She also recognised 
at the time that even if the allegations had been fabricated as part of a ploy to get 
housing, using the child to make up stories of sexual abuse was in itself harmful 
and needed to be investigated. She thought that she had discussed these concerns 
with Ms Arthurworrey.6  Haringey Social Services
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6.394   Ms Arthurworrey told the Inquiry that she stopped her interview with Victoria 
because she felt she needed a police officer to be present if these disclosures were 
going to be made. She herself had not been memorandum interview trained, and 
did not feel she had sufficient experience or the necessary skills to deal with an 
interview of this kind.
6.395   As Ms Arthurworrey got up to leave, she said Victoria was visibly upset. She was 
worried that she was not being believed. She was told that she would have a 
proper chance to explain the incident in more detail next time. Ms Arthurworrey 
said, “She shouted out, ‘I am not lying. I must tell you more. It is true.’“
6.396   Ms Arthurworrey asked Ms Kozinos if she would explain to Kouao about Haringey’s 
child protection procedures because she did not believe Kouao was taking the 
situation sufficiently seriously. According to Ms Arthurworrey:
“Her demeanour seemed to suggest that she did not give a damn ... 
She was telling me that Manning should be punished for what he has 
done but there was something about her manner, she just was not 
understanding the seriousness.” 
Arranging a strategy meeting
6.397   While Ms Kozinos was doing this, Ms Arthurworrey reported the matter to 
Haringey police Child Protection Team. The referral was taken by Paula Waldron 
who allocated the task of investigating it to PC Jones the following morning.
6.398   Ms Arthurworrey also set about arranging a strategy meeting – the first sexual 
harm strategy meeting that she was to attend, despite having eight other cases 
alleging sexual harm at that time. She said she told Ms Kozinos that she would be 
out of the office on a training course for the next three days and the first day that 
she would be available to attend a strategy meeting was Friday 5 November 1999. 
According to Ms Arthurworrey, Ms Kozinos told her to “go ahead and arrange it 
for then”. This was despite clear local child protection guidelines which call for 
“a strategy meeting to be convened within 72 hours of receipt of a sexual abuse 
referral indicating a high level of suspicion or immediately if the sexual abuse had 
occurred within the past 72 hours”. According to Kouao, the most recent incident 
of sexual harm had occurred that very morning and this should have necessitated 
an immediate strategy meeting.
6.399   In her oral evidence, Ms Arthurworrey said, “If Rose had told me to arrange the 
strategy meeting for Tuesday I would have cancelled my training, but she told me 
to arrange it for Friday when I came back.”
6.400   Ms Kozinos disagreed. She said that at the time she knew the allegations were about 
sexual harm but knew none of the detail – significantly she did not know whether 
any penetration had been alleged or the dates of the alleged incident(s) – and she 
did not see Victoria. As the duty senior, and in the absence of Ms Baptiste, she gave 
advice to Ms Arthurworrey and said she told her to arrange the strategy meeting “as 
soon as possible”. She anticipated that this would be done within 72 hours and by 
arrangement with Ms Baptiste, who she expected to chair the meeting. She also said 
it was Ms Baptiste, who, having returned to the office, asked her as a favour to speak 
to Kouao and explain to her the child protection procedures.
6.401   I accept that Ms Kozinos may not have known the detail of Kouao’s allegations 
and, specifically, whether the threshold for an immediate strategy meeting to be 
called had been crossed. Nonetheless, as the duty senior it was her job to know 
and to ensure that the local child protection guidelines were complied with. This 
she failed to do. The result was that her anticipation was never translated into The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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a clear instruction to Ms Arthurworrey to do as required, namely to convene 
a strategy meeting literally as soon as possible – even though it might involve 
cancelling Ms Arthurworrey’s training course – and Ms Arthurworrey did not 
challenge this.
Finding ‘safer’ accommodation
6.402   On the advice of Ms Kozinos, Ms Arthurworrey told Kouao that she and Victoria 
could no longer stay with Manning. Kouao suggested that she stay with her 
friends, the Kimbidimas, and she rang and spoke to Chantal Kimbidima to make 
the necessary arrangements. Ms Arthurworrey also spoke to Mrs Kimbidima. She 
explained to her that allegations of sexual harm had been made and that Kouao 
and Victoria would need to stay with her during the course of their investigations, 
which she thought would probably take about a month to complete.
6.403   Ms Arthurworrey believed there was no problem with Victoria and Kouao staying 
with the Kimbidimas, though she only spoke to Mrs Kimbidima. She made no 
checks at all as to the suitability of the accommodation and whether it would, 
indeed, provide a ‘safe’ haven for Victoria. Ms Arthurworrey said in evidence that 
she had not been advised to do this, and she would have needed advice from 
Ms Kozinos because her commitments were to the duty team that day.
6.404   Ms Kozinos, as duty senior, was in charge of the duty float and provided the funds 
when requested to pay for Kouao’s taxi fare to the Kimbidimas. She, too, saw no 
reason to question the suitability of the Kimbidimas’ house as a temporary home 
for Victoria, because she assumed that Ms Arthurworrey would have discussed this 
with her team manager before Victoria left the social services office.
6.405   Ms Arthurworrey returned to duty that evening and rang the Kimbidimas to check 
that everything was all right. She said she was told that Victoria was there but that 
Kouao had returned to Manning’s flat to pick up some of their things. Although 
neither Mr or Mrs Kimbidima remember receiving a second call from social 
services on 1 November, or any time that week, Mrs Kimbidima confirmed that 
Kouao did indeed return to Somerset Gardens that evening and it seems unlikely 
that Ms Arthurworrey could have learned this from anyone else other than the 
Kimbidimas. What Ms Arthurworrey did not know – and she said she did not learn 
until 13 December – was that Victoria also returned to live with Kouao in Manning’s 
flat. Significantly, Victoria never spent a single night at the Kimbidimas’ home.
6.406   Mr Kimbidima told the Inquiry there had been some misunderstanding. When 
Kouao told him that Manning was harming her daughter on the morning of 
1 November and that she could not stay at Somerset Gardens, he agreed to her 
leaving her belongings at his home but that was all. He thought he had explained 
this to his wife, but according to Mr Kimbidima she misunderstood. Therefore, 
when social services rang to ask if Kouao and Victoria could stay there pending 
their investigations, Mrs Kimbidima agreed. On his return home, Mr Kimbidima 
said he made it clear that Victoria and Kouao could not stay. He tried to find them 
a hotel for the night but when that failed he rang Kouao who told him, “Do not 
worry, come here anyway. I will explain to you.” Mr Kimbidima took Victoria back 
to Somerset Gardens about 11pm that evening.
6.407   What Kouao wanted to explain to Mr Kimbidima was that Victoria had told her in 
the taxi back that she had made up the sexual abuse allegations so that Manning 
would go to prison and she and Kouao would keep his flat. 
Retraction of allegations
6.408   On the very next day, 2 November 1999, Kouao returned with Victoria to the 
NTDO to tell the same story to Ms Kozinos and retract the allegations. Ms Kozinos 6  Haringey Social Services
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was the duty senior that day and Kouao asked to see her after learning that 
Ms Arthurworrey was out of the office.
6.409   Ms Kozinos observed that Victoria looked reasonably well and wore clean clothing, 
although her hair looked slightly unkempt. She said “hello” to Victoria “who 
appeared shy but did say ‘hello’ back to me. She gave me a big smile”. 
6.410   This was the last time anyone from any of the statutory agencies was to see 
Victoria before her final and fatal admission to the North Middlesex Hospital on 
25 February 2000.
6.411   Kouao was keen for Ms Kozinos to hear from Victoria that she had been a “silly 
girl” and that she had lied about the sexual allegations. Ms Kozinos said she 
observed that Kouao was bullying in her manner to Victoria and she therefore 
insisted on speaking to Kouao alone first, while Victoria remained in the reception 
area under the care of the receptionist. The interview lasted no more than 
10 minutes.
6.412  Kouao’s explanations as to why Victoria would make up such stories and why 
Kouao had not reported any of the incidents thus far seemed “vague”. However, 
she was extremely anxious that Manning should not be arrested or spoken to by 
the police and described him as a good friend who had treated her and Victoria 
well since their arrival in the UK. Ms Kozinos told Kouao she was not satisfied 
with the explanation she had been given and that Haringey’s child protection 
procedures would have to run their course. This was notwithstanding Kouao’s story 
that she was waiting for funds from France to arrive the following week, and that 
as soon as they did she and Victoria planned to return to France. Life had been 
problematic for Kouao since their arrival in the UK and she told Ms Kozinos that 
she had had enough.
6.413   It seemed to Ms Kozinos that Kouao’s priorities were not about Victoria but to keep 
Manning out of prison and to resolve her housing needs. Therefore, she could not 
be sure of Kouao’s ability to protect Victoria. According to her notes of the interview, 
Ms Kozinos explained to Kouao there would be a strategy meeting with the police 
child protection team, a full family assessment would be completed by the allocated 
social worker, and the case would go to case conference. This was a course of action 
that Ms Kozinos regarded as inevitable at the time because of the concerns raised 
by Kouao’s retraction and subsequent explanations. She also told Kouao she would 
have to find alternative accommodation and Kouao reassured her that she would go 
straight back to the Kimbidimas’ house with Victoria and stay there – an option, of 
course, that was never in fact open to her – and that she would not allow Manning 
contact with Victoria until the investigation had been completed.
After the interview
6.414   Kouao and Victoria did not leave the NTDO immediately. When Ms Kozinos returned 
to the reception area to meet another client, she observed Kouao who appeared to 
be “coaxing Victoria and telling her something, which she insisted she needed to tell 
us. Her manner was bullying and not very sensitive”. 
6.415   After her interview with Kouao, Ms Kozinos did two things – she updated 
Ms Baptiste and wrote up her notes of the interview. Ms Baptiste had no 
recollection of their conversation. But according to Ms Kozinos, Ms Baptiste 
told her that Ms Arthurworrey had thought that Victoria’s answers were totally 
rehearsed and that in light of the retraction, Ms Baptiste questioned the rationale 
for continuing with the strategy meeting. In fact, she suggested it should 
be cancelled. Ms Kozinos quite rightly persuaded her otherwise because she The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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recognised that the making of such allegations and their withdrawal in such 
circumstances might be significant in terms of Kouao’s relationship with Victoria.
6.416  Ms  Kozinos’s notes of her 7 to 10 minute conversation with Kouao are detailed, 
covering three handwritten pages, and appear on the SS5 case forms that are 
intended for use by Haringey social workers in writing up summaries and interviews 
between the department and a child or a child’s carer. The notes are dated 
2 November 1999 and are signed by Ms Kozinos with her correct professional title, 
senior practitioner, as she was at the time.
6.417   It is Ms Arthurworrey’s contention that no such record of the interview with 
Kouao was written up at that time, in November, and was therefore not available 
to the strategy meeting on 5 November 1999. She stated in evidence that 
she only realised the SS5 form was missing from the file after Victoria’s final 
admission to St Mary’s Hospital Paddington on 25 February 2000. According to 
Ms Arthurworrey, she pointed this out to Ms Kozinos who filled a form out in front 
of her. As the discussion and events surrounding the second strategy meeting on 
5 November have some bearing on this particular conflict of evidence, I shall return 
to this matter later in this Report. 
6.418   The strategy meeting took place in the NTDO as arranged at 11am on Friday 
5 November 1999. Ms Arthurworrey returned that day from her training course 
and was told by Ms Kozinos that Kouao had come into the office on the Tuesday 
and had retracted the allegations, claiming that Victoria had made everything 
up. Ms Arthurworrey was not surprised, she said, because she “had found the 
whole circumstances of [Kouao’s] disclosure very bizarre”. There was no mention, 
either before or during the strategy meeting, according to Ms Arthurworrey, of 
Ms Kozinos’s observation that Kouao was bullying towards Victoria, or that Victoria 
had left the office in a withdrawn and subdued state – although both observations 
appear in Ms Kozinos’s note of the interview with Kouao.
6.419   If Ms Kozinos had indeed written up her note on 2 November, then it should have 
been on the file and available to the strategy meeting on 5 November. As she did 
not read the file, she was in no position to check this for herself. She believed she 
conveyed the contents of the note to the meeting but never referred to it directly, 
nor did she arrange to have it photocopied and distributed to those present, not 
least because social services would “not normally give things from our file anyway 
without permission”.
6.420   In support of her version of events, Ms Kozinos referred to Ms Arthurworrey’s note 
on the file of the 5 November strategy meeting. Ms Arthurworrey wrote:
“... informed Marie-Therese had come to the department on Tuesday 
2nd November and retracted the allegations. Said Anna had told her she 
had made everything up. See SS5 for more details.” 
6.421   The reference to the SS5 refers, according to Ms Kozinos, to the retraction, and 
must go to show that her note of the interview with Kouao was available at least 
by 5 November.
6.422   In questioning, Ms Kozinos was asked to consider two other possibilities. First, 
that Ms Arthurworrey herself had not completed her notes for 5 November 
until very much later and after Ms Kozinos had completed hers. Second, that 
Ms Arthurworrey expected Ms Kozinos to complete her note of the interview on 
an SS5 and, although she did not have it to hand at the time, she anticipated 
Ms Kozinos would do so at some future date.6  Haringey Social Services
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6.423   In relation to the first, there has never been any suggestion that Ms Arthurworrey’s 
note of 5 November was not completed at the time, and therefore I discount 
it as a possibility. In relation to the second, Ms Arthurworrey said in her third 
statement, written some considerable time after Ms Kozinos gave her oral evidence 
and therefore after the options had been put, that it was this second option that 
reflected the truth. She said:
“I made a cross reference to the SS5 forms for more detail about the 
retraction because although an SS5 form had not been filled out at the 
time, I fully expected Rosemarie Kozinos to complete one in accordance 
with the standard practice. I did not follow up Rosemarie Kozinos nor 
remind her to fill in an SS5 form.”
6.424   If the second option is to carry any weight, Ms Kozinos said she would have 
expected to see a reference in Ms Arthurworrey’s contact note to an expected or 
‘outstanding’ SS5. However, the clear and unambiguous statement “see SS5 for 
details” implies that the SS5 she wrote already existed. Counsel for Ms Kozinos 
also suggested that the detailed and comprehensive notes made by Ms Kozinos 
bore the hallmarks of notes made while events were still fresh in her mind. 
This argument must carry some weight because Ms Arthurworrey did not say 
that she saw Ms Kozinos transcribe the notes made during the interview with 
Kouao from her notebook to the SS5 – which is what Ms Kozinos said she did. 
Instead, Ms Arthurworrey claimed that when she pointed out the missing note 
on 25 February, Ms Kozinos simply “took a pen and paper and wrote up that 
interview from memory”. I find I agree with Counsel for Ms Kozinos’s suggestion 
that her notes of her interview with Kouao “do not look like the product of a 
hurried attempt at a cover up some three months later”. 
6.425   I also attach weight to the fact that the allegation by Ms Arthurworrey was first 
raised in her statement to the Inquiry – in particular she makes no reference to 
it in her statement for the Part 8 review – and the fact that she only provided an 
explanation for her cross-reference to the SS5 in her contact note after the options 
had been put to Ms Kozinos.
6.426   I accept that Ms Arthurworrey’s allegation in itself probably had little relevance to 
the events leading to Victoria’s death – all the more so if Ms Kozinos did indeed 
feed back verbally the events of 2 November, although the record of the strategy 
meeting does not help in this respect as it is singularly deficient in its recording of 
the actual discussion that took place. However, the allegation plainly impacts on 
the credibility of both witnesses. It is my view that on this occasion the evidence 
of Ms Kozinos is to be preferred, and I accept that she had written her note of the 
interview with Kouao on 2 November or very shortly thereafter.
The November strategy meeting
6.427   The 5 November strategy meeting was chaired by Ms Kozinos as a favour to 
Ms Baptiste – the second favour of the week. According to Ms Kozinos, she was 
asked to chair the meeting “possibly within minutes” of the scheduled start time 
– though Ms Baptiste had no recollection of this. She was also told the case was 
a family support case, which it clearly no longer was once Kouao had made, and 
then retracted, the sexual abuse allegations.
6.428   The meeting was attended by Ms Arthurworrey, PC Jones and PC Ricketts. As was 
the practice at the time, Ms Kozinos again did not read the case file before the 
strategy meeting began. As a result, she was not aware and did not remember that 
she had been involved in Victoria’s case back in July. In fact, she expected to rely 
on Ms Arthurworrey and the two police officers to update her. The fact that neither 
Ms Arthurworrey nor PC Jones brought to her attention that she had chaired the The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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earlier strategy meeting – indeed it was Ms Kozinos who remembered this herself 
midway through the discussion – did not cause her to question this expectation.
6.429   She did not, as a result of remembering her earlier involvement, ask to see the 
case file – albeit that the file was in the nearby duty room and would have taken 
minutes to retrieve – nor did she go through the 18 earlier strategy meeting 
recommendations to assess the progress made on each. Instead, she continued 
to rely on what the police and Ms Arthurworrey told her, namely:
“The allegations had been fully investigated and that there were no 
concerns, that they had also discussed it with a child protection adviser 
and they had medical records that showed it was accidental injuries.”
6.430   According to Ms Kozinos “the matter had been closed so to speak but it was open 
as a family support case” and she had “no reason to disbelieve either of them or 
not to take what they said at face value at the time”.
6.431   The strategy meeting identified the following 15 tasks to be completed: 
  “i)  PCPT to contact immigration re status; S/W to establish which airport the 
client came in on;
  ii)  S/W to complete a check with France if client previously known. Find out 
more information re other children;
 iii)  Some proof that child is hers;
 iv)  Check on Carl Manning by PCPT–S/W to obtain DOB;
  v)  Client to give police a statement/or one withdrawing;
 vi)  Full assessment on child re neglect issues;
 vii)  Discuss case with legal;
 viii)  Talk to child on her own with mother’s permission;
 ix) Need to explore issues of schooling;
  x)  Complete check re medical on Anna;
 xi)  Explore issues of Anna bedwetting/and bereavement of father;
 xii)  Explore Carl and mother’s relationship;
 xiii)  Possible joint home visit with PCPT;
 xiv)  Copies of minutes to PCPT;
 xv)  Explain child protection procedures to mother and give her copies of leaflets.”
6.432   On the face of it this is a sensible and comprehensive list of tasks. The fact that 
some of them appear to replicate the July strategy meeting recommendations 
is hardly surprising, given that Victoria’s case file was not to hand, as the 
recommendations were being drawn up and there was no discussion of the 
progress made with any of the earlier recommendations. As before, no date was 6  Haringey Social Services
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set by which any of these new tasks were to be completed, nor was there a review 
date to check on progress.
6.433   In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the work that this strategy 
meeting considered important was ever completed. Although Ms Kozinos 
considered that a case conference was “inevitable”, it never took place.
6.434   According to Ms Kozinos, the third strategy meeting recommendation to seek 
some proof that the child was Kouao’s, arose from a feeling she had when Kouao 
came into the office on 2 November that something was amiss in the interaction 
and bonding between Kouao and Victoria. She thought it important enough to 
recommend that Ms Arthurworrey verify their relationship by checking Kouao’s 
documentation. If this check had been completed on Kouao’s passport alone, 
it would almost certainly, according to the police evidence to this Inquiry, have 
confirmed their suspicions. 
6.435   The strategy meeting record also noted that a memorandum interview would 
not be pursued at that stage. No reasons for this decision appear on the record. 
Despite the fact that Ms Arthurworrey had already cut short one interview with 
Victoria on 1 November because she felt that a proper memorandum interview was 
called for, Ms Kozinos said she believed that Victoria needed to be spoken to again 
so that the procedures could be explained to her and her views about going ahead 
with the memorandum interview could be gauged. According to Ms Kozinos, this 
was a joint decision of the strategy meeting and it was their intention that such 
an interview would take place shortly after Victoria had been spoken to. It seems 
more plausible, however, that the decision not to call a memorandum interview 
straightaway was largely influenced by the feeling of the meeting, conveyed by 
Ms Arthurworrey, that they simply did not believe the sexual harm allegations were 
anything other than a ploy by Kouao to obtain housing. The tone of the strategy 
meeting recommendations would seem to support this.
6.436   Although Victoria was not in school at the time, the strategy meeting record 
curiously refers to Victoria’s school as Bruce Grove Primary School. Ms Arthurworrey 
accepted that the information was contradictory but that she had told the meeting 
of Kouao’s intention to register Victoria at the school, and the fact that her 
schooling was still an issue is evident from the strategy meeting recommendations.
6.437   That Victoria was still at the Kimbidimas’ house on 5 November 1999 was an 
assumption made by both Ms Kozinos and Ms Arthurworrey, although PC Jones 
believed that she had been told by social services that Victoria and Kouao had 
returned to Manning’s flat. In the meantime, Ms Arthurworrey had just returned 
from a training course and had “no idea” as to whether any checks had been 
done on Victoria’s whereabouts. She said that Ms Kozinos told her that Victoria 
was with the Kimbidimas. Ms Kozinos, on the other hand, told the Inquiry that 
she had relied on Kouao’s assurance that she and Victoria would stay with the 
Kimbidimas and that both Ms Arthurworrey and Ms Baptiste were satisfied with the 
arrangement. Moreover, she was clear that Ms Arthurworrey told her during the 
strategy meeting that Victoria was with the Kimbidimas, but she did not remember 
asking Ms Arthurworrey how she knew. In fact, no checks were ever made as to 
Victoria’s whereabouts up to and including 5 November. As a result, social services 
were inadvertently relying on Kouao’s initial intention to stay with the Kimbidimas 
as evidence that they were staying there.
6.438   According to Ms Kozinos, the strategy meeting also discussed doing a risk 
assessment that very day, though no note of this appears in the strategy meeting 
record. The intention was that PC Jones and Ms Arthurworrey would visit Kouao 
at the Kimbidimas’ house to assess her capacity to protect Victoria, though The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Ms Kozinos recalled some question as to whether PC Jones could do the visit that 
day. In Ms Kozinos’s mind there was no question as to the need to do a home 
visit nor its relative urgency as they were approaching the weekend. The use of 
the word ‘possible’ in the strategy meeting recommendation referred only to 
whether the visit would be joint with the police, not whether it should happen at 
all. She now accepted that that instruction was far from clear – indeed, no such risk 
assessment was completed on 5 November or any time thereafter.
6.439  Ms  Baptiste’s management role for the DIAT B team ceased that very day and 
Ms Mairs assumed responsibility for both A and B teams from 8 November 
as part of Haringey’s restructuring exercise. But this did not deter Ms Kozinos 
from updating Ms Baptiste after the strategy meeting. She had understood that 
Ms Baptiste would retain some transitional responsibility through to the new year 
and would continue to supervise members of her team. Therefore, Ms Kozinos 
assumed it would fall to her to ensure that any risk assessment was carried out 
speedily and the strategy meeting recommendations would be met. Yet again, 
Ms Baptiste said she did not remember this conversation but cannot dispute 
that it occurred or that she may indeed have still had some team management 
responsibility at least as of 5 November. 
6.440   Ms Arthurworrey accepted that it was her responsibility as the allocated social 
worker to ensure that all the tasks identified by the strategy meeting were 
completed. The first task she dealt with was to send a fax to the French consulate 
welfare department – a task that she should have done in response to the July 
strategy meeting recommendations and did not – asking whether the family under 
the misspelled name of ‘Kovoa’ but giving their correct last known address in Paris 
were known to French social services. Six days later, according to her contact note, 
she received a telephone call from the consulate giving her a ‘no trace’ response.
6.441   This was a relatively simple task. The Inquiry can only speculate as to whether 
Ms Arthurworrey would have received a different response, and one that might 
have cast doubt on the viability of Kouao’s plan to return to France, if she had at 
least spelled the family name correctly – a family that she had been working with 
for the past three months.
6.442  Ms  Arthurworrey’s understanding of some of the other tasks expected of her 
was far from clear. She admitted, for example, that she was unsure about what 
“complete check regarding medical on Anna” actually meant and she did not 
check with Ms Kozinos exactly what she was required to do. Nor did she see the 
reference to “a case conference is required” as being definitive. She believed that 
her role was to carry out an assessment of Victoria, bring the findings back to her 
team manager for discussion, and only then would a decision to convene a case 
conference be taken. She told the Inquiry:
“The case conference was not the focal point of discussion in that 
strategy meeting. I would have expected that if I were to call a case 
conference immediately, I would have expected that to be under item 
one of the work to be undertaken.” 
6.443   Instead, her intention was to invite Kouao into the office for an interview so 
that she could update her on the strategy meeting, make arrangements for an 
assessment to take place, and review the placement with the Kimbidimas. 
6.444   Despite an express instruction to the contrary, Ms Arthurworrey did not discuss 
Victoria’s case with Haringey’s legal department because she felt she did not 
have enough information to do so. There had been no mention of initiating 
care proceedings or taking out an order in respect of Victoria. According to 6  Haringey Social Services
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Ms Arthurworrey, “The last time I saw Victoria she presented as happy, she 
presented as relaxed. She did not present in my opinion as a child who had been 
sexually abused.”
6.445   It was this impression which undoubtedly contributed to virtual inaction by 
Ms Arthurworrey and her managers in their handling of Victoria’s case from early 
November onwards. In my view, Haringey allowed this case to drift to its tragic 
conclusion. Less than four months later, Victoria was dead.
6.446   The next formal opportunity to check on the progress made with Victoria, and in 
particular how work on the strategy meeting recommendations was progressing, 
came on 15 November 1999 when Ms Arthurworrey had her second supervision 
session since being allocated the case. Ms Mairs who had only the previous week 
taken on responsibility for both the A and B duty and investigation teams initiated 
and took the supervision.
First supervision with Ms Mairs
6.447   In her new management role, Ms Mairs told the Inquiry that she had gained 
“maybe seven” additional social workers to supervise, including Ms Arthurworrey, 
bringing the total to 16. According to Ms Mairs, there was no handover from 
Ms Baptiste at the time because Ms Baptiste was not around. Ms Baptiste accepted 
there was no formal handover, as there should have been, but believed she did 
speak to Ms Mairs about the social workers she had supervised. She could not, 
however, recall whether each of her supervisee’s cases had been discussed, and 
in the light of her vague evidence on the subject I find it probable that no such 
discussions did in fact take place.
6.448   Thus it was that Ms Mairs came to the supervision session without prior 
knowledge from the former team manager about the concerns in Victoria’s case. 
Since it was not the practice to read case files before supervision, she further 
disadvantaged herself.
6.449   The whole session lasted about one and a half hours, of which about an hour was 
spent on casework. At the time, Ms Arthurworrey had 16 cases – five were due to 
close, four were waiting to close, four or five were child protection and the rest 
were family support. Both agreed that not much more than five minutes were 
spent discussing Victoria’s case. 
6.450   Like Ms Kozinos, Ms Mairs believed that Ms Baptiste still retained some supervisory 
responsibility for her team, so Ms Mairs did not consider that she was initiating 
a new supervision contract with Ms Arthurworrey. She told the Inquiry: “I was 
looking at it more from the point of view of reviewing the cases [Ms Arthurworrey] 
had so she was clear about what actions needed to be done on it and to enable 
her to get some support.” 
6.451   Ms Mairs accepted that her supervision of Victoria’s case was wholly reliant on 
Ms Arthurworrey’s account of her work. The case had been in hand since July 
and Ms Arthurworrey had been the social worker throughout. So Ms Mairs said 
she expected Ms Arthurworrey to be able to update her – albeit that little more 
than five minutes was set aside for discussion – and she never ascertained if 
Ms Arthurworrey herself had read everything on the file.
6.452   Not surprisingly, therefore, when Ms Mairs came to give oral evidence concerning 
what she believed Ms Arthurworrey told her in supervision, she appeared confused. 
She thought Ms Arthurworrey had received a medical report from the North 
Middlesex Hospital which made clear that, although an allegation of physical harm 
had been made, a doctor’s examination had concluded that the marks were due The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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to scabies. In fact, that medical report referred to Victoria’s first admission to the 
Central Middlesex Hospital.
6.453   Ms Mairs said she had no reason to doubt what Ms Arthurworrey told her or to 
check if she could have been mistaken. She appeared to Ms Mairs to be “a very 
competent and capable social worker” and she was not aware of any concerns 
about her practice. 
6.454   Ms Mairs also accepted at face value Ms Baptiste’s decision that the case was 
‘family support’ and, because of what she had been told and the fact that the 
case had been around since July, she formed the view that the social services 
investigation was coming to a close. That she could have believed this just days 
after a strategy meeting to consider allegations of sexual harm in Victoria’s case 
seems extraordinary, unless Ms Mairs’s version of events is accurate, namely that 
Ms Arthurworrey never told her that there had been any allegations of sexual harm, 
let alone that Kouao had subsequently retracted those allegations and a strategy 
meeting had followed. According to Ms Mairs, her recorded decisions from the 
supervision session bear this out and clearly relate only to the July admission to the 
North Middlesex Hospital.
6.455   Ms Arthurworrey is adamant that Ms Mairs did know about the sexual harm 
allegations and the 5 November strategy meeting. She admitted that during 
the supervision she did not draw Ms Mairs’s attention to the relevant section of 
the file, but she had Victoria’s file open on her lap and she read from the notes 
of the November strategy meeting. Ms Mairs wrote down her action points as 
Ms Arthurworrey was talking. 
6.456   Ms Arthurworrey told the Inquiry that as this was the first occasion Ms Mairs had 
supervised her, and because she had never before discussed Victoria’s case with 
her, she brought Ms Mairs up to date from the beginning of her involvement with 
the case up to and including the strategy meeting on 5 November 1999.
6.457  Ms  Mairs’s supervision decisions merit careful consideration. She recorded the 
following: 
“– child protection investigation took place; no further concerns;
– refer to EWO – school;
– permission to interview child on her own;
– discussions bed wetting with GP;
– refer to family centre bereavement counselling;
– closing summary;
– complete care plan;
– complete decisions of strategy meeting;
– work to be completed by 17th December 1999.”
6.458   If indeed these decisions related to the July strategy meeting, then an experienced 
manager such as Ms Mairs ought to have registered and recorded her concerns 
that almost five months had elapsed and the outstanding work was not now going 
to be completed before mid December. Moreover, it might have caused her to 
question her assumption about the competency of Ms Arthurworrey and the need 
to review the case file. No such record of concern exists and Ms Mairs admitted 
that she did not remonstrate with Ms Arthurworrey about this. Ms Mairs said she 
hoped to be able to discuss the case with Ms Baptiste, Ms Arthurworrey’s previous 
manager, but no such opportunity arose.
6.459   Moreover, the second, third, fourth and fifth of Ms Mairs’s decisions closely 
mirror recommendations that emerged from the November strategy meeting. 6  Haringey Social Services
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In particular, the first strategy meeting made no mention of bed wetting or 
bereavement counselling – factors which arose for Ms Arthurworrey only after her 
visit to Somerset Gardens in August 1999. The onus on Ms Arthurworrey back in 
July was simply to complete checks in relation to schooling and not to deal with 
the issue by way of a referral to the education welfare officer.
6.460   If the decision to speak to Victoria on her own, as Ms Mairs asserted, relates 
to the July referral then it would have meant that a vital element of a child 
protection inquiry had yet to happen, nearly five months after the initial referral. 
This was clearly a grave and unacceptable lapse in professional practice. Further, 
if Ms Arthurworrey had believed that these decisions related to the first strategy 
meeting, she would almost certainly have pointed out to Ms Mairs that she had 
obtained permission to speak to Victoria and did so on the ward in the North 
Middlesex Hospital on 6 August 1999.
6.461   When asked why, if this was a ‘family support’ case, Victoria would need to be 
seen alone and not in the company of Kouao, Ms Mairs told the Inquiry that she 
associated scabies with neglect and that this was compounded by the bed wetting 
and the non-school attendance. She said:
“I considered there may be other things that were going on that wanted 
further investigation and I made a decision that it was more appropriate 
to see the child on her own to actually do that because ... once you see 
a child on their own you do get more from it.”
6.462   Ms Mairs admitted that when she told Ms Arthurworrey “to complete the decisions 
of the strategy meeting” she did not know what those decisions were or how 
many were outstanding. She said she had the impression they were not “major”. 
In fact, she assumed that as the case was more than four months old, all the major 
recommendations would have been dealt with. This was an assumption that she was 
in no position to verify without first reading the case file, and this she did not do.
6.463   Ms Mairs then directed provisional closure of the case provided that no 
further concerns emerged. She also directed that any outstanding work 
should be completed by 17 December 1999. Given that Ms Mairs authorised 
Ms Arthurworrey to take three days off in lieu and two days annual leave, and that 
she would have had to complete a week on duty during the coming month, in 
reality Ms Arthurworrey had just two weeks to complete any outstanding tasks. 
Ms Mairs considered this to be adequate because she believed Ms Arthurworrey 
was finishing off the earlier July tasks.
Did Ms Mairs know about sexual abuse allegations?
6.464   Ms Mairs has persistently denied that she was ever told about the sexual harm 
allegations and the 5 November strategy meeting during her only supervision with 
Ms Arthurworrey about Victoria. In questioning, she did not accept that she could 
have misunderstood what she had been told. She told the Inquiry that if she had 
been told she would have written it down, and she would have been far more 
concerned about the case, and that the decisions that she made in supervision, 
while valid, would not have gone far enough. Nor could she have expected the 
work to have been finished by mid December as the case would have had to go to 
case conference.
6.465   Having reviewed the evidence, I find it hard to accept the accuracy of Ms Mairs’s 
statements in this matter. It seems inconceivable that Ms Arthurworrey would not 
have updated Ms Mairs about the November sexual abuse allegations, or told her 
about the second strategy meeting, especially as these events had occurred so 
recently and Ms Arthurworrey has consistently expressed throughout her evidence The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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the need for confirmation and direction from her managers. I accept that no 
mention of sexual abuse would have been made if Ms Arthurworrey was simply 
reading from the November strategy meeting recommendations because those 
words do not appear. However, Ms Arthurworrey would have had no motive for 
not mentioning these allegations or that there had been a strategy meeting as 
recently as 10 days ago. 
6.466   It was clearly Ms Mairs’s job, as supervisor, to know about the key milestones in 
the case. Moreover, a number of her supervision decisions mirror almost exactly 
the recommendations of the second strategy meeting and the concerns they seek 
to address were not an issue for social services back in July. I am therefore forced to 
the conclusion that Ms Mairs’s supervision decisions could not have referred to the 
July strategy meeting, and that the reason she took no issue with Ms Arthurworrey 
about the delay in completing the necessary tasks was because the strategy 
meeting they were discussing was the November strategy meeting. It follows, 
therefore, that the unrealistic deadline that she set demonstrated her failure to 
fully grasp the seriousness of the matters before her, and the opportunity to get a 
management grip on the case through supervision was lost yet again.
6.467   Ms Arthurworrey told the Inquiry she was not unduly fazed by the December 
deadline. Indeed, until her supervision with Ms Mairs she had not been given 
any timetable to complete the work of the November strategy meeting and she 
thought the deadline was manageable. She said, “We always worked at a fairly 
cracking pace in north Tottenham.” Whether that was true or not, the fact is 
that by 17 December 1999, Ms Arthurworrey had done little more than make an 
unsuccessful check with the French consulate.
Losing contact with Kouao and Victoria
6.468   She also wrote to Kouao on 19 November 1999 offering her an office appointment 
at 2pm on 1 December – a delay she now concedes as being wholly unacceptable. 
The purpose of the appointment, according to the letter sent by Ms Arthurworrey, 
was to “discuss her circumstances further” and invite Kouao to contact 
Ms Arthurworrey should the appointment time prove inconvenient. Hardly, it might 
be thought, a letter which conveys any sense whatsoever of urgency or seriousness 
with regard to sexual harm allegations and the outcome of a strategy meeting.
6.469   Ms Arthurworrey addressed the letter to Kouao at Somerset Gardens, and not 
care of the Kimbidimas, where she said she assumed Kouao and Victoria were 
staying. Unbeknown to her at the time, she had sent it to the ‘right’ address. 
Ms Arthurworrey explained that she was about to take the time off in lieu agreed 
with Ms Mairs and that she wrote the letter in some haste. It was not until Kouao 
failed to turn up at the office on 1 December – though it is difficult to infer 
from the letter any reason that might have persuaded Kouao to attend – that 
Ms Arthurworrey realised her “mistake”.
6.470   She rang Kouao on her mobile phone but there was no reply and she left a 
message. In evidence, Ms Arthurworrey claimed to have rung Kouao on several 
occasions although her contact notes only record the first such call made on 
1 December. Her next recorded contact note showed she telephoned Manning on 
13 December. Again there was no response and she left a message for him to call 
her back. Perhaps not surprisingly, as he must have still been waiting anxiously for 
the police or social services to interview him about the sexual harm allegations, 
he did not do so.
6.471   When asked why she had waited so long to ring Manning, Ms Arthurworrey said 
that she already formed the impression that Kouao may have moved on, as she 
said she intended to do the last time Ms Arthurworrey visited Somerset Gardens 6  Haringey Social Services
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at the end of October 1999. Ms Arthurworrey accepted that it was a dangerous 
assumption to make at the time and she should not have done so.
6.472   She also rang the Kimbidimas on 13 December 1999. This, according to 
Ms Arthurworrey, was the first time she learned that Kouao and Victoria had 
returned to live with Manning but she did not ask, nor was she told, when they 
had returned. What is clear is that from 13 December, Ms Arthurworrey ought to 
have appreciated that arrangements made for keeping Victoria safe after the sexual 
harm allegations made against Manning had broken down.
6.473   Ms Arthurworrey now had no idea of the whereabouts of the family. She told 
Ms Kozinos shortly after 1 December that Kouao had failed to turn up for her 
appointment and was told to “keep on trying” and that they would discuss it in 
supervision. She also attempted to visit Victoria at Somerset Gardens. Her first 
two attempts were said to have been in the period between 13 and 23 December 
1999, although there is no documentary evidence of either of them.
6.474   It did not occur to Ms Arthurworrey to explore with the legal department the 
powers open to her – she did not in any event believe that Kouao was deliberately 
trying to conceal Victoria from social services. However, she said that she told 
PC Jones on 10 December that she had had no contact with Kouao or Victoria, 
although again, no record of the conversation appears on the contact sheets.
6.475   As she could not find Kouao and Victoria, Ms Arthurworrey was effectively 
prevented from taking her investigation and assessment of the family any further 
forward. The recommendations from the November strategy meeting were, 
in effect, left to fall by the wayside.
Supervision with Ms Kozinos
6.476   Ms Arthurworrey was to have had another opportunity to discuss Victoria’s case in 
formal supervision, this time with Ms Kozinos, on 14 December. In the event, the 
meeting was cancelled because of industrial strike action in which both Ms Kozinos 
and Ms Arthurworrey took part. The supervision session was subsequently 
rearranged for 23 December.
6.477   Ms Kozinos was to begin her role as practice manager, which carried with it 
supervisory responsibilities for social workers, the very next day. Although she had 
never before undertaken formal supervision of social workers, except to provide 
case direction in the absence of a team manager, she said she felt reasonably 
confident about taking on the task. Indeed, Ms Arthurworrey had requested that 
Ms Kozinos should be her supervisor following the restructuring of the DIATs. 
6.478   According to Ms Kozinos, this introductory supervision with Ms Arthurworrey took 
some three hours and covered nine agenda items. Among the decisions agreed 
upon was that Ms Arthurworrey would be on annual leave from 25 December 
1999 to 17 January 2000, and that she would attend a memorandum interview 
training course in April 2000. Ms Kozinos also noted that Ms Baptiste had 
completed a performance development review with Ms Arthurworrey but that had 
“not been handed over”. She noted on the record: “I will discuss with Carole next 
time she is back at work. Need previous supervision and PDR notes. Also need an 
official handover.” 
6.479   Ms Kozinos also arranged two further supervision sessions with Ms Arthurworrey 
for 18 January and 7 February 2000 and a further performance development 
review for 10 February. According to Ms Kozinos, none of these took place 
– although Ms Arthurworrey claimed that she had a brief informal supervision with The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Ms Kozinos on 18 January in which Victoria’s case was mentioned but there was 
no recorded note. 
6.480   Judging by the extreme brevity of Ms Kozinos’s action notes of 23 December 
1999, discussion of Victoria’s case must have been very short indeed. Ms Kozinos 
admitted that as this was an introductory session, little time was devoted to 
casework and she estimated that Victoria’s case took no more than five minutes 
to discuss.
6.481   Ms Kozinos recorded the following four lines: 
“– Family have left area. No further contact.
– Complete spot visit.
– Complete appropriate paper work then NFA.
– Update PCPT – Karen Jones.”
6.482  Ms  Arthurworrey’s recollection of the session was, as had been her general 
experience of supervision, that it was not a two-way discussion: “It was myself 
informing Rose of the situation and then just Rose writing down these actions. 
There was no discussion.” 
6.483   Equally, as was the practice, Ms Kozinos did not read the case file either before or 
during supervision. This is a factor that might have been considered marginally 
less relevant on this occasion because Ms Kozinos had chaired both the July and 
November strategy meetings herself. She ought, therefore, to have been aware of 
the seriousness with which the latter strategy meeting viewed the case, and she 
might have been expected to recall the general direction of the strategy meeting 
recommendations, if not the detail.
6.484   However, none of this was evident in the manner in which she dealt with 
Victoria’s case in supervision. Although it is fair to say that Ms Arthurworrey’s and 
Ms Kozinos’s evidence about what was said during this meeting conflict with each 
other, given Ms Kozinos’s prior knowledge of the case it is difficult to explain her 
readiness to accept at face value what she claimed Ms Arthurworrey told her.
6.485   According to Ms Kozinos, Ms Arthurworrey informed her that she had reported to 
Ms Mairs in supervision on 15 November 1999 – just 10 days after the strategy 
meeting – that there were no outstanding child protection concerns and that 
Ms Mairs had recommended case closure. Implicit in this, presumably, was that 
the concerns had been fully investigated. Ms Arthurworrey’s previous managers 
had also told her not to take Victoria’s case to case conference, despite a clear 
recommendation of the strategy meeting that that was the appropriate course. 
Indeed, Ms Kozinos’s view at the time was that a case conference was inevitable 
and she had told Kouao the same.
6.486   Ms Kozinos told the Inquiry that she had begun to doubt her own judgement 
about the case and wondered whether she had been heavy-handed with Kouao. 
She said:
“I doubted myself and put much more faith in what Lisa told me at face 
value ... also because of my team manager who I do have faith in, who 
was very experienced in my view, having recommended to close it, I did 
not question it.”
6.487   Ms Kozinos never asked Ms Arthurworrey about the progress in meeting each 
of the November strategy meeting recommendations and, more fundamentally, 
she never asked her whether she had seen Victoria – an essential element of 6  Haringey Social Services
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any competent section 47 inquiry – and she regretted not doing so. She simply 
assumed that such an interview had taken place, whereas a check of the case 
file would have shown that it had not. She would also have seen that virtually 
all the 15 tasks identified by the strategy meeting were still outstanding. As to 
Victoria’s whereabouts, Ms Kozinos was adamant that Ms Arthurworrey told her 
in supervision that the family “had gone ... they have left, gone back to France”. 
But she never asked Ms Arthurworrey how she could have known this.
6.488   At the end of the supervision, Ms Kozinos said she was left with the impression that 
the majority of Ms Arthurworrey’s cases were low-profile family support cases, that 
she had missed certain deadlines in these cases and that she was going through 
the process of closing a lot of them. Victoria’s case was one of these. 
6.489   Ms Arthurworrey, on the other hand, said she told Ms Kozinos that she had not 
completed any of the strategy meeting recommendations and that she had not 
had any contact with Victoria since the strategy meeting, despite making a number 
of telephone calls. She also denied telling Ms Kozinos that her previous line 
managers had recommended case closure. She also told Ms Kozinos that there was 
a possibility [my emphasis] that the family may have gone back to France because 
that was what had been discussed in October, but she did not know where they 
were. Accordingly, Ms Kozinos wrote down the first action note as “‘Family have 
left area, no further contact.’”
6.490   Ms Kozinos explained the reference to “no further contact” as meaning there had 
been no further contact because the family had returned to France. This, together 
with her recollection that Ms Arthurworrey had mentioned making some spot 
visits, confirmed that Ms Kozinos was aware that contact with the family had been 
lost at some stage.
6.491  Ms  Kozinos’s second action point – ”complete spot visit” – was directed to 
Manning’s flat. Ms Kozinos denied she had been told that Victoria and Kouao had 
returned there at some point – she said that if she had known this her response 
would have been very different – and that she had no reason not to accept that 
the family had left the Kimbidimas and gone to France. However, she wanted to 
double check. She said:
“Part of me, with the feelings I got from the visit with the mum, it must 
have been still something that was niggling at me and I suggested just to 
be on the safe side, just to be certain, just to make sure, that she has not 
returned to Manning’s.” 
6.492   Ms Kozinos accepted that a single spot check could hardly prove conclusively that 
the family had indeed returned to France. She admitted that she did not think it 
through and did not follow her instinct because she was aware of her manager’s 
decision – a manager who she respected and believed knew better – to close the 
case, and she did not challenge this.
6.493   In fact, Ms Kozinos’s instinct was to prove correct and the consequences for 
Victoria might have been very different if those instincts had been properly 
acted upon.
6.494   She recalled that Ms Arthurworrey said she would do several more spot visits 
because Manning’s flat was on her way to work and it would not inconvenience 
her. However, she denied that this must cast doubt on Ms Arthurworrey’s 
supposed firm belief that the family had returned to France. Ms Kozinos said, 
“[Ms Arthurworrey] seemed certain ... I think she was going to do this just to 
reassure me. I think because she said that.”The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Disagreement over supervision content
6.495  Ms  Kozinos’s and Ms Arthurworrey’s accounts of what was said in supervision on 
23 December 1999 differ markedly in a number of key respects and, in particular, 
whether Ms Kozinos was told that:
• all the concerns had been properly investigated or that none of the strategy 
recommendations had been completed;
• Victoria had not been seen since the strategy meeting and there had been no 
contact with the family;
• Victoria and Kouao had returned to Manning’s flat at some stage previously;
• the family had definitely or possibly returned to France;
• Ms Arthurworrey’s previous line managers had recommended case closure.
6.496   In the absence of any proper record of their discussion, I cannot be certain 
exactly what Ms Kozinos was told during this supervision session, or whether 
she misunderstood the information given to her by Ms Arthurworrey. However, 
having seen and heard both the witnesses, I have come to the conclusion that on 
this occasion Ms Kozinos’s interpretation of what she was told and her direction 
was almost entirely influenced by her understanding that there had already been 
a management decision to close the case. Moreover, it seems probable that 
this understanding could only have come from Ms Arthurworrey, for although 
Ms Mairs’s instruction to prepare a closing summary was recorded on the previous 
supervision summary and action sheet, both agreed that Ms Kozinos did not read 
the case file either before or during supervision. As Ms Mairs was a manager highly 
regarded by Ms Kozinos, she therefore let slide any remaining concerns she may 
have had and did not properly and systematically apply her mind to these.
Failure to find Kouao and Victoria
6.497   Ms Arthurworrey made one more visit to Somerset Gardens on 6 January 
2000 in the hope of catching the family at home. On the first two occasions 
Ms Arthurworrey did not get beyond the front door of the block of flats. On the 
third visit she entered the premises and knocked on the door. She said:
“I remember knocking and I remember thinking it sounds very quiet and 
then the light time switch [in the hallway] went off and I knocked again. 
There was no response and then I left.”
6.498   She recorded on the contact sheet that the flat was in darkness. In fact, the 
likelihood is that Victoria was staying at the flat throughout this period and was, 
at the very least, spending the night there. It is true that she, Kouao and Manning 
had made three trips to France in late 1999, but it seems likely that she was back 
from the last trip by the time of Ms Arthurworrey’s first spot visit. Manning told the 
Inquiry that the three of them had made two visits to France, one in early October 
and one in mid November, and that Kouao and Victoria went alone to France for 
two weeks in late November/early December. It seems likely but not certain that 
they were back from that last trip in time for the first attempt by Ms Arthurworrey 
to visit them in the 10 days between 13 and 23 December.
6.499   On none of the visits did Ms Arthurworrey obtain a response from inside the flat. 
There are two possible explanations for this. Either Victoria had been taken out 
by Kouao and Manning, although there is little evidence that at the time she ever 
went out, except to church, or Victoria was at home unable to get to the door.
6.500   Apart from a couple more unsuccessful phone calls to Kouao and Manning, 
Ms Arthurworrey made just one more attempt at establishing the whereabouts 
of Victoria. On 10 January 2000 – more than two months after the November 
strategy meeting – she telephoned Bruce Grove Primary School. She knew at the 6  Haringey Social Services
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end of October that Kouao had intended to register Victoria at the school, so she 
rang to see whether Victoria had been registered and was attending. No child of 
that name was on the register or ever had been.
6.501   This was clearly no more than a half-hearted step to locate the family before 
closing the case. According to Ms Arthurworrey, she had made no checks of the 
school before January because she had already formed the view that the reason 
Kouao failed to attend her office appointment on 1 December was because she 
and Victoria had returned to France. It remained her belief throughout January 
and February 2000 that the family had moved out of the area.
File closure
6.502   The third direction given in supervision on 23 December was to “complete 
appropriate paper work then NFA [no further action]”. Ms Arthurworrey 
understood this to mean that she should prepare her closing summary and 
send out a closing letter. Thus it was on 18 February 2000 she wrote to Kouao 
at Somerset Gardens. She wrote the following:
“Dear Marie-Therese
I am writing to inform that as you have failed to maintain contact with 
this office and your exact whereabouts are unknown, the department will 
be closing your file.
If you are experiencing any difficulties, please do not hesitate to contact 
our duty team on the above number.
Yours sincerely
Lisa Arthurworrey.”
6.503   Nobody reading this letter, including Kouao, who almost certainly received it, 
could have deduced that here was a social services department that had treated at 
all seriously allegations of sexual harm made as recently as the previous November.
6.504   In Ms Arthurworrey’s words, the letter was “very basic”. She said she simply did not 
know how to write the letter. She had asked Ms Kozinos for advice and assistance 
but she was too busy and quite dismissive. Ms Arthurworrey said, “I came away and 
I just sat down and thought about it and this is what I came up with.” 
6.505   Ms Arthurworrey proceeded to close the case in accordance with local guidelines 
and without any further discussion with either her supervisor, Ms Kozinos, or her 
team manager, Ms Mairs. She said she prepared a closing summary and recorded 
on the last contact sheet “file to be closed”. She also recorded details of the 
closing letter that she sent to Kouao and the fact that she had left a message for 
PC Jones on 18 January 2000 informing her that Haringey Social Services was 
closing Victoria’s file. She believed she handed the file to Ms Kozinos some time 
between 18 and 25 February 2000 – although Ms Kozinos suggested that she must 
have been given the file for closure by the latest before her next supervision with 
Ms Arthurworrey on 21 February, because Victoria’s case no longer appears on the 
February supervision record.
6.506   Both the closing summary and the last contact sheet would have been signed by 
Ms Kozinos as practice manager. Indeed, Ms Arthurworrey assumed they had been 
because she found Victoria’s file in the “close” basket on 25 February. The closing 
summary and the last contact sheet would also then have been authorised and 
countersigned by Ms Mairs.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.507   The process for closure was described slightly differently by Ms Mairs, who stated 
that only the closing summary would normally be signed off by the practice 
manager and then countersigned by the team manager. Yet Ms Arthurworrey 
recalled seeing both signatures on the last contact sheet on 25 February – a claim 
that cannot be supported by the documentary evidence as both the contact sheet 
and closing summary are missing from the file.
6.508   At the final stage in the closure process, Ms Mairs as team manager would have 
signed off a local children and families’ assessment action record, marking it for no 
further action. This she did. In stark contrast to what she said in her statement to 
the Inquiry and in her interview with Mr Monaghan as part of Haringey’s internal 
review process, Ms Mairs admitted in oral evidence that she closed Victoria’s case 
on the morning of 25 February 2000, the day Victoria died. 
Victoria’s final admission to the North Middlesex Hospital and St Mary’s 
Hospital Paddington 
6.509   At 3.37am on Friday 25 February Mr Robert Philpotts, the out-of-office-hours 
social worker for Haringey council, received a telephone call from Dr Pahari at the 
North Middlesex Hospital. He was ringing to tell social services that a child known 
as ‘Anna’ Kouao had been brought to the hospital in an emergency. She was in 
a coma, with an abnormally low temperature, and was breathing slowly with a 
slow heart rate. Dr Pahari passed on Kouao’s explanation that Victoria had stopped 
eating the day before she became ill and that Kouao had contacted her church 
and the church had diagnosed that the child was possessed by an evil spirit. Kouao 
denied giving Victoria any drugs or potions, only holy water, and that she and the 
church community had prayed for Victoria. When Victoria failed to improve, she 
was taken back to the church. From there, Kouao took a minicab to make her way 
to the hospital, but as Victoria’s condition appeared to become critical, the taxi 
driver stopped at an ambulance station for assistance.
6.510   On examining Victoria, Dr Pahari noticed “several old bruises, scars and ulcers to 
her wrists and ankles, streaky bruises across her buttocks as if she had been beaten. 
Anna’s face and hands are swollen”.
6.511   Kouao denied she had deliberately harmed Victoria. It was also noted that Victoria 
had no GP, did not attend school and that she had been incontinent since July 
1999. Dr Pahari told Mr Philpotts that Victoria was critically ill and was being 
prepared for transfer to the intensive care unit at St Mary’s Hospital Paddington. 
He asked that a duty social worker follow up the case.
6.512   Mr Philpotts typed up a note of what he had been told on an out-of-office-hours 
team social work report form, and faxed a copy of it across to the duty team 
at 5.07am.
Dr Pahari’s referral
6.513   Mr Almeida was the duty manager in charge that Friday morning. He received 
Dr Pahari’s referral from the duty clerk first thing in the morning and attached a 
note to the file at 9.30am, setting out the following actions: 
“– check register etc;
– previous concerns;
– family composition etc;
– ring hospital clarify nature of referral;
– injury accidental/non-accidental;
– abuse – physical, sexual, neglect;
– discuss with duty senior urgently once the facts have been established.”6  Haringey Social Services
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6.514   Mr Almeida did not recognise the case at the time, nor did he recall that 
Ms Arthurworrey, who by chance was also on duty that day, was the allocated social 
worker. Instead he gave the case to Ms Hayes to make some urgent telephone calls 
to the North Middlesex Hospital and St Mary’s Hospital Paddington.
6.515   Ms Hayes told the Inquiry, “When I rang North Middlesex they said they had seen 
Anna before and she had been there during the summer for scabies [my emphasis]. 
That is when I realised it was Lisa’s case.” 
6.516   Ms Hayes spoke to the consultant, Dr Lesley Alsford. In addition to what Dr Pahari 
had already conveyed to social services, Ms Hayes was told that the hospital 
suspected that Victoria might have been poisoned and that tests would be carried 
out either there or at St Mary’s Hospital. It was thought that cigarette burns might 
have accounted for some of the old scars and that the marks on Victoria’s arms and 
legs suggested that she had been tied bound. Victoria was unable to straighten her 
legs. She had ulcerations on both buttocks and lower legs and her feet were red 
and swollen. The child was very malnourished. She had low blood protein and it 
was thought she may have been starved. Dr Alsford also told Ms Hayes that Victoria 
may have AIDS and that she was of the opinion that the child had been neglected.
6.517   At St Mary’s Hospital, Ms Hayes spoke to Dr Ivan Dillon who told her that Victoria 
was in a critical condition and there was a possibility that she would not survive. 
The hospital was unsure of the reasons for Victoria’s condition and they were 
planning to do a number of tests, including looking at the possibility of HIV/AIDS. 
Ms Hayes was told that Kouao was at the hospital and social services should ring 
back in the afternoon and speak to Dr Joseph Britto, the consultant on duty, who 
might have more information.
6.518   According to Ms Hayes, she then handed over the notes she had made of 
her telephone calls to Mr Almeida, who subsequently spoke about the case 
to Ms Mairs. In the meantime, Ms Hayes had given a copy of the referral to 
Ms Arthurworrey whose case she realised it was.
Immediate reaction to the referral
6.519   Ms Arthurworrey said she went to look for the file and found it in the 
administration ‘closed file’ basket. She said she flicked through it at the time 
and noticed that both the last contact sheet and closing summary were on the 
file. A decision was made to hold a strategy meeting on 28 February 2000 to 
be chaired by Ms Mairs. Ms Mairs also listed a number of action points on the 
contact sheet which, given Victoria’s critical condition, appear remarkably routine 
and demonstrate yet again that she could not have read the details contained in 
Dr Pahari’s initial referral or any other case file material. She wrote: 
“– strategy meeting 28 February;
– request medical report;
– check school if any concerns;
– check GP if any concerns;
– explain child protection procedures to parent;
– detail risk assessment;
– Invite legal, PCPT, SW;
– Up date Dave Duncan;
– Up date me.”
6.520   In the event, the strategy meeting held on 28 February 2000 was anything but 
routine. Ms Arthurworrey said she heard the news from Ms Kozinos and Ms Mairs 
that Victoria had died at about 3.45pm on 25 February. The focus of the strategy The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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meeting was now no longer a routine child protection case but the death of a child 
in unexplained circumstances where deliberate harm was strongly suspected.
After Victoria’s death
6.521   In the meantime, Ms Green had received a telephone call on 25 February 2000 
from Dr Rossiter at the North Middlesex Hospital. Dr Rossiter was critical of social 
services’ involvement in Victoria’s case so far and she wondered what they had been 
doing. She also wanted to alert Ms Green’s team to Victoria’s second admission 
to the hospital and her impending transfer to St Mary’s Hospital. Ms Green ran 
an index check on Victoria and having established that Ms Arthurworrey was the 
allocated social worker she said she contacted her. She also tried unsuccessfully to 
contact three line managers, none of whom were in work.
6.522   Ms Green was given the name of an assistant director, outside of the children and 
families’ department, who had been named to cover for the absence of the other 
three. Between them, based on what Ms Arthurworrey and Dr Rossiter had said 
and the information on the client index system, they agreed that no other children 
were at risk. On that basis they were content for the strategy meeting to go ahead 
as planned for the Monday morning.
6.523   Mr Duncan, the commissioning manager for children’s services for both district 
offices, was first alerted to Victoria’s death on the Friday afternoon. He was away 
on leave when Ms Kozinos rang to update him. He was telephoned again in 
the evening of Sunday 27 February by the out-of-office-hours team to say that 
Victoria’s carers had been arrested and the police wanted to see the social services 
file. Mr Duncan then sought to contact three people. He left a message for 
Ms Wilson, assistant director for children’s services, on her answer-phone asking 
her to contact him. He spoke briefly to Ms Graham, commissioning manager 
child protection, quality and review, to seek advice regarding disclosure of the file 
and to inform her of Victoria’s death. He also spoke to Gerald Lloyd, the principal 
solicitor dealing with social services matters in Haringey.
6.524   On the following morning, Monday 28 February 2000, according to Mr Duncan, 
Ms Wilson asked for Victoria’s file so that it could be reviewed by senior managers. 
Ms Wilson recalled telling someone to secure the file and bring it to her office but 
could not remember whether this was over the telephone to Ms Graham or Ms Green. 
6.525   Ms Mairs told the Inquiry that she was instructed by Mr Duncan during a meeting 
in his room to photocopy Victoria’s file and he confirmed in his statement that a 
copy of the file was retained in the district office.
Removal of documents from Victoria’s file
6.526   Exactly what happened during this photocopying session is the subject of several 
and diverse accounts. According to Ms Arthurworrey, she followed Ms Mairs to the 
photocopy room and saw her pass the file to an administrative assistant to copy. 
As Ms Mairs did so, she tore out the last contact sheet saying, “Let us get rid of 
this” and Ms Arthurworrey believed she screwed it up but cannot be sure. She was 
unable to recall who the administrative assistant was but said she would not have 
seen Ms Mairs’s actions as she was doing the photocopying and had her back to 
Ms Mairs. Neither the last contact sheet nor the closing summary appear on the file.
6.527   When asked why she did not protest immediately to Ms Mairs, Ms Arthurworrey 
said, “Angella Mairs was the headmistress. I was a child who was seen but 
could not be heard, and I had seen what happened to those who challenged 
Angella Mairs.”6  Haringey Social Services
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6.528   It might seem extraordinary that Ms Arthurworrey failed to report what she had 
seen, if true, to anyone in authority. She told the Inquiry that she did not know to 
whom she could go with this information and feel safe. She had never met either 
Ms Wilson, the assistant director who had asked for the file, nor Ms Richardson, 
the director of housing and social services, and she did not think of letting either 
of them know in writing. Nor did she contact Ms Duncan, the commissioning 
manager for the NTDO and Ms Mairs’s immediate line manager. She said:
“I did not feel comfortable in discussing this with Dave Duncan. Primarily 
because I knew I was still in Angella’s team and she had made no 
attempt to hide the fact that she had removed the last contact sheet, 
she just did that.” 
6.529   Ms Arthurworrey said her reasons for not making this allegation when interviewed 
for the Part 8 review was that she found the interview “very oppressive, the line of 
questioning was accusatory and it was blaming”.
6.530   Instead, Ms Arthurworrey chose to tell her friend and colleague Ms Robertson of 
the incident the day it happened and Ms Robertson confirmed this in evidence. 
Ms Arthurworrey also spoke about it to another colleague a couple of days 
later. Ms Robertson told the Inquiry that her conversation with Ms Arthurworrey 
was brief – both were shortly due to attend the strategy meeting – but that 
Ms Arthurworrey was visibly upset and did not feel she could trust anybody:
“Angella was quite powerful and she was quite assertive in her 
personality so I understand why Lisa felt it might not have been acted 
upon if it was reported. I can understand her reason.”
6.531   In fact, Ms Arthurworrey thought that it was not until December 2000, when she 
responded in writing to Haringey in connection with the draft Part 8 review report, 
that she finally made the allegation known to the senior management.
6.532   Ms Green recalled that she was asked by Ms Graham to travel to the NTDO on the 
Monday morning to retrieve the file. She set off at about 10am. Asked why this 
did not happen immediately after Victoria’s death the previous Friday, she told the 
Inquiry that none of her line managers was available to give the instruction and the 
senior manager she had spoken to earlier in the afternoon did not suggest that it 
was something she should do. 
6.533   When Ms Green arrived at the NTDO about half an hour later, Ms Mairs was 
expecting her and had already begun photocopying the file. Ms Green was not 
surprised by this, she said, because it was normal practice for the district office to 
have kept a working copy of the file. She accepted though that on this occasion 
where there were no other children of the family at risk the practice was entirely 
devoid of purpose.
6.534   Ms Green reckoned that Ms Mairs and the administrator were halfway through the 
photocopying by the time she arrived. As the photocopying room was small she 
went to wait in the DIAT office where she said she found Ms Arthurworrey. She 
waited a further half an hour before returning to the photocopy room. The task 
was still not finished and pages of the file were being removed to be photocopied. 
According to Ms Green, when she asked to have the file Ms Mairs was dismissive. 
She told her she would get it when it was ready.
6.535   Ms Green did not attempt to seize the file. It needed to be recompiled and she 
assumed that Ms Mairs had been instructed to copy the file by Mr Duncan, though 
she never checked this out. Instead, she sought advice by telephone from her line The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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manager, Ms Graham. According to Ms Green, Ms Graham was “incensed” and 
told Ms Green: “I am not having it, and I will be contacting managers and you will 
be given the file pronto.” 
6.536   Ms Green waited another 20 minutes before the file was handed over – the whole 
photocopying task having taken, by her reckoning, one hour and 20 minutes. 
During this time, Ms Green said Ms Arthurworrey was working in the DIAT office. 
She said, “I was not there all of the time because I made a phone call from the 
next floor up to my manager. But she was in there a lot of the time.”
6.537   While Ms Green could not account for what Ms Arthurworrey may have observed 
prior to her arrival, she was clear, and Ms Arthurworrey confirmed, that nothing 
was said to her about Ms Mairs removing pages from the file. If the incident had 
happened she would have expected Ms Arthurworrey to report the facts to her and 
the opportunity was certainly there for her to do so. Ms Green signed out the file 
and took it back to Ms Wilson’s office at about noon.
6.538  Ms  Mairs’s version of events that morning differed on a number of counts. She 
recalled that both Ms Green and Ms Arthurworrey were present while she was 
photocopying the file, although she acknowledged that Ms Green may have 
popped out at some time, but not for any lengthy period in her opinion. There 
may have been an administrative assistant there, too, but she could not remember. 
She thought that Ms Arthurworrey had been taking out sections of the file to 
photocopy and then replacing them in the file once they had been photocopied. 
The whole process, according to her, lasted no more than 45 minutes.
6.539   Ms Mairs denied categorically removing the contact sheet from the file. She told 
the Inquiry: “I did not do that. I have no reason to do that. It does not serve me 
any purpose and I would not do that.”
6.540   When asked whether the missing papers would have provided documentary 
evidence that she had instructed there to be no further action in Victoria’s case, 
Ms Mairs said, “I never denied the fact that I closed the case on 25th and that 
I said I did it.” 
6.541   While the issue of whether or not Ms Mairs removed the closing summary and last 
contact sheet from Victoria’s case file cannot in any way have impeded Haringey’s 
handling of her case, the allegation that material evidence was deliberately 
removed is extremely serious and a finding either way must impact on the 
likely truth of either Ms Arthurworrey’s or Ms Mairs’s evidence to the Inquiry on 
other matters.
6.542   In her closing submission, Counsel for Ms Mairs commented that there were 
opportunities for others to remove papers from the file and that it was Ms Mairs’s 
unchallenged evidence that she did not handle the file between the morning 
of Friday 25 February – when Ms Arthurworrey said she last saw the papers in 
question – and the morning of Monday 28 February. Ms Arthurworrey’s allegation, 
however, is not just that the papers were removed from the file but that she saw 
Ms Mairs do so.
6.543   Ms Mairs has also consistently denied that she had any motive for removing the 
closing summary and last contact sheet, and that she had always maintained that 
she closed Victoria’s file on 25 February, though she said the decision to do so had 
been made by Ms Kozinos and Ms Arthurworrey. In fact, this is not the case. In her 
statement to the Inquiry, Ms Mairs said that although the file had been passed to 
her, at the time of Victoria’s death she had not yet closed the file. Mr Monaghan 
in his report similarly observed: “[Ms Mairs] maintains that she had not closed 6  Haringey Social Services
195
the case on 25.2.00. Only the missing documents could verify the status of the 
case on 25.2.00.” 
6.544   Counsel for Ms Mairs also suggested that it was inherently unlikely that Ms Mairs, a 
senior and experienced practitioner, would have behaved in the manner described 
by Ms Arthurworrey and in full view of her junior colleagues, knowing “that an 
action of this sort would be likely to lead to consequences of the most serious kind”.
6.545   It was Counsel’s submission that Ms Arthurworrey’s account must be seriously 
undermined by her failure to report the incident to anyone in authority, either at 
the time or at the Part 8 investigation. In Counsel’s words, “She had no compelling 
reason for not doing so.” It might also be said in support of Ms Mairs that the 
existence on the file of the children and families’ assessment action record, which 
she also signed on 25 February for no further action, removed any motive for 
Ms Mairs to lie about when she closed the case and hence would have rendered 
purposeless the removal of the other documents.
6.546   I am not persuaded by these arguments. That Ms Mairs should have attempted 
to convey in her statement to this Inquiry and in interview to Mr Monaghan, 
that she had not closed Victoria’s case by the time of her death, when in fact 
she had, suggests that she did indeed rashly believe that she could hide the 
truth in February 2000 by removing the closing summary and final contact sheet 
which bore her signature. It is equally plausible that Ms Mairs simply overlooked 
the children and families’ assessment action record when removing the other 
documents and, realising that it was still on the file, felt compelled to admit in oral 
evidence that she had closed Victoria’s case on 25 February, a fact which she had 
previously denied.
6.547   Having seen all the witnesses in connection with this incident, I also attach weight 
to the evidence of Ms Robertson who confirmed that Ms Arthurworrey had told 
her immediately what had happened and that she seemed to be visibly upset by 
the events. That Ms Arthurworrey could and should have immediately reported 
the incident to her senior managers and did not – she had ample opportunity 
to mention the incident to Ms Green – was clearly a serious mistake. She had no 
apparent motive for making up this allegation and it is extremely doubtful that 
there would have been any reprisals for taking such action. However, both her and 
Ms Robertson’s observations about Ms Mairs’s assertive and powerful personality 
would go some way to explaining Ms Arthurworrey’s reluctance in this matter, and 
it could also account for Ms Mairs’s belief she could get rid of material evidence 
without any attempt to hide her actions and without fear of the consequences.
6.548   Further weight must also be attached to Ms Arthurworrey’s version of events, 
in so far as she and Ms Green corroborate each other as to who was involved 
in the photocopying, though neither can recall with certainty any details 
about the administrative assistant who was present. It also seems clear from 
Ms Green’s version that both she and Ms Arthurworrey spent some time in the 
DIAT office while waiting for Ms Mairs to complete the photocopying and were 
not, as suggested by Ms Mairs, all standing together for most of the time in the 
photocopying room.
6.549   Therefore, I am forced to the conclusion that Ms Mairs was responsible for the 
removal of the closing summary and last contact sheet from Victoria’s case file. 
In the absence of any corroborating testimony, this finding must inevitably cast 
some doubt on her evidence to the Inquiry on other matters that relate directly to 
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Analysis of practice 
6.550   It is worthwhile at this point to step back from the chronology of events in 
Haringey to analyse in more detail what that chronology shows to have been the 
particular deficiencies in the practice of Haringey Social Services in the period with 
which I am concerned. The value of such an analysis lies in identifying the steps 
necessary to avoid the same problems arising elsewhere. 
6.551   Quite apart from the vast amount of documentation that was provided on the 
subject, I heard over 20 days of oral evidence concerning the manner in which 
Haringey discharged its responsibility to safeguard and promote Victoria’s welfare. 
Before commencing a detailed analysis of particular deficiencies in the service 
offered to Victoria by Haringey Social Services, it is useful to highlight four simple 
facts which do much to explain how it came to be that Victoria’s plight was so 
disastrously overlooked for so long.
1   During the 211 days that Victoria’s case was held by an allocated social worker 
employed by Haringey Social Services, she was seen by that social worker on only 
four separate occasions.
2   On none of those occasions did the social worker spend any more than 
30 minutes with Victoria.
3   On none of those occasions did the conversation between the social worker and 
Victoria extend much further than “hello, how are you?”
4   The amount of time that the social worker spent discussing Victoria’s case with 
those who were responsible for supervising her work amounted to no more than 
30 minutes in total.
6.552  One’s instinctive reaction on hearing the details of a case such as Victoria’s, where 
the most extreme ill-treatment has gone undetected over a substantial period of 
time, is one of disbelief that nobody would seem to have noticed. The incredulity is 
increased in those cases in which there has been extensive involvement on the part 
of professionals whose job it is to protect vulnerable children. 
6.553  Victoria’s case, for the vast majority of the time that she was known to Haringey, 
was allocated to a qualified social worker based in an office containing a number 
of experienced managers. In view of this, it seems inconceivable that so little was 
done to help her. However, if one bears in mind the four facts listed above, it 
becomes a little easier to see how important information could have been missed 
or ignored.
6.554   However, what these facts do not do is explain why the attention that Victoria’s 
case did receive from the staff of Haringey Social Services was so limited and 
ineffectual. The answer to that question involves looking more closely at a number 
of specific elements of the practice of the staff concerned. That is the purpose of 
the section which follows.
6.555   Before turning to consider those particular areas of practice, I wish to make 
two points.
6.556   The first is that some of what follows may be thought by some to be self-evident or 
to amount to little more than a call for social workers to do the job they have been 
trained to do and are paid to carry out. I have some sympathy with this sentiment, 
as I was often struck during the course of the evidence to this Inquiry by the basic 
nature of the failures illustrated by Victoria’s case. 6  Haringey Social Services
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6.557   I make no apology for labouring these basic points during the analysis that follows. 
Victoria’s case, like several others which have prompted Inquiries of this nature, 
is one that is characterised by a consistent failure to do basic things properly. 
In an environment in which time and resources may well be limited, it is of vital 
importance that sight is not lost of the fundamental aspects of sound social 
work practice. 
6.558   The second point I wish to make at the beginning is that by focusing on specific 
elements of the practice of those who had direct dealings with Victoria’s case, 
I would not wish to give the impression that I regard those front-line workers as 
wholly responsible for the deficiencies revealed. 
6.559   It is plainly the case that when any member of staff in any organisation fails 
adequately to carry out a basic element of his or her job, then he or she must 
shoulder responsibility for that failure. However, where the poor practice concerned 
is found to be indicative of generally poor standards across the organisation as 
a whole, or where it is contributed to by the front-line staff being inadequately 
supported in their roles, then the senior members of that organisation must also 
accept their share of the blame.
6.560   The evidence I have heard leads me to the view that the manner in which a 
number of senior managers and elected councillors within Haringey discharged 
their statutory responsibilities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children 
living in the borough was an important contributory factor in the mishandling of 
Victoria’s case. As such, the failure to adequately protect Victoria should be seen 
as a collective failure on the part of those involved with the provision of services 
to children and families in Haringey to ensure that adequate systems and practices 
were in place at the time, both to ensure that front-line staff carried out their 
duties adequately and to detect when they did not.
6.561   Given my views in this regard, I was left unimpressed by the manner in which 
a number of senior officers and councillors from Haringey sought to distance 
themselves from the poor practice apparent in Victoria’s case. A good illustration 
of this attitude was provided by the former chief executive of the council, Gurbux 
Singh, who said:
“I have personally thought long and hard about what I could have done 
differently, which could have actually led to a situation where the tragedy 
of Victoria could not have actually happened. I have thought long and 
hard about that. I have thought about the sorts of procedures we could 
have put in place beyond that. But I end up thinking I am not sure that 
there was a great deal else more that we could have actually done.”
6.562   Mr Singh went on to say that, despite it being absolutely clear that Haringey 
had failed adequately to discharge its duty to safeguard and promote Victoria’s 
welfare, he was not clear in his own mind where the “line of responsibility” for 
that failure lay.
6.563   As I have already made clear, I do not share his uncertainty. As an organisation 
charged with the vital task of safeguarding children, Haringey council had a 
responsibility to ensure that its front-line staff were providing a proper and safe 
service to vulnerable children in the borough. As chief officer of the organisation, 
Mr Singh and his senior colleagues had a duty to ensure that such a service 
was provided.
6.564   A succession of senior managers and councillors from Haringey gave evidence 
before me and expressed their complete surprise at the state of the council’s The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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front-line services as revealed by the evidence given to this Inquiry by social 
workers and their immediate managers. It is the job of the leaders of any 
organisation to be aware of conditions on the ‘shop floor’ and the standard of 
service provided to its customers. It is their job to identify deficiencies in that 
service and put them right. Ignorance cannot, in my view, be a legitimate defence. 
Therefore, I make it clear at the outset that the criticisms of practice, below, are 
directed not just at the front-line staff concerned but at the senior managers and 
councillors whose role it was to ensure that Victoria, together with other vulnerable 
children in the borough, received an adequate service.
6.565   I have set out previously in this section a detailed description of the manner in 
which Victoria’s case was handled by Haringey Social Services during the seven 
months or so that she was known to them. The occasions on which those involved 
failed to act in an appropriate and timely manner were numerous and varied. 
However, there are a number of particular aspects of Haringey Social Services’ 
practice, as illustrated by Victoria’s case, which merit more detailed analysis. 
They are:
• The manner in which the strategy meetings were conducted.
• The way in which the case was allocated to the social worker.
• The decision to authorise Victoria’s discharge from hospital.
• The manner in which the home visits were carried out.
• The approach taken to Kouao’s credibility.
• The use that was made of Victoria’s case file.
• The supervision received by the social worker.
• The manner in which the case was closed.
• The way in which the allegations of sexual harm were dealt with.
I deal with each in turn. 
Strategy meetings
6.566   The 1999 version of Working Together provides the following guidance as to the 
circumstances in which it is appropriate to hold a strategy meeting: “Whenever 
there is reasonable cause to suspect that a child is suffering, or is likely to suffer 
significant harm, there should be a strategy discussion involving the social services 
department and the police, and other agencies as appropriate (for example, 
education and health), in particular any referring agency.” As to the format that 
such discussions should take, the guidance avoids being prescriptive, stating 
simply, “A strategy discussion may take place at a meeting or by other means 
(for example, by telephone).” 
6.567   The guidance clearly allows for a degree of flexibility as to the precise form that 
strategy discussions should take. In my view, such flexibility is entirely appropriate 
because the circumstances in which harm to a child may come to light may be 
many and varied. In some cases, formal meetings involving all the involved parties 
may be inappropriate in view of the urgency of the situation.
6.568   An inevitable consequence of the flexibility permitted by the national guidance, 
however, is that local arrangements and protocols can differ widely. All four sets of 
strategy meeting guidelines submitted by the social services departments involved 
in Victoria’s case were materially different from each other. In the case of Haringey, 
I was told that there was even inconsistency between the local ACPC procedures, 
in this respect, and the custom and practice adopted by front-line staff.
6.569   In my view, Victoria’s case demonstrates that the need for flexibility in this area 
must be balanced against the danger of confusion arising between the partner 
agencies involved as to the proper manner in which to proceed when first faced 6  Haringey Social Services
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with a case of possible deliberate harm. In other words, while circumstances will 
inevitably dictate the precise procedure to be adopted in any given case, minimum 
and consistent standards, clearly understood by all the agencies involved, are vital.
6.570   Turning first to the strategy meeting held on 28 July 1999, shortly after Victoria’s 
admission to the North Middlesex Hospital, there are a number of respects 
in which the perfectly proper decision to have a discussion at this point was 
undermined by defects in the procedure adopted. The following are clear examples 
of this:
• The meeting should have been held in the North Middlesex Hospital, as required 
by the local ACPC procedures. The referral, it will be recalled, had come from 
the hospital in the first place and, in the four days that Victoria had spent there, 
a significant amount of relevant information had been collected. It should have 
been obvious to all concerned that Dr Rossiter’s attendance at the meeting was 
absolutely essential. Her commitments at the hospital meant that she did not 
have the time to travel to Haringey Social Services offices. 
• The meeting was chaired by a senior practitioner, Ms Kozinos, rather than by a 
team manager. This, again, was contrary to local ACPC procedures. While the 
competency of the chairmanship is, of course, more important than the identity 
of the chairman, in my view it is preferable to adopt a clear and consistent 
approach in this regard. The effective chairing of a strategy meeting can be 
a challenging task. It is best performed by a manager who is experienced in 
the work and aware of the responsibilities it carries. Meetings of this nature 
are a valuable resource which use up a substantial amount of the limited time 
available to busy professionals. The ad hoc allocation of the chairmanship to 
whichever manager happens to be free at the time can seriously undermine 
their effectiveness.
• The danger of inexperienced or inefficient chairmanship is well illustrated by 
Victoria’s case. The 18 action points identified during the course of the meeting 
were, for the most part, sound. However, the lack of clarity as to precisely who 
was responsible for what, the absence of any timescales for the completion of the 
various actions identified, and the failure to circulate copies of the minutes of the 
meeting to those with responsibility for taking the strategy forward meant that the 
practical impact of those 18 action points was seriously diminished. Again, this is a 
defect which adherence to a basic set of procedures could easily have avoided.
• However, of all the deficiencies in the conduct of the strategy meeting, it is the 
failure to arrange for a review meeting to monitor the progress of the agreed 
strategy which causes me the greatest concern. The ACPC procedures make 
reference to the need to “consider” holding such a meeting following a strategy 
discussion, but no reference at all is made to the practice in the procedures 
drawn up by Ms Mairs for use in the NTDO. In my view, such meetings are 
absolutely essential. If one takes Victoria’s case as an example, 18 different 
actions were identified as being necessary and were assigned to a variety of 
people from a number of different agencies without any specified timescales. 
To simply assume that all the tasks would be satisfactorily completed, and that 
it was therefore unnecessary to check, was optimistic to say the least.
6.571   That the deficiencies in the manner in which this first strategy meeting was 
conducted was not an isolated example of poor practice would seem to be 
confirmed by the fact that many of the same faults are apparent in the second 
strategy meeting conducted a little over three months later.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.572   In particular, a list of 15 generally sensible action points was produced, which, if 
carried out, may have gone a long to way to establishing the danger that Victoria 
was in. None of those action points is allocated to a particular individual and none 
of them has a specified timescale for completion. In view of this, the repeated 
failure to put in place any form of review mechanism is nothing short of disastrous 
in the context of Victoria’s case. 
6.573   The fact that the two strategy meetings in which her case was discussed were 
so ineffective in safeguarding Victoria’s welfare is not explained by any lack of 
specialist judgement or expertise on the part of the professionals involved. As 
I have made clear above, the lists of recommended action points produced after 
each one were detailed, thorough and generally sound. The explanation lies, in my 
view, in the basic failure to implement simple procedures that would have ensured 
that the strategies agreed upon at the meetings were put into effect. 
6.574   The flexibility afforded by the Working Together guidelines would appear to have 
led, in the case of Haringey at least, to strategy discussions being organised and 
conducted in a haphazard and ad hoc manner, with the inevitable result that 
important points were missed. 
6.575  Victoria’s case leads me to the view that while professionals must be allowed the 
freedom to tailor their response to individual situations as they see fit, and that it 
is impossible to lay down a detailed and prescriptive procedure for the conduct 
of strategy meetings, the time has come for the introduction of a few basic 
minimum standards. By making the recommendation, I aim to ensure that full 
value is extracted from strategy meetings and discussions, and that the crucial role 
they play in the protection of children is not undermined for want of a few basic 
procedures. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation 
Directors of social services must ensure that all strategy meetings and discussions 
involve the following three basic steps:
• A list of action points must be drawn up, each with an agreed timescale and 
the identity of the person responsible for carrying it out.
• A clear record of the discussion or meeting must be circulated to all those 
present and all those with responsibility for an action point.
• A mechanism for reviewing completion of the agreed actions must be specified. 
The date upon which the first such review is to take place is to be agreed 
and documented. 
Case allocation
6.576   The proper and well-thought-out allocation of cases is a central component of 
the effective management of a social work team. As with any group of staff, there 
will be significant variations among a given group of social workers as to their 
respective levels of experience, training and expertise. Perhaps most important 
of all, some will have more available time than others by virtue of their current 
workloads. All of these factors are relevant to the decision of which social worker 
should be allocated a particular case.
6.577   It is clear that effective management of this nature involves a detailed knowledge 
on the part of the manager – both of the social workers on his or her team and 
the precise state of their current workloads. As was explained to me during the 
course of the evidence, the latter requirement cannot be met effectively by simply 6  Haringey Social Services
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maintaining a list of the number of open cases currently held by each social worker 
on the team. Bare statistics of this sort can mask the fact that some cases require 
far more time and attention than others, and that a particular case, counted as one 
for the purposes of such statistics, may involve more than one child in the family.
6.578   It would appear that Victoria’s case was allocated to Ms Arthurworrey by 
Ms Baptiste without any consideration of the sort of factors I have previously 
described. In the first place, there would seem to have been no assessment 
of whether Ms Arthurworrey had the requisite capabilities to handle the case. 
Ms Arthurworrey told me that at the time she found Victoria’s case file lying on 
her desk, she had never completed a section 47 inquiry, never dealt with a child in 
hospital and never taken a case through to case conference. For present purposes, 
what concerns me is not whether Ms Arthurworrey was capable of handling 
Victoria’s case in a competent manner, but that no assessment of her capabilities 
would seem to have been made by her manager before allocating the case to her.
6.579   Nor would there seem to have been any consideration as to whether 
Ms Arthurworrey’s workload at the time allowed her to devote enough time to 
Victoria’s case. The only system for the monitoring of the workload of individual 
social workers in operation in Ms Baptiste’s team at the time was a crude list 
of the number of open cases held by each social worker, the more obvious 
limitations of which I have just described. Even on the basis of this unreliable 
information, Ms Arthurworrey, at the time that she was allocated Victoria’s case, 
was holding more cases than virtually all of her colleagues and seven more than 
the recommended maximum specified in the office procedures. Again, the issue 
for present purposes is not whether Ms Arthurworrey had sufficient time to deal 
adequately with Victoria’s case, but rather that no thought would seem to have 
been given as to whether or not she did.
6.580   Ensuring that a member of staff has the time and ability to undertake a particular 
task before asking them to do so amounts to no more than basic managerial 
competence. Therefore, I was greatly surprised to learn not only that this was 
not done in Victoria’s case, but that there was no system in place in the office 
concerned that suggested it might have been done in respect of other cases. 
Ms Arthurworrey’s experience of returning to the office one morning and finding 
a new case file sitting on her desk was not, I was concerned to hear, unique. 
6.581   With a view to ensuring that such basic lapses in managerial practice are not 
repeated elsewhere, I make the following recommendation: 
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that no case is allocated to a social 
worker unless and until his or her manager ensures that he or she has the 
necessary training, experience and time to deal with it properly.
6.582   However, proper case allocation does not end with the simple identification of the 
right social worker for the job. It requires the manager to ensure that the social 
worker understands the work that he or she has been charged with doing. In 
practical terms, this would involve the manager and the social worker sitting down 
together with the case file and agreeing on the most appropriate manner in which 
to take the case forward.
6.583   Nothing of this sort was done in Victoria’s case. The only explanation or guidance 
as to how to proceed with the case given to Ms Arthurworrey by Ms Baptiste 
would appear to have come in the form of a brief conversation between the two The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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of them after Ms Arthurworrey had glanced through the file. When asked whether 
she found Ms Baptiste’s input on this occasion to be helpful, Ms Arthurworrey 
replied, “Ms Baptiste just told me that this was a case about a child who was in 
hospital with scabies. No it was not helpful.” Ms Baptiste, she went on to say, did 
no more than tell her “to implement the strategy meeting recommendations”. 
No indication was given as to when she expected Ms Arthurworrey to have 
completed those tasks. 
6.584   Apart from the factual inaccuracy concerning the reason why Victoria had been 
admitted to the North Middlesex Hospital (which may have influenced the way in 
which Ms Arthurworrey approached the case afterwards), there would appear to be 
a complete absence of any thought on the part of Ms Baptiste as to how best to 
approach Victoria’s case. Consequently, she was unable to offer Ms Arthurworrey 
anything in the way of meaningful guidance or assistance in taking the case forward.
6.585   Nor would it seem as though manager and social worker read through Victoria’s 
case file at the time of allocation. In addition to gaining a proper understanding 
of what needs to be done, and by when, this basic step can help to ensure that 
vital information is not missed at the outset of any investigation of the child’s 
circumstances. An example of such information in Victoria’s case is provided by 
the note on the CP1 form completed by Dr Forlee, which records that Kouao had 
previously been in contact with social services, who had apparently suggested that 
she and Victoria be separated. This potentially vital piece of information was never 
picked up Ms Arthurworrey, despite the inclusion of the document concerned in 
Victoria’s case file. 
6.586   I appreciate that in many social services departments up and down the country, 
the allocation of cases to social workers will routinely follow careful consideration 
as to who is best placed to handle the case and a thorough discussion between 
social worker and manager as to what needs to be done and by when. Prior to 
hearing the evidence to this Inquiry, I would have expected such procedures to 
be universal. In an effort to ensure that they become so, I make the following 
recommendation: 
Recommendation
When allocating a case to a social worker, the manager must ensure that the 
social worker is clear as to what has been allocated, what action is required and 
how that action will be reviewed and supervised.
6.587   The fact that Victoria had an allocated social worker for the vast majority of the 
time that she was known to Haringey Social Services meant that she was, in theory 
at least, better served that many other vulnerable children in the borough.
6.588   During the course of the evidence to this Inquiry there were many references to the 
problem of open cases which did not have an allocated social worker. By way of 
an example, my attention was drawn to a report written by Mr Duncan in January 
2001 in which he made the worrying observation that there were 100 unallocated 
cases in the NTDO alone.
6.589   The disadvantages inherent in a case being unallocated are obvious. If there is no 
particular individual charged with, and responsible for, ensuring that the needs 
of the child concerned are met, the likelihood of that child failing to receive 
the service he or she needs is increased enormously. While not of direct impact 
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convince me that the problem of unallocated cases is one that needs urgent 
attention. I therefore make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that all cases of children assessed as 
needing a service have an allocated social worker. In cases where this proves to 
be impossible, arrangements must be made to maintain contact with the child. 
The number, nature and reasons for such unallocated cases must be reported to 
the social services committee on a monthly basis.
6.590   However, the mere fact of allocation of a case is not enough to ensure that the 
child concerned receives the necessary services. The achievement of that objective 
requires the social worker concerned regularly to see, speak to and work with 
the child and the child’s family. Unless this happens, the fact that the case is 
recorded as ‘allocated’ is meaningless. Therefore, in order to ensure that the above 
recommendation has the positive impact intended, I make the following additional 
recommendation: 
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that only those cases in which a social 
worker is actively engaged in work with a child and the child’s family are 
deemed to be ‘allocated’. 
Discharge from hospital
6.591   The precise sequence of events surrounding Victoria’s discharge from the North 
Middlesex Hospital remains unclear. However, there is no doubt that her discharge 
was approved by both Ms Arthurworrey and PC Jones following the brief interview 
of Victoria they conducted on 6 August 1999. 
6.592   In my judgement, the decision that it was appropriate for Victoria to go home was 
taken without any proper consideration of whether it was safe for her to do so. 
Victoria’s discharge from the North Middlesex Hospital is a key event in the story 
of her case. On the morning of 6 August, she was in a safe place and all her basic 
needs were being met. By that evening she had been returned to an environment 
that would eventually bring about her death a little over six months later.
6.593   Given the importance of the decision, the lack of investigation and analysis 
that preceded it is extremely disappointing. In my view, there were at least 10 
important steps that were not taken when considering whether Victoria should 
have been allowed home. These are:
• No adequate understanding was gained during the course of the interview with 
Victoria on 6 August of how she spent her days when she was living with Kouao 
and Manning.
• No attempt was made to seek the views of any of the medical staff who had 
been involved in Victoria’s care, other than Dr Rossiter and Nurse Quinn.
• Victoria’s notes were not carefully considered, and the concerns expressed in 
them were not explored.
• No attempt was made to seek the views of Dr Forlee, the doctor who had made 
the initial referral.
• No critical analysis was applied to Kouao’s account of how Victoria had come by 
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• No visit was made to the home to which it was proposed to return Victoria.
• No effort was made to gain a proper understanding of the nature and causes of 
scabies and its links to possible neglect.
• No structured discussion about the case took place between Ms Arthurworrey 
and her manager, during which the merits of the decision to discharge were 
properly considered.
• No active consideration was given to convening a case conference, or any 
other form of multi-agency meeting, in order to explore whether discharge to 
Manning’s flat was in Victoria’s best interests.
• No efforts were made to put any community support programme in place 
for Victoria. For example, the possibility of enrolling her in a summer play 
scheme was not explored, nor were any attempts made to secure community 
nursing surveillance.
6.594   In my view, all of the 10 steps should have been taken before deciding that 
Victoria could return home with Kouao. They are examples of the sort of rigorous 
consideration that must be undertaken before authorising the removal of a child 
about whom there have been child protection concerns from a safe place back 
to the environment in which the concerns first arose. In an effort to encourage 
the application of careful analysis to decisions of this nature, I make the following 
recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that no child known to social services 
who is an inpatient in a hospital and about whom there are child protection 
concerns is allowed to be taken home until it has been established by social 
services that the home environment is safe, the concerns of the medical staff 
have been fully addressed, and there is a social work plan in place for the 
ongoing promotion and safeguarding of that child’s welfare.
Home visits
6.595   Ms Arthurworrey candidly admitted that she was “totally set up” by Kouao and 
Manning during the two visits she made to Somerset Gardens. The picture of a 
happy and well-cared for Victoria playing contentedly on the floor with a doll was 
far removed from the reality of the situation, even at this early stage. 
6.596   Although Ms Arthurworrey was by no means the only professional that Kouao 
deceived into thinking that she had Victoria’s best interests at heart, she was the 
only one who had the opportunity to assess them in their home environment. 
Home visits of this nature can be extremely valuable sources of information in 
determining how well a child is cared for. That Ms Arthurworrey came away from 
both the visits she made to Somerset Gardens without any concern that Victoria 
might be in danger owes as much to defects in the approach taken to those visits 
as to any deceit on the part of Kouao or Manning.
6.597   In particular, I consider that the following essential components of a successful 
home visit were missing on both of the occasions that Ms Arthurworrey went to 
Victoria’s home:
• The proper planning of the visit in advance.
• The maintenance by the social worker of an open mind.
• The review of judgements and assumptions made during the course of the visit.
I consider each in turn.6  Haringey Social Services
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Proper planning
6.598   There would appear to have been a complete absence of any planning or 
discussion between Ms Arthurworrey and Ms Baptiste in advance of either of the 
home visits. There was no consideration of the types of questions that should be 
asked, the background checks that were necessary before undertaking the visit, 
the things to look out for in the home, or the manner in which Victoria should be 
approached and spoken to. All of these, in my view, are matters that should be 
considered in advance of any home visit of this type. 
6.599   The absence of any planning or preparation in advance of the visits also meant that 
the opportunity was lost to review and, if necessary, challenge the assumptions 
that Ms Arthurworrey had made about the case. Before the first visit, it will be 
recalled that she had effectively closed the child protection element of the case. 
The decision taken with PC Jones at the hospital on 6 August 1999 that Victoria 
was not a child at risk of significant harm had been reinforced by her interpretation 
of the material she later received from the Central Middlesex Hospital. Had there 
been any discussion of the case between Ms Arthurworrey and her manager before 
the home visit, the deficiencies in her analysis of the case at this point may have 
been exposed. As it was, she simply turned up at the home with a wholly mistaken 
view of the sort of case with which she was dealing.
6.600   The same is true of the later visit at the end of October. As the scope of the 
discussion between Ms Arthurworrey and Kouao illustrates, the prevailing view 
at this stage would seem to have been that the only issue that needed to be 
addressed was Kouao’s accommodation difficulties. The child protection referral 
concerning Victoria that had been received three months earlier had turned into a 
case about an adult with a child who needed better accommodation. Again, had 
there been any proper planning of this home visit involving a discussion between 
Ms Arthurworrey and her manager, the point may have been made that it was, in 
fact, Victoria who was the client in the case. Perhaps then Ms Arthurworrey would 
have taken the trouble to talk either to or about her during the course of the visit.
Keeping an open mind
6.601   Turning now to the visits themselves, it was suggested to Ms Arthurworrey during 
the course of her evidence that she showed a “lack of inquisitiveness” during the 
course of the visits she made in August. Her reply was interesting: “I am a social 
worker and I work with the facts as they are presented to me. As I have said to 
you, I was more trusting of Kouao when I went on that visit. I am not a detective. 
I had no reason to question what I saw and what I was being told at that point.”
6.602   While I accept that social workers are not detectives, I do not consider that they 
should simply serve as the passive recipients of information, unquestioningly 
accepting all that they are told by the carers of children about whom there are 
concerns. The concept of “respectful uncertainty” should lie at the heart of the 
relationship between the social worker and the family. It does not require social 
workers constantly to interrogate their clients, but it does involve the critical 
evaluation of information that they are given. People who abuse their children are 
unlikely to inform social workers of the fact. For this reason at least, social workers 
must keep an open mind.
6.603   Their managers must also keep an open mind. I have already highlighted the 
value of discussion between social worker and manager before a home visit takes 
place so as to test assumptions made about the case thus far. I regard it as equally 
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Reviewing judgements and assumptions
6.604   By the time that she had returned to the NTDO after the home visit on 16 August 
1999, Ms Arthurworrey had formed the view that Kouao was “a respectful adult 
who was child focused”. This view had been reached without her questioning 
Victoria about her well-being, establishing how she spent her days or following up 
any of the concerns expressed by the hospital such as Victoria’s unusually large 
appetite. The second home visit would seem to have served only to reinforce 
Ms Arthurworrey’s view of Kouao, despite the fact that, once again, no attempt 
was made to establish how Victoria spent her days or how she felt about her 
current living arrangements.
6.605   These assumptions were never tested in discussion between Ms Arthurworrey and 
her manager and so, again, the opportunity was lost to discover the lack of analysis 
that had preceded the assumption being made. Even such simple questions as 
“How was Victoria?”, “What did she say?”, or “How does she spend her days?” 
might have revealed Ms Arthurworrey’s failure to focus on the needs of her client. 
In fact, Ms Baptiste would appear to have restricted herself to being the passive 
recipient of information given to her by Ms Arthurworrey in the same way that 
Ms Arthurworrey had been with respect to Kouao.
6.606   The net effect of these deficiencies in practice is that the valuable opportunities 
to gain an insight into Victoria’s situation provided by Ms Arthurworrey’s two 
home visits were completely wasted. That the same deficiencies were apparent in 
each of the two home visits, and that they were not identified until after Victoria’s 
death, would seem to indicate that bad practice of this nature was not unusual 
in Haringey at the time. In an effort to ensure that it is not replicated elsewhere, 
I make the following recommendation: 
Recommendation
Social workers must not undertake home visits without being clear about the 
purpose of the visit, the information to be gathered during the course of it, 
and the steps to be taken if no one is at home. No visits should be undertaken 
without the social worker concerned checking the information known about 
the child by other child protection agencies. All visits must be written up on the 
case file. 
Working with deceitful people
6.607   One aspect of the manner in which Ms Arthurworrey approached the home 
visits crops up on numerous occasions during the course of Haringey’s handling 
of Victoria’s case and merits further consideration. I refer to the extent to which 
Ms Arthurworrey was prepared to accept at face value that which she was told 
by Kouao. 
6.608   As recorded earlier, Ms Arthurworrey encouraged me to bear in mind that she 
was not “a detective” when considering how inquisitive she should have been 
during the course of her home visits. This point was echoed in Haringey’s closing 
submissions to the Inquiry, in which I was told that social workers “are not used to 
dealing with wholesale deception” of the type perpetrated by Kouao in this case.
6.609   While I accept that both of these points have some validity, I was struck by the 
extent to which the information held by Haringey Social Services during the course 
of their dealings with Victoria revealed clear inconsistencies in Kouao’s story, of 
which the following are some examples:6  Haringey Social Services
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• The case file records Kouao’s date of birth as being “18/07/66”, whereas the age 
of her eldest child is recorded on the CP1 form as being 24. This would have 
meant that Kouao had her first child at the age of nine or 10. This discrepancy 
was never explored.
• Kouao’s country of birth varies between Zaire, France and the Ivory Coast 
depending upon which document in the case file one looks at. Similar confusion 
applied to Victoria. On the record of the 5 November 1999 strategy meeting she 
is recorded as being a Zairean Catholic.
• The length of time that Kouao intended to spend in the UK is variously recorded 
as a one-year “leave of absence”, “two years to learn English” and “permanent”.
• Various dates between January and March are identified for Victoria and Kouao’s 
arrival in the country.
• Several references are made to Manning’s “fiancée” but her identity is never 
established.
6.610   Much was made in the evidence of a number of witnesses to the plausibility of 
Kouao and how successful she could be at diverting suspicion. In addition to 
whatever natural talent she may have had in this respect, she would also seem 
to have used the fact that English was not her first language to good effect. 
Ms Arthurworrey recalled at one stage that Kouao’s English would sometimes 
deteriorate when certain difficult subjects arose, a tendency that was repeated 
during the course of her evidence to this Inquiry.
6.611   Nonetheless, it seems to me that a careful review of the available information 
would have indicated that there were numerous discrepancies in the information 
that Kouao was giving to social services, which needed to be resolved if an 
accurate picture of Victoria’s situation was to be established. These discrepancies 
were never properly explored.
6.612   Despite the absence of much in the way of investigation and critical analysis of the 
available information, it would appear that some of those involved in the case had 
their suspicions as to the reliability of Kouao’s version of events. This is illustrated 
by the inclusion of the following in the list of 15 action points drawn up at the 
5 November strategy meeting: “some proof that the child is hers”. 
6.613   This note demonstrates that, over three months after the initial referral had been 
made, there were still doubts as to whether Victoria was Kouao’s real daughter. 
Unfortunately, there is no record of what prompted those suspicions. There are, 
however, plenty of possibilities including the discrepancy in their appearance and 
dress, the lack of warmth shown between them, or the infrequency of Kouao’s 
visits to the hospital and failure to bring anything for Victoria when she did visit. 
Unfortunately, the point is academic in view of the fact that no proof that Victoria 
was Kouao’s daughter was ever sought.
6.614   What the point does illustrate, however, is how significant discrepancies in the 
account given by the carer can be. If, for example, the suspicion expressed at the 
strategy meeting on 5 November had been followed up, the first thing that might 
have been done would have been to look at Kouao’s passport which, as the police 
later discovered, contained the photograph of a little girl who looked different 
to Victoria. Had such a discovery been made, the outcome of this case may have 
been different.
6.615   The same might be said in relation to the discrepancies in Kouao’s account of 
her background in France. Quite apart from the inconsistencies set out above, 
Kouao’s decision to leave a well-paid job in France and come to the UK, where she 
was unable to support herself or find satisfactory accommodation was, on the face 
of it, curious. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.616   At the first strategy meeting on 28 July 1999, the need to carry out checks 
concerning Kouao’s and Victoria’s background in France was identified – action 
point 17 states: “complete checks in France – International services.” Unfortunately, 
the notes of the strategy meeting do not specify what checks were necessary or 
how they should be undertaken. 
6.617   This may explain why, by the time of the second strategy meeting over three 
months later, no such checks had been carried out. Again, the meeting identified 
the need to contact the French authorities and the following note was made: 
“s/w to complete a check with France if client is previously known. Find out more 
information re other children.”
6.618   The investigation carried out by the police after Victoria’s death revealed that a 
substantial amount of important information was held by the French authorities 
concerning Victoria and Kouao. In addition to the discovery that Kouao owed 
French social services a significant amount of money in respect of improperly 
claimed benefits, the fact that Victoria had experienced problems with absenteeism 
at school and had been subject to a child at risk emergency notification was also 
established. A French social worker had also become involved who had noted a 
“difficult mother daughter relationship” between Kouao and Victoria. 
6.619   The fact that Haringey Social Services proved incapable of discovering this 
information while Victoria was alive may be attributable to a lack of awareness on 
the part of the staff concerned as to the proper avenues to explore and procedures 
to adopt. If that is the case then the situation needs to be addressed. Many social 
services departments around the country have to deal on a regular basis with 
children who have arrived in this country from abroad. Even in those cases in which 
the country of origin of the child concerned is without a developed welfare system, 
the child may well have passed through such a country on his or her way to the 
UK. The social services departments of those countries are a potentially valuable 
source of information. Social workers should be provided with clear guidance and 
procedures explaining how best to access such information. It is with this objective 
in mind that I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that social work staff are made aware of 
how to access effectively information concerning vulnerable children which may 
be held in other countries.
Case file management
6.620   During the course of one of his submissions to me, the representative appearing 
before the Inquiry on behalf of the NHS witnesses informed me that telling medical 
professionals that they should write better notes was like “pushing at an open 
door”. In doing so, I expect that he intended to convey something of the wearying 
regularity with which this issue arises in the context of investigations of this nature. 
Numerous inquiries in the past have called for higher standards of case recording 
and the more thorough maintenance of case files by professionals from all agencies 
involved in the welfare of children.
6.621  In  view of the regularity with which deficiencies in this regard have been identified, it 
is disappointing to find them repeated with such regularity throughout Victoria’s case. 
One wonders why, if the problem is so universally acknowledged that to identify it 
amounts to “pushing at an open door”, it has yet to be properly addressed.6  Haringey Social Services
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6.622   I have dealt elsewhere in this Report with the importance of recording all relevant 
information concerning a child in his or her case file or notes and have made a 
general recommendation to this effect directed at all the agencies involved. I do 
not propose to repeat those matters here, particularly in view of the fact that my 
concerns regarding the management of Victoria’s case file in Haringey are of a 
slightly different nature.
6.623   The case file is the single most important tool available to social workers and 
their managers when making decisions as to how best to safeguard the welfare 
of children under their care. It should clearly and accessibly record the available 
information concerning the child and the action that has been taken on the case 
to date. Reference to the case file should be made at every stage of the case and 
before any significant decision is made.
6.624   My concern regarding the Haringey case file is not that it contained glaring 
omissions, but rather that so little use would seem to have been made of it by 
those with responsibility for Victoria’s case. As I have mentioned earlier, the case 
file would not appear to have been read by Ms Baptiste at the time she allocated 
Victoria’s case to Ms Arthurworrey. Nor, it would seem, was any meaningful 
reference made to the file during the course of the supervision sessions in which 
Victoria’s case was briefly discussed. Most remarkable of all, perhaps, is the fact 
that the second strategy meeting proceeded in the complete absence of Victoria’s 
case file, despite the fact that it was sitting in the next room at the time. 
6.625   The lack of reference to the case file at these and other stages in Victoria’s case may 
go some way to explaining why so many important steps were missed. It is not 
difficult to envisage how, for example, the review during the course of supervision 
of the lengthy lists of action points produced after the two strategy meetings would 
have revealed that there was much outstanding work to be done. It is extremely 
frustrating to think how important a difference such a basic and self-evident element 
of good social work practice could have made in Victoria’s case. The information 
contained in Victoria’s case file should have been more than sufficient to prompt 
effective social work intervention in her case. That it was not read at key points is 
indicative of extremely poor practice and a matter much to be regretted.
6.626   It is impossible for me to form any judgement as to how easy it would have been 
for a reader of Victoria’s case file to have gleaned from it the relevant information 
at various stages along the way. The reason for this is that by the time that it 
reached the Inquiry, the case file had been taken apart and copied on several 
occasions and was no longer in its original order.
6.627   However, it may be that a contributory factor in the failure of various professionals 
involved in Victoria’s case to read the file was that the information was not 
presented in a sufficiently convenient and accessible way. If only a limited amount 
of time is available for supervision, for example, the manager concerned may feel it 
is not worth spending it trying to make sense of a jumble of papers in the file.
6.628   This is one of the reasons why I regard the inclusion in any case file of a clear, 
comprehensive and up-to-date chronology as absolutely essential. In addition to 
saving valuable time that would otherwise be spent trying to extract the relevant 
information from a number of documents, such a chronology would also help to 
identify actions ordered on the case which had yet to be completed. The discipline 
of preparing the initial chronology at the outset of the case is also valuable given 
that it would require the allocated social worker carefully to read the file before 
embarking upon the assessment. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.629   If it is to be comprehensive, a chronology will, in many cases, have to take account 
of the information possessed by other agencies involved and the work they carry 
out on the case. As the agency best placed to co-ordinate the collection of the 
relevant information, I regard it as the responsibility of social services to maintain 
the chronology, seeking the input of other agencies as appropriate. In order to 
ensure that social services are clear as to their obligations in this regard, I make the 
following recommendation: 
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that every child’s case file includes, on 
the inside of the front cover, a properly maintained chronology.
Supervision
6.630   There is now a good deal of consensus as to the key features of effective social work 
supervision. In particular, it is widely recognised that such supervision should be 
well documented and should include the discussion of individual cases. In addition, 
supervision provides an opportunity to challenge assumptions and judgements that 
have been made regarding particular cases and to agree plans of action. All of these 
elements are present in the supervision policies and guidance in use in Haringey 
Social Services at the time that they were dealing with Victoria’s case.
6.631   Unfortunately, it is very difficult to see these principles reflected in the supervision 
that was offered to Ms Arthurworrey when she was dealing with Victoria’s case.
6.632   The first formal supervision that Ms Arthurworrey received concerning her work 
on Victoria’s case took place on 20 September 1999, some two months or so after 
the case had first been allocated to her. Although a delay of two months between 
allocation and first supervision in a case of this nature is unsatisfactory, it is the 
nature of the supervision when it was provided that causes me most concern.
6.633   As I have noted previously, Victoria’s case file was not read by Ms Baptiste either 
before, during or after the supervision session. Her failure to do so meant that 
her knowledge of the case was entirely dependent upon what she was told by 
Ms Arthurworrey. The limitations of such a situation are obvious. If the manager 
knows only what she is told by the social worker, it will be virtually impossible for 
her to identify action points that had been missed or to challenge constructively the 
social worker’s understanding. A prime example of the limitations of this approach 
to supervision provided by Victoria’s case is the fact that Ms Baptiste would appear 
to have been unaware during this supervision session that the majority of the action 
points identified at the July strategy meeting had yet to be completed. 
6.634   In addition to the lack of preparation that preceded it, the supervision session itself 
was characterised by a complete lack of thoroughness or analysis. The record of the 
session written by Ms Baptiste on the case file runs to a total of eight handwritten 
lines which, for the first supervision session in a case referred with child protection 
concerns, is wholly inadequate.
6.635   The brevity of the record merely reflects the lack of time spent discussing the case 
which, according to Ms Arthurworrey, did not extend much beyond five minutes. 
Supervision of this length in a case of the complexity and seriousness of Victoria’s 
can amount to no more than the rubber-stamping of the decisions and judgements 
already made by the social worker. Overall, one is left with the clear impression 
that the objective of this first supervision session was simply to get through the 6  Haringey Social Services
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cases as quickly as possible, with the manager acting as the passive recipient of 
whatever information the social worker decided to give her.
6.636   During the seven months or so that she had responsibility for Victoria’s case, 
Ms Arthurworrey participated in a total of four supervision sessions in which 
it was discussed. The other three would seem to have followed a very similar 
pattern to the first session, in that the case file was never read and very little in 
the way of meaningful analysis took place. As a result, whatever mistakes or errors 
of judgement that Ms Arthurworrey may have made during the course of her 
handling of Victoria’s case went undetected by her immediate managers. 
6.637   The nature and extent of the supervision that Ms Arthurworrey received in Victoria’s 
case would seem, from the evidence I heard, to have been typical of the practice 
in the NTDO at the time. Thorough supervision appears to have been one of the 
casualties of the inability of some staff to cope with the day-to-day pressures of work 
in the team. While it may have been possible to record supervision as occurring, 
and to report as much to senior managers, its quality was extremely poor. 
6.638   Effective supervision is the cornerstone of safe social work practice. There is no 
substitute for it. In particular, the need for such supervision cannot be met by what 
were referred to as ‘corridor conversations’ between managers and staff. A number 
of such conversations regarding Victoria’s case took place between Ms Baptiste and 
Ms Arthurworrey before the first formal supervision session that I have described 
earlier. A number of extremely important decisions about Victoria’s case would 
seem to have been taken by Ms Baptiste during the course of informal, ad hoc 
discussions of this nature, of which the following are examples:
• She agreed to the cancelling of the planned home visit prior to Victoria’s 
discharge from hospital.
• She endorsed Ms Arthurworrey’s interpretation of the material received 
from the Central Middlesex Hospital that there were no longer any child 
protection concerns. 
• She accepted Ms Arthurworrey’s interpretation of the information obtained 
during the October home visit that there were still no child protection concerns.
• She decided that the concerns expressed by Dr Rossiter, as relayed via 
Ms Kitchman, required no further action.
6.639   All of these important decisions were made during the course of informal 
discussions and without reference to the case file. They illustrate the amateurish 
way in which the supervision of Victoria’s case was approached. The significance 
of the inadequacy of the supervision given to Ms Arthurworrey cannot be 
overstated. As with so many aspects of Victoria’s case, the faults would have been 
remedied by the straightforward observance of basic practice standards. In this 
instance, the outcome for Victoria might have been different if her case file had 
ever been read by those who were supposed to be supervising Ms Arthurworrey. 
The recommendation which addresses this is in paragraph 6.59.
Case closure
6.640   The need to thoroughly read the case file before taking any important decision 
on a case is never more vital than when consideration is being given to closing it. 
The mechanics of case closure are straightforward – all that is generally considered 
necessary is that a manager or senior practitioner endorses the view reached by 
the social worker in charge of the case that there is no reason to keep it open any 
longer. However, implicit in such a system is the requirement that the manager or 
senior practitioner concerned carefully reviews the case to ensure that there is not 
further work for social services still to do. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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6.641   Ideally, therefore, a social worker, having carried out all the action identified 
as necessary on the case, would present that case to a manager who, having 
verified that this was indeed so, would endorse the decision to close the case. 
The sequence of events in Victoria’s case was very different.
6.642   The strategy meeting held on 5 November added a further 15 action points to 
those that remained outstanding from the earlier strategy meeting in July. By this 
stage there were approximately 30 individual steps that had been identified as 
necessary in Victoria’s case, but which had yet to be completed. Despite the fact 
that all this work remained outstanding, Victoria was never seen again by anyone 
from Haringey Social Services after 2 November, when she was brought to the 
NTDO to withdraw the allegation of sexual harm.
6.643   Instead, her case was allowed to limp listlessly towards the point at which those 
involved would seem simply to have lost interest in doing anything proactive 
on it. The chronology of what Ms Arthurworrey did in respect of Victoria’s case 
during the four months or so between the November strategy meeting and the 
decision to close the case makes for depressing reading. A letter was written, a few 
telephone calls were made and three visits were made to the flat, none of which 
found anyone at home. 
6.644   Therefore, when the case was passed to Ms Mairs for closure, the file should 
have revealed that, far from the thorough completion of all identified tasks, 
the preceding four months had witnessed nothing but sporadic and ineffectual 
attempts to get in contact with the family concerned. 
6.645   The last time that this child had been seen she had been making and withdrawing 
allegations of sexual harm in a manner identified by all those involved at the time 
as suspicious. As a result, a strategy meeting had been called at which 15 action 
points had been identified, several of which involved seeing and speaking to 
Victoria. As even a brief reading of the case file would have revealed, virtually no 
progress had been made on any of those action points. 
6.646   Even if the manager concerned was interested only in whether there were sufficient 
grounds for safely assuming that Kouao and Victoria had left the borough, the 
case file would have revealed that there were important steps that had yet to be 
taken. For example, no checks had been made with the health services to ascertain 
whether Victoria had received further treatment, no attempt had been made to 
speak to any of Manning’s neighbours to establish who was living at the flat, and 
no contact had been made with the French authorities in an effort to establish 
whether Kouao and Victoria had indeed returned to France.
6.647   The closure of a case should be the result of a job well done, not the result of a 
desire to have one less case to worry about. Victoria’s case file shows that there 
was much still to be done on her case at the time that it was closed. In those 
circumstances there would appear to be two possibilities. Either the case file was 
not read before it was signed off for closure, or it was read and the decision to 
close it was made in the knowledge that there were concerns that had yet to be 
resolved and important steps that had yet to be taken. Both would amount to very 
poor practice indeed.
Sexual harm allegation
6.648   Finally, I turn to consider the manner in which Haringey dealt with the allegation 
made on 1 November 1999 that Manning had sexually harmed Victoria. 6  Haringey Social Services
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6.649   In many respects, an allegation of specific harm done to a child by a named 
individual is easier to deal with from a social services point of view than a more 
vague referral of general suspicion. This is not least because of the wealth of 
procedures and guidance that have been produced in order to assist social workers 
in identifying the correct steps to take. It was somewhat surprising, therefore, to 
learn that Haringey’s handling of the 1 November allegation was flawed in almost 
every material respect.
6.650   The crucial error, in my view, was the failure by social work staff, after they had 
been informed of the allegation and had invited Victoria and Kouao to attend 
the office, to arrange for a police officer to be present when they arrived. That 
police officer could then have assisted social services in interviewing both Kouao 
and Victoria at an early stage. The result of this failure was that when Kouao and 
Victoria did arrive, they were interviewed in an entirely inadequate manner.
6.651   First, Kouao was spoken to by two social workers – neither of whom had ever been 
trained in the conduct of interviews of this nature and neither of whom had, by 
that stage, completed a section 47 investigation. No notes of this interview were 
taken at the time, although Ms Arthurworrey was able to recall that she told Kouao 
that the police would be involved and that Manning would be arrested.
6.652   Secondly, Victoria was spoken to by the same inadequately trained social workers. 
Despite her apparent willingness to talk about what had happened to her she 
was discouraged from doing so, apparently due to the fact that the social workers 
realised by this stage that the police should be involved in that process. Had a 
properly trained child protection officer been involved from the outset, Victoria’s 
account could have been obtained at the time that she seemed anxious to give it. 
The disadvantages of discouraging a child in Victoria’s situation from telling social 
workers what has happened to her are obvious.
6.653   Only after they had interviewed both Kouao and Victoria did Haringey Social 
Services contact the police. By this time it was after 4pm and PC Jones, to whom 
the case was allocated, had gone home for the night. I comment elsewhere in this 
Report as to the adequacy of the police’s response at this stage, but for present 
purposes it is sufficient to note that had the police been involved from the outset, 
this particular difficulty would not have arisen. 
6.654   Victoria and Kouao were then allowed to leave the office supposedly to stay with 
the Kimbidimas, a family about which virtually nothing was known. No checks 
were made as to what the sleeping arrangements would be, how Victoria and 
Kouao would be fed and looked after or what, if any, connection the Kimbidimas 
had with Manning, the alleged perpetrator of the harm.
6.655   Thereafter, nothing of any value was done apart from scheduling a strategy 
meeting for 5 November 1999, some four days after the allegations had first been 
made. The timing of the strategy meeting is curious to say the least. While an 
immediate strategy meeting prior to the commencement of a joint investigation 
may have made sense (as for that matter would a strategy meeting at the end of 
the initial investigation when all the parties had been interviewed), I can see no 
logical basis for the decision to call the meeting in the middle of an investigation 
which had yet to yield any findings. 
6.656   To summarise, my view is that when dealing with specific allegations of harm to 
children, such as the one with which Haringey were presented on 1 November 
1999, there a number of steps which must be taken immediately. I set out a list of The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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the immediate action which should have been taken on Victoria’s case and which 
provide a practical template for use in such cases:
• During the same day that the allegations were made, both Victoria and Kouao 
should have been seen and spoken to at a mutually agreed safe place by a 
properly trained police officer and social worker.
• Kouao should have been spoken to first and a detailed note made of what she 
had to say at that time.
• Victoria should then have been interviewed with the use of a video camera.
• If, during the course of that interview, Victoria had made allegations about 
Manning, he should have been arrested and interviewed by the police. At that 
point consideration should have been given to obtaining medical and legal advice.
• Social services should then have taken steps to find safe and secure 
accommodation for Kouao and Victoria. This would involve satisfying themselves 
that the sleeping arrangements would be adequate and that they would have 
sufficient means of supporting themselves. Emergency contact details should 
have been provided.
• Social services and the police should then have reviewed the work they had done 
and agreed a set of next steps in the investigation.
6.657   All of the steps could and should have been taken on the same day that the 
allegation was first reported. 7 Tottenham Child and Family Centre
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7   Tottenham Child and 
Family Centre
7.1       In drafting this section of the Report I was greatly helped by the closing 
submissions made by Counsel to the Inquiry. They seem to me to summarise 
accurately the material evidence, and I have drawn on them heavily in the 
paragraphs that follow.
7.2       The Tottenham Child and Family Centre was situated in Moira Close, Tottenham, 
and was one of two centres established under a partnership agreement between 
Haringey council, Haringey Health Care NHS Trust and the NSPCC.
7.3       The managers of the centres were employees of either the council or the health 
authority, but they reported to Catriona Scott who was employed by the NSPCC 
and was responsible for the day-to-day management of the centres. According to 
Ms Scott, “The main function of the family centres was to provide planned family 
services relating to health and welfare.”
The referral
7.4       On 5 August 1999, Victoria’s case was referred to the Tottenham Child and Family 
Centre by Barry Almeida, a practice manager at the North Tottenham District Office 
of Haringey Social Services. He had no independent recollection of having made the 
referral, basing his evidence instead on the handwritten notes he made on the case 
file, the relevant part of which reads: “Referred to Moira Close Family Centre. They 
have taken referral but say will take up to two months for assessment.”
7.5       Mr Almeida’s note also indicates that the family centre was, in fact, the third 
organisation that he had contacted in an effort to persuade someone to visit 
Victoria’s accommodation. His first port of call would seem to have been the health 
visiting service that, according to the notes, informed him that they would “not 
be involved in hygiene assessment of this nature. It would be the school nurse”. 
As Mr Almeida correctly recorded in his notes, this posed something of a problem 
given the fact that Victoria was not attending school.
7.6       There is nothing to suggest that the point was pushed with the health visiting 
service. Instead, Mr Almeida tried the environmental health service. His notes 
indicate that the response he got from them was to be told that people are 
“allowed to be as squalid as they like in their own home, as long as they do not 
cause a public health hazard”. For this reason, it would seem, they also were not 
prepared to undertake a visit.
7.7       Having drawn a blank with both the health visiting service and the environmental 
health service, Mr Almeida decided to try the family centre. In addition to the 
notes he made on Victoria’s case file, the fact that it was indeed Mr Almeida 
who made the call would seem to be confirmed both by the written evidence of 
Anna Ieronimou, the family centre officer who took the referral, and by the family 
centre’s own referral sheet, which names Mr Almeida as the referrer.
Reasons for the referral
7.8       However, what is less clear is what Mr Almeida hoped to achieve by making the 
referral. There would seem to be two possibilities. He initially stated in his oral The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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evidence that the purpose of his call was to obtain advice from the family centre 
as to what precautions Lisa Arthurworrey should take when visiting Victoria’s home 
in light of the fact that Victoria had previously been diagnosed with scabies. This 
would appear to contradict the impression given by his statement, which was 
that he telephoned the family centre because of its ability to carry out parenting 
assessments and provide family support.
7.9       The discrepancy is plainly an important one. There is a very significant difference 
between social services telephoning another agency in order to obtain advice as 
to how to proceed themselves, and seeking to transfer to that other agency some 
responsibility for the provision of support services to the family concerned.
7.10     Unfortunately, however, when this discrepancy was put to him, Mr Almeida 
was unable to provide me with much assistance. Instead, he introduced a third 
possibility by suggesting that his reasons for calling the family centre were in fact a 
combination of both. In other words, he was concerned both to obtain advice for 
Ms Arthurworrey and to prompt some form of action by the family centre directed 
at Victoria’s welfare. However, he was unclear as to what action he expected the 
family centre to take.
7.11     The confusion as to exactly why he telephoned the centre is illustrated by 
Mr Almeida’s admission during the course of his evidence that he did not really 
think about the referral or whether or not it was appropriate at the time. He 
accepted that the referral should not have been made until the reasons for it had 
been carefully thought through, and that the lack of clarity from him probably led 
to the family centre staff being confused as to what exactly they were supposed 
to do.
Initial handling of the referral
7.12     Despite the confusion on the part of the referrer as to precisely what he hoped to 
achieve, the family centre did pick up the referral and log it on their system.
7.13     The ‘system’ was described by Sylvia Henry, the practice manager, in her evidence. 
It would seem to have consisted of the recording of the name of the child and 
the basis for the referral on a sheet of paper. The sheet was then placed into the 
‘referrals box’, the contents of which were checked every Friday at a managers’ 
meeting. During the course of that meeting, each new referral was logged in 
a book and allocated to a practice manager. The practice manager would then 
decide whether to deal with the case him or herself, or to pass it on to a family 
centre officer. Once that decision had been made, the name of the manager or 
officer to whom the case has been allocated was noted down in the logbook 
together with an indication of the action required.
Allocation of the referral
7.14     According to Ernell Watson, a practice manager at the family centre, Victoria’s 
case came up for allocation at the managers’ meeting on 13 August 1999. Why 
it was not considered at the first meeting after it had been received, namely 
Friday 6 August, is unclear. I had originally been led to believe that the reason 
no meeting took place that day was due to the family centre hosting a party 
for a group of its users. However, it would appear that there was a meeting, 
as evidenced by a document that appeared to be the minutes of the 6 August 
meeting. Ms Watson amended her statement, in light of this document, to remove 
the reference to the cancellation of the 6 August meeting. She was unable to 
provide me with any further assistance with the matter, however, due to the fact 
that, as the minutes confirm, she was not present at that meeting. I am unable to 
form any conclusion, therefore, as to why Victoria’s referral stayed in the family 
centre’s referral box until the following week.7  Tottenham Child and Family Centre
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7.15     On 13 August 1999, Victoria’s referral was allocated to Ms Henry, a qualified social 
worker. Ms Henry confirmed in her evidence that, at the time that it was allocated 
to her, Victoria’s case was marked as ‘urgent’. There would seem to be little doubt 
as to whether or not this was the case in view of the fact that Ms Watson made 
the following note on the family centre’s contacts sheet on 13 August 1999: “Case 
needs to be actioned ASAP.”
7.16     Ms Henry explained that, on receipt of a new case, the first thing that she 
would do would be to determine whether further information was needed from 
the referrer or whether she could proceed directly to an initial assessment. In 
Victoria’s case she decided that further information from the referrer was needed. 
She asserted that it would be her usual practice when dealing with urgent cases 
to make such inquiries as may be necessary within a short time. She could not 
envisage circumstances where she would have been unable to follow up an urgent 
referral during the course of the week following its allocation.
7.17     Up to this point, it seems as though the sequence of events can be followed fairly 
easily. Mr Almeida made a referral to the family centre on 5 August. The family 
centre had agreed to accept the referral. It was taken by Ms Ieronimou and was 
placed in the referrals box pending allocation. At the managers’ meeting on 
13 August the referral was taken out of the referrals box and allocated to Sylvia 
Henry for urgent action. Ms Henry accepted responsibility for the referral. Having 
considered the information available at that stage, she decided (unsurprisingly, 
given Mr Almeida’s vagueness as to what he expected the family centre to do) 
that more information was required from the referrer. She was aware of the need, 
therefore, to contact Mr Almeida at the earliest available opportunity during the 
following week.
Ms Henry’s note
7.18     It is at this stage, however, that the evidence becomes slightly opaque. The source 
of the difficulty is the next note which appears on the family centre’s contact sheet. 
It reads: “T/C Barry Almeida. Family now moved out of the borough and case 
closed.” The note is not signed but Ms Henry did not seek to dispute the fact that 
she made it. Neither, unfortunately, is it dated. This latter omission is significant.
7.19     Ms Henry stated in evidence that her departure from her usual practice of signing 
and dating all entries on the file can only be explained by her being interrupted at 
the critical moment. Unfortunately, she seemed to have no recollection of when 
her conversation with Mr Almeida, in which she was told that the ‘family’ had 
moved out of the borough, took place. Mr Almeida was clear in his evidence that 
the only phone call that he made to the family centre was on 5 August 1999 when 
he made the initial referral. No written reference to any other telephone call either 
to or from the family centre can be found in Haringey’s case file.
7.20     The most curious aspect of Ms Henry’s note, however, is not the fact that it refers 
to a telephone call (the existence of which is disputed by the other party), but 
that it records information that is plainly incorrect – Kouao and Victoria never did 
leave the borough. Therefore, it is surprising that this assertion should have been 
made by anyone in Haringey Social Services. It is even more surprising if one were 
to accept Ms Henry’s assertion that she would have followed up Victoria’s referral 
promptly after it was allocated to her on 13 August. It is conceivable that someone 
at the North Tottenham District Office might have formed the view that Victoria 
and Kouao had left the borough by December 1999 or January 2000 – this was the 
period during which Lisa Arthurworrey was trying unsuccessfully to contact them. 
Given that this is the case, it is very hard to see how anyone could have reached 
this conclusion at any point during the three months or so after Ms Henry assumed 
responsibility for the case. Furthermore, it would have been readily apparent to The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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anyone in the North Tottenham District Office who took the time to check, that 
Victoria’s case was not closed until 25 February 2000.
Alternative explanations
7.21     In attempting to establish the accurate position in light of these apparent 
inconsistencies, Counsel to the Inquiry identified four possible versions of events, 
each of which was put to Ms Henry. They were as follows:
• Ms Henry did not follow up Victoria’s referral by calling the North Tottenham 
District Office until some time after 1 December 1999, the earliest date on which 
it could even have been suspected by Haringey Social Services that Victoria and 
Kouao had left the borough. (It was on this date that Kouao failed to attend the 
North Tottenham District Office for an appointment, without explanation.) If this 
were true, Ms Henry would have done nothing on this urgent case for at least 
three and a half months.
• Ms Henry did call the North Tottenham District Office promptly after being 
allocated Victoria’s referral and was given entirely false information by 
whoever she spoke to at the office. This would mean that despite the fact that 
Ms Arthurworrey had visited Kouao and Victoria on 16 August 1999, someone 
at the North Tottenham District Office decided to tell Ms Henry that the family 
had left the borough and the case was closed.
• The note that Ms Henry made on the family centre’s contact sheet was not 
an accurate reflection of what she was told. In other words, she misheard or 
misinterpreted what was said and somehow gained the impression that the 
family had moved. This explanation provides no assistance with the question of 
when the call was made – such a mistake could have been made at any time up 
to the date of Victoria’s death.
• The entry made by Ms Henry on the contacts sheet was written in after it 
emerged that Victoria had died, in an effort to explain away the fact that nothing 
had been done by the family centre in respect of the referral throughout the six 
months leading up to Victoria’s death.
7.22     Having given the matter careful consideration, I am unable to add any further 
plausible alternatives to Counsel’s list. Which of the four scenarios is to be preferred 
is not an easy question to answer.
7.23     Ms Henry was unable to provide much assistance in respect of this issue. She could 
not remember the telephone call and she could not say for sure what she was told 
and when. This is unfortunate because the matter is a significant one. If it is the 
case that Ms Henry was told relatively soon after she assumed responsibility for 
Victoria’s referral that Victoria and Kouao had moved and their case was closed, 
the fact that no action was taken on Victoria’s case by the family centre may be 
easily explained.
7.24     Ms Henry refuted the suggestion that she added the entry after Victoria’s death 
in order to attempt to explain her inactivity. She also invited me to reject the 
conclusion that she did nothing on the case until some time after 1 December 
1999. She agreed that there was a possibility that she did not correctly record 
what she was told during the course of the conversation that she allegedly had 
with Mr Almeida but invited me to conclude that she did make a call to the North 
Tottenham District Office before February 2000, during which Mr Almeida told her 
that the family had moved out of the borough and the case had been closed.7  Tottenham Child and Family Centre
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7.25     In attempting to reach a view on this matter I also took into account the fact that 
Victoria’s case was closed on the family centre’s computerised information system 
on 15 March 2000. This may be significant as I was told by Ms Henry that cases 
tended to be closed on the system within a month or so of them being identified 
as requiring no further action by family centre staff.
7.26     The fact that the case was closed on 15 March 2000 may indicate, therefore, 
that Ms Henry was not told that Victoria and Kouao had left the borough until 
some time in February. Were this to be the case, it might provide an explanation 
for why she was told that the family had left the borough, as there had been no 
contact between Kouao and anyone at the North Tottenham District Office for 
approximately three months. However, it would still not explain why nothing was 
done in relation to Victoria’s case until six months after the referral had first been 
received by the family centre.
7.27     Having given this matter careful consideration, I am unable to reach a conclusion 
in which I have any confidence. No satisfactory account of how and when 
Ms Henry’s entry on the contact sheet came to be made has been provided, 
and I can do no more than speculate as to the true position.
Case recording
7.28     However, what is clear is that the handling of Victoria’s case by the family centre 
provides another example of the importance of adequate record-keeping and 
supervision of cases. For reasons that it is unnecessary for me to rehearse, the 
importance of recording and monitoring action taken in response to a referral 
concerning a vulnerable child cannot be overstated.
7.29     The NSPCC is not one of the agencies covered by the Terms of Reference of this 
Inquiry. Nonetheless, it is clear that through the work of the family centre for 
which it was responsible, the NSPCC did have some involvement with Victoria’s 
case, by virtue of which it may have had an opportunity to have made a material 
difference to its outcome. In view of this, I am grateful for the assistance provided 
to the Inquiry by the NSPCC.
7.30     That assistance included the making of a closing submission by its director, Mary 
Marsh. During the course of that closing submission she addressed the issue of the 
adequacy of the manner in which the handling of Victoria’s referral was recorded 
and supervised by the family centre. In my view, she put the matter very fairly 
when she made the following statement in relation to the handling of Victoria’s 
case after its allocation to Ms Henry on 13 August 1999:
“The record thereafter is inadequate and incomplete with no evidence of 
immediate action despite the recognition of the urgency in the original 
indication. Regrettably, the only evidence we have is the undated note 
on the file made by the practice manager, that she was told in a phone 
call with Haringey Social Services that the family had moved away, with 
no date recorded or recalled.
There are serious issues here about the inadequate maintenance of 
records and the supervision and monitoring [of] the progress of cases 
and referrals, which we recognise and we accept are our fault in this 
case. It should not have been possible for this referral to have been left 
without any follow up, apparently for so long.”The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Uniformity of referrals
7.31     Ms Marsh went on to make a further point in this regard with which I also agree. 
She explained how a necessary result of the careful and accurate recording of 
referrals once they have been received by an organisation such as the family 
centre, is that the referrers themselves act in a consistent and regulated manner. 
Vague telephone referrals, unconfirmed in writing, such as the one made by 
Mr Almeida, make the job of all concerned far more difficult than necessary. I also 
heard evidence to suggest that this was merely one of several ways in which 
referrals were made to the family centre.
7.32     If the involvement of the family centre in Victoria’s case illustrates anything, it is 
that the valuable work of organisations such as this can be seriously undermined 
by a lack of basic systems and processes. It is vital that all those involved in the 
protection of children adopt a rigorous and professional attitude to their work if 
important opportunities to help children in Victoria’s situation are not to be missed.
What should have been done?
7.33     The value of such opportunities was graphically illustrated by the evidence given by 
Ms Henry and Ms Watson as to what Ms Henry would have done had she followed 
up Victoria’s case in accordance with her usual practice and the family centre’s 
established procedures.
7.34     The family centre’s performance indicators required that initial assessments be 
completed within six weeks of the receipt of the referral. However, both Ms Henry 
and Ms Watson agreed that a shorter period would be appropriate in cases such as 
Victoria’s, which had been clearly identified as urgent.
7.35     Therefore, at some point well before the end of September, Ms Henry would 
have carried out an initial assessment of Victoria’s situation. I was told that this 
would have involved the making of further inquiries of social services as to the 
circumstances of the case, together with a home visit carried out by a member 
of the family centre’s staff. On the basis of the information obtained during the 
course of such a visit, the family centre staff would have considered how best to 
support Kouao and Victoria. This may have involved regular home visits or the 
enrolment of Victoria in some form of daycare activity.
7.36     The potential impact of such support in the context of Victoria’s case is 
self-evident, and it is a matter much to be regretted that she never benefited 
from the expert attention of either Ms Henry or any other member of the family 
centre staff.8 Enfield  Social Services
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8 Enfield Social Services
The managerial context
8.1       Enfield Social Services had case responsibility for Victoria for just over 24 hours 
– from 3.15pm on Monday 26 July 1999, when she was referred to the North 
Middlesex Hospital social work team, until 4.30pm on Tuesday 27 July 1999, 
when they transferred responsibility for the case to Haringey Social Services.
8.2       That the local authority of Enfield had any involvement with Victoria at all was 
largely a matter of history and geography. The North Middlesex Hospital is in 
the borough of Enfield, just north of the Haringey border and about 12 minutes’ 
walk from Haringey’s North Tottenham District Office. Karen Johns, the Enfield 
hospital social worker allocated to Victoria’s case, thought that about 75 per cent 
of the children admitted to the North Middlesex Hospital came from the borough 
of Haringey. Yet in 1999, Haringey employed no social workers at the hospital. 
That has since changed.
8.3       At that time, Haringey had an arrangement with Enfield Social Services whereby 
Enfield children and families’ social workers would provide basic initial services 
for Haringey children admitted to the hospital before the cases were passed to 
Haringey. The arrangement was set out inadequately in a two-page minute of a 
meeting held between the two agencies in July 1996. It was modified following a 
further meeting in September 1996.
8.4       The location of such a key operational protocol in a set of minutes was not ideal, 
and I shall return to the content later. The arrangement should have been set out 
in greater detail as part of Enfield’s or the hospital’s updated guidelines. At the 
time, the hospital social work team was expected to follow procedures set out in 
a variety of written documents, some of which were out of date. These included:
• the Enfield Child Protection Guide, published in August 1996, which required that 
in child protection cases an inter-agency case conference should be held before a 
case is transferred to the responsible area team;
• the protocol setting out the arrangement between Haringey and Enfield, which 
although produced at around the same time, envisaged a lesser scale of Enfield 
involvement;
• the North Middlesex Hospital child protection guidelines of 1998.
8.5       Also available were the Haringey child protection guidelines, which might be 
thought to have more than a passing relevance to Haringey children admitted to 
the hospital and referred on to Haringey Social Services. However, according to 
Ms Johns, these were not followed. Instead the hospital social workers relied on 
the protocol between the two agencies and the brief and less than adequate North 
Middlesex Hospital procedures.
8.6       Lesley Moore, the seconded assistant director for children and families from July 
2000, did not seek to defend the “poor state of procedures and arrangements”. 
She admitted, “Although staff had access to the right people to give them 
advice about what should happen and what was in current guidance, it was not 
readily available to them in the form of accessible written practice, guidance and 
procedure.”The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
222
8.7       I would go further and say that the profusion of guidance in various documents 
relating to the different agencies made it very unclear what was expected of 
front-line staff. Even worse for Haringey children was the confusion over where 
Enfield’s responsibility ended and Haringey’s began. The inadequacy of this 
arrangement potentially put the safety of children at risk. Therefore, I make the 
following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that staff working with vulnerable 
children and families are provided with up-to-date procedures, protocols and 
guidance. Such practice guidance must be located in a single-source document. 
The work should be monitored so as to ensure procedures are followed.
8.8       Although Ms Johns thought that 60 to 70 per cent of the referrals she dealt with 
were Haringey children, she admitted Enfield responded to them differently from 
Enfield children. Moreover, when faced with competing pressures in 1999 owing 
to staff shortages, she sometimes felt obliged to give priority to an Enfield child 
over a Haringey child. Indeed, Enfield’s own management review of Victoria’s case 
found that the issue may not have been about the quality of Ms Johns’s practice 
but about how Enfield social workers at the North Middlesex Hospital regarded 
Haringey cases at the time. Perhaps not surprisingly, Ms Johns said in evidence that 
she thought the arrangement with Haringey was “not the best arrangement” and 
that Haringey should have employed their own social workers at the hospital.
8.9       These were not the only issues of concern for the North Middlesex Hospital social 
work team in the summer of 1999. There were long-standing staff tensions within 
the team and there were tensions between the team and the North Middlesex 
Hospital medical staff, all of which drifted without resolution, in some instances 
for years. Indeed, the evidence pointed to a complete lack of management grip 
on any of these issues. As a result, there was a vacuum created by the absence of 
responsible, managerial decision-making.
Management and accountability
8.10     None of this was helped by the line management and accountability arrangements 
that existed at the time. Since 1997, there had been two specialist social 
work divisions within Enfield, one for adults and one for children and families. 
The hospital social work team had stayed in the adult division as it consisted 
predominantly of social workers dealing with adults. Therefore, the assistant 
director for adult services managed all hospital social work.
8.11     The next in command was Lesley Howard, service manager for hospitals and 
health liaison from April to August 1999. Ms Howard was responsible for the line 
management of both hospital social work team managers at Chase Farm Hospital 
and the North Middlesex Hospital. While she was experienced in both adult and 
children’s social work, she had limited experience and training in child protection 
work. As a result, temporary arrangements were put in place to ensure team 
leaders and social workers at the hospital could access support and guidance from 
colleagues in the community children and families’ division.
8.12     In July 1999, Lesley Carr was appointed as the new intake and assessment manager 
for children and families, reporting directly to the assistant director of the children 
and families’ division. Ms Carr was given the specific task of bringing the children 
and families’ hospital social workers at both Chase Farm Hospital and the North 
Middlesex Hospital within the fold of the children and families’ division. Ms Johns 8  Enfield Social Services
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was one of only four and a half full-time equivalent hospital social workers 
specialising in children’s work at the time. By the time Ms Carr left her post in 
October 2000, she had still to complete this task. Indeed, it was not until April 
2001 that the hospital social workers specialising in children and families were 
finally brought under the wing of the children and families’ division.
8.13     As a result, during her time in office Ms Carr assumed no management 
responsibility for children’s social work within the two borough hospitals. Her 
role was “mainly consultancy in terms of service delivery”. She would advise on 
particularly complex childcare cases but only when asked to do so. It was not 
her job to routinely check case files or to do random samples of the quality of a 
social worker’s work. That was the province of the line managers within the adult 
division.
8.14     However, this was not a perception shared by Ms Howard. In terms of her own 
children and families’ work, Ms Howard saw her role as being responsible for 
management and staffing issues. While ultimately responsible for practice issues, 
she was happy for the team leaders to seek support through “the informal channels 
that had been put in place”. Thus it seemed that there was nobody above team 
manager who routinely and actively monitored the childcare practice of the 
hospital social workers.
8.15     I was presented with a number of reasons as to why it took almost two years to 
move the children and families’ social workers. Decisions had yet to be made as 
to whether the move would be accompanied by a physical move of the social 
workers away from the hospital site to Edmonton Social Services office. The 
hospitals did not favour such a move because they saw value in retaining easy 
face-to-face communication with hospital-based social workers. On the other 
hand, the alternative solution was the integration of the referral and assessment 
team. This would have given Enfield greater flexibility in allocating its resources, 
particularly during periods of staff shortage. Ms Carr told the Inquiry:
“Part of it was to do with disentangling the bureaucracy around the 
paying of staff and around the budgets. Part of it was around the fact 
that we would be taking these staff on with no managers at all. Part of 
it was linked to the retirement of managers and part of it was linked 
to not having sufficient managers based in Edmonton and no structure 
to actually take on the work, and part of it was very much based on 
concerns the hospitals were raising about moving the hospital children’s 
social workers out of the hospital, the biggest difficulty being if they 
were based, as they were, in the two hospitals, providing cover between 
them would have been a very difficult business. There were insufficient 
numbers to actually do the job properly and that was really what held up 
a lot of things, was trying to ensure we had enough finances to be able 
to staff it adequately and run a good service, and it was not something 
we could actually change overnight, much as I would liked to have.”
8.16     Two years could hardly be said to be “overnight”. Far more damaging was the 
admission that the team was insufficiently staffed and had inadequate children 
and families’ team management capacity to do the job properly.
8.17     Ms Carr also suggested the changeover was held up until after budgets could 
be restructured in April 2000. She acknowledged that budget restructuring was 
purely an accountancy exercise within the same organisation and did not involve 
a big transfer of money or a change in conditions of service. However, she had no 
answer as to why someone with line management responsibility simply did not 
force the transfer quickly.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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8.18     By the time Ms Moore arrived in post, the proposal on the table was to pull 
the social workers from the hospital and relocate them in the community. She 
considered this unacceptable and was therefore partly responsible for putting 
the emerging plans on hold. She felt that the management transfer was slowed 
because of complex plans to reorganise the whole social services department. 
She said, “It was not just a question of throwing the hospital teams up in the air 
and deciding where they may land in a better place, but also all the teams right 
across the community in adults’ and children’s services.” There were difficulties 
with senior management agreeing what that structure should look like, although 
Ms Moore thought these were beginning to resolve themselves by October 2000. 
At that time, management were “pulled up in [their] tracks by two things”. 
First, the director was taken ill very suddenly and was off sick for a substantial 
period of time. Second, there was a major financial crisis that occupied senior 
management’s attention. Extreme measures were put in place and eligibility criteria 
were tightened, with all the associated political issues. According to Ms Moore, 
“The whole of senior management’s group time was taken up in dealing with the 
practicalities of that and putting straight so that we did not end up without the 
money to run a service.”
8.19     With the appointment of an interim director in January 2001, and the worst of 
the financial crisis behind them, Enfield’s senior management team revisited the 
structural reorganisation. When it finally came, the decision to relocate the hospital 
children’s social work teams took three months to implement. This, according 
to Ms Moore, was “as fast as we could humanly function from that point on”. 
Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Directors of social services must ensure that hospital social workers working with 
children and families are line managed by the children and families’ section of 
their social services department. 
Lack of attendance at hospital meetings
8.20     The fact that hospital social workers were managed by the ‘adults’ team within 
social services led to a lack of clarity as to who was responsible for ensuring 
hospital social workers attended hospital meetings. Had there been effective line 
management, this unsatisfactory state of affairs would have been resolved.
8.21     These tensions came to a head over social worker non-attendance at hospital 
meetings, particularly the Monday afternoon psychosocial meetings. The weekly 
psychosocial meetings were arranged to be held at the North Middlesex Hospital on 
Mondays at 2pm. The meetings took, on average, one and a half to two hours and, 
according to Ms Carr, looked at every child in the ward. Enfield social workers were 
supposed to attend. Indeed, attendance at multi-agency meetings was an intrinsic 
and important part of a social worker’s role and this expectation was clearly set out 
in the hospital social workers’ job descriptions. The meetings were supposed to be a 
valuable forum for the exchange of information between medical staff and hospital 
social workers. Ms Carr said that information exchange “helps to give a more 
complete picture for the social worker who is doing an assessment”. Ms Carr added:
“It allows a much wider understanding of a range of issues that are 
going on and certainly helps the social workers to understand the 
medical perspectives, and it also helps the social worker in interpreting 
the medical understanding for parents and for supporting other parents 
and children while in hospital.”8  Enfield Social Services
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8.22     However, by the time Victoria was admitted to the North Middlesex Hospital, 
Enfield’s hospital social workers had long since ceased to attend both the 
psychosocial meetings and the weekly non-accidental injury forum on Tuesdays. 
On instruction from the team managers, Cynthia Lipworth and Pat Dale, the 
hospital social workers ceased attending these hospital meetings as long ago as 
February 1998. They were not to resume attendance until May 2001, a period of 
over three years altogether. Hospital medical staff were less than happy with this. 
The evidence of Nurse Beatrice Norman and Dr Mary Rossiter suggested that the 
hospital staff placed greater value on these meetings than the social workers did.
8.23     Although the instruction to cease attendance had come from the team managers, 
it appears to have been driven by the social workers themselves. Evidence from 
Ms Carr, Ms Lipworth and Ms Johns all suggested that when social workers did 
attend, they felt deskilled and devalued. They felt their professional expertise 
was not appreciated, their opinions were not always heard, time was not always 
provided for their feedback, and meetings were not clearly structured. There was 
also a concern that the meetings were used to shortcut the formal routes for 
referrals of work from medical staff to Enfield Social Services.
8.24     Ms Carr felt the problem “should have been resolved and should have been 
resolved at the beginning”, but she also said, “There were a number of what is 
probably best to describe as difficulties within personalities of the staff involved ... 
[By July 1999] the position had become pretty intractable and it was not going 
to be solved overnight.” She did not think forced attendance would necessarily 
have aided communication. Instead she said she tried to work with the consultant 
paediatricians to formalise the meeting process.
8.25     Ms Carr felt the social and medical staff misunderstood each other’s roles, which 
hindered communication. There were problems getting busy people, particularly 
Dr Rossiter, to look at the issues closely. Ms Carr scheduled a number of meetings with 
Dr Rossiter and Dr Naidoo, a consultant child psychiatrist, but they were “occasionally 
cancelled at short notice” because there were other issues on the agenda and these 
matters tended to slip down. Ms Carr did have a number of meetings with Dr Rossiter 
to look at changing working practice as a whole. While the psychosocial meetings 
were part of those discussions, Dr Rossiter was more concerned about other issues and, 
according to Ms Carr, those “took up a lot of the discussion time in the early days”.
8.26     When pressed, Ms Lipworth agreed that the non-resolution of social work 
attendance at these hospital meetings had become a big issue. She accepted that 
it was her responsibility to take the problem up the management chain until it was 
resolved. Ms Lipworth had attended one of the meetings herself to confirm the 
social workers’ perceptions and she was sure she would have taken the matter up 
with her line managers, but she could not recall those discussions.
8.27     Ms Moore also partly blamed the organisational structure. Staff from the children 
and families’ division were aware of the issues and had been involved in meetings 
to resolve the conflict, but because they had no line management responsibility 
they “pushed the issue across to adults [division] who should have been the ones 
that made the decision”. Ms Moore emphasised the problems that existed within 
the organisation about decision making:
“There were certainly more discussions about issues than there were 
decisions about issues ... and some of the issues did not get resolved. 
What was needed was a decision. Once I was aware that there was a 
problem, a decision was made and the meetings have resumed.”The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation 
Directors of social services must ensure that hospital social workers participate in 
all hospital meetings concerned with the safeguarding of children.
Social workers’ workload
8.28     According to Ms Johns, by the time Victoria was admitted to the North Middlesex 
Hospital, workloads were “high but not overwhelming”. Others disagreed. With 
hindsight Ms Moore thought the workload was very high at the time, with 
caseloads exceeding 12 per worker. As a result, she thought there were some cases 
“which did not receive speedy enough and adequate enough attention”.
8.29     When the specialist children and families’ staff were overstretched, adult care 
workers at the North Middlesex Hospital would provide services to children and 
families as back-up, as would the hospital social workers at Chase Farm Hospital 
and the community social workers in the Edmonton Centre. However, as Ms Carr 
pointed out, back-up staff would then have to adapt to a new environment and 
new procedures, which was invariably problematic.
8.30     Ms Johns was an experienced social worker who had been with the Enfield hospital 
social work team for nearly five years. She was one of only two and a half full-time 
equivalent children and families’ social workers in Ms Lipworth’s 10-strong team 
(nine full-time equivalents) at the North Middlesex Hospital. By July 1999, she 
worked primarily in antenatal, postnatal and general paediatric social work. She 
had recently returned to work after a month’s sick leave from work-related stress 
caused, she believed, by strife within the team. Ms Johns described difficulties 
caused by absences and sickness of other full-time staff. Ms Johns also stated that 
there was “chronic conflict and tension” between staff, including her own line 
manager Ms Lipworth. As with much else that required managerial resolution 
in the North Middlesex Hospital social work team, this staffing issue was left 
unaddressed until June 2000.
8.31     However, Ms Johns was quite clear that these matters in no way influenced her 
handling of Victoria’s case, nor did she rely on work pressures at the time or the 
availability (or otherwise) of professional advice to explain her actions.
Victoria in Enfield
Referral
8.32     On 26 July 1999, two days after Victoria was admitted to the North Middlesex 
Hospital, Nurse Sharon Jones of Rainbow ward referred her to the Enfield hospital 
social work team. 
8.33     Ruth Warne took down the details of the referral at 3.15pm and completed 
an initial contact sheet in the name of ‘Anna Kovao’ and wrote the address as 
267 Somerset Gardens, Creighton Road, London N17. She recorded that Victoria 
had been admitted on 24 July 1999 with burns. She was suffering from scabies and 
had poured water on her head to stop the itching. When nurses bathed her they 
noticed marks on her back and arms. Once child protection forms had been filled 
out the referral was passed to Ms Johns.
8.34     Had Ms Johns or any of the other hospital social work team attended the weekly 
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the medical team’s concerns about Victoria from Dr Rossiter, the consultant 
paediatrician, and Dr Justin Richardson, the paediatric registrar, even before the 
referral had been made. The psychosocial notes for that day’s meeting question 
whether the scalding injuries were non-accidental and register the long time delay 
between the scalding and Victoria’s presentation to the accident and emergency 
department. Certainly, Ms Johns or her colleagues would have had the opportunity 
to explore those concerns directly and question the extent to which non-accidental 
injury was suspected. It is possible they would also have seen the body maps, 
which Dr David Reynders, the paediatric senior house officer, said he prepared in 
time for the meeting. However, for the reasons already given, Enfield hospital social 
workers had ceased attending these meetings some 18 months earlier.
8.35     Instead, Ms Johns telephoned Nurse Jones who merely repeated the details 
recorded by Ms Warne on the initial contact sheet. In her action sheet Ms Johns 
recorded that following the child protection meeting there was a concern. 
However, according to Nurse Jones, the completed child protection forms did 
not specify non-accidental injury.
8.36     This was the first of a number of file notes prepared by Ms Johns in Victoria’s 
case and I give her credit for the quality of her clear, accurate and comprehensive 
casework recording throughout. Indeed, given the lack of any comparable notes 
produced at the time by the North Middlesex Hospital, I have placed heavy 
reliance on Ms Johns’s notes and her evidence arising from them to provide an 
account of the information exchange that took place between the hospital and 
social services during the first few days of Victoria’s admission.
8.37     Ms Johns advised that a doctor speak to Kouao to inform her that a referral 
was being made to social services and to seek her explanation for the marks 
on Victoria’s body. She also advised that the child protection forms should be 
reviewed in order to specify whether any of the injuries observed were believed to 
be non-accidental. She did not consider it appropriate at this stage to go up to the 
ward to see or speak to Victoria. Had Victoria been an Enfield child, Enfield’s child 
protection procedures state quite clearly the child should be seen by the social 
workers as a “matter of urgency”. However, when asked why the same would not 
apply to Victoria, Ms Johns said:
“It would be inappropriate for a social worker to go marching in ... you 
could not. You would have to ask parents’ permission to speak to a 
child anyway. Talking to a child could prejudice, possibly contaminate 
evidence that the police may want later for criminal proceedings.”
8.38     I do not share Ms Johns’s view and these were clearly not concerns that Enfield 
considered relevant when drafting their own procedures. I return to this issue of 
speaking to Victoria later in paragraph 8.49 and the wider implications later in this 
Report.
Contacting Haringey Social Services
8.39     That same afternoon at about 3.45pm, Ms Johns faxed the duty social worker at 
Haringey’s North Tottenham District Office a standard request for any information 
known about “Anna Kovao”. Although Ms Johns was keen for the doctors at the 
North Middlesex Hospital to firm up their view as to whether Victoria’s burns 
were accidental or not, she certainly had not ruled out non-accidental injury when 
making her first contact with Haringey Social Services.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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8.40     She relayed her reason for the request as follows:
“Child admitted on 24/7/99 with (?) accidental burns to head and face 
when she poured hot water over her head to stop itching caused by 
scabies. Other marks have been noted on her back and the origin of 
these will be checked out.”
8.41     At the time Ms Johns said, “It was the very beginning of a child protection referral 
that I saw here.” However, she was uncertain whether she had enough information 
to convey to Haringey that this case warranted a child protection investigation. 
In short, on 26 July1999 Ms Johns said she did not know whether there were 
suspected child protection concerns that would have required her to do an initial 
assessment of Victoria in accordance with the agreement between Haringey and 
Enfield.
8.42     Nonetheless she marked the fax as urgent and asked for a reply “by the next 
day, if possible”. In fact, according to her file note, Ms Johns received a phone 
call from Anil Nair at the North Tottenham District Office, although no copy of 
Ms Johns’s fax or any record of Haringey’s response appears on the Haringey 
case file. According to Ms Johns, she was told that “the client” was not known to 
Haringey Social Services. This was clearly a mistake for, albeit unknown to Mr Nair, 
Dr Simone Forlee had already contacted the out-of-office-hours Haringey social 
work team on 24 July 1999 to talk about Victoria’s case, and to let Haringey know 
that she had been admitted to the hospital. 
Obtaining a diagnosis of non-accidental injury
8.43     Early the next morning, 27 July 1999, Ms Johns took a call from Nurse Sue 
Jennings who was checking up on the action that social services were taking in 
relation to Victoria. Ms Johns explained to Nurse Jennings, as she had previously 
to Nurse Jones, that social services would not take any further action, which in 
Victoria’s case meant making a referral to Haringey, until they had a clear diagnosis 
of non-accidental injury and the parents had been informed of social services’ 
involvement. When questioned, Ms Johns accepted there was in fact no procedural 
hurdle that required any such preconditions before she could take action. Nor was 
she prevented from doing so because the relevant correct child protection boxes 
on the child protection forms had not been ticked. However, it remained her view 
the box marked “I wish to await further information before committing myself” 
that Dr Forlee had ticked on 24 July was not good enough. She told the Inquiry, 
“That should never exist, that box. We can do nothing with that and I have always 
had a problem when that box is filled in.”
8.44     After updating her team manager, Ms Lipworth, Ms Johns agreed to send a 
memorandum to the sister in charge of Rainbow ward and copied it to Dr Maud 
Meates, the admitting consultant, repeating the advice she had given to Nurse 
Jennings. She delivered the memo to the ward nurse in charge by hand. In support 
of what Ms Johns understood to be the correct procedure, she attached to her 
memo a copy of the page in the social work department section of the North 
Middlesex Hospital child protection procedures. These require the examining 
paediatrician to specify whether the case is one of child protection or not, and 
to advise the social worker of who has informed the parent(s) that a referral has 
been made to social services. However, Ms Johns accepted the procedures did 
not suggest, as implied by her memo, that, in the absence of both of these, social 
services could do nothing more.
8.45     In her memo she stated she had made preliminary checks and Victoria was not 
known to either the hospital social work team or Haringey Social Services. She also 
wrote, on the basis of the box on the child protection form ticked by Dr Forlee, 8  Enfield Social Services
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that she understood ‘non-accidental’ injury had not been suggested in Victoria’s 
case. This observation was to prove remarkably at odds with the observations of 
Victoria’s condition over the previous three days from the staff on Rainbow ward.
8.46     Ms Johns did not have to wait long for the confirmation of non-accidental 
injury that she was looking for, although it was not in relation to the scalding 
incident. That same morning, Dr Forlee, the senior house officer who had first 
admitted Victoria on 24 July, telephoned Ms Johns. Dr Forlee told her that when 
she (Dr Forlee) had completed the child protection forms she had been unsure 
whether the facial burns were non-accidental. However, other concerns had 
emerged. Ms Johns recorded these as follows:
“– Anna has old scars all over her body. A diagram has been made. The marks 
resemble the shape of a belt buckle
– A skeletal survey has been carried out – results are not yet known
– Concerns regarding interaction with mother. Anna wet herself when mother 
came even though she had been dry all day (bed wets at night), she seems on 
edge when mother visits, she was described by the ward staff as seeming to 
‘jump to attention’ when her mother came
– On admission Anna was unkempt in a dirty dress, with no underwear. Mother 
was well kempt
– Mother has not brought any clean clothes for Anna since her admission.”
8.47     Once again Ms Johns said she told Dr Forlee that the child protection forms would 
need to be amended to reflect these new concerns and that the parents needed 
to be told that there would be a referral to social services. Dr Forlee agreed to let 
Ms Johns know when this had happened and she (Dr Forlee) thought most likely 
it would be the next day.
8.48     By now Ms Johns was clear there were child protection concerns. Ms Johns’s 
understanding of the agreement with Haringey was that she would only be 
expected to complete an ‘initial assessment’ of Victoria if Haringey could not 
respond immediately, and only then by agreement with Haringey.
Failure to speak to Victoria
8.49     Following her phone conversation with Dr Forlee, Ms Johns paid her second visit 
to Rainbow ward in connection with Victoria’s case. Victoria was pointed out to 
Ms Johns at a distance but Ms Johns did not speak to her, despite what she had 
learned from Dr Forlee. This was not an oversight. She told the Inquiry, “I made 
a deliberate decision not to see Victoria”. She gave a number of reasons for not 
doing so:
“For one, there was no parental permission for any social worker to 
see this child. The parent had not even been told of concerns and also 
I would not wish to prejudice any investigation given that there was 
a possibility that a crime had been committed and this little girl was 
injured.”
8.50     She was also aware that English was not Victoria’s mother tongue. In her view, 
“no social worker would have interviewed either the mother or the child without 
a French-speaking interpreter”. Yet again, Ms Johns’s decision not to speak to 
Victoria at the earliest opportunity, and certainly before the referral to Haringey 
Social Services, was in my opinion fundamentally wrong in principle and practice. 
I shall return to this at some length later.
8.51     Instead she discussed Victoria’s case with Nurse Jennings and read the case notes 
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the scalding injury and the concerns Dr Forlee had already conveyed by phone that 
morning, Ms Johns also recorded the following facts (without pause for question):
• Kouao’s husband had died in June 1994.
• Kouao herself was born in 1966 and yet claimed to have four other children the 
eldest of whom was 24 [thus making Kouao nine years old at the time she 
gave birth to her eldest child].
• Kouao and Victoria had been in the country four months.
• Kouao had visited Victoria every day but for short periods as she was working.
• Kouao was in the UK on study leave for two years having left behind a job in 
France as an airport manager.
8.52     Ms Johns updated her team manager and they agreed that she should make 
a formal referral to Haringey Social Services and that Kouao would have 
to be interviewed. Ms Johns made the referral by telephone and spoke to 
Caroline Rodgers in the North Tottenham District Office at around 4.30pm on 
27 July 1999. 
8.53     It is vitally important that when a social worker from one local authority transfers 
responsibility for a case in this manner that the receiving authority is clear what its 
responsibilities are. The Enfield child protection procedures required the manager 
in Ms Lipworth’s position to formally agree the transfer of responsibility with the 
relevant service manager in Haringey. In Victoria’s case this was not done. There is a 
clear danger when cases are transferred without clear and thorough procedures being 
followed, that confusion may arise over who is responsible for what. In an effort to 
avoid such confusion arising in the future, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Where hospital-based social work staff come into contact with children from 
other local authority areas, the directors of social services of their employing 
authorities must ensure that they work to a single set of guidance agreed by all 
the authorities concerned. 
Transferring responsibility to Haringey
8.54     Ms Rodgers’s record of what she was told, namely a summary of Victoria’s 
presenting problems on admission and the ward medical team’s subsequent 
concerns for her, appears to be a fair reflection of what Ms Johns knew at the 
time and was recorded in her own case file notes. Although Ms Johns said she 
also agreed with Ms Rodgers to await further contact from Haringey before 
interviewing Kouao, she did not expect to do this now that the case had been 
formally transferred to Haringey. In fact, Ms Johns expected to do nothing more 
at all in Victoria’s case unless it was by prior negotiation, with Haringey as the lead 
investigating authority.
8.55     Ms Johns updated both Dr Saji Alexander, the paediatric registrar, and Nurse 
Jennings about the referral to Haringey Social Services before learning from Shanthi 
Jacob, duty senior manager at North Tottenham District Office, that a strategy 
meeting had been arranged for 2.30pm the next day at the social services office, 
and not the hospital as required by Haringey’s own child protection procedures.
Strategy meeting
8.56     In her written statement, Ms Johns said that a hospital social worker would not 
normally attend Haringey meetings unless a manager thought it essential. When 
Ms Jacob’s invitation arrived Ms Lipworth was not on site. Nonetheless Ms Johns 8  Enfield Social Services
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agreed to go without first seeking permission because she said she “felt particularly 
concerned for Victoria’s safety and well-being”. She believed she told Ms Jacob 
words to the effect that she would be lucky to get any medics to attend, although 
she said it was only later that she learned that Dr Rossiter would not be able to go. 
According to Ms Johns, that made it “even more crucial that I attend in order to 
pass all the medical forms to Haringey Social Services”.
8.57     Ms Johns said she was not aware it was part of Haringey child protection 
procedures that strategy meetings involving Haringey children admitted to hospital 
should be held in the hospital. She simply recollected that Dr Rossiter said she had 
an agreement with Haringey that it should be so. Ms Johns’s lack of awareness 
of an important requirement of the Haringey procedures highlights the need for 
a single, clear set of procedures and reinforces the recommendation I made at 
paragraph 8.7 above.
8.58     In oral evidence, Ms Johns said she asked Ms Jacob if the strategy meeting venue 
could be changed to the hospital but was told by Ms Jacob, after checking with 
her manager, that the venue had to stay as planned originally.
8.59     It was Dr Rossiter who told Ms Johns in a telephone conversation that she would 
not be able to attend the Haringey strategy meeting. According to Ms Johns’s 
note of their conversation they discussed Victoria, and Dr Rossiter queried whether 
there were signs of anxious attachment. She told Ms Johns she thought at the very 
least there was neglect, probable emotional abuse and possibly physical abuse. 
She also mentioned in passing that Kouao visited Victoria late at night and the 
photographs that had been ordered had now been taken. In fact the photographs 
were not taken until 29 July 1999. I know of no basis for Dr Rossiter’s belief that 
the photographs had been taken. She also gave Ms Johns the details of Dr Meates, 
the consultant paediatrician with day-to-day responsibility on the ward but not 
child protection responsibility. Ms Johns was told that the play therapist on 
Rainbow ward, Noelle O’Boyce, had also made some observations but Ms Johns 
did not pursue this as part of any ‘initial assessment’, either with Dr Rossiter or 
Ms O’Boyce, because Haringey had accepted responsibility for the case. She said, 
“All the action was now their action and would have had to be negotiated with 
me.” Dr Rossiter could not recall this conversation but she did not have any note 
to contradict what Ms Johns recorded as having passed between them.
8.60     Ms Johns believed, though she no longer had any independent recollection of 
this, that she and Dr Rossiter would have discussed updating the child protection 
forms. It was not unreasonable for Ms Johns to have focused so much attention on 
the proper completion of the child protection forms. The child protection forms 
she had seen on the ward at that time related only to the scalding injuries for 
which Victoria had been admitted. The hospital medical team was yet to confirm 
for Ms Johns whether they believed those burns injuries were non-accidental. In 
addition, the ward staff had now raised new concerns, conveyed to Ms Johns by 
Dr Forlee, on the basis of marks seen on Victoria’s body which appeared to bear 
no direct relationship to the scalding incident. Ms Johns had yet to see any new 
child protection forms completed in respect of these concerns and this was the 
position she found herself in when she attended the strategy meeting at the North 
Tottenham District Office on 28 July 1999.
8.61     On her way to the meeting, Ms Johns visited Rainbow ward a third time, to 
collect and photocopy the child protection forms, the accident and emergency 
card and the body “diagrams”. She did not have the skeletal survey results or 
the photographs because they were not yet available. In fact, contrary to the 
information she had been given by Dr Rossiter, Ms Johns noted after her visit to the 
ward that the whole-body photographs had still to be taken. She did not have any The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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of the information from the nurses’ critical incident log because she did not know 
of its existence, nor was she aware of the significance of that document.
8.62     If Ms Johns had looked at the log on this occasion, the only additional information 
she would have gleaned was that Kouao and a gentleman had visited Victoria at 
about 10.30pm, had woken Victoria from her sleep and that Kouao kept pointing 
a finger to her. It was also on the critical incident log that Nurse Jennings observed 
on 27 July 1999 that ‘Anna’ would like to communicate and that a French link 
worker would be a good idea. The important point is that without looking at the 
log Ms Johns did not know whether she was missing critical pieces of information.
8.63     Apart from the critical incident log, there were significant pieces of information 
contained elsewhere in Victoria’s notes. For example, there was a reference to 
Victoria’s earlier admission to the Central Middlesex Hospital in her ward notes 
and, on the CP 1 form completed by Dr Forlee, it said that Kouao and Victoria had 
previously had dealings with an unspecified social services department. Neither of 
these pieces of information were drawn to the attention of Haringey Social Services 
in time for the 28 July 1999 strategy meeting. 
8.64     While on the ward, Ms Johns said she had been told that Kouao had been 
informed of the referral to social services but Kouao had not been asked for any 
explanation of the marks on Victoria’s body. Ms Johns did not know why this was 
but said she noted it down nonetheless.
8.65     Ms Johns expected the child protection forms to have been amended as she had 
asked and as she thought had been agreed, but they were not. However, despite 
having no clear, updated medical report from the hospital, she was aware of 
Dr Forlee’s concerns and she conveyed these to the strategy meeting. She also 
gave each of the participants – Rosemarie Kozinos, Ms Rodgers and PC Karen Jones 
– a copy of the hospital documentation she brought with her. As a result, by way 
of written material from the hospital, the strategy meeting had an unresolved 
view as to whether the scalding incident was non-accidental. They also had a set 
of body maps showing a series of marks on Victoria’s body but no direct written 
opinion to confirm whether these, too, could possibly be non-accidental injuries.
Action points from the strategy meeting
8.66     Therefore, perhaps not surprisingly, Ms Johns wrote “request medical report 
regarding skeletal survey and old injuries (dates etc)” in the case file as the first 
action from the strategy meeting. According to her note, the rest of the action 
plan was agreed as follows:
“– when medical information is available, undertake joint visit/interview with police 
child protection team
– if appropriate, interview Anna
– mother to be informed regarding social services intervention
– check scabies and its relationship to possible neglect
– check school attended
– full child protection investigation.”
8.67     She took from the meeting the following tasks to perform:
“– seek report from the ward staff regarding neglect
– check with Dr Meates whether photographs can be passed to the police
– alert ward to call the police if attempt to remove Anna from the ward is made
– ask the ward staff to monitor mother/daughter interaction
– keep Haringey Social Services informed of any discharge plans.”8  Enfield Social Services
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8.68     Ms Johns only recorded 12 of the 18 action points that appear in the Haringey case 
file. That she was not entitled automatically to receive a copy of the minutes of the 
meeting, according to Haringey’s child protection procedures, meant that she was 
unable to remedy any discrepancy between the two.
8.69     The expectation was that Ms Johns and the chair of the strategy meeting, 
Ms Kozinos, would jointly undertake the first, second and fifth tasks. In her record 
of the action plan Ms Kozinos had indicated “hospital social worker” against each 
of the three tasks. That Ms Johns should have assumed responsibility for the other 
two tasks, namely to alert the ward to call the police if an attempt was made to 
remove Victoria, as well as asking the ward staff to monitor mother/daughter 
interaction, is less than clear, particularly as Ms Kozinos told the Inquiry: “Unless 
otherwise stated as hospital social worker or police child protection team, it is the 
social worker from our office that carries the decisions out with the lead agency”.
8.70     Given no such ‘hospital social worker’ indication was made against these two 
tasks, the scope for confusion was obvious, particularly for Lisa Arthurworrey, to 
whom the case was subsequently allocated and who had not been present at the 
strategy meeting.
8.71     On her return to the North Middlesex Hospital, Ms Johns wrote and then delivered 
a memo for the ward notes addressed to the sister in charge of Rainbow ward. 
She also updated Nurse Jennings on the outcome of the strategy meeting. In 
the memo she asked if the ward staff could provide a summary of the observed 
interaction between Kouao and Victoria that had given cause for concern and 
if they could continue to monitor and record the interaction between the two. 
Ms Johns said this was how she interpreted her task from the strategy meeting to 
seek a report from the ward staff concerning neglect. In terms of the third task 
that she took from the strategy meeting, Ms Johns advised Nurse Jennings that if 
Kouao did attempt to remove Victoria from the ward before discharge was agreed 
jointly by the hospital and Haringey Social Services, the police should be alerted 
immediately and asked to step in. She also gave notice that Haringey would be 
contacting Dr Meates for further medical information.
8.72     On 29 July 1999, Ms Johns paid her fifth visit to Rainbow ward, to return the 
original child protection forms she had taken away to photocopy for the strategy 
meeting and to update Nurse Beatrice Norman. She also tried twice to contact 
Dr Meates by telephone but she was unavailable. Ms Johns sent her a memo to let 
her know that Haringey Social Services would be undertaking a child protection 
investigation in respect of Victoria, and that the duty social worker, Ms Rodgers, 
would try and contact her in the near future. She also wanted Dr Meates’s advice 
as to the procedure for letting the police have the hospital’s medical photographs 
of Victoria “so as to avoid the need to repeat the procedure twice”. According to 
Ms Johns’s statement, Dr Meates replied within two days by annotating Ms Johns’s 
original memo to her – the date stamp suggests it was received by the hospital 
social work team on 2 August 1999. The reply gave permission for the police to 
have copies of the photographs provided they followed the procedures. Ms Johns 
passed on this information to Haringey Social Services.
Victoria is discharged from hospital
8.73     On 2 August 1999, Ms Johns also received a telephone call from Nurse Jennings on 
Rainbow ward to say that Victoria was fit for discharge. Ms Johns told the Inquiry 
she was quite clear that fit for discharge meant only that Victoria was ‘medically’ 
fit enough to go home or to go elsewhere. Nurse Jennings expressed her view that 
she would like the discharge to happen as soon as possible. According to Ms Johns 
it was normal for the ward to say that because they are always in need of beds. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Nurse Jennings also told Ms Johns that the scabies was no longer active. Ms Johns 
agreed to let North Tottenham District Office know the position.
8.74     For the reasons already noted, Ms Johns did not attend the psychosocial meeting 
that afternoon. The notes of the meeting, kept in a book in the psychiatry 
department, identified signs of emotional abuse and noted that Victoria seemed 
scared of mother’s visits with her male friend, though she was not fearful when just 
mother visited. In fact Victoria seemed “clingy with mother”.
8.75     Had Ms Johns attended the psychosocial meeting she may have noticed the 
inconsistency between this description of Kouao’s interaction with Victoria and 
that contained in Dr Forlee’s notes. Dr Forlee’s notes revealed concerns regarding 
Victoria’s interaction with Kouao, in particular that Victoria wet herself when her 
mother visited, Victoria seemed “on edge when her mother visits” and that Victoria 
seemed to “jump to attention” when Kouao visited. Dr Rossiter did attend the 
meeting that day and she recalled asking for a psychiatric assessment because of 
her concerns about emotional abuse. According to Dr Rossiter, the psychiatrist 
was not prepared to see Victoria without further background information and until 
she had been assessed by social services. However, as the hospital never wrote to 
Haringey to pursue this, and partly because Ms Johns did not attend the meeting, 
this exchange of views never reached Haringey.
8.76     Ms Johns subsequently made four separate telephone calls. First she rang the 
North Tottenham District Office to speak to Ms Kozinos. Ms Kozinos told her that 
Victoria’s case had been allocated to Ms Arthurworrey. Ms Johns recorded speaking 
to Ms Arthurworrey that same day and in her oral evidence Ms Arthurworrey said 
that they probably did have a conversation. Ms Arthurworrey remembered saying 
she had not yet been given the file but that she would contact Ms Johns when 
she had it. Ms Johns then left a message for Dr Meates to telephone her. She rang 
Nurse Jennings on Rainbow ward twice, first to let her know the outcome of her 
contact with the North Tottenham District Office and then later in the afternoon to 
say, as she had yet to hear from Ms Arthurworrey, she would fax her and invite her 
to make contact directly with the ward.
8.77     The next morning, Ms Johns faxed a memo to Ms Arthurworrey letting her know 
that Victoria was “ready for discharge” and the ward would like this to happen 
as soon as possible. Ms Johns did not qualify this remark or indicate in any way 
it was her understanding that although Victoria was medically fit for discharge, 
discharge should only happen if social services agreed jointly that it was in fact 
safe for Victoria to be discharged. She indicated to Ms Arthurworrey that she 
might want to talk to the ward directly to discuss social services’ involvement and 
gave her Nurse Isobel Quinn’s details as the nurse in charge for that day. She also 
mentioned that Victoria’s scabies had been successfully treated and was no longer 
active and she passed on Dr Meates’s message for the police with regard to the 
photographs. She admitted she did not know what the usual procedures were for 
the police to obtain the photographs but assumed that PC Jones would know.
8.78     Finally, Ms Johns contacted Nurse Quinn to update her and pass on 
Ms Arthurworrey’s contact details. Ms Johns was to have no more involvement in 
Victoria’s case from 3 August 1999. She completed and signed off the necessary 
paperwork on 9 August, including a brief closing summary. The summary 
did not address the hospital’s view as to whether the scalding incident was 
non-accidental, the significance of the other marks discovered on Victoria’s body 
and whether there was anything other than a query around possible emotional 
abuse and neglect. Against the box marked ‘risk factors’ Ms Johns wrote “N/E” 
(not established). The reason for this, according to Ms Johns, was that Victoria’s 8  Enfield Social Services
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case had been transferred to Haringey Social Services and they had accepted 
responsibility. Therefore, it rested with Haringey to identify the relevant risk factors.
8.79     Ms Lipworth closed Victoria’s file in Enfield on 13 September 1999.
Analysis of practice
8.80     Viewed as a whole, Ms Johns’s role in Victoria’s case was limited to that of a 
‘postbox’ for information passing between the hospital and Haringey Social 
Services. Ms Johns’s description of herself as a “conduit of information” is difficult 
to challenge and I have to question whether that can be a sensible use of an 
experienced social worker’s time.
8.81     Having heard all the evidence, I fully accept that in her clear and unambiguous 
referral to Ms Rodgers on 27 July 1999, and in the information she conveyed to 
the strategy meeting on 28 July, Ms Johns provided Haringey Social Services both 
orally and in writing with the fullest details she possessed at the time. I am left in 
no doubt that if Ms Johns had been given the full picture by the North Middlesex 
Hospital staff, as they described to me in their evidence, she would have recorded 
it and passed it on to Haringey.
The initial assessment
8.82     The inadequacies in the initial assessment may in part be attributable to the fact 
that the Enfield-Haringey protocol in place at the time stipulated the following two 
options in relation to Haringey child protection cases:
• Where there are clear concerns of child protection needs in a case, Enfield 
hospital social workers find that usually Haringey Social Services respond 
immediately, whether the case is known to them or not. If they cannot respond 
immediately they agree a plan of action with the team manager.
• Where child protection needs are not clear but are suspected, if the case is 
not known to Haringey, the hospital social worker will do an initial assessment 
in consultation with the duty team manager, ie getting any background 
information. This assessment will then be discussed with the duty team manager 
and, if agreed that it is clearly child protection, the district team will continue the 
work. If hospital social workers feel it is child protection and the district does not, 
the team leaders of hospital and district need to discuss.
8.83     On 26 July 1999, having established that Victoria was unknown to Haringey, 
Ms Johns had sufficient information in relation to the scalding incident to firmly put 
Victoria’s case into the second of these two protocol options; in other words child 
protection needs were not clear but suspected. When asked, Ms Johns accepted 
that she had responsibility for Victoria from 3.15pm on 26 July – though in her 
mind the responsibility went no further than seeking to clarify the referral. Counsel 
to the Inquiry then pressed her as to which child protection protocol option 
she thought the case fell into at that stage. Ms Johns was less than clear in her 
response. I have no such doubts.
8.84     Ms Johns had already conceded that she did not, contrary to the advice she gave 
to the nursing and medical staff on Rainbow ward in her memo, require clear 
specification by a doctor of non-accidental injury and confirmation that the carers 
had been told of a referral to social services before she could become involved. 
Indeed, arguably the whole purpose of the second option, the ‘not clear’ category, 
was to kick-start an initial assessment at the earliest opportunity (in conjunction The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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with Haringey) in order to firm up the child protection concerns and assess the risk 
to Victoria.
8.85     Admittedly, through no fault of Ms Johns, the child protection process had already 
got off to a false start. Dr Forlee’s first discussion with Haringey Social Services 
on the evening of 24 July 1999 had prompted no immediate investigative action. 
Ms Johns, however, soon had an opportunity to get matters back on track. In my 
view, the time she spent from 26 July onwards – reminding hospital staff of the 
procedures to be followed – would have been better spent talking to Victoria and 
Kouao and ascertaining the views of the medical and nursing staff responsible for 
Victoria’s care. The only advantage in pressing for the proper completion of the 
child protection forms with a clear diagnosis of child protection, from Enfield’s 
perspective, was that it would move Victoria’s case into the first option, and 
provided that Haringey accepted the case and could respond immediately, which 
they did, responsibility for undertaking any assessment would pass to them. As a 
result, any obligation on an Enfield hospital social worker to do more than the 
most rudimentary first checks would have disappeared.
8.86     In the 24 hours or so that Victoria’s case rested with Ms Johns, and despite there 
being no clear child protection concerns, Ms Johns did little more social work 
investigative tasks than check whether Victoria was known to Haringey, speak to 
medical staff, read Victoria’s case notes on the ward and consult with her manager. 
There were no phone calls to any other agencies. For example, a phone call to the 
Central Middlesex Hospital would have opened a whole trail of inquiries leading 
back to Brent and Ealing Social Services. However, Ms Johns thought these were 
part of the secondary checks that Haringey would perform. The fact they did 
not is clearly not the responsibility of Enfield Social Services, but once again an 
opportunity to pull together information known about Victoria by those whose 
remit it was to do so, and for however short a period, was lost.
8.87     When asked what she thought was meant by an ‘initial assessment’, Ms Johns was 
anything but clear because there was no clear definition at the time:
“At the time ... it was very unclear ... initial assessment could just 
simply mean gathering the information that was available and clarifying 
from that what kind of referral there was or was not, or perhaps even 
interviewing a parent ... You might actually be assessing what kind of 
case this is, because if child protection needs are not clear, that does 
need to be clarified at some point. Before the case can be passed to 
Haringey properly and appropriately, that does need to be clear.”
8.88     Both Ms Carr and Ms Lipworth supported Ms Johns’s notion that it was sufficient 
as of 26 July 1999 to do no more than clarify the kind of referral Enfield was 
dealing with before passing it on to Haringey. Enfield’s own management review 
of Victoria’s case took a different view:
“It must be pointed out that an initial assessment would normally include 
gathering background information and the Child Protection Guidelines 
for North Middlesex Hospital state that a hospital should do preliminary 
checks on all cases.”
8.89     However, while the author of that report conceded it was acceptable for those 
initial checks, which according to the guidelines ought to include health visitor, GP, 
police child protection team and school if relevant, to be undertaken by Haringey, 
it was the author’s clear opinion that an initial assessment would normally include 
contact with a parent.8  Enfield Social Services
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8.90     The doubts expressed by many to the Inquiry about what constitutes an initial 
assessment will hopefully be remedied with the full-scale implementation of the 
new National Assessment Framework. For any experienced social worker in the 
summer of 1999 to believe that undertaking an initial assessment – or as Ms Johns 
would have it, clarifying the nature of a possible child protection referral – could be 
done without seeing and speaking to the child, the child’s carer and the ward staff 
who had daily care of the child, is difficult to credit.
8.91     While responsibility for sharing medical information and other observations about 
Victoria during her stay on the ward clearly rested with the hospital, it seems likely 
that conversations with the ward and medical staff might have uncovered much 
that the hospital failed to pass on.
8.92     Enfield accepted that the ‘initial assessment’ they carried out while Victoria was in 
hospital was limited, but they submitted that in the circumstances of the case being 
accepted as a child protection referral by Haringey within 26 hours of Ms Johns 
receiving the referral and while Victoria was safe in hospital, Ms Johns’s actions 
were quite appropriate. Had Victoria been about to be discharged, or had Haringey 
responded differently and not accepted the case, Ms Johns said she would have 
investigated further. I do not accept this. Even at the most basic level Ms Johns did 
not take the basic steps necessary to ensure that Haringey staff received the fullest 
information.
Speaking to Kouao
8.93     Enfield has also accepted that none of its social workers spoke to Kouao while 
Victoria was in hospital, but again claim that the window of opportunity to do so 
was small and they question what relevance such an interview would have had.
8.94     Ms Johns said in evidence, and the records confirm her understanding of the 
conversation with Ms Rodgers on 27 July 1999, that she would await contact 
from Haringey before interviewing Kouao. However, as has been pointed out 
already in paragraph 8.54, it was not Ms Johns’s expectation that she would have 
to interview Kouao once Haringey had accepted the case, unless this had been 
negotiated between her and Haringey. In assessing the failure by an Enfield social 
worker to interview Kouao, the following ought to be borne in mind.
8.95     Although the North Middlesex Hospital guidelines say it is sufficient to discuss with 
the consultant paediatrician or registrar when the parents/carers should be seen 
and by whom, the Enfield Area Child Protection Committee guide to inter-agency 
procedure and practice for professional staff states:
“Parents need to be clear from the start what procedures are being 
involved, who makes what decisions, the statutory powers, duties and 
roles of the agencies involved and their own legal rights. This should all 
be explained by the social worker.”
8.96     By the time of the strategy meeting on 28 July 1999, neither Ms Johns nor any of 
the medical staff involved in Victoria’s care had spoken to Kouao for the purpose of 
eliciting her explanation for the old marks found on Victoria’s body and observing 
her reaction to the concerns felt by the hospital. Information of this nature may have 
proved highly valuable for the strategy meeting. Ms Johns was aware, as a result of her 
dealings with the case so far, that Kouao had yet to be spoken to for these purposes. 
In my view, she should have done so herself in time for the strategy meeting. 
Seeing and speaking to Victoria
8.97     Finally I come to Ms Johns’s decision neither to see nor speak to Victoria. Ms Johns 
visited Rainbow ward on five different occasions but made no attempt to speak The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
238
to Victoria. She gave several reasons why she did not. Ms Johns was not alone 
in expressing reservations about speaking to a child in Victoria’s circumstances. 
Several witnesses said they had seen guidance that said they must be cautious 
about contaminating evidence or forming any kind of relationship with a child. 
Ms Johns was the person with a vital role in communicating the concerns of 
the hospital staff to Haringey Social Services in as comprehensive and helpful a 
manner as possible. In the situation in which Victoria found herself, this was a more 
important consideration than the possible ‘contamination’ of any investigative 
interview that might prove necessary. I note that by this point, in any event, 
Victoria had already been spoken to by a significant number of other people, 
including Kouao. In such circumstances, it is difficult to see what further damage 
to the investigative process Ms Johns might have done. 
8.98     It is agreed that, as of 27 July 1999, Haringey had accepted full case responsibility 
for Victoria and that the ball was firmly in their court when it came to arranging 
a formal interview, which complied with the Home Office Memorandum of Good 
Practice (a ‘memorandum interview’) jointly with the police. That this should be 
done strictly within the good practice guidelines is not in question. However, those 
guidelines do not prevent a simple exchange of conversation with the child, the 
content of which should be properly recorded. Seeing, listening to and observing 
the child must be an essential element of an initial assessment for any social 
worker, and indeed any member of staff routinely working with children, and this 
can be of great importance when dealing with child protection cases.
8.99     Ms Johns should have had such a conversation with Victoria on 26 July 1999, when 
she had clear case responsibility. She offered two explanations for her failure to do 
so. First, that she did not wish to “form a relationship” with Victoria. Second, that 
she did not wish to compromise any future investigation. I reject these. The social 
worker’s role in these circumstances is simply to listen without interruption and to 
record and evaluate what has been said.
8.100   Enfield went on to suggest that even if Ms Johns had spoken to Victoria, since she 
had said nothing of significance about her circumstances to the numbers of nurses 
and others with whom she had had contact on a daily basis in the ward, there 
was little likelihood of Ms Johns discovering anything of forensic significance. It is 
a matter of speculation as to whether that is true, but by not seeing and speaking 
to Victoria Ms Johns passed up an opportunity to form her own impressions about 
this little girl, and it is these impressions which must go to the core of what a social 
work assessment is about. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation 
Hospital social workers must always respond promptly to any referral of 
suspected deliberate harm to a child. They must see and talk to the child, to the 
child’s carer and to those responsible for the care of the child in hospital, while 
avoiding the risk of appearing to coach the child.
8.101   Finally, Enfield concluded: “The reality is that had Victoria been seen or interviewed 
by a Haringey social worker on say 29th July no one would be critical of Ms Johns 
for not seeing her before that.”
8.102   Sadly this seems to miss the point entirely. Each individual practitioner must accept 
accountability for their own practice. They have a job to do and cannot put their 
trust in what might follow by others to justify their own actions or inaction.Part three: Health9 Central  Middlesex  Hospital
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9 Central Middlesex Hospital
Background to Victoria’s admission
9.1       Kouao brought Victoria to Priscilla Cameron’s house on 13 July 1999 at about 
8.30pm. She told Mrs Cameron that she had left the Nicoll Road hostel and was 
now living with Manning. She asked Mrs Cameron if she would look after Victoria 
permanently. Mrs Cameron refused, but said that Victoria could stay the night 
with her.
9.2       During the course of the night, both Mrs Cameron and her daughter, Avril 
Cameron, noticed that Victoria had a number of injuries. They decided that she 
had to be taken to hospital.
9.3       The Camerons were concerned not just that Victoria had been injured, but also as 
to how those injuries might have been caused. In order to try and find out, Avril 
Cameron took Victoria the following morning to see Marie Cader, a French teacher 
at her sons’ school. She told Ms Cader that she suspected Victoria might have been 
physically abused.
9.4       Ms Cader found Victoria reluctant to talk about her injuries. She also found her 
to be inconsistent in the explanations that she offered for them: “When I referred 
to how she hurt her face she did say to me that she had scratched herself, and 
I looked at her hands at the time, and I noticed that her nails were very short, so 
I asked her if she was sure about having scratched herself, and I explained that her 
nails were short. She then replied, ‘I fell.’”
9.5       Ms Cader agreed with Ms Cameron’s intention to take Victoria to hospital. She was 
confident that, once Victoria had been placed under the care of the hospital staff, 
“they would carry out the necessary procedure and ensure that the right people 
were contacted in order to help the child”. It is clear from what followed that her 
confidence was misplaced.
Central Middlesex Hospital
9.6       On 14 July 1999, Ms Cameron took Victoria to the Central Middlesex Hospital, 
which is situated in north west London within what was then the Brent and Harrow 
Health Authority and is now the North West London Strategic Health Authority.
9.7       The hospital itself formed part of the North West London Hospitals NHS Trust. 
The Trust was formed on 1 April 1999 by the merging of the Central Middlesex 
Hospital NHS Trust with the Northwick Park and St Mark’s NHS Trust. The current 
chief executive, John Pope, was appointed shortly after this merger. The current 
medical director, Dr John Riordan, was appointed in July 1999.
Arrival at accident and emergency department
9.8       Victoria was seen at 11.50am on 14 July 1999 by Dr Rhys Beynon, a senior house 
officer in the accident and emergency department. Ms Cameron told him what 
she knew of Victoria’s background. He recorded that she had been looked after 
by “a neighbour” for the past month and that “lots of bruises/cuts to face/arms/
hands” had been noticed. He also noted that, the previous night, Victoria’s mother The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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had asked the Camerons to “look after [Victoria] for good” and that they had 
noticed “lots of new cuts/bruises/red eyes”.
9.9       This history led Dr Beynon to consider it a strong possibility that Victoria’s injuries 
were non-accidental. He was aware of the requirement, laid down in the hospital’s 
child protection guidelines, that cases of suspected abuse had to be referred to 
a paediatrician. Accordingly, he contacted Dr Ekundayo Ajayi-Obe, the on-call 
paediatric registrar.
9.10     Dr Ajayi-Obe recalled being paged by Dr Beynon some time after midday. He 
explained that there was a child in the accident and emergency department whom 
he suspected to be suffering from non-accidental injury. Dr Ajayi-Obe agreed to 
take over responsibility for Victoria’s care.
Dr Beynon’s observations
9.11     Dr Beynon conducted only a very cursory examination of Victoria while she was 
under his care. His explanation for not being more thorough was as follows: 
“Given what I was told, she was going to have to be fully examined by the 
paediatric team. I did not feel any benefit from giving an eight-year-old child two 
full physical examinations.”
9.12     He did, however, notice numerous wounds on Victoria’s body. Unfortunately, 
precisely what he saw is unclear, due to the fact that he did not record his 
findings. While he accepted that he should have documented all that he saw, 
Dr Beynon told me that his failure to do so was due, at least in part, to the need 
for busy casualty officers to manage their time. He was aware that the paediatric 
team would be taking over Victoria’s care and that they would be undertaking a 
thorough examination at a later stage.
9.13     Despite the brevity of his notes, Dr Beynon said that, had he been informed that 
Victoria had been scratching excessively prior to her attendance at hospital, he 
would have recorded this information, as it would have been inconsistent with 
a diagnosis of non-accidental injury. Furthermore, he did not notice Victoria 
scratching herself.
9.14     In the context of his role as an accident and emergency senior house officer, 
I regard the approach that Dr Beynon took to Victoria’s care to be appropriate. 
He described that role as being akin to that of a “switchboard operator”, and that 
his primary responsibility was to refer Victoria on to someone with the requisite 
specialist knowledge and experience. This is precisely what he did, and in my view, 
he exhibited sound judgement in his care of Victoria by referring her immediately 
to a paediatric registrar.
9.15     In the normal course of events, this would be the last contact that a doctor in 
Dr Beynon’s position would expect to have with his patient. However, he was 
particularly interested in Victoria’s case and this led him to go up to the ward 
before his shift the following day to check on her progress. He was told that the 
child protection team was aware of Victoria’s case and was going to come and 
assess her.
9.16     Dr Beynon’s reasons for taking the time and trouble to find out what was to 
happen to Victoria after she had been admitted to the ward are instructive. He said 
that he thought that Victoria had a very interesting history and that, at the time, 
his concern for her was such that he thought she might end up in care.9 Central  Middlesex  Hospital
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9.17     Dr Beynon was an expert neither in paediatrics nor in child abuse – Victoria’s was 
one of only two cases of suspected child abuse that he saw in the six months he 
spent in the accident and emergency department. Nonetheless, he saw and heard 
enough, in the brief period during which he was involved in her care, to cause 
him considerable concern. The obvious implication – namely that Victoria was 
exhibiting fairly obvious signs of physical abuse on 14 July 1999 – is reinforced by 
the evidence of Dr Ajayi-Obe who assumed responsibility for her care later that 
afternoon.
Arrival on Barnaby Bear ward and assessment by 
Dr Ajayi-Obe
9.18     Victoria was transferred to Barnaby Bear ward. Following her arrival, she was 
examined by Dr Ajayi-Obe. She found Victoria to be a “jolly child” who was not 
unduly distressed by what was happening to her at the hospital. Dr Ajayi-Obe felt 
that, despite the fact that Victoria was able to understand her questions, she was 
reluctant to talk about how she had come by her injuries. She recorded her as 
being “a very secretive child”.
9.19     Dr Ajayi-Obe’s examination of Victoria would seem to have been a thorough one. 
Of the findings that she recorded in the notes, I consider the following to be of 
particular significance:
• “Scars of various sizes and ages all over body from about two days to several 
weeks, possibly months.”
• “Relatively fresh scars on the face, corners of mouth. Infected cuts on fingers, 
bloodshot eyes.”
• “A month ago Anna’s Mum came knocking on the carer’s door ... desperate to 
leave Anna with somebody for the following Monday.”
• “Does not go to school.”
• “Pungent smell, unkempt appearance.”
9.20     Dr Ajayi-Obe also completed a body map, on which she recorded a number of 
marks on both sides of Victoria’s face, on the top of her right arm, on both hands, 
on her back and on her buttocks. Precise details of all of these marks were not 
recorded by Dr Ajayi-Obe, but their location on parts of the body not normally 
affected by ordinary childhood accidents was sufficient in itself, in my view, to raise 
a suspicion of physical abuse.
9.21     In addition to their location, the nature of some of the marks was also a cause 
of concern: for example, the infected cuts that Dr Ajayi-Obe noted to Victoria’s 
fingers. As to the explanation for the cuts given by Kouao to the Camerons, 
Dr Adjayi-Obe remarked that she had never come across a child who had 
deliberately cut him or herself with a razor blade. In addition, she considered 
that Victoria’s bloodshot eyes could not have been caused by a cold, or by mere 
rubbing or crying.
9.22     Nor was Dr Ajayi-Obe satisfied with Victoria’s explanation of how she had come by 
her various injuries. When asked, Victoria indicated that she had caused the injuries 
herself and demonstrated itching and scratching. However, Dr Ajayi-Obe did not 
consider this to be credible and told me that, in her opinion, only some of the 
marks and injuries that she recorded could conceivably have been self-inflicted.
9.23     As to the question of whether Victoria’s injuries might have been attributable to 
scabies, Dr Ajayi-Obe said such a diagnosis did not cross her mind. This was despite 
the fact that she had seen a number of scabies cases while practising in Lagos.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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9.24     In marked contrast to any of the other doctors who saw Victoria, Dr Ajayi-Obe’s 
notes were detailed and comprehensive. She obtained a great deal of information 
about Victoria’s social situation which, together with her examination findings, 
occupy some seven pages of hospital notes. The examination she gave Victoria 
was detailed and thorough. As such, her notes provide the best evidence available 
as to the information available to the hospital staff on the day that Victoria was 
admitted.
9.25     I am satisfied that this information, viewed as a whole, was sufficient to ground 
a strong suspicion that Victoria was being physically abused. In particular, the 
quantity and distribution of marks on Victoria’s body added considerable weight to 
the suspicions expressed by Ms Cameron and the preliminary diagnosis made by 
Dr Beynon.
9.26     Dr Ajayi-Obe, it would seem, reached the same conclusion. Having examined 
Victoria and listened to her history, she was “strongly suspicious” that her injuries 
were non-accidental. She decided that Victoria should be admitted onto the ward.
Initial action by Dr Ajayi-Obe
9.27     Dr Ajayi-Obe then made two telephone calls. The first was to Dr Ruby Schwartz, 
the ‘on-call’ consultant who was also the hospital’s named doctor for child 
protection. Dr Schwartz remembers receiving Dr Ajayi-Obe’s call while conducting 
an epilepsy clinic at a local school. She was told that a child was on the ward with 
suspected non-accidental injuries. Although she made no note of the conversation, 
Dr Schwartz recalled that her response was to direct Dr Ajayi-Obe to admit Victoria 
and advise social services of the position. She said that she would come and 
see the child later that day. Dr Ajayi-Obe never had the opportunity to explain 
her concerns to Dr Schwartz face to face – she had gone off duty by the time 
Dr Schwartz arrived at the hospital.
9.28     In accordance with Dr Schwartz’s advice, the second call that Dr Ajayi-Obe made 
was to Brent Social Services, whose records indicate that the referral was received 
at 4pm. Dr Ajayi-Obe could not recall to whom she spoke but remembers telling 
someone that she had a child on the ward whom she suspected to be suffering 
from non-accidental injury.
9.29     At 5.30pm, Nurse Paula Johnson, ward sister and lead child protection nurse at the 
Central Middlesex Hospital, took a call from Michelle Hines of Brent Social Services. 
Nurse Johnson recorded in the hospital notes that Victoria had been placed in 
police protection and that she was not to leave the ward. The note also records 
that the child protection team preferred Mum not to visit. If she did, she was to be 
closely supervised.
Nursing records
9.30     At about this time, Ms Cameron left Victoria to go back to her own children. She 
asked one of the nurses to tell Victoria in French that, although she was leaving, 
the doctors and nurses would look after her. Far from being reassured, Victoria 
became “unusually upset” at Ms Cameron’s departure and tried desperately to 
follow her out of the ward. Victoria’s reaction was observed by several nurses, but 
was recorded by none of them.
9.31     In fact, the nursing notes relating to Victoria’s time on the ward are bereft of any 
information that might have been useful in the assessment of whether or not she 
was the victim of abuse. For example, Nurse Carol Graham, who recalled being 9 Central  Middlesex  Hospital
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told at the time of her admission that there were suspicions about Victoria, was 
shown marks on Victoria’s forearms by one of her colleagues, Nurse Mary Sexton. 
They both formed the view that the marks were indicative of non-accidental injury. 
Neither of them made any record of their findings or suspicions.
9.32     Furthermore, the fact that Victoria’s admission was related to concerns about abuse 
is absent from the nursing records. The nursing care plan for Victoria prepared by 
Nurse Bob Gobin, who was the nurse assigned to Victoria from 7.45pm onwards, 
makes no mention of any of the child protection concerns that brought Victoria 
into hospital in the first place, and attributes her admission solely to the fact that 
she was said to be suffering from scabies.
9.33     If, as Nurse Gobin said, the plan was written after Dr Schwartz’s ward round that 
evening, which I discuss at paragraph 9.36 below, one can understand why the 
issue of scabies should have featured prominently. Nonetheless, it would plainly 
have been preferable for the plan to have reflected the concerns relating to 
possible deliberate harm that had prompted Victoria’s admission in the first place, 
and the further concerns felt by some of the nursing staff during the time that 
Victoria was on the ward.
9.34     The importance of accuracy applies just as much to nursing records as it 
does to medical notes. Nurse Johnson shared my surprise that no mention of 
non-accidental injuries, suspicions of abuse, police protection or concerns about 
Kouao found their way into the nursing care plan. She told me that this is the 
first document that a nurse involved in the care of a particular child will look at. 
In Victoria’s case, she would have expected the plan to have consisted of two 
pages – one dealing with scabies and one relating to the suspicions of abuse 
which had prompted the admission.
9.35     The observations of nurses during the day-to-day care of children on the ward 
can be of enormous value in cases of possible deliberate harm. In order for this 
resource to be most effectively utilised, it is vital that the nursing staff are made 
aware of which children are the subject of concern. I therefore make the following 
recommendation:
Recommendation 
When a child is admitted to hospital and deliberate harm is suspected, the 
nursing care plan must take full account of this diagnosis.
Dr Schwartz’s ward round
9.36     Dr Schwartz examined Victoria on the paediatric assessment unit with Dr Anita 
Modi, an experienced paediatric registrar, at around 8pm. Dr Schwartz said she 
left Victoria’s examination until last because her case was a “complicated one” and 
she wanted to make sure that she had sufficient time to carry out a full assessment 
without interruption. Dr Schwartz told me that, prior to examining Victoria, she 
read all the notes taken since her admission.
9.37     By the time that Dr Schwartz arrived at Victoria’s bedside, Kouao was on the 
ward and the examination was carried out in her presence. Dr Schwartz was not 
concerned about the way Kouao and Victoria interacted, but she was troubled to 
hear they were homeless and that Victoria was not attending school. She had a 
discussion with Kouao (largely in French but using some English words) during the The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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course of which Kouao explained how Victoria had come by her injuries, giving an 
explanation that Dr Schwartz regarded as plausible.
9.38     Dr Schwartz could not recall whether she spoke directly to Victoria. What is 
clear, however, is that she did not seek to speak to her alone. With the benefit of 
hindsight, she accepted this would have been a sensible course of action, but at 
the time she expected a full investigation to be carried out by social services and 
was wary of compromising any interview they might wish to conduct.
9.39     I take the view that paediatricians should not be discouraged from speaking 
directly to a child, or from seeing a child alone, solely on the grounds that this 
might compromise a future joint investigation. I hold to this view especially when 
concerns about possible child abuse are presented initially to doctors so that they 
are the first members of the multi-disciplinary team with an opportunity to evaluate 
what has happened to a child. I therefore make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
When the deliberate harm of a child is identified as a possibility, the examining 
doctor should consider whether taking a history directly from the child is in that 
child’s best interests. When that is so, the history should be taken even when 
the consent of the carer has not been obtained, with the reason for dispensing 
with consent recorded by the examining doctor. Working Together guidance 
should be amended accordingly. In those cases in which English is not the first 
language of the child concerned, the use of an interpreter should be considered.
9.40     When Dr Schwartz finished examining Victoria, she concluded that she had 
scabies and this had caused her to scratch herself vigorously. She described the 
findings that led her to this conclusion as follows: “What I found were the marks, 
particularly on her hands, the scratch marks, the areas that looked as if they had 
pus in, and the fact that there were scratches on the body as well.” She was also 
influenced by what she considered to be the resemblance between Victoria’s 
symptoms and those of scabies sufferers she had seen in the past.
9.41     As to Dr Ajayi-Obe’s alternative interpretation of Victoria’s injuries, Dr Schwartz 
said that, in her judgement, neither the quantity nor the distribution of the marks 
on Victoria’s body were indicative of physical abuse. Furthermore, the marks on 
Victoria’s hands looked to her like superficial scratches rather than cuts inflicted by 
a razor blade and she noticed nothing significantly abnormal about Victoria’s eyes.
9.42     Dr Schwartz could not recall whether she looked at Victoria’s fingernails to see if they 
were long enough to cause the type of marks visible on Victoria’s body, nor could 
she recall asking Victoria whether she scratched herself. In addition, Dr Schwartz 
found no evidence of the burrows commonly associated with scabies infection.
9.43     Dr Schwartz also accepted that a scabies diagnosis could not account for all of the 
marks visible on Victoria’s body, many of which did not appear in the characteristic 
sites of scabies in children. However, she took the view that none of these other 
marks were indicative of physical abuse. She said that, in her view, “Some of them 
could have been old insect bites, some of them could have been secondary to 
knocks that she had sustained during the course of play and movement around, 
some of them could have been things that had occurred prior to her coming to 
this country. I did not feel that they had the configuration that would worry me of 
a child that has suffered non-accidental injury.”9 Central  Middlesex  Hospital
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The merits of Dr Schwartz’s diagnosis
9.44     In her evidence before me, Dr Schwartz was unshakeable in her conviction that 
Victoria had scabies. Although the definitive evidence of scabies provided by sight 
of the scabies mites or their burrows was not available, she believed that she saw 
sufficient signs to make her confident of her diagnosis. I was told that the scabies 
mite and its burrows can often be difficult to detect, particularly in children, 
and that the fact that Dr Schwartz did not see them in Victoria’s case does not 
demonstrate that her diagnosis was flawed.
9.45     In addition, Dr Ajayi-Obe, even though she herself had not considered a diagnosis 
of scabies when she examined Victoria, was prepared to accept that such a 
diagnosis might account for at least some of Victoria’s history and presentation.
9.46     While this matter is plainly one that cannot be definitively resolved so long after 
the event, I heard no compelling evidence to demonstrate that Dr Schwartz was 
wrong to conclude that Victoria had scabies. In the absence of such evidence, 
I have decided that the account of this highly experienced paediatrician should 
be accepted on this point, and that Victoria was suffering from a scabies infection 
when she was admitted to the Central Middlesex Hospital on 14 July 1999.
9.47     However, the more important question is whether Victoria was suffering from 
scabies alone or a combination of scabies and physical abuse. In her statement 
to this Inquiry, Dr Schwartz was clear that, in her judgement, Victoria was not 
exhibiting signs of physical abuse when she saw her on the evening of 14 July 
1999. While she moved slightly from this position during the course of her oral 
evidence, admitting that she “could not entirely exclude physical abuse”, the tenor 
of her evidence was that there was very little, if any, visible indication that Victoria 
had been abused when she examined her.
9.48     Having considered all the available material, I reject Dr Schwartz’s evidence on 
this point. I conclude that Victoria was exhibiting visible signs of physical abuse 
on 14 July 1999 and that Dr Schwartz failed to recognise them. I prefer the 
conclusions reached by both Dr Beynon and Dr Ajayi-Obe, both of whom took 
the view, having seen Victoria’s injuries and listened to her history, that there was 
a strong possibility that she had been abused. While this conclusion is based upon 
the totality of the evidence I heard on the issue, I set out below the specific matters 
which I found to be of particular relevance.
9.49     Dr Schwartz told me during the course of her oral evidence that the lesions on 
Victoria’s body, which she considered to be compatible with scratching caused 
by scabies, were to be found “predominantly on her hands and her arms”. It is 
plain from the notes and, in particular, the body map completed by Dr Ajayi-Obe, 
that Victoria’s injuries were by no means restricted to her arms and hands. In fact, 
Dr Ajayi-Obe recorded that Victoria had scars of varying ages “all over” her body, 
including on the legs, back, neck and face.
9.50     The only explanation for any of Victoria’s injuries that had been provided by the 
time that she was seen by Dr Schwartz was that she had inflicted them herself, 
either by scratching or cutting herself with a razor blade. There is nothing to 
suggest that Kouao put forward any alternative explanation when Dr Schwartz 
spoke to her at Victoria’s bedside. What, then, was Dr Schwartz’s diagnosis of the 
marks on Victoria’s body other than those on her hands and arms?
9.51     Her view was that these were the result of old insect bites and ordinary childhood 
injuries caused by running around and playing. The obvious initial difficulty with 
this diagnosis is that, as far as can be determined from the notes, nobody had ever The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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suggested that these injuries might have been caused by insect bites or childhood 
rough and tumble. Therefore, it would appear that Dr Schwartz’s diagnosis of these 
injuries was based upon her assumptions, rather than any information obtained 
from Victoria or her carer. Nor is there any indication that she took the trouble to 
test those assumptions by asking them. She certainly did not go through each of 
the visible injuries and ask Victoria or Kouao how they had been caused.
9.52     Of course, the simple fact that it was based upon untested assumption does not 
necessarily mean that Dr Schwartz’s diagnosis of the marks on Victoria’s body was 
incorrect. However, in my judgement, it is not a diagnosis that withstands close 
analysis.
9.53     First, the pattern of injuries on Victoria’s body is striking. Children who hurt 
themselves while running around and playing will normally sustain cuts and grazes 
to their fronts and, particularly, to those parts of their bodies not protected by 
clothing. When they fall, they tend to fall forwards. However, there is a marked 
absence of injuries recorded to the front of Victoria’s body. The majority of the 
marks are noted as having been on her back, buttocks and backs of her legs. 
Therefore, I find that the records completed at the time provide little support for 
Dr Schwartz’s view that a significant proportion of Victoria’s injuries could have 
been caused by childhood rough and tumble.
9.54     Second, Dr Schwartz’s theory as to insect bites is substantially undermined by 
the history taken by Dr Beynon. He recorded that Victoria had arrived in England 
two to three months earlier, having previously lived in France. Dr Schwartz told 
me that she had been influenced in her diagnosis by the fact that Victoria had 
lived “in poor conditions” in the Ivory Coast. She said, “She had lived in poor 
conditions, I had been informed that she had come from abroad, that she may 
have had marks from insect bites or the like abroad.”
9.55     While I accept that it can sometimes be difficult to accurately assess the age 
of injuries visible on a child’s body, I have no reason to doubt Dr Ajayi-Obe’s 
assessment, recorded in the notes, that the injuries she saw on Victoria ranged in 
age from “two days to several weeks, possibly months”. For any of Victoria’s marks 
to have been attributable to insect bites received in the Ivory Coast, they would 
have to have been over eight months old. I conclude, in light of Dr Ajayi-Obe’s 
evidence on the point, that the marks she saw on Victoria’s body were not that 
old, and so were not the result of insect bites. I suspect that, had Dr Schwartz 
taken the trouble to find out how long it had been since Victoria left Africa, she 
would have reached a similar conclusion.
9.56     The inadequacy of the alternative explanations for Victoria’s injuries offered at 
the time does not, in itself, establish that those injuries were indicative of abuse. 
In determining what was the correct interpretation of the evidence available to 
Dr Schwartz, I have found the nature and location of the marks on Victoria’s body 
to be the decisive factor.
9.57     The Central Middlesex Hospital child protection guidelines include a list of factors in 
a child’s presentation and history that should alert a health professional to suspicion 
of abuse. These include marks to the skin in unusual sites and patterns. As set out 
above, this was plainly the case with Victoria’s marks. She had a number of old and 
new lesions on her body at sites that could not be explained by either Dr Schwartz’s 
diagnosis of scabies or by the normal rough and tumble of childhood.
9.58     In addition, the guidelines indicate that a lack of supervision by the carer and/or an 
inappropriate story as to how the injuries might have been sustained can also be 
suggestive of abuse. The explanation offered as to how Victoria’s injuries had been 9 Central  Middlesex  Hospital
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sustained, namely that she had scratched herself and cut her own hands with razor 
blades, falls in my view into both of those categories. In this regard, Dr Schwartz 
should also have taken account of the fact that it was the childminder’s daughter 
and not the mother who had actually sought treatment for Victoria’s injuries.
9.59     Therefore, I conclude that the marks visible on Victoria’s body and the history with 
which she presented at the hospital were sufficient to ground a strong suspicion 
of physical abuse of the sort felt by Dr Ajayi-Obe. I also conclude that Dr Schwartz 
failed properly to assess the evidence available to her at the time in discounting the 
possibility that some of Victoria’s injuries may have been non-accidental.
9.60     It is unclear to what extent Dr Schwartz challenged Kouao on the issues noted by 
Dr Beynon and Dr Ajayi-Obe because no details of Dr Schwartz’s interview with 
Kouao are recorded. Dr Schwartz said that she should have gone through each 
of Victoria’s injuries and asked Kouao for an explanation, but admitted that she 
probably did not do this. I consider this a major oversight in Victoria’s care. As with 
any serious medical condition, the proper treatment of deliberate harm requires a 
thorough and systematic approach so that important matters which might prove 
crucial to the future welfare of the child are not missed. In order to encourage the 
use of such an approach, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
When a child has been examined by a doctor, and concerns about deliberate 
harm have been raised, no subsequent appraisal of these concerns should 
be considered complete until each of the concerns has been fully addressed, 
accounted for and documented.
Failure to reconcile differences in medical opinion
9.61     I wish to make one additional point that I consider to be a major factor in 
determining the outcome of Dr Schwartz’s evaluation of Victoria. Dr Schwartz 
said she was unable to speak to Dr Ajayi-Obe on the evening of 14 July because, 
by the time she had finished her assessment of Victoria, Dr Ajayi-Obe had gone 
off duty for the day. Whatever the circumstances that made contact difficult, it 
is unacceptable that no conversation took place between the two doctors when 
Dr Schwartz reached such a dramatically different conclusion to Dr Ajayi-Obe as 
to the cause of Victoria’s marks.
9.62     The difference in the diagnoses reached by Dr Schwartz and Dr Ajayi-Obe was 
plainly of enormous significance to the future management of Victoria’s case. 
Dr Schwartz should have been aware that her diagnosis would have a profound 
impact on the child protection investigation that had started (albeit ineffectively) 
that evening. Therefore, it was imperative that, before arriving at the view she did, 
she ensured that she had a full appreciation of the matters which had led Dr Ajayi-
Obe to reach a different view a few hours earlier.
9.63     Although the basis of Dr Ajayi-Obe’s concerns was clearly recorded in her notes, 
finding time to discuss the case with Dr Ajayi-Obe after her own examination 
might have led Dr Schwartz to reassess her conclusions about the cause of the 
marks on Victoria’s body. At the very least, it might have resulted in a more 
conscientious attempt by Dr Schwartz to ensure that the concerns that she said 
she had about Victoria at the time of her examination were clearly reflected in the 
hospital notes.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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9.64     I appreciate that the working practices and shift patterns at the Central Middlesex 
Hospital at the time could often make contact between two particular doctors 
difficult to arrange. However, whatever the practical difficulties may have been in 
this particular case, they do not provide an excuse for the failure of Dr Schwartz 
to speak to Dr Ajayi-Obe to gain a full understanding of the reasons why she had 
come to the view that Victoria was likely to be the victim of deliberate harm.
9.65     I conclude that a diagnosis of possible deliberate harm should never be superseded 
by an alternative diagnosis, without a discussion taking place between the doctors 
concerned. When major differences of opinion occur, such as in Victoria’s case, it 
is the responsibility of the consultant in charge of the case to make sure that the 
views of all those concerned are properly taken into account before a conclusion is 
reached. The diagnosis of deliberate harm is far from an exact science and failure 
to recognise it can be fatal. In those circumstances, it is imperative that when it 
is suspected, it is not subsequently ruled out without careful consideration of the 
alternative view. In an effort to ensure that such consideration takes place, I make 
the following recommendation:
Recommendation
When differences of medical opinion occur in relation to the diagnosis of 
possible deliberate harm to a child, a recorded discussion must take place 
between the persons holding the different views. When the deliberate harm of 
a child has been raised as an alternative diagnosis to a purely medical one, the 
diagnosis of deliberate harm must not be rejected without full discussion and, 
if necessary, obtaining a further opinion.
Notes of Dr Schwartz’s assessment
9.66     The notes of Dr Schwartz’s assessment of Victoria were written by Dr Modi and 
occupy about one-third of a page in the hospital records. Dr Schwartz told me that 
her normal practice was to write her own notes, particularly in complicated cases 
such as Victoria’s, and her failure to do so on this occasion was likely to have been 
due to her being called away on an urgent matter.
9.67     As to the quality of the notes, Dr Schwartz told me that they did not reflect the 
totality of what took place during the course of her examination and assessment 
of Victoria. In particular, they did not reflect the fact that, although she had ruled 
out non-accidental injury, she was still concerned that Victoria might be suffering 
from “other forms” of abuse. She stated that, in light of subsequent events, it was 
a disaster from her point of view that they did not.
9.68     Dr Modi said that she felt that her notes were adequate, save that she should 
have written “no physical abuse issues” instead of “no child protection concerns”. 
While it might be possible to criticise Dr Modi for failing to reflect this distinction 
in the notes, particularly in light of what was to transpire the following day, I take 
the view that the notes provide a fairly accurate reflection of the conclusions that 
Dr Schwartz expressed at this point. I am not satisfied that she had pressing “child 
protection” concerns regarding Victoria, or that she went very much beyond her 
diagnosis of scabies in her consideration of the case.
9.69     The fact that Dr Schwartz disputed the accuracy of Dr Modi’s note illustrates why 
it is extremely important for consultants, wherever possible, to write their own 
notes. It is a matter of grave concern that two senior doctors, both of whom were 
present at the time, were unable to agree as to what was said on a topic of this 9 Central  Middlesex  Hospital
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importance. If the notes confused and misled them, how much more misleading 
and confusing would they be for others who came to read them later?
9.70     For this reason, I regard it as vitally important that doctors make a full record of 
their history-taking, observations and findings at the time they are carried out. This 
is particularly important when dealing with sensitive and potentially contentious 
issues, such as child protection. Medical opinion is often sought in the context of a 
multi-agency child protection investigation well after the date on which a child is 
seen and examined. Medical opinion based on incomplete or imprecise records is 
virtually worthless.
9.71     In addition, doctors will often have to speak about their concerns for a child in the 
context of a later strategy meeting, a case conference, or even a criminal trial. In 
order for them to be able to provide a clear and accurate account of what they saw 
and thought at the time they examined the child concerned, precise and detailed 
notes are essential.
9.72     Dr Schwartz was aware that there was likely to be further investigation of 
Victoria’s case by social services, and that she was likely to have role to play in 
that investigation. I am unable to discern how she could have felt equipped to 
provide social services with a coherent view of Victoria’s circumstances and physical 
condition without having made her own notes at the time of her interview with 
Kouao and examination of Victoria. In an effort to avoid the repetition of such a 
mistake, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
When concerns about the deliberate harm of a child have been raised, doctors 
must ensure that comprehensive and contemporaneous notes are made of these 
concerns. If doctors are unable to make their own notes, they must be clear 
about what it is they wish to have recorded on their behalf.
Further investigations
9.73     Also included in Dr Modi’s note were instructions that a skin swab be performed 
and a dermatology opinion obtained. Dr Modi told me that she considered it to 
be the responsibility of junior doctors on the ward to ensure that these instructions 
were carried out and that she delegated this responsibility when she handed 
over to another junior doctor on the morning of 15 July 1999. Nurse Gobin also 
recorded “refer to dermatologist and other multidisciplinary team” on the nursing 
care plan. He said he would have told the nurse in the morning during handover 
to pass this information on to doctors to ensure it was done.
9.74     The senior house officer on the ward during the morning of 15 July was Dr Charlotte 
Dempster, a locum. When questioned about the further investigations ordered by 
Dr Schwartz and recorded in the notes by Dr Modi, she said that she would have 
expected the skin swab to have been done by a nurse and sent to the laboratory, 
and that she did not remember whether or not she spoke to a dermatologist in order 
to seek an opinion. However, what does seem to be clear is that in the event, no skin 
swab was taken and no dermatology opinion was obtained.
9.75     As to how these unfortunate omissions could have occurred, Dr Schwartz said: 
“There are many requests that, in this case and in other cases, we ask for that do 
not appear to occur, and I do not know, in a system where there are so many 
people, how we can actually prevent these sorts of things from occurring.”The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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9.76     I do not accept Dr Schwartz’s assertion that oversights of this nature cannot be 
prevented. On the contrary, the more people that are involved, the more important 
it is to devise a system that ensures that requests are followed up. I refuse to accept 
that failures to follow through important medical requests are somehow either 
inevitable or excusable. The fact that there would appear to have been no system 
operating on the ward designed to ensure that requests of this nature were followed 
up is one, therefore, that causes me considerable concern. I return to the issue of 
systematic care later in this Report in paragraphs 11.35 and 11.36.
The day after admission
9.77     Dr Dempster first met Victoria and Kouao on the morning ward round on 15 July. She 
would normally expect to carry out such ward rounds in the company of a consultant 
or registrar but, on this occasion, she was on her own. This is particularly surprising 
given that Dr Dempster was a locum working only a single shift in the hospital.
9.78     Dr Dempster based her understanding of Victoria’s situation on Dr Modi’s notes 
written the evening before and the information that she was given at the handover 
when she arrived on the ward. She described that understanding as: “It had been 
passed over to me that the concerns about non-accidental injury were not a 
problem any more, so the diagnosis with her was she had scabies.”
9.79     Following her ward round, Dr Dempster considered that the priority as far as 
Victoria was concerned was to contact social services and arrange for them to come 
and see Victoria. It would normally be the job of a registrar to seek the involvement 
of social services in cases such as Victoria’s but, as she was the only doctor on the 
ward, Dr Dempster assumed the responsibility for ensuring that this was done.
Dr Dempster’s contact with social services
9.80     She rang the number that had been written in the notes on the previous evening 
but could not remember to whom she spoke or in which department they worked. 
She refuted the suggestion, made by Ms Hines, that she told social services that 
the hospital “would like the child protection withdrawn and treat as a child in 
need, because the family needs urgent housing”. Her recollection was that she told 
social services, “Dr Schwartz’s diagnosis from the ward round the night before and 
... what the concerns were – the problems with the housing and other issues.”
9.81     Having listened to Dr Dempster’s evidence, I conclude that her recollection of this 
conversation is to be preferred to that of Ms Hines. The uncertainty she displayed as to 
the difference between a “child in need of protection” and “a child in need”, together 
with her lack of experience of dealing with social services, causes me to doubt that 
she expressed herself in the precise and technical way suggested by Ms Hines. As to 
the lifting of child protection, this was again a matter of which Dr Dempster had little 
experience. She told me that she would not have known how to go about removing 
a child from police protection and would not have considered this to be a matter 
within the authority of a senior house officer. Given her lack of familiarity with the 
issues involved, I consider that Dr Dempster did little more than relay the conclusion 
expressed in the notes that there were no longer any “child protection issues”.
9.82     Whatever the precise form of words she used, Dr Dempster had some difficulty 
in securing a satisfactory response from social services. She recalled that she 
ended up having at least two or three lengthy conversations with social services 
due to the fact that she was having trouble ascertaining who was going to take 
responsibility for seeing Victoria. Her impression was that the change in diagnosis 
from non-accidental injury to scabies meant that a different person was now to 9 Central  Middlesex  Hospital
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take responsibility for the case. She said, “Whoever I talked to made it a lot more 
complicated, actually, because I thought that whoever I talked to would come in 
and see her and it would be very straightforward. But it was not.”
9.83     In fact, there would appear to have been considerable confusion, not merely as to 
the identity of the social worker who was to visit Victoria, but whether there was 
going to be a visit at all.
Dr Dempster’s letter
9.84     At some stage during her conversations with social services, Dr Dempster was 
asked to put the hospital’s concerns in writing. In response to this request, she 
wrote and faxed a letter to the “Duty Social Worker”. She expected the letter to 
be passed to one of the social workers with whom she had been dealing thus far. 
The letter read as follows:
“Thank you for dealing with the social issues of Anna Kouao. She 
was admitted to the ward last night with concerns re: possible NAI 
[non-accidental injuries]. She has however been assessed by the 
consultant Dr Schwartz and it has been decided that her scratch marks 
are all due to scabies. Thus it is no longer a child protection issue. 
There are however several issues that need to be sorted out urgently: 
1) Anna and her mother are homeless. They moved out of their 
B & B accommodation 3 days ago. 2) Anna does not attend school. 
Anna and her mother recently arrived from France and do not have a 
social network in this country. Thank you for your help.”
9.85     Dr Dempster said that her intention in writing the letter was to prompt a visit 
to the hospital by a social worker, rather than to set out every relevant piece of 
information in the hospital’s possession. However, her letter did not contain any 
such invitation and Dr Dempster explained that it was through the conversations 
that she had with social workers that she expected someone to come to the 
ward. She admitted that she could not remember being told outright that a social 
worker would come to the ward to see Victoria, and agreed that the origin of her 
understanding was possibly the entry in the hospital notes from the night before 
that stated: “Michelle Hines will visit ward tomorrow”.
9.86     Dr Dempster agreed that, taken at face value, her letter alone was inadequate to 
ensure a visit, and that it would have been sensible to make explicit her wish that 
social services come in and see Victoria on the ward before she was discharged. 
She also accepted not only that she omitted to mention many of the important 
markers of neglect that were recorded in the hospital notes, but also that she 
failed to mention these markers verbally to the social workers to whom she spoke. 
The inevitable result was that social services gained an incomplete picture of the 
hospital’s concerns. As explained above, Dr Dempster thought that these gaps 
could be filled when the social worker responsible for Victoria’s case came to visit 
the ward. No such visit ever took place.
9.87     Dr Schwartz said that the writing of this letter should not have been left to a locum 
doctor with little knowledge of the case and that, had she written it herself, its 
contents and emphasis would have been very different. In particular, she regarded 
Dr Dempster’s letter as constituting only a very “superficial” account of the 
complex discussion which had taken place the previous evening.
9.88     It is plainly a matter of considerable regret that Dr Dempster’s letter did not contain 
a more thorough account of the information held by the hospital – which was The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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potentially indicative of abuse. However, it is easy to see how Dr Dempster’s letter 
came to be worded in the way that it was. There was little, if anything, in Dr Modi’s 
note of the previous day’s ward round which would have indicated to Dr Dempster 
that Victoria’s case was one of particular concern and, by the time that she came 
onto the ward on the morning of 15 July, the strong suspicions held by Dr Beynon 
and Dr Ajayi-Obe less than a day earlier had effectively fallen below the horizon.
Victoria’s discharge
9.89     How Victoria came to be discharged from Barnaby Bear ward remains a mystery. 
While Dr Dempster was able to provide me with some assistance as to the 
discharge procedure that should have been followed, she had no recollection 
whatsoever of the circumstances of Victoria’s departure.
9.90     The decision to discharge, she told me, is normally taken by a senior doctor, 
following which a discharge letter is written. One copy of the discharge letter 
should go in the notes, one should go to the patient, and one should go to the 
GP. The fact that no discharge letter appears in Victoria’s notes led Dr Dempster 
to conclude that she cannot have been involved in the actual discharge itself. 
In any event, she said that she would not have authorised Victoria’s discharge 
herself, but would have contacted whichever senior doctor was responsible for 
the ward that day.
9.91     As there was no registrar on duty on 15 July, Dr Dempster thought it likely that 
she spoke to Dr Schwartz. For her part, Dr Schwartz remembers being paged by 
Dr Dempster on the morning of 15 July and being told by her that social services 
were not investigating further.
9.92     Having received this news, Dr Schwartz was “almost positive” that she spoke to 
someone in social services seeking an assurance that Victoria would not go home 
without being satisfied that the “significant worries” she felt about her would be 
addressed. These included, as far as Dr Schwartz was concerned, the concerns 
about housing and schooling identified in Dr Dempster’s letter.
9.93     Unfortunately, there is no note of any conversation between Dr Schwartz and social 
services in the hospital records and, therefore, no way of knowing if a call took 
place, to whom Dr Schwartz spoke, or what assurances she received. Nor is there 
any record of a conversation with Dr Schwartz on the Brent Social Services’ case 
file. Ms Hines was firm in her denial that she spoke to Dr Schwartz and equally firm 
in her belief that she recorded faithfully in her contact notes details of the doctors 
she spoke to, together with a brief summary of their conversation.
9.94     In the absence of any objective at evidence from that time that a conversation 
between Dr Schwartz and social services took place on 15 July, or any convincing 
explanation of why no record of it was made in either the hospital or social services 
records, I am driven to conclude that it is unlikely such a conversation occurred. 
The result of this conclusion is that I reject Dr Schwartz’s evidence that she received 
any assurance, either from Ms Hines or any other Brent social worker, that her 
concerns regarding Victoria would be addressed before she was discharged.
9.95     The problems caused by such imprecision of recollection are clear. It is 
understandable that busy professionals dealing with a large number of cases on a 
daily basis can forget precisely what conversations they may have had about which 
cases. The result is that cases can proceed on the basis of mistaken assumptions 
as to what has been done or said. The only solution to this problem lies in the 
keeping of better notes. I therefore make the following recommendation:9 Central  Middlesex  Hospital
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Recommendation
When concerns about the deliberate harm of a child have been raised, a record 
must be kept in the case notes of all discussions about the child, including 
telephone conversations. When doctors and nurses are working in circumstances 
in which case notes are not available to them, a record of all discussions must 
be entered in the case notes at the earliest opportunity so that this becomes 
part of the child’s permanent health record.
9.96     Regardless of what her expectations of social services may have been, Dr Schwartz 
did accept that she should have arranged some form of medical follow-up for 
Victoria prior to her discharge. She blamed her failure to do so on pressure of time 
and the fact that there was no “failsafe” mechanism in operation to ensure that 
children were not discharged before appropriate arrangements had been made for 
their continuing care.
9.97     Nurse Johnson agreed that appropriate medical follow-up should have been 
arranged for Victoria and that, as the named child protection nurse, she should 
have taken responsibility for ensuring that it was. However, the position was 
complicated by the fact that Victoria was under the care of neither a GP nor 
a school nurse, who would ordinarily be the hospital’s first points of contact. 
Therefore, once Victoria had left the ward, Nurse Johnson felt that there was 
nobody she could speak to who was in a position to ensure that Victoria’s medical 
needs were monitored and addressed. In addition, having seen from the notes that 
Dr Dempster had been in both written and verbal contact with social services, she 
took the view that ‘they’ would ensure that Victoria’s needs were met. However, 
she accepted that she should have at least made a telephone call to ascertain why 
no social worker had ever visited the ward to see Victoria.
9.98     The circumstances of Victoria’s discharge illustrate clearly one of the principal 
concerns I have as to the way that Victoria’s case was managed by the Central 
Middlesex Hospital, namely the marked lack of adequate notes of the important 
decisions made regarding Victoria’s care and the material on which those decisions 
were based. There is no record of the various conversations that apparently took 
place between medical staff and social services, or about what was discussed in 
them. Nor are there any notes which throw any light whatsoever on how Victoria 
came to be discharged and who took the final decision to let her leave.
9.99     As to this last point, I was very concerned to hear that it was not considered 
normal practice in the hospital at the time to record the identity of the person who 
took the decision to discharge a child. I would agree entirely with Dr Schwartz’s 
assessment that this constituted a “worrying state of affairs”.
9.100   This lack of adequate record-keeping is indicative, it seems to me, of the 
amateurish and haphazard manner in which the crucially important decision to 
discharge Victoria was made. Dr Dempster, a locum working a single shift, was 
alone on the ward on the morning of 15 July with only Dr Schwartz on the end 
of a telephone to advise on Victoria’s management. Although Dr Dempster had a 
broad understanding of the role of social services in the protection of children, she 
was unfamiliar either with the relevant terminology or with the particulars of local 
child protection arrangements and quickly became confused as to who in social 
services was dealing with the case and what he or she was proposing to do. In the 
event, neither she nor any of the other witnesses who appeared before me were 
able to say how it was that Victoria actually came to leave the ward.
9.101   The unsurprising result of this obviously inadequate approach to Victoria’s 
discharge was that she left hospital without any record of her departure, without The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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a discharge letter, without having been seen by a social worker, and without 
any arrangements whatsoever being made for any form of medical or nursing 
follow-up. In the context of her case, these were disastrous omissions. In an effort 
to ensure that they are not repeated, I make the following recommendations:
Recommendation
Hospital trust chief executives must introduce systems to ensure that no child 
about whom there are child protection concerns is discharged from hospital 
without the permission of either the consultant in charge of the child’s care or of 
a paediatrician above the grade of senior house officer. Hospital chief executives 
must introduce systems to monitor compliance with this recommendation.
Recommendation
Hospital trust chief executives must introduce systems to ensure that no child 
about whom there are child protection concerns is discharged from hospital 
without a documented plan for the future care of the child. The plan must 
include follow-up arrangements. Hospital chief executives must introduce 
systems to monitor compliance with this recommendation.
9.102   I wish to make one further comment concerning Victoria’s discharge from hospital 
that applies equally to the Central Middlesex Hospital and the North Middlesex 
Hospital, and that is the failure to record a GP for her.
9.103   The uncritical acceptance that Victoria was not registered with a GP, or that her 
GP was unknown, ensured that no effort was made to identify a GP for Victoria at 
either the Central Middlesex Hospital or the North Middlesex Hospital. Inevitably, 
any attempt to follow up Victoria after discharge from hospital, or any attempt to 
pass on to her GP the very serious concerns that had been identified about her, 
were severely compromised by this gap in information.
9.104   Registration with a GP is the bedrock of continuity of care in the National Health 
Service. It is stating the obvious to note the importance of registration with a GP 
for every child, let alone one in whom there are concerns about deliberate harm. 
In reality there will be very few children who are not registered with a GP, which is 
why failure to establish the identity of a GP for Victoria was such a major oversight.
9.105   The discharge of a child from hospital back into the community is as much a 
transfer of responsibility for a child’s care, as is a referral from the community to 
a hospital consultant. I consider that the importance of continuity of care for all 
children is such that there needs to be clear responsibility placed on a hospital 
consultant under whose care a child has been admitted, to ensure that every child 
is discharged with a registered GP, whether this involves diligently tracking down 
the GP during admission or, in the rare event of a real lack of a registered GP, 
registering the child with an appropriate one before discharge. Therefore, I make 
the following recommendation:
Recommendation
No child about whom there are concerns about deliberate harm should be 
discharged from hospital back into the community without an identified GP. 
Responsibility for ensuring this happens rests with the hospital consultant under 
whose care the child has been admitted.10  North Middlesex Hospital
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10 North Middlesex Hospital
The hospital
10.1     The North Middlesex University Hospital, previously the North Middlesex Hospital, 
is situated in north east London. It forms part of what was the Barnet, Enfield and 
Haringey Health Authority and is now the North Central London Strategic Health 
Authority. It is sited just inside the border of Enfield council. However, despite 
its location, more than 70 per cent of the children treated in the hospital live in 
Haringey, with the remainder living in Enfield. In 1999, the approximate combined 
population of Barnet, Enfield and Haringey councils was over 700,000. The 
current chief executive of the North Central London Strategic Health Authority is 
Christine Outram.
Arrival at the hospital
10.2     Kouao took Victoria to the North Middlesex Hospital accident and emergency 
department on Saturday 24 July 1999 at around 6.15pm. Victoria was seen by a 
casualty officer who referred her to the paediatric team.
10.3     The on-call paediatric registrar that evening was Dr Olutoyin Banjoko, assisted 
by a paediatric senior house officer, Dr Simone Forlee. The casualty officer told 
Dr Forlee over the telephone that a child had been seen with scalds to the head, 
the explanation for which was that she had poured hot water over herself to relieve 
the itching caused by scabies.
10.4     Both Dr Banjoko and Dr Forlee thought that this history was unusual and were 
immediately alert to the possibility that the injuries might be non-accidental. 
Dr Banjoko decided that Dr Forlee should go and see Victoria.
10.5     On her way there, Dr Forlee collected a set of the hospital’s child protection forms 
on which to record her findings. The individual forms were designed to record 
specific sorts of information. Form CP1 was for basic administrative data, CP2 was 
for the history of the presenting complaint, and CP3 was designed to record the 
medical examination. In addition, CP3 contained a section requiring the doctor 
concerned to reach a conclusion as to whether the injuries were accidental or 
non-accidental, or whether further information was required before a conclusion 
could be reached. Finally, CP5 is an action checklist of things to do to assist with 
the diagnostic process and with future management.
Dr Forlee’s interaction with Kouao and Victoria
10.6     When Dr Forlee saw Victoria, she was “not really in pain” and was “fairly passive”. 
Her scalds were being attended to and, because she did not require immediate 
medical attention, Dr Forlee concentrated on finding out the details of what 
had happened from Kouao. During the course of her conversation with Kouao, 
Dr Forlee made a number of telling observations, the most significant of which are 
set out below.
10.7     Dr Forlee found Kouao’s account of how Victoria had come by her injuries to be 
inconsistent and unconvincing. That Victoria would pour hot water over herself 
to ease itching did not “ring true” as far as Dr Forlee was concerned. Nor did she 
consider the pattern of Victoria’s burns to be consistent with her having poured The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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water on her own head in the manner described by Kouao. Furthermore, Kouao 
seemed unable to provide a consistent account of when the incident occurred 
– various times were mentioned, ranging from midday to 3pm. 
10.8     Of greater concern than Kouao’s inability to give a consistent account of when the 
incident took place was the fact that, on any version, there had been a significant 
delay before Victoria had been brought to the hospital. Dr Forlee did not ask 
Kouao to provide an explanation for this delay.
10.9     In addition to her reservations about Kouao’s account of how Victoria came by 
her injuries, Dr Forlee found a number of aspects of the social history recounted 
by Kouao to be unconvincing. For example, Dr Forlee found Kouao’s account 
of having left a comfortable environment in France to live in awful conditions in 
England “bizarre”, and she was understandably confused when Kouao gave her a 
date of birth which would have meant that she was seven years old when her first 
child had been born. Again, Dr Forlee would seem not to have challenged Kouao 
on these aspects of her story.
10.10   As to her and Victoria’s domestic circumstances, Kouao told Dr Forlee that she had 
been involved with social services in respect of housing, and gave the impression 
that the accommodation she and Victoria were staying in was substandard. She 
also mentioned that social workers had spoken about separating her from Victoria, 
but she did not seem to want to elaborate on this issue. In addition, and of 
particular concern to Dr Forlee, Kouao said that she was not registered with a GP 
and indicated that she had no firm plans to send Victoria to school. 
10.11   At some point during the course of her discussion with Dr Forlee, Kouao told 
Victoria in English to “tell the doctor what happened”. Dr Forlee recalled that 
Victoria responded by giving an account of the incident, in broken English, which 
was broadly consistent with Kouao’s. Listening to Victoria give her account, 
Dr Forlee formed the impression that she had been coached as to what to say. 
10.12   Dr Forlee recalled that Victoria was unkempt and smelly and was not wearing any 
underwear. In contrast, Kouao was immaculately presented. She also observed that 
there did not seem to be particular warmth between Kouao and Victoria.
10.13   Having listened to Kouao’s account and watched the way in which she interacted 
with Victoria, Dr Forlee felt that Victoria should be spoken to on her own and 
with the aid of a French interpreter. She said her plan in this regard was to ask a 
French-speaking member of the nursing staff to obtain a full history from Victoria.
10.14   Unfortunately, however, neither of these entirely appropriate steps was taken. 
At no point during her stay in the hospital did any doctor speak to Victoria in a 
formal attempt to find out what had happened to her, either with or without the 
assistance of an interpreter. I consider this omission to amount to a major oversight 
in the care with which she was provided by the hospital. I am in no doubt that 
Victoria should have been spoken to as part of a comprehensive process of 
gathering information about her condition and circumstances. However, it would 
seem that the completion of this important task was deferred on the assumption 
that someone else would do it, or that it would be done at a later date.
10.15   Once she had obtained Kouao’s account of how Victoria had come to be injured, 
Dr Forlee moved on to carry out a brief physical examination of Victoria. She 
charted the injuries to Victoria’s head and checked to see there were no other 
injuries on her body that required immediate attention. She did not go any further 
because she had decided that Victoria should be admitted and it would be more 
appropriate to carry out a detailed examination once she was on the ward under 10  North Middlesex Hospital
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the supervision of a more senior paediatrician. In addition, she was hampered by 
the poor lighting in the accident and emergency department, together with the 
fact that much of Victoria’s skin was covered in white lotion.
10.16   Dr Forlee was not convinced, on the basis of what she had seen and heard up to 
this point, that Victoria’s injuries were non-accidental. She therefore ticked the box 
on the CP3 form indicating that more information was required before a firm view 
as to the nature of the injuries could be taken.
10.17   Having done so, she proceeded to telephone Dr Mary Rossiter, the North Middlesex 
Hospital’s named doctor for child protection and the on-call consultant at the time. 
She told her about Victoria’s injuries and the circumstances in which she had arrived 
at the hospital. Dr Rossiter agreed with the plan to admit Victoria. In addition to 
her burns needing attention, she felt that they “needed to get to know her better”. 
Dr Forlee then called Dr Banjoko to tell her what had been decided.
Roles of named and designated professionals
10.18   I have indicated above that Dr Rossiter was the ‘named’ doctor for child protection. 
Before I go on to deal with Dr Forlee’s referral of Victoria’s case to social services, 
it may help if I pause to explain the nature and extent of the responsibilities of the 
named and designated healthcare professionals.
10.19  The  terms  ‘designated’ and ‘named’ doctor and nurse for child protection first 
appeared in the 1991 edition of Working Together and were subject to further 
clarification in 1995 in Child Protection: clarification of arrangements between the 
NHS and other agencies.
10.20   When commissioning child protection services, each health authority must enlist 
the help of a senior doctor and nurse experienced in child protection to advise on 
the content of contracts in relation to the protection of children. This is the role of 
the designated doctor and designated nurse.
10.21   In addition, each NHS organisation concerned with children should have, or be 
able to call on the services of, a senior doctor and a senior nurse with a high 
level of expertise in child protection, to perform a number of functions, including 
identifying the child protection training needs of medical and nursing staff. 
This ensures that the proper child protection protocols are in place and acts as 
a reference point for other agencies to ensure that child protection advice is 
properly co-ordinated. In effect, the named doctor and named nurse are the child 
protection experts and are expected to lead their colleagues in all matters relating 
to the protection of children.
Dr Forlee’s referral to social services
10.22   Having decided upon a strategy to meet Victoria’s immediate medical needs, 
Dr Forlee contacted Haringey Social Services. The duty social worker on call that 
evening was Luciana Frederick. Ms Frederick was not immediately available and so 
Dr Forlee left a message for her at around 8.30pm, their subsequent conversation 
taking place “a lot later in the evening”.
10.23  Dr  Forlee’s recollection of this conversation was patchy. However, it was sufficient 
for her to dispute a number of aspects of the note made by Ms Frederick on the 
Haringey council Out of Hours Social Work Report form, which reads as follows:The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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“1. Child admitted to hospital – concerns about injury caused by hot 
water poured onto face causing facial burns. 2. It appeared to be an 
accident, however mother may need support. 3. Advice given – Doctor 
agreed to discuss case with hospital s/w the following day. 4. NFA.”
10.24   First, and most important, Dr Forlee denied telling Ms Frederick that Victoria’s 
burns appeared accidental. Second, she said that she was told that further action 
on Victoria’s case would have to wait until “normal office hours”, which meant that 
she could not have agreed to talk to the hospital social worker “the following day”, 
because that was a Sunday. Finally, Dr Forlee was certain that she never indicated 
that “NFA” (meaning no further action) was necessary on the part of Haringey 
Social Services. As far as Dr Forlee was concerned, it was her responsibility to 
inform social services of Victoria’s case. What they did about it was up to them.
10.25   Before leaving the accident and emergency department and picking up the story 
of Victoria’s treatment at the hospital with her transfer to the ward, there are two 
aspects of Dr Forlee’s involvement with Victoria which require analysis. The first is 
the standard and contents of her notes. The second is her failure to obtain a copy 
of the records relating to Victoria’s admission to the Central Middlesex Hospital 
10 days previously. I deal with each in turn.
Dr Forlee’s record keeping
10.26   It is clear from the observations recorded above that, despite the brevity of her 
physical examination of Victoria, Dr Forlee obtained a large amount of telling 
information during the course of her interaction with Kouao and Victoria. Even 
without the benefit of hindsight, there was much that was plainly suspicious 
in Kouao’s account and the manner in which it was given. More importantly, 
Dr Forlee would appear to have been very perceptive in her assessment of the 
relationship between Kouao and Victoria.
10.27   Therefore, it is a matter of considerable regret that Dr Forlee chose to record so 
little of the valuable information she gleaned during the course of her contact with 
Kouao and Victoria on the child protection forms. In particular, she failed to record 
the following, vitally important observations that:
• Victoria was living in inadequate and dirty accommodation.
• She suspected that Victoria had been coached to give a consistent account of the 
manner in which she came by her injuries.
• There was very little warmth in the relationship between Victoria and Kouao.
• She regarded it as appropriate for Victoria to be spoken to alone with the 
assistance of a French-speaking interpreter.
• The pattern of burns to Victoria’s head were inconsistent with Kouao’s account 
of the incident.
10.28   Dr Forlee explained the absence of these observations from her notes by telling me 
that her role as an on-call senior house officer was to gather information sufficient 
to ensure a child’s safety, before moving on to the next case. In her view, there 
was simply not the time to produce a comprehensive account of all potentially 
relevant information. She also explained that when filling in child protection forms, 
doctors in her position are instructed merely to record and not interpret what they 
are told, in case it is wrong. 
10.29   While I appreciate the considerable burden placed on medical staff in a busy 
hospital setting, and accept that inexperienced doctors should not act outside their 
areas of competence, I remain troubled by the fact that so many of Dr Forlee’s 10  North Middlesex Hospital
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important observations and insights did not find their way into Victoria’s notes. 
Had they done so, they might have proved very useful in any subsequent child 
protection investigation. 
10.30   The central importance of a detailed history and a complete record of the 
suspicions and observations of medical staff in the context of a case of possible 
deliberate harm to a child is self-evident. In many cases, such records can be 
the most valuable diagnostic tool available to a clinician charged with forming 
a conclusion as to whether injuries may be non-accidental. I wish doctors to 
be in no doubt as to their obligations in this regard, and therefore repeat the 
recommendation made in paragraph 9.72:
Recommendation
When concerns about the deliberate harm of a child have been raised, doctors 
must ensure that comprehensive and contemporaneous notes are made of these 
concerns. If doctors are unable to make their own notes, they must be clear 
about what it is they wish to have recorded on their behalf.
Failure to obtain the Central Middlesex Hospital notes
10.31   From the outset of her involvement with Victoria, Dr Forlee had what she described 
as a “vague idea” that she had recently been treated at the Central Middlesex 
Hospital. It seems most likely that she was given this information by a staff member 
in the accident and emergency department when she arrived to examine Victoria. 
Despite this knowledge, Dr Forlee made no attempt either to obtain the Central 
Middlesex Hospital notes relating to Victoria’s previous admission or to telephone 
the Central Middlesex Hospital in order to speak to a colleague with some 
knowledge of Victoria’s previous problems.
10.32   Her explanation for not doing so seemed to be that sight of the notes would not 
have made a material difference to her treatment plan. Even without them, she 
had what she considered to be “sufficient ground to make a reasonably accurate 
assessment that there was a child at risk”, and her decision to admit Victoria 
“would not have been altered specifically by other information”. She also reminded 
me of the practical difficulties in obtaining notes from other hospitals in the sort of 
on-call situation in which she was working at the time.
10.33   I agree with Dr Forlee that obtaining the Central Middlesex Hospital notes that 
evening, and speaking to a doctor who knew Victoria, would not have altered her 
decision to admit. Furthermore, I appreciate the difficulty associated with obtaining 
paper-based medical records from other hospitals late in the evening and the 
constraints on doctors’ time in a busy on-call situation. However, I am firmly of 
the view that, had the doctors at the North Middlesex Hospital seen the Central 
Middlesex Hospital notes disclosing the possibility of a previous serious assault on 
Victoria only 10 days previously, the level of concern they felt about her scalding 
would inevitably have been greater.
10.34   Dr Forlee said that the information contained in the Central Middlesex Hospital 
notes would have been beneficial “at a later stage”. I disagree with her. In my 
view, the circumstances of Victoria’s previous admission was vital information 
which was relevant from the outset. As it turned out, this step was never taken 
and the notes relating to Victoria’s treatment by the Central Middlesex Hospital 
were never seen by those treating her at the North Middlesex Hospital.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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10.35   In my view, the need to obtain details of other hospital admissions at an early 
stage in the treatment and management of a child with possible non-accidental 
injuries is not removed simply because a decision to admit has already been made. 
Apart from the obvious point that the significance of such further information that 
may be available cannot be assessed until it has actually been obtained, there may 
be numerous aspects of the management of the case that may be affected by 
knowledge of what has happened to the child previously.
10.36   In cases involving possible deliberate harm to a child, it is vital that doctors take 
their decisions in light of as much relevant information about that child as may 
be available. The fact that Victoria had been admitted to another hospital 10 days 
previously with another set of suspected non-accidental injuries was plainly a 
relevant piece of information in the context of her case. In an attempt to ensure 
that doctors working in this difficult area have as much relevant information 
available to them as possible, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
When a child is admitted to hospital and deliberate harm is suspected, the 
doctor or nurse admitting the child must inquire about previous admissions 
to hospital. In the event of a positive response, information concerning the 
previous admissions must be obtained from the other hospitals. The consultant 
in charge of the case must review this information when making decisions 
about the child’s future care and management. Hospital chief executives must 
introduce systems to ensure compliance with this recommendation.
10.37   Despite her failure to secure the notes, there was one aspect of Victoria’s treatment 
at the Central Middlesex Hospital of which Dr Forlee was aware. The North 
Middlesex Hospital casualty card recorded that Victoria had taken “self-discharge” 
from the Central Middlesex Hospital. I was interested to read this, as it provides 
a possible explanation as to why there is no record of Victoria’s discharge in 
the Central Middlesex Hospital notes. The fact that a seven-year-old child has 
discharged “herself” from hospital may also be relevant when assessing whether 
that child might be the victim of some form of deliberate harm.
Victoria’s arrival on Rainbow ward
10.38   At around 10pm, Victoria, still accompanied by Kouao, was moved to Rainbow 
ward. Shortly after their arrival, they were seen by Dr Banjoko, who explained to 
Kouao that there was a need to further investigate Victoria’s injuries and provide 
her with appropriate treatment. Dr Banjoko decided not to broach the subject of 
how Victoria had come by her injuries at this stage.
10.39   Nor did Dr Banjoko consider it appropriate to carry out an examination of 
Victoria that evening. She was aware from the child protection forms that no 
proper examination of Victoria’s body had yet been carried out but, in view of 
the late hour, she considered that it would not be “morally right” to conduct a 
full examination at this stage and that this task was better left to Dr Rossiter who, 
as she understood it, would be seeing Victoria the next morning.
10.40   In cases where a child presents with possible non-accidental injuries, the 
importance of a full and thorough examination by a doctor experienced in this 
area is self-evident. It was, in any event, an express requirement of the hospital’s 
child protection procedures. Therefore, I find it staggering that throughout the two 
weeks she spent in the hospital, this vital element of her care was overlooked by a 10  North Middlesex Hospital
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succession of doctors who, for the most part, seemed to assume either that it had 
already been done, or that it could be left to someone else.
10.41   While I am prepared to accept that Victoria’s age and her condition at the time 
may have rendered it inappropriate to conduct a full examination when she first 
arrived on the ward, I am in no doubt that it should have been done as soon 
as possible thereafter. I am anxious that doctors receive clear guidance on this 
important issue, and therefore make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Any child admitted to hospital about whom there are concerns about deliberate 
harm must receive a full and fully-documented physical examination within 
24 hours of their admission, except when doing so would, in the opinion of 
the examining doctor, compromise the child’s care or the child’s physical and 
emotional well-being.
Sunday 25 July 1999
10.42   In fact, the first people to examine Victoria the following morning were Nurse 
Millicent Graham and Nurse Regina Tsiagbe, who had been specifically allocated 
to take care of her. Nurse Millicent Graham was aware that Victoria had been 
admitted the previous evening with general suspicions of non-accidental injury 
and so was on the lookout for anything suspicious from the outset.
10.43   Victoria was the first patient that the two nurses went to see that morning. They 
went into her cubicle, and Nurse Millicent Graham remembered that Victoria was 
pretending to be asleep. Nurse Millicent Graham recalled that Victoria had wet 
the bed overnight and needed a bath, which she and Nurse Tsiagbe proceeded to 
give her.
10.44   The only entry made by these two nurses in the notes recording what they saw 
that morning concerns the fact that Victoria had some difficulty in walking to the 
bathroom and had bruises all over her body. In their evidence before me, however, 
they were able to recall some more detail. Nurse Millicent Graham, for example, 
remembered that Victoria’s fingernails seemed infected and that she thought some 
of them might fall off. She also remembered seeing a mark on Victoria’s shoulder 
which looked as if something had been “heated and pressed into her skin”. As to 
the latter observation, she said that although she made no note of it she did bring 
it to the attention of one of the doctors on the ward at the time.
10.45   This will not be the last time that I remark upon an unfortunate absence in the 
nursing notes of observations as to Victoria’s condition while she was on Rainbow 
ward that may well have proved to be significant. The failure of the nursing staff 
to record their observations in the notes, and the consequent discrepancy between 
the levels of concern they expressed in their oral evidence and that reflected in the 
records made at the time, was a matter which arose with depressing regularity. 
In respect of this particular occasion, Nurse Millicent Graham told me that she 
considered her note taking to have been “absolutely disgusting”.
10.46   In view of these discrepancies, each of the nurses who expressed concerns in 
oral evidence, which they did not record at the time, was asked whether or not 
their recollections had been coloured by knowledge of what had subsequently 
happened to Victoria. Perhaps unsurprisingly they all denied that this was the case The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
262
and assured me that I could confidently rely upon their oral evidence concerning 
these matters.
10.47   While I do not believe that any of the nursing staff sought deliberately to mislead 
me during the course of their oral evidence, I have taken into account the fact that 
recollections can often be influenced by knowledge of later events, particularly 
when those events are as harrowing as those in Victoria’s case. As a result, I have, 
as far as possible, based the account of events that follows on the documentation 
made at the time.
Dr Rossiter’s initial observations
10.48   Although no written records of it exist, both Dr Forlee and Dr Rossiter clearly 
recalled conducting a ward round on the morning of Sunday 25 July. Dr Rossiter 
clearly remembered seeing Victoria during the course of this ward round but her 
memory of precisely what transpired was “hazy”.
10.49   The notes provide some assistance. For example, the fact that Dr Rossiter’s 
signature appears on the CP3 form, and is dated 25 July, would seem to confirm 
her recollection of having gone through the CP forms with Dr Forlee. In addition, 
the CP5 form would appear to indicate that Dr Rossiter was correct in her assertion 
that she directed a skeletal survey to be carried out and a set of photographs of 
Victoria’s injuries to be taken.
10.50   The nature and extent of Dr Rossiter’s examination of Victoria on this occasion 
remains unclear. She thought that she “looked at” Victoria after her bath and 
noted then that she had injuries that needed to be documented and drawn 
properly. She remembered considering what may have caused the marks and 
identified looped wire as a possibility. Unfortunately, no notes were made either 
of the marks she saw or of her theory as to their possible cause – an omission she 
regretted but was unable to explain.
10.51  Dr  Rossiter’s recollection was that she delegated the task of carrying out a full 
examination of Victoria’s body and recording of any marks discovered to Dr David 
Reynders, the senior house officer who was due to take over from Dr Forlee. 
Dr Rossiter was confident that Dr Reynders had sufficient experience and ability 
to be able to perform this task on her behalf.
10.52   If this was indeed Dr Rossiter’s plan, there were two problems with it. First, 
Dr Reynders was not on duty on 25 July and did not arrive on the ward until the 
following day. Second, Dr Rossiter left no clear instructions in the notes and made 
no arrangements to ensure that the doctor to whom she had delegated the task 
had a clear understanding of what was expected of him.
10.53   Dr Rossiter accepted that the arrangements she put in place to ensure that a full 
examination of Victoria was carried out were “clearly inadequate”. In addition 
to agreeing with her assessment, I would add that her failure to check whether 
her instructions had been carried out meant that she did not find out until after 
Victoria’s death that no thorough examination of her was ever carried out during 
the two weeks she was an inpatient at the North Middlesex Hospital.
10.54   Finally, with regard to Dr Rossiter’s ward round on 25 July, a note by Nurse 
Tsiagbe indicates that Dr Rossiter had a conversation with Kouao that morning. 
Unsurprisingly, the notes record neither the questions put to Kouao by Dr Rossiter 
nor her responses. Dr Rossiter was unable to assist me any further from her 
independent recollection. Therefore, I will simply restrict myself to observing that 
a further opportunity to record potentially useful information for the benefit of 
those who came later to deal with Victoria’s case was squandered.10  North Middlesex Hospital
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Visit by Kouao
10.55   The last significant event of 25 July was a visit from Kouao, who arrived on the ward 
accompanied by a man. Nurse Millicent Graham recalled Kouao behaving towards 
Victoria in a manner she considered inappropriate, a view apparently shared by 
Nurse Grace Pereira, who made the following entry in the ward’s critical incident log:
“Mum visited with a gentleman at 10.30pm. Woke Anna up from her 
sleep. They sat on the chairs whilst Anna stood up in front of mum as 
they talked. Master servant attitude observed and mum kept pointing a 
finger at her. They left the room after about 10 mins. Mum went back to 
the room again to ask her what she needs after a suggestion from nurse 
and as soon as she entered although Anna had got into bed she got out 
and stood in front of mum to talk to her.”
10.56   The critical incident log was kept in a folder in the ward office and did not form 
part of the main hospital notes of the child concerned. Its purpose was to record 
concerns of a child protection nature felt by nurses and, as such, took the place 
of form CP6, which had been designed for that purpose but was found to be 
inadequate. The fact that Nurse Pereira chose to record her observations on the 
critical incident log is an indication that she regarded the interaction between 
Victoria and Kouao to be relevant in a child protection context.
Monday 26 July 1999
The morning ward round
10.57   The morning ward round on Rainbow ward usually took place between 8.30am 
and 9.30am. On 26 July 1999, it was conducted by a paediatric registrar, Dr Justin 
Richardson, who was accompanied by Dr Forlee.
10.58   Dr Richardson recalled being brought up to date with Victoria’s case, probably by 
Dr Forlee. In particular, he remembered being told that there were child protection 
concerns surrounding Victoria and that marks had been noticed on her body 
which, it was thought, were attributable to “inappropriate chastisement”. Despite 
being aware of these concerns, Dr Richardson did not look at the child protection 
forms contained in Victoria’s notes to ensure that the concerns and suspicions 
reported to him were adequately recorded. Nor did he examine the marks on 
Victoria for himself.
10.59   While I regard a careful review of the notes as one of the key responsibilities of 
the senior doctor conducting a ward round, I realise that Dr Richardson would 
probably have been aware that, by the time he saw her, Victoria had been seen 
by Dr Rossiter, and a plan for her future management had been put into action. 
In those circumstances, it is perhaps understandable that Dr Richardson should 
have limited himself to ensuring that Victoria was comfortable rather than taking 
the child protection issues forward.
10.60   Dr Forlee wrote up the notes at the end of the ward round. In addition to some 
physical findings she recorded the following: “X-rays; discuss at psychosocial 
meeting today. Dermatologist. Photographs.” As to whose responsibility it was to 
ensure that these further steps were carried out, Dr Forlee told me that this would 
have fallen to one of the senior house officers on the ward at the time. However, 
she did not think that she was responsible on this particular occasion.
10.61   Later the same morning, Nurse Clare Watling and Noelle O’Boyce, the play 
specialist on Rainbow ward, gave Victoria a bath. At approximately 10.30am, 
they called over Nurse Beatrice Norman, the lead paediatric nurse at the The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
264
North Middlesex Hospital, to show her what they had found. Nurse Norman said 
that, when she looked, she saw a number of injuries to Victoria’s body. She told 
me that she instructed the nurses to make a note of all they had seen once they 
had finished bathing Victoria. If that is right then she was disobeyed – the nurses 
restricted themselves to recording only the fact of Victoria’s bath, not what it had 
revealed.
10.62   The fact that no record was made of Victoria’s injuries at this point was quickly 
rectified, at least in part by Dr Reynders who, at some point during the morning of 
26 July, completed a set of body maps upon which he made a detailed record of 
the marks visible on Victoria’s body. 
10.63   Dr Reynders would appear to have restricted himself simply to recording the 
marks on Victoria’s body. Despite the fact that he concluded that the shape and 
distribution of the marks was strongly suggestive of deliberate injury, he did not 
think that he should be the one to investigate further how they had been caused. 
That was a task which, in his view, was better left to a more senior clinician 
working in a controlled environment where any information could be properly 
recorded. 
The psychosocial meeting
10.64   In the afternoon, a routine psychosocial meeting was held. These meetings 
provided a forum in which any child with possible social or psychological problems 
could be discussed. Notes of these meetings were recorded in a book stored in the 
hospital’s child psychology department.
10.65   Dr Richardson was at the meeting on 26 July, and Dr Rossiter thought it very 
probable that she was also there. Neither of them had anything but the vaguest 
recollection of what was discussed. However, the notes provide some assistance 
and indicate that Victoria’s case was raised. It was recorded that child protection 
concerns remained and that Dr Rossiter was to carry out an examination of 
Victoria’s injuries.
10.66   When it was put to her, Dr Rossiter was somewhat confused by the note which 
indicated that she was to carry out an examination. Her recollection was that 
she was extremely busy that week and could not recall having taken on this 
responsibility herself. However, whether or not she agreed to do so at the 
psychosocial meeting, Dr Rossiter agreed that she should have examined Victoria 
at some point during the days that followed.
10.67   A number of explanations were offered for her failure to do so. First, she speculated 
that she may have forgotten, and the notes of the psychosocial meeting did not 
come to the attention of those who might have been in a position to remind 
her. Second, it was possible that she thought that there was no need to examine 
Victoria, as this had already been delegated by her to another member of her 
team. Finally, and to my mind most plausibly, she thought that she may simply 
have failed to get round to it due to pressure of work and the fact that she was 
“juggling a lot of cases and trying to prioritise”.
Referral to Karen Johns
10.68   It is instructive to pause at this point to consider what, if any, conclusion the 
hospital had reached as to the cause of Victoria’s injuries at this stage. Despite the 
fact that she had been seen in the bath by five nurses, examined by two doctors 
and observed by several of the ward staff interacting with her ‘mother’, no firm 
view would seem to have been taken as to whether the injuries discovered were 
likely to be non-accidental.10  North Middlesex Hospital
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10.69   This is illustrated by the referral made on the afternoon of 26 July by Nurse Sharon 
Jones to Karen Johns, a social worker employed by Enfield Social Services. At the 
time there was an agreement between Enfield and Haringey under which hospital 
social workers employed by Enfield Social Services would carry out an initial 
assessment of Haringey children admitted to the North Middlesex Hospital with 
child protection concerns, and then pass on the case to Haringey Social Services 
for action.
10.70   Following receipt of the referral, Ms Johns telephoned the ward and spoke to Nurse 
Jones. Her note of the conversation indicates that she was told by Nurse Jones that 
the child protection forms did not state that Victoria’s injuries were thought to be 
non-accidental. Nurse Jones’s note of the conversation, made in the critical incident 
log, reads as follows: “S.W. referral made. Spoke with Karen Johns (Hospital Social 
Worker). Drs and nurses to contact SW dept. again if it is thought that injuries are 
non-accidental and CP forms have been completed stating this.”
10.71   It would seem clear, therefore, that the various suspicions chronicled above were 
not communicated to Ms Johns on 26 July. As far as she was concerned, the 
hospital had yet to reach the view that Victoria’s injuries were likely to be non-
accidental. It would also appear from the note in the critical incident log that she 
was waiting for such a view to be expressed by the hospital before taking any 
further action.
10.72   Continuing with Victoria’s story, later the same evening, Kouao returned to the 
ward to visit Victoria. Dr Reynders spoke to her and obtained her consent for the 
skeletal survey to be carried out and the photographs of Victoria’s injuries to be 
taken.
10.73   There is one aspect of this conversation which causes me some concern. Dr Reynders 
did not tell Kouao the real reason why the hospital wished to take photographs of 
Victoria’s injuries. Instead of telling her that there were child protection concerns, he 
said that the photographs were necessary to monitor the healing of the burns. While 
I understand the reluctance of a junior doctor in Dr Reynders’s position to confront a 
parent about matters of this nature, I regard it as undesirable that an inexperienced 
clinician be placed in a position where he or she is forced to resort to subterfuge 
in this way. It is preferable, where possible, to be honest with the parents or carers 
of a child about whom there are child protection concerns. If that means that 
difficult conversations are necessary then they should be handled by a senior and 
experienced doctor. In order to encourage the development of this practice, I make 
the following recommendation:
Recommendation
In a case of possible deliberate harm to a child in hospital, when permission is 
required from the child’s carer for the investigation of such possible deliberate 
harm, or for the treatment of a child’s injuries, the permission must be sought 
by a doctor above the grade of senior house officer.
Observations of Nurse Quinn and Nurse Pereira
10.74   The nurse in charge of the night shift on 26 July was Nurse Isobel Quinn. She 
allocated Victoria’s care to Nurse Pereira. Before settling Victoria down for the 
night, Nurse Pereira gave her another bath. As she bathed her, Nurse Pereira saw a 
large number of scars on her body, many of which she considered to be indicative 
of non-accidental injuries, such as bites and blows with a belt buckle.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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10.75   Disturbed by what she had seen, Nurse Pereira called Nurse Quinn to come and 
look. Nurse Quinn told me that she also saw marks, which she thought may have 
been caused by a belt buckle. She also noticed that Victoria’s arm was bruised 
and swollen.
10.76   I should state that the first time that either of these two nurses recorded what they 
saw that evening was in their written evidence to this Inquiry. The only indication 
in the notes that this incident ever took place was a comment written by Nurse 
Pereira that, when she bathed Victoria, she found her to be “sore all over her 
body”. There is no mention of the bite marks, the belt buckle mark or the injuries 
to the arm.
10.77   I have found it very difficult to understand why important observations of this 
nature were not recorded in the notes. Both Nurse Pereira and Nurse Quinn were 
aware that Victoria was a child about whom there were child protection concerns, 
and Nurse Pereira had seen fit the previous evening to make a note in the critical 
incident log concerning the master-servant relationship between Kouao and 
Victoria. Nurse Pereira was frank enough to accept that she should have made a 
note of her observations that night. Nurse Quinn simply told me that she could 
not account for why she chose not to do so.
10.78   I consider the issue of recording information in more detail in section 11. For 
present purposes, I wish simply to make the point that this is precisely the sort 
of information that nurses should record in the notes. They are a vital source of 
information in the discovery and investigation of child abuse and it should be 
made clear to anyone who may be in doubt that the recording of suspicious 
injuries on a child is a fundamental responsibility.
Tuesday 27 July 1999
The morning ward round
10.79   Dr Maud Meates, a consultant paediatrician, conducted the morning ward round 
on 27 July accompanied by Dr Saji Alexander, a registrar. Both doctors said that 
they were aware of the fact that there were suspicions that Victoria may have 
been physically abused. Dr Meates added that discussions she had with other 
medical staff during the course of her ward round alerted her to possible issues 
of emotional abuse and neglect as well. At the time, she said the accumulating 
evidence was “making us much more certain that this was an abusive situation”.
10.80   Neither Dr Meates nor Dr Alexander carried out a full examination of Victoria 
during the course of the ward round. Both doctors apparently assumed that this 
had already been done. Neither of them sought to confirm this assumption by 
reading through the notes.
10.81   At the end of the ward round, Dr Alexander recorded an action plan that included 
referral to the hospital social worker, a request for an opinion about Victoria’s right 
eye that had become swollen, and a further request for photographs and a skeletal 
survey. 
10.82   As to the referral to the hospital social worker, Dr Alexander said that he was 
“probably” unaware of the fact that Ms Johns had already been informed about 
Victoria and that she was awaiting a definitive medical opinion as to whether 
Victoria’s injuries were thought to be non-accidental. Dr Meates, it would seem, 
was similarly ignorant of the current position.10  North Middlesex Hospital
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Ms Johns’s attempts to obtain a diagnosis
10.83  Dr  Meates’s ward round appears to have prompted a further call to be made from 
the ward to Ms Johns. Her records indicate that she received a call from Nurse 
Sue Jennings concerning Victoria on 27 July. Although Nurse Jennings had no 
recollection of the conversation, Ms Johns’s notes suggest that Ms Johns was asked 
what action she proposed to take. Ms Johns replied that she intended to take 
no action until there was a clear diagnosis of non-accidental injury and Victoria’s 
parents had been informed of social services’ involvement.
10.84   To reinforce the message, Ms Johns wrote a memo to the “Sister in charge of 
Rainbow ward”, in which she clarified the child protection referral procedures. She 
explained that, unless and until a paediatrician confirmed that a child was likely to 
be suffering from non-accidental injury and informed the child’s “parents” of that 
suspicion, social services could do no more than carry out routine checks. Finally, 
she wrote in the memo that she understood that it had not yet been suggested 
that Victoria was suffering from non-accidental injury, but that she would retain 
the papers and await further information.
10.85   Unfortunately, neither Dr Meates nor Dr Rossiter ever saw Ms Johns’s memo and so 
did not take steps to correct her misunderstanding that non-accidental injury had 
yet to be “suggested”. However, even without their intervention, matters started to 
inch painfully towards the point where Ms Johns felt she had sufficient information 
to make a child protection referral.
10.86   Although Dr Forlee could not recall doing so, Ms Johns’s notes record that 
Dr Forlee called her on 27 July and explained that fresh concerns had arisen since 
the child protection forms had originally been completed, and that suspicion 
was growing that Victoria was the victim of abuse. Ms Johns recorded that she 
explained to Dr Forlee that the child protection forms would have to be amended 
to reflect these heightened suspicions and that Victoria’s “parents” should be 
informed.
10.87   Assuming that Ms Johns’s note made at the time of her conversation with Dr Forlee 
is accurate (and I have no reason to doubt it), then Dr Forlee failed to do as she was 
asked. She made no amendment to the child protection forms herself and could 
not recall whether or not she reported Ms Johns’s request to anyone else. During 
the course of her oral evidence, Dr Forlee drew my attention to the ad hoc manner 
in which responsibility for matters of this nature was assumed by doctors on the 
ward. She told me that “areas that we covered, areas that we had responsibility for 
changed every day” and that “things happen[ed] fairly haphazardly rather than in 
an organised, co-ordinated way”.
10.88   This is a woeful state of affairs. It combines what appears to me to be an 
institutionalised lack of any system on the ward for responding to requests and 
for ensuring the comprehensive and coherent gathering and passing on of 
information, with a discontinuity of medical care that blurred areas of personal 
responsibility. 
10.89   It is abundantly clear that Ms Johns needed a straightforward, documented 
statement from ward staff about Victoria’s injuries and whether or not these 
were thought to be non-accidental. She had made a request for this four times: 
in a conversation with Nurse Jones on 26 July and recorded by her in the critical 
incident log, in a conversation with Nurse Jennings the following day, in a 
memorandum to the ward, and in a conversation with Dr Forlee. On each occasion 
she was clear in her request and in her reasons for it.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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10.90   Despite the number and clarity of her requests, she received no satisfactory response 
from the ward staff. Furthermore, there did not seem to be any system in place on 
the ward designed to ensure that requests for information from other agencies were 
dealt with promptly and efficiently. As Dr Rossiter put it, “I think we were in trouble 
of having a lot of links in the chain most of which are able to break.” 
Wednesday 28 July 1999
Further action by Ms Johns
10.91   It would appear that Ms Johns eventually decided to take Victoria’s case forward, 
despite the absence of the unambiguous diagnosis she had asked for. Her notes 
indicate that she spoke to Dr Alexander on 28 July and told him that the referral 
had been passed on to Haringey Social Services. He told her that the hospital staff 
would pass on this information to Kouao when they saw her later that day, and a 
note made by Dr Richardson indicates that this was indeed done. 
10.92  Ms  Johns’s notes further state that she spoke to Nurse Jennings and asked, yet 
again, if she could remind the doctors either to complete a new CP3 form or 
amend the existing one to show that non-accidental injury was suspected. Nurse 
Jennings could not recall what, if anything, she did in response to this request. 
Whatever it may have been, it certainly did not result either in the amendment of 
the CP3 form or in the completion of a new version.
10.93   However, it is possible that Ms Johns’s call prompted Nurse Jennings to speak to 
Dr Rossiter concerning Victoria’s case and Ms Johns’s outstanding queries. This 
may explain why Dr Rossiter spoke to Ms Johns later the same day. At the end 
of this conversation, Ms Johns made the following entry in her notes: “Anxious 
attachment? At least neglect; probable emotional abuse; possible physical abuse.”
10.94   Dr Rossiter did not make her own note of the contents of her conversation with 
Ms Johns and had insufficient recollection of it to enable her to dispute the 
accuracy of Ms Johns’s record. Assuming that the note is an accurate reflection of 
what Dr Rossiter said, then, in my view, she gave Ms Johns a substantially more 
equivocal impression of the level of the hospital’s concerns regarding physical 
abuse than the available evidence would have warranted. Nonetheless, Ms Johns 
considered by this stage that she had sufficient grounds to refer Victoria’s case on 
to Haringey Social Services.
Haringey strategy meeting
10.95   Having received the referral from Ms Johns, Haringey Social Services arranged a 
strategy meeting for 2.30pm on 28 July at Haringey’s offices. No one from the 
hospital attended. Dr Rossiter said that she was probably aware that the meeting 
was taking place and would have gone had it been held in the hospital at a time 
compatible with her other commitments, but that she would not have had time 
to travel to Haringey’s offices on the afternoon in question. Nurse Norman was 
unaware that the meeting was taking place and none of the ward staff would seem 
to have been invited.
10.96   Following the strategy meeting, Ms Johns sent a memo to the ward. The memo 
stated that social services would contact Dr Meates to clarify the medical position 
and discuss a timetable for intervention (it would seem as though Haringey had 
yet to realise that Dr Rossiter had assumed responsibility for the child protection 
aspects of Victoria’s case).10  North Middlesex Hospital
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10.97   The memorandum ended by asking ward staff to “kindly assist” in the following 
respects:
“– To provide a brief summary of the observed interactions between Anna and her 
mother, which led to staff members feeling concerned
– Could staff continue to closely monitor the interaction between mother and 
daughter and record this
– Should Ms Kovao [sic] attempt to remove Anna from the ward, prior to discharge 
being agreed jointly by the hospital and Haringey Social Services, the police to 
be alerted immediately and asked to prevent this.”
10.98   The final significant event of 28 July was a visit to the ward by Dr Thomas Mann, 
a consultant dermatologist. He examined Victoria at around 4.30pm at which 
point he found no evidence of scabies burrows and concluded that Victoria had 
been successfully treated and no longer posed a risk of infection. However, he did 
consider that Victoria’s skin may have been irritated by over-treatment with the 
Derbac lotion that had been prescribed by the Central Middlesex Hospital to treat 
Victoria’s scabies. 
Thursday 29 July to Monday 2 August 1999
10.99   The days immediately following the strategy meeting passed uneventfully as far as 
Victoria was concerned. She would seem to have been well cared for on the ward 
and her injuries continued to heal. By 2 August, Dr Reynders felt able to write in 
her notes that Victoria was “much better” and “able for discharge”.
10.100 At Dr Rossiter’s suggestion, Victoria was befriended by a French-speaking nurse 
named Lucienne Taub. Nurse Taub would spend some time with Victoria virtually 
every day and would often take her on little excursions around the hospital, 
including visits to the neo-natal wards, which Victoria particularly enjoyed.
10.101 While unremarkable from Victoria’s perspective, this period witnessed a number 
of incidents of potential significance to the future management of her case.
Photographs
10.102 The first was the visit of the hospital’s photographer, Ian Abernethy, on 29 July. 
Mr Abernethy took a series of photographs of Victoria’s injuries, several of which 
were shown during the course of the Inquiry’s hearings. They constitute a clear 
and helpful record of the marks visible on Victoria’s body at the time.
10.103 Therefore, it is a matter of great concern that they were not seen by anyone until 
after Victoria’s death. Part of the explanation for this unfortunate omission may 
lie in the fact that the photographs, once developed, were sent to Dr Meates’s 
office rather than Dr Rossiter’s office. This was because they had originally been 
requested in Dr Meates’s name. Dr Meates had no recollection of ever having 
received the photographs. She explained that, if she had received them she would 
have passed them to Dr Rossiter who, in turn, was clear in her recollection that 
they never reached her.
10.104 The lack of any adequate system for the proper distribution of the photographs is 
illustrated by the manner in which Dr Meates dealt with the request, contained in 
a memo written by Ms Johns on 29 July, for the police to be provided with copies. 
Dr Meates was prepared to agree to the request, annotated the memo to this 
effect and sent it back to Ms Johns. Thereafter, nothing was done.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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10.105 It is unfortunate that Dr Meates did not share the contents of the memo of 29 July 
with Dr Rossiter. Given that Dr Rossiter was responsible for the child protection 
aspects of Victoria’s care, her ignorance of it was regrettable. Victoria’s case would 
seem to demonstrate that, unless it is clear to all those concerned exactly which 
consultant is responsible for the child protection aspects of a particular case, there 
is the possibility that important information is missed. In order to address this 
problem, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
When a child is admitted to hospital with concerns about deliberate harm, a 
clear decision must be taken as to which consultant is to be responsible for the 
child protection aspects of the child’s care. The identity of that consultant must 
be clearly marked in the child’s notes so that all those involved in the child’s 
care are left in no doubt as to who is responsible for the case.
Amendment of CP3
10.106 The second incident of significance happened on 1 August 1999, when Dr Rossiter 
finally got round to amending the CP3 form originally completed by Dr Forlee over 
a week earlier. The amendment consisted of an arrow pointing from the conclusion 
originally ticked by Dr Forlee, “I wish to await further information before 
committing myself”, to the one above which read “I consider the incident is likely 
to be non-accidental”. Next to the arrow Dr Rossiter wrote: “What is uncertain is 
the category.”
10.107 Dr Rossiter explained that the intention of the arrow was to show that her 
view had changed and that the note beside it was intended to convey that she 
considered Victoria to be a victim not just of physical abuse but, perhaps just as 
seriously, emotional abuse and neglect. As to the physical abuse, her view was 
based not on the scalding injuries to Victoria’s head but on the other injuries which 
had been discovered since her admission. This is significant because Dr Rossiter 
chose not to amend the ‘description of injuries’ section on the CP3 form, which 
continued to refer only to the scalds to Victoria’s face.
10.108 In fact, the long-awaited amendment of the CP3 form did little to improve the 
position as far as social services were concerned. The annotated CP3 form still fell 
well short of an accurate reflection of the hospital’s concerns. In particular, there 
was no reference to the various marks on Victoria’s body which were thought to 
be indicative of abuse, including those Dr Rossiter thought may have been caused 
by looped wire. Similarly, there was nothing to indicate that the overall picture of 
Victoria’s circumstances was leading Dr Rossiter to have serious concerns about 
emotional abuse and neglect.
Psychiatric assessment
10.109 The third incident of significance was when Dr Rossiter decided, during the course 
of her ward round on 1 August, that Victoria should be subject to a psychiatric 
assessment. She took the view that a psychiatrist might be able to gain a clearer 
insight into the difficulties Victoria was facing. Dr Reynders wrote up the notes 
of that ward round and recorded that the assessment should be done urgently. 
He also noted that Victoria’s case would be discussed at the psychosocial meeting 
to be held the following day.
10.110 Dr Rossiter attended the psychosocial meeting on 2 August and repeated her 
instruction that a psychiatric assessment of Victoria should be carried out. In 
the event, the psychiatrist concerned refused to carry out an assessment until 10  North Middlesex Hospital
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more background information about Victoria’s circumstances was available and 
she had been assessed by social services. Instead of taking steps to provide the 
psychiatrist with what he needed, matters would seem to have been left there by 
those responsible for Victoria’s care. The result was that no psychiatric assessment 
was ever carried out and the opportunity it may have provided to gain a valuable 
insight into Victoria’s circumstances was lost.
Tuesday 3 August 1999
Dr Alexander’s assessment
10.111 The ward round on the morning of 3 August was carried out by Dr Alexander. 
He noted that Victoria was “better” and “medically fit for discharge”. However, 
he was concerned that she had yet to provide a satisfactory account of what had 
happened to her and considered that a proper history was still required.
10.112 In my view, Dr Alexander was undoubtedly right in his assessment of the situation 
– a proper history was plainly necessary. Unfortunately, this proved to be another 
example of a member of the hospital staff deciding on an appropriate course of 
action but failing to follow it through. Dr Alexander did not take the history himself, 
apparently because he thought that Nurse Taub would do so. However, Nurse Taub 
said that nobody ever asked her to take a history from Victoria. It would appear, 
therefore, that Dr Alexander not only failed to take the step that he rightly identified 
as being necessary, but also omitted to delegate it to someone else.
10.113 Although Dr Alexander considered that Victoria was medically fit for discharge 
when he saw her on 3 August, he considered that it was still necessary to ensure 
that it was safe for her to return home. This would have required, in his view, 
some form of formal investigation or case conference at which the “specific details 
of further care are discussed”. Again, Dr Alexander was plainly correct in his 
assessment of the situation. It is, therefore, a matter of regret that he did not take 
the trouble to contact social services to ensure that his expectations in this regard 
would be met.
Contact between Lisa Arthurworrey and Nurse Quinn
10.114 Later that morning, at around 11.20am, Lisa Arthurworrey, the social worker from 
Haringey who was responsible for Victoria’s case, telephoned the hospital and 
spoke to Nurse Quinn. Their respective accounts of this conversation differed in a 
number of critical respects.
10.115 Nurse Quinn said that her conversation with Ms Arthurworrey lasted about 
10 minutes, during the course of which she told her about all the concerns 
the medical staff felt regarding Victoria. These included suspicions that Kouao 
was not Victoria’s real mother and that the scalds to Victoria’s head were 
non-accidental. In addition, Nurse Quinn said that she told Ms Arthurworrey about 
the inappropriate interaction between Kouao and Victoria that had been observed 
on the ward.
10.116 According to Nurse Quinn, Ms Arthurworrey appeared to appreciate the hospital’s 
concerns and asked her to fax “details of the nurses’ concerns about Victoria’s 
behaviour and interactions with Kouao”. Nurse Quinn said that, in response to this 
request, she faxed to Haringey Social Services a handwritten note along with form 
CP1 and possibly also forms CP2 and CP3. The fax amounted to six pages in total.
10.117 There is a copy of the note written by Nurse Quinn in the hospital records. It takes 
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significant incidents during Victoria’s stay on the ward. The following matters were 
included:
• The ‘master and servant’ relationship between Kouao and Victoria observed by 
Nurse Pereira
• The fact that Kouao made no effort to assist Victoria when she wet herself during 
the course of one of Kouao’s visits
• The fact that Kouao never brought any clothes or treats into the hospital for 
Victoria
• The evidence of ‘emotional abuse’ recorded by Dr Rossiter during the course of 
her ward round on 1 August
• The fact that Victoria seemed to simulate crying when Kouao left after a visit on 
3 August
• Victoria’s large appetite, including the fact that she once ate five bowls of cereal 
during the course of a single evening.
10.118 There is no indication in the note as to whether it was intended to constitute a 
comprehensive account of the hospital’s concerns, whether the matters included 
were additional to those discussed over the telephone, or whether they represented 
a selection of the concerns already discussed. What is clear, however, is that no 
mention was made of any of the hospital’s suspicions about physical abuse.
10.119 For my part, I find it extremely difficult to know what to make of Nurse Quinn’s 
note. Numerous witnesses from the hospital came before me and gave disturbing 
accounts of the injuries they saw on Victoria’s body. I heard a variety of nurses 
say that they thought Victoria had been bitten, branded and beaten with a belt 
buckle. Dr Rossiter said that she suspected that some of the marks on Victoria 
had been caused by chastisement with a looped wire and there were suspicions 
regarding the serious scalds with which Victoria had originally been admitted. 
Even if Nurse Quinn is right to say that all the hospital’s concerns were covered in 
her conversation with Ms Arthurworrey prior to the writing of this note, this does 
not explain why she should have chosen to leave these matters out in favour of a 
description of how much cereal Victoria ate one morning.
10.120 In addition, the note Nurse Quinn made of her conversation with Ms Arthurworrey 
in the critical incident log would suggest that she had no justification for being 
deliberately selective in terms of the concerns she included in her note. Nurse 
Quinn made a note of the conversation in the critical incident log. The relevant 
section of the note reads: “She has requested that I fax the CP1 form to her and 
any [my emphasis] concerns we may have.”
10.121 The explanation for Nurse Quinn’s note may lie in the alternative account of 
Ms Arthurworrey, whose evidence as to her conversation with Nurse Quinn 
was bolstered by the fact that she made a detailed note at the time about what 
was said.
10.122 Critically, Ms Arthurworrey’s note contains the following entry: “Hospital are 
satisfied with the explanation given by Anna’s mother re her burns. Explanation 
was that Anna, who had been suffering from scabies, had poured hot water from 
a kettle over her head. She did this to relieve the itching.”
10.123 Nurse Quinn was adamant that this note was incorrect and said that she told 
Ms Arthurworrey precisely the opposite. Ms Arthurworrey was equally confident 
that her note was an accurate reflection of what she was told. The point is plainly 
one of considerable importance. Deliberately scalding a seven-year-old girl to the 
extent that she needs two weeks in hospital is a matter of enormous seriousness.10  North Middlesex Hospital
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10.124 If the hospital really did suspect that Kouao had injured Victoria in this manner 
I find it impossible to understand why Nurse Quinn would have chosen not to 
say so in her note to Ms Arthurworrey which, according to her own record, was 
supposed to contain “any concerns we may have”. The suggestion that one might 
simply forget to mention the concern that Victoria’s mother had deliberately 
poured boiling water over her head is, to my mind, utterly implausible.
10.125 I find it equally difficult to accept that Ms Arthurworrey could have so disastrously 
misinterpreted what she was told by Nurse Quinn such that she failed to appreciate 
that she was being told that the hospital suspected that Kouao had deliberately 
inflicted very serious injury to Victoria. Ms Arthurworrey’s note is detailed and was 
made at the time. It indicates to me that she was paying close attention to what 
she was being told by Nurse Quinn.
10.126 Finally, I note that in the letter written by Nurse Quinn to Ms Arthurworrey, the 
following is included in the list of matters thought by Dr Rossiter to indicate 
emotional abuse: “self-treatment – boiling water prior to admission and whilst in 
hospital put Hibisrub on her head”. This would seem to indicate that the hospital’s 
concern regarding Victoria’s scalds was not that they had been caused by Kouao 
but that they had been self-inflicted by Victoria. I cannot believe that Nurse Quinn 
would have written this in her note immediately after telling Ms Arthurworrey that 
the hospital suspected the scalds to have been caused by Kouao.
10.127 For these reasons I accept Ms Arthurworrey’s evidence over that of Nurse Quinn on 
this issue. I conclude that Nurse Quinn did tell Ms Arthurworrey that the hospital 
was satisfied with Kouao’s explanation for Victoria’s scalds, and that it was not 
considered that they had been caused deliberately.
Old injuries
10.128 Although I have found that Nurse Quinn did not tell Ms Arthurworrey of the 
hospital’s suspicions regarding Victoria’s scalds, she did give her other information 
indicative of possible physical abuse. Ms Arthurworrey’s note confirms that she was 
told by Nurse Quinn that “old injuries” had been discovered on Victoria’s body 
which “appeared to be non-accidental”. The question that arises, therefore, is 
what, if any, information did Nurse Quinn provide regarding these “old injuries”, 
and did it adequately reflect the hospital’s concerns about them.
10.129 Nurse Quinn told me that the documentation she sent to Ms Arthurworrey 
consisted of a cover sheet, her handwritten note, form CP1, and probably also 
forms CP2 and CP3, making a total of six pages in all. This would seem to be 
consistent with the entry on the cover sheet stating that the fax consisted of six 
pages in total. Copies of Nurse Quinn’s letter together with forms CP1, CP2 and 
CP3 are to be found in the Haringey case file, adding further weight to Nurse 
Quinn’s recollection in this regard.
10.130 There is no reference in any of these documents to the “old injuries” about which 
the hospital was apparently concerned. As set out above, there was no mention 
of any physical injuries in the letter written by Nurse Quinn, and the only injuries 
described on the CP forms were the scalds to Victoria’s head, briefly described 
on form CP3. Ms Arthurworrey had asked for the hospital to send information 
of “any” concerns felt by the medical staff. In the documentation provided in 
response to this request, the only injury mentioned was the scalding to the head 
which Nurse Quinn had told Ms Arthurworrey was considered to be accidental. 
Anyone reading this documentation would be very hard pressed to find any 
indication that the hospital suspected physical abuse.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Ms Arthurworrey’s conversation with Dr Rossiter
10.131 As happened so often during the course of Victoria’s tragic case, an opportunity 
to clear up any confusion presented itself almost immediately. Following receipt 
of Nurse Quinn’s note, Ms Arthurworrey telephoned the hospital and spoke to 
Dr Rossiter. As far as Dr Rossiter could recall, the purpose of the conversation was 
to clarify the contents of Nurse Quinn’s note.
10.132 Dr Rossiter accepted that she might have played down the issue of physical abuse 
during her conversation with Ms Arthurworrey. Her explanation for this was that 
she had previously experienced difficulty in persuading social services to take issues 
of emotional abuse and neglect sufficiently seriously, and so was trying particularly 
hard to convey her concerns of this nature to Ms Arthurworrey.
10.133 Dr Rossiter did not regard this discussion as a prelude to Victoria’s discharge. As far 
as she was concerned, she wished to consider the findings and outcome of the 
section 47 investigation she believed to be under way before deciding whether or 
not it would be appropriate for Victoria to go home.
10.134 The above account of the events of 3 August illustrates that, despite considerable 
contact between the hospital and social services during the course of the day, little 
in the way of clear information demonstrating that the hospital suspected that 
Victoria was the victim of serious physical abuse was provided to Ms Arthurworrey. 
Nurse Quinn had made reference to “old injuries” during the course of their 
telephone conversation, but no reference to these injuries was to be found in the 
documentation sent by the hospital and little, if any, mention had been made of 
them by Dr Rossiter when she spoke to Ms Arthurworrey later in the day.
10.135 The concerns that the medical and nursing staff at the hospital told me that they 
felt about Victoria never, in my view, crystallised into anything resembling a clear, 
well-thought-through picture of what they suspected had happened to her and that 
would have helped social services in determining how best to deal with her case.
Friday 6 August 1999
Victoria’s discharge
10.136 Following his ward round on the morning of 6 August, Dr Reynders made the 
following entry in Victoria’s notes: “Anna is well. Burns well healed. For home visit 
today with police. ? D/C [discharge] after that if it is safe.”
10.137 Dr Reynders never personally spoke to any social worker handling Victoria’s case 
and was unable to assist me as to how he gained the impression that Victoria’s 
discharge depended on the police and social services deciding that Victoria’s home 
was safe. He said that in marking “discharge” with a question mark in the notes, 
he intended to convey the following: “If we had received the report back from the 
social services and the police department that they had established a safe place 
for her to go to, that she may possibly be discharged.” Before any firm decision to 
discharge was taken, Dr Reynders told me, he would have wanted to discuss the 
matter with a more senior colleague.
10.138 Unfortunately, while Dr Reynders may have known what his note meant, others 
did not. Nurse Margaret Ryan, who was the nurse in charge of the ward that day 
and who accompanied Dr Reynders on his ward round, understood the note to 
refer not to a possible discharge plan but to a definite one. She thought that if the 
findings of the home visit proved satisfactory, then Victoria was to go home.10  North Middlesex Hospital
275
10.139 The last entry in the hospital notes was made later the same day by Nurse Millicent 
Graham. It reads: “Seen by social worker and police today at 15.30; spoke with 
Anna, myself also present, Anna happy to go home, started to pack right away. 
Mum ‘phoned to say she was on her way. Picked up Anna at 20.00. Satisfactory 
day, home with Mum.”
10.140 Nurse Millicent Graham told me that by the time they came to the ward to see 
Victoria on 6 August, she believed Ms Arthurworrey and PC Karen Jones had 
visited Victoria’s home and satisfied themselves that it was safe for her to return. 
In consequence, she believed that the condition identified by Dr Reynders in his 
note had been met and that the path was clear for Victoria’s discharge. As a result, 
she updated Nurse Ryan as to the current position and telephoned Kouao to tell 
her that she could come and collect Victoria.
10.141 For reasons that are set out in detail elsewhere in this Report, Ms Arthurworrey and 
PC Jones never did make their intended visit to Victoria’s home. Nurse Millicent 
Graham, therefore, was seriously mistaken as to the true position. While she 
thought (or assumed) that the condition on which Victoria’s discharge depended 
had been met, the reality was precisely the opposite. Nobody had visited Victoria’s 
home to ensure that it was safe for her to return.
10.142 Nurse Ryan was present on the ward at the time Victoria left with Kouao. She also 
would appear to have been content to let Kouao take Victoria and expressed no 
reservations as to this course of action at the time.
10.143 I attribute this lack of concern on the part of Nurse Ryan to two misconceptions 
on her part. The first was that she interpreted Dr Reynders’s note as meaning 
that Victoria’s discharge was authorised subject only to a home visit establishing 
that it was safe for her to return. The second was that she though PC Jones and 
Ms Arthurworrey had conducted such a home visit and were satisfied with what 
they found. One can see how the combination of these two misunderstandings 
would have led Nurse Ryan to believe that it was appropriate for Kouao to leave 
the hospital with Victoria on the evening of 6 August.
10.144 The discharge from hospital of a child about whom there have been concerns of 
deliberate harm is a very serious step and one about which there should be no room 
for confusion. I am firmly of the view that doctors should decide when patients are 
ready for discharge from hospital. In this regard I agree with the frustration expressed 
by Dr Rossiter when she commented that Victoria’s case illustrates that ward staff 
appear sometimes to labour under the misapprehension that social workers are 
entitled to discharge patients who are under the care of a doctor.
10.145 Even if one accepts that Nurse Ryan genuinely believed that a home visit had been 
carried out and the findings had satisfied both social services and the police, there 
was still a need, in my opinion, for Dr Rossiter to have been consulted prior to 
discharge taking place. As I stated in the previous section, I regard the approval of 
a senior doctor to be an indispensable prerequisite for the discharge from hospital 
of a child about whom there are concerns of deliberate harm. Therefore, I repeat 
the recommendation I have made in paragraph 9.101 to this effect:
Recommendation 
Hospital trust chief executives must introduce systems to ensure that no child 
about whom there are child protection concerns is discharged from hospital 
without the permission of either the consultant in charge of the child’s care or of 
a paediatrician above the grade of senior house officer. Hospital chief executives 
must introduce systems to monitor compliance with this recommendation.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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10.146 Plainly, before approving the discharge, the senior clinician concerned must be 
satisfied that the necessary follow-up arrangements have been made to ensure 
that the child’s medical needs continue to be met after he or she leaves the 
hospital. In an attempt to ensure that the decision to discharge is not taken by the 
wrong person and that it does not result in the child being returned home with 
un-addressed health needs, I repeat the following recommendation I have made in 
paragraph 9.101 to this effect:
Recommendation
Hospital trust chief executives must introduce systems to ensure that no child 
about whom there are child protection concerns is discharged from hospital 
without a documented plan for the future care of the child. The plan must 
include follow-up arrangements. Hospital chief executives must introduce 
systems to monitor compliance with this recommendation.
Events following Victoria’s discharge
10.147 Dr Rossiter discovered that Victoria had been discharged when she returned to 
work on 9 August following the weekend. She said the fact that the discharge had 
taken place and, moreover, that it had happened without her knowledge made her 
feel “insecure, worried and angry”.
10.148 The first thing she did was to dictate a discharge summary that included the 
following:
“Noted to be a very distressed child. Multiple marks on her not just due 
to scratching, thought possibly due to chastisement, eg with looped 
wire. Child protection forms completed. Photographs taken, rather 
belatedly (staffing problems). Discussed in psychosocial ward round. 
Child showing anxious attachment, seemed very frightened when 
mother visited with her boyfriend, clinging desperately to mother on the 
short times she visited alone. Considered likely to be abused, probable 
neglect and emotional abuse, less difficult to prove physical abuse. Social 
worker spoke to Dr Rossiter on the ‘phone who expressed her very clear 
views as above. Home visit for risk assessment made by social services. 
On their advice child discharged home by ward staff. Very worrying case.”
10.149 While this discharge summary did not record all the concerns identified by 
the hospital staff and contained several of what Dr Rossiter described as 
“misconceptions”, it was plainly the clearest indication that Victoria was the likely 
victim of physical and emotional abuse yet committed to paper. It also indicates 
that Dr Rossiter had grave concerns about Victoria that had not been resolved prior 
to her discharge.
10.150 Unfortunately, it is impossible to identify to whom this discharge summary was 
sent at this stage because there is no recipients list attached to the copy of the 
letter contained in the hospital’s medico-legal file. Dr Rossiter’s intention in drafting 
the discharge summary was that it would be sent to Victoria’s GP (via the health 
visitor), and to the social worker dealing with her case. However, Ms Arthurworrey 
did not see the discharge summary until much later, by which time, as described 
below, Dr Rossiter’s enthusiasm for pursuing the matter had diminished.
10.151 Under normal circumstances it would have been open to Dr Rossiter to seek 
to arrange some follow-up for Victoria via the liaison health visitor. An ideal 10  North Middlesex Hospital
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opportunity for her to have approached the liaison health visitor would have been 
at the regular meetings attended by both of them each Tuesday. Unfortunately, 
these meetings were suspended between 8 June and 14 September due to the 
excessive commitments of both Dr Rossiter and the liaison health visitor. As a 
result, Victoria’s case did not benefit from this potentially valuable resource.
10.152 Immediately after dictating the discharge summary, Dr Rossiter dictated a letter to 
Petra Kitchman, a child protection adviser employed by Haringey Social Services. 
Ms Kitchman was, as far as Dr Rossiter was concerned, the ‘link person’ between 
the hospital and social services and so she regarded her as the appropriate person 
to deal with her concerns and pass them on to whoever had responsibility for 
Victoria’s case.
10.153 The letter reads as follows:
“This is the child I wanted to speak to you about. I never managed 
to speak to a social worker face to face (you have heard my concerns 
about this) and my understanding was that there would be a Social 
Assessment prior to an urgent planning meeting and then referral to 
a child psychiatrist. Unfortunately the ward staff seemed to think that 
social workers can discharge patients who are under the care of a doctor 
and although I would probably have let the girl go home (she was 
very eager to do so) at least a consultant should have been informed. 
I have enormous concerns about this child who is now lost to follow up 
somewhere in Haringey. What are you going to do?”
10.154 Despite being dictated on 9 August, it would appear that Dr Rossiter’s letter was 
not typed until four days later. Ms Kitchman told me that she did not receive it 
until 20 August, by which time Victoria had been back at Manning’s flat for two 
weeks.
10.155 Shortly after receiving the letter, Ms Kitchman recalls telephoning Dr Rossiter, a fact 
which would seem to be confirmed by a further letter, written to her by Dr Rossiter 
dated 2 September, which refers to their conversation. The contents of that letter 
indicate that Dr Rossiter’s concerns had been allayed to a considerable degree 
by what she had been told by Ms Kitchman. In particular, the following passage 
would suggest that Dr Rossiter was given the impression that Victoria’s welfare was 
being given close attention: “I was pleased to hear that Anna is still at home, has a 
social worker and appears to be happy. That is good news.”
10.156 Despite being reassured to learn that Victoria’s case was receiving attention, 
Dr Rossiter was not prepared to let the matter rest there. Her letter of 2 September 
asked that Ms Kitchman ascertain which school Victoria was attending and the 
identity of her family doctor “so that we can correspond further”. Dr Rossiter 
also enclosed with her letter a copy of the discharge summary she had originally 
dictated on 9 August.
10.157 Dr Rossiter eventually received a reply to her letter from Ms Kitchman on 
19 October. By that stage, Ms Kitchman had discussed the case further with 
Ms Arthurworrey in light of the matters identified in Dr Rossiter’s discharge 
summary. As for Dr Rossiter’s concerns regarding physical abuse, Ms Kitchman 
wrote: “In terms of your concerns regarding possible physical abuse and the marks 
made with looped wire, Lisa has advised me that this has already been investigated 
by Dr Schwartz at the Central Middlesex Hospital who confirmed that the marks on 
Anna were due to scabies.”The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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10.158 Dr Rossiter accepted that Ms Kitchman’s letter demonstrated that social services 
had entirely misunderstood the nature and significance of the injuries to Victoria 
which had been discovered while she had been at the North Middlesex Hospital. 
It was clear that Ms Arthurworrey was labouring under the misapprehension that 
Dr Rossiter’s concerns regarding physical abuse had been adequately addressed by 
Dr Schwartz’s earlier scabies diagnosis.
10.159 As an indication of her dissatisfaction with the contents of Ms Kitchman’s letter, 
Dr Rossiter wrote “we disagreed” next to the paragraph in which it was stated that 
Dr Schwartz considered that the marks on Victoria were attributable to scabies. 
She signed the annotation and dated it 2 November 1999. She told me that she 
wrote it in a “fit of pique” as she was angry and disappointed that her concerns 
had been misinterpreted and dismissed in this way.
10.160 Unfortunately, Dr Rossiter did nothing to correct the misunderstanding 
demonstrated by Ms Kitchman’s letter. She told me that, to her “shame”, she 
“ran out of steam” at this point. She accepted that this was extremely unfortunate, 
as had she sought to rectify Ms Arthurworrey’s misconception, she may have 
prompted social services to take some effective action on the case.
10.161 In my view, it is the responsibility of all professionals working in the child 
protection arena to make sure that the information they provide to their colleagues 
in partner agencies is properly understood. As Victoria’s case illustrates, the nature 
and significance of medical diagnoses is one area in which misunderstandings can 
easily arise.
10.162 I consider it unacceptable, therefore, that Dr Rossiter failed to take any steps 
to contact Ms Kitchman or Ms Arthurworrey to explain why she believed that 
they were wrong in their conclusion that her concerns had been addressed by 
Dr Schwartz’s scabies diagnosis. While I have some sympathy with her irritation 
on finding that her views continued to be misinterpreted, there can be no 
excuse for allowing social services to continue labouring under such a significant 
misapprehension. I am anxious that doctors should be left in no doubt as to their 
responsibilities in this regard and therefore make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
All doctors involved in the care of a child about whom there are concerns about 
possible deliberate harm must provide social services with a written statement 
of the nature and extent of their concerns. If misunderstandings of medical 
diagnosis occur, these must be corrected at the earliest opportunity in writing. 
It is the responsibility of the doctor to ensure that his or her concerns are 
properly understood.
10.163 As it turned out, the brief annotation scribbled angrily by Dr Rossiter on 
Ms Kitchman’s letter of 19 October was the last involvement any health 
professional had in Victoria’s case, until she returned to the North Middlesex 
Hospital on the evening before she died.11 Health  analysis
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11 Health analysis
11.1     In the two preceding sections, I have dealt in some detail with the various 
deficiencies in the care that Victoria received from the two hospitals in which 
she was an inpatient during the summer of 1999. As my analysis of the services 
that Victoria received in the Central Middlesex Hospital and the North Middlesex 
Hospital went on, I felt it was necessary to expand on two issues in particular.
11.2     The first issue is the way in which information obtained about Victoria while she 
was in hospital was managed, recorded and shared. The second issue is the status 
and priority given to child protection in the context of paediatric medicine.
11.3     The regularity with which these issues arose, and their centrality to a proper 
understanding of what went wrong in the handling of Victoria’s case by these two 
hospitals, mean that these issues are worth separate analysis. That is the purpose 
of this section.
The information gathered about Victoria
11.4     There was enough information about Victoria readily available to the staff caring 
for her at the Central Middlesex Hospital and the North Middlesex Hospital for 
them to have reached a proper appreciation of the danger that she was in. What is 
more, most if not all of this information came to the attention of at least one of the 
health professionals concerned. As is clear from the preceding sections, the findings 
and observations of the doctors and nurses involved in Victoria’s care produce a 
compelling picture of a child at very serious risk. One of the greatest tragedies of 
Victoria’s case is that such ineffective use of this vital information was made at the 
time.
11.5     There was a consistent failure by doctors and nurses at both hospitals to record 
information comprehensively, to record and share concerns, and to record and 
complete the actions that the concerns prompted. Worst of all, nobody noticed 
when things were not being done.
11.6     I set out below what I consider to be the most glaring examples of poor practice 
in relation to these aspects of Victoria’s care. They are by no means exhaustive and 
they are not restricted to any particular staff group – senior or junior, doctor or 
nurse. They demonstrate a generalised failure at both hospitals to appreciate the 
importance of efficient information management as an integral part of Victoria’s 
care. They also show a failure to recognise that competence in information 
management is no less critical in cases of deliberate harm to a child, than 
competence in diagnosis or competence in treatment.
Information was known but not recorded
11.7     The first and most obvious deficiency in the way information was managed by 
staff at the hospitals was the failure to record their observations and concerns. 
The periods that Victoria spent in hospital are littered with instances of important 
information failing to find its way into her notes. Nurse after nurse, from the 
North Middlesex Hospital in particular, came before me to describe extremely 
concerning injuries or behaviour about which the records completed at the time 
are completely silent. Dr Simone Forlee, as discussed in section 10, was extremely 
perceptive in her initial assessment of Victoria when she was first admitted. But 
the first time that any of these valuable insights were written down was when she 
prepared her statement for this Inquiry.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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11.8     The wearying regularity with which Counsel to the Inquiry was obliged to ask the 
simple question “Why did you not record that in the notes?”, leads me to conclude 
that the amount of useful information about Victoria that was recorded by the 
professionals charged with her care while she was in hospital, is far exceeded by 
the amount of useful information that was not.
11.9     I express myself in forceful terms on this issue because I wish it to be clearly 
understood that I regard the keeping of proper notes and the accurate recording 
of concerns felt about a child as being a fundamental aspect of basic professional 
competence. At one stage, the representative of the NHS witnesses told me that 
pointing out to health professionals that they should write better notes “is pushing 
at an open door”. If that was intended to convey that this is a well-recognised 
problem of which doctors and nurses have long been aware, then it is time that 
it was addressed. 
Recorded information was not shared
11.10   The next information management deficiency illustrated by Victoria’s case is that 
the useful information that was recorded was kept in a variety of different places.
11.11   During the period that Victoria spent on Rainbow ward, information about 
children was recorded in a number of different locations – the hospital notes, the 
medico-legal folder containing the child protection forms, the critical incident log, 
the psychosocial meeting book, and the ward allocation book. Such a fragmented 
recording system significantly inhibited the sharing of important information.
11.12   The recording of information about a particular child in a number of different 
places can allow inconsistencies to arise and persist. Chronology is vital in medical 
records because diagnoses change and more information becomes available. When 
notes are held in a variety of different places, the difficulties in ensuring that the 
most up-to-date information is readily obtainable are clear.
11.13   There are many examples in Victoria’s hospital care where doctors and nurses 
did not seek information because they assumed they had a full picture, or 
were simply ignorant that their knowledge base was incomplete. For example, 
Dr Justin Richardson did not see the set of completed child protection forms 
about Victoria in the ward’s medico-legal folder when he carried out his ward 
round on 26 July 1999. 
Information was passed verbally and not recorded
11.14   On numerous occasions during the course of the evidence, the answer that was 
given to the question of why a particular observation or intended action was not 
recorded in the notes, was that the need to do so had been removed by the fact 
that the information had been “handed over verbally”.
11.15   For example, Dr Forlee felt that Victoria should have been seen in the absence 
of Kouao and with the aid of a French interpreter. She believed she would have 
suggested this on her ward round. Unfortunately, the suggested action was not 
recorded and Victoria never was spoken to alone with the assistance of a French 
interpreter. 
11.16   Similarly, Dr Ekundayo Ajayi-Obe told me that she remembered telling “someone” 
that she had a child on the ward whom she suspected to be suffering from 
“non-accidental injury”. However, the fact that she did not record to whom she 
spoke or what she said made it impossible to assess what should have been done 
as a result of this conversation, or by whom.11 Health  analysis
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11.17   Verbal handovers and referrals, either face-to-face or on the telephone, carry with 
them a high risk of ambiguous transfer of information and the creation of false 
confidence that actions have been understood and will be carried out. Such verbal 
exchanges alone, unsupported by clear documentation, undermine high-quality care.
Actions were agreed without making anyone responsible for carrying them out
11.18   In the context of a busy paediatric ward it may often be the case that a senior doctor 
will be forced, by virtue of the other calls on his or her time, to delegate a particular 
task to another member of the medical staff. When such delegation occurs, it is vital 
that a clear note is made of the identity of the person to whom responsibility for 
the task has been transferred. The inevitable consequence of not doing so, is that 
nobody is clear who has responsibility and the task does not get done.
11.19   This was the case with the examination of Victoria while she was in the North 
Middlesex Hospital. Dr Mary Rossiter believed she delegated the responsibility for 
documenting the marks on Victoria’s body and for a full examination to the senior 
house officer taking over from Dr Forlee on the morning of 25 July 1999 whom 
she thought to be Dr David Reynders. As it happened, Dr Reynders was not on 
duty that day. When Dr Reynders did finally come to see Victoria, he was under 
the impression that all he was required to do was document Victoria’s injuries on 
a body map.
11.20   The lack of any system on the ward for the proper assigning of responsibility for 
particular tasks was further illustrated by the evidence of Dr Forlee. When asked 
how each of the steps in an action plan formulated at a ward round would be 
taken forward, she explained that the usual procedure was that two senior house 
officers would be present and that following the ward round “it would be fairly 
random who wrote in the notes”.
11.21   There was apparently no system on Rainbow ward to ensure that actions to be 
completed were recorded, there was no system for assigning responsibility for 
carrying out the actions and there was no mechanism to alert anyone if the actions 
were not completed. 
Actions were put off but not completed
11.22   In circumstances in which staff work under severe pressure of time and where a 
number of different individuals will have responsibility for the care of a particular 
child during a relatively short period, the dangers of putting off necessary tasks to 
another day are self-evident. This was illustrated on a number of occasions during 
the course of Victoria’s stay in the North Middlesex Hospital and the Central 
Middlesex Hospital. The following are good examples:
11.23   First, Dr Forlee decided to defer a full examination of Victoria to a later stage after 
her admission. She felt that such an examination would best be performed on the 
ward under the supervision of a more experienced paediatrician than herself.
11.24   Second, later the same day, Dr Olutoyin Banjoko decided that further questioning 
of Kouao should be done in a more controlled setting where there was a consultant 
and other members of the child protection team present. She also thought it was 
not morally right to subject Victoria to an examination that evening, taking into 
account both the lateness of the hour and the fact that Victoria was to be seen by 
Dr Rossiter the next day. 
11.25   Third, similarly at the Central Middlesex Hospital, Dr Ruby Schwartz put off seeing 
Victoria alone because she thought a full investigation would be undertaken by 
social services and she did not want to compromise any interview they might have The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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wanted to have with Victoria. However, she accepted that with hindsight, seeing 
Victoria alone would have been a sensible thing to do.
11.26   None of the deferred actions set out above subsequently took place. Victoria was 
never seen alone, Kouao was never interviewed. No thorough examination of 
Victoria was ever conducted at the North Middlesex Hospital. At least part of the 
explanation for these omissions lies, in my view, in the fact that the necessary steps 
were not taken at the time they were identified and, instead, were put off until 
another day. 
11.27   Immediate action may not always be either possible or desirable. Deferring actions 
either out of consideration for the patient or as a result of clinician workload may 
be understandable. But failure to record that the action has been deferred and 
failure to check that the action is completed is virtually guaranteed to ensure it 
will never get done. Responsibility for the action must remain with the deferring 
clinician until either the action is completed or until responsibility for the action is 
handed over unambiguously to another clinician and so documented.
Actions were assumed to be complete but not checked
11.28   Victoria’s case contains numerous examples of doctors and nurses making assumptions 
about either what had already been done or what others were going to do.
11.29   An example of the first is Dr Saji Alexander’s assumption, when he conducted 
his ward round, that a full and thorough examination of Victoria’s injuries was 
unnecessary, given the fact that a record had been made of them on the body 
maps. The result was that he did not do one himself. He never sought to check his 
assumption that Victoria had been fully examined. Had he done so, he would have 
discovered that it was mistaken.
11.30   As to the second, there were a number of instances where medical and nursing 
staff made assumptions about the steps that social services would take on Victoria’s 
case. For example, Dr Rossiter took no other action following her telephone 
conversation with Lisa Arthurworrey because she did not think it was a prelude 
to Victoria’s discharge. She thought she would be getting feedback from social 
services, regrouping at the next psychosocial meeting, and then after that start 
thinking about Victoria going home. However, her expectations were not realised 
and Victoria ended up being discharged without her knowledge.
11.31   Presumptions and expectations that others will take appropriate actions may 
or may not be reasonable in any given situation, but they must always be 
accompanied by checking that the assumptions are correct and expectations have 
been met.
Actions were recorded but ignored
11.32   Finally, there were frequent instances when a necessary action was clearly identified 
in the notes, but simply did not take place afterwards. For example, Dr Reynders 
wrote up the note following Dr Rossiter’s ward round on 1 August 1999, when it 
was recorded that an urgent psychiatric assessment was needed. No psychiatric 
assessment ever took place.
11.33   Another example is provided by the note of the psychosocial meeting in the 
book in the psychiatry department. The note recorded that Dr Rossiter would 
examine Victoria. This was not done. Dr Rossiter was busy with other commitments 
that week and was, therefore, puzzled by the note. Even when an action was 
appropriately recorded, there was no system in place to ensure that the action 
was completed.11 Health  analysis
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11.34   Many of the criticisms made above deal with the failure to record important 
information in the notes. They are based upon the assumption that once an 
action is clearly identified and recorded as necessary, it is more likely to take place. 
Therefore, it is profoundly disturbing to find instances in Victoria’s case which 
demonstrate that even the clear recording that a particular step was necessary 
was no guarantee that it would take place.
Systematic care
11.35   In the paragraphs above I have set out some examples of where failure to 
record and share information, and to record, carry through and check actions, 
significantly inhibited the efficient management of Victoria’s care. The context of 
these examples was a lack of any system at both hospitals robust enough to have 
prevented these information management failures from occurring, and resilient 
enough to have survived the consequences of a human error once it occurred.
11.36   The accurate and efficient recording of information cannot be left solely to the 
individual diligence of the doctors and nurses concerned. They must be supported 
by a clear system that minimises the risk of mistakes and provides a mechanism 
for recognising mistakes when they occur. The greater pressures are on staff, the 
greater the need for a system to support them. The busier the organisation, the 
more important it is to have a system that ensures agreed actions are recorded 
and completed.
Summary
11.37   The management of Victoria’s care at the Central Middlesex Hospital and the 
North Middlesex Hospital was full of inadequate and ambiguous recording of 
information and actions, deferred actions, assumptions and expectations that 
things ‘would happen’ or be done by ‘someone’ or others ‘at a later stage’. 
There were numerous failures to ensure that things that someone thought ‘would 
happen’ did happen. Victoria’s case clearly demonstrates the need for doctors 
and nurses to document information, actions and referrals consistently and 
unambiguously, to share that information, and to ensure subsequently that what 
has been agreed is carried through.
11.38   In my view, many of the deficiencies in the way in which information about 
Victoria was managed by hospital staff could have been avoided if a few basic 
systems had been in place to provide some logical coherence and clear direction 
for the way in which information should have been handled. Something as simple 
as a single action list in Victoria’s notes readily available to all those involved in 
her care may well have ensured that numerous important tasks took place, which, 
in the event, fell by the wayside.
11.39   Although the evidence that I heard on these matters was restricted to the working 
practices of the staff at two hospitals only, I am concerned that it is representative 
of an institutionalised failure within the health services to properly manage 
information and to give that task the prominence and attention it deserves. 
In order to address this issue, I make the following recommendations:
Recommendation 
Within a given location, health professionals should work from a single set of 
records for each child.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
284
Recommendation 
During the course of a ward round, when assessing a child about whom there 
are concerns about deliberate harm, the doctor conducting the ward round 
should ensure that all available information is reviewed and taken account of 
before decisions on the future management of the child’s case are taken.
Recommendation
When a child for whom there are concerns about deliberate harm is admitted 
to hospital, a record must be made in the hospital notes of all face-to-face 
discussions (including medical and nursing ‘handover’) and telephone 
conversations relating to the care of the child, and of all decisions made during 
such conversations. In addition, a record must be made of who is responsible for 
carrying out any actions agreed during such conversations.
Recommendation
Hospital chief executives must introduce systems to ensure that actions agreed 
in relation to the care of a child about whom there are concerns of deliberate 
harm are recorded, carried through and checked for completion.
Recommendation
The Department of Health should examine the feasibility of bringing the care 
of children about whom there are concerns about deliberate harm within the 
framework of clinical governance. 
Status of child protection
11.40   I turn now to the other issue with which I am particularly concerned, namely the 
status and priority afforded to child protection within paediatric medicine.
11.41   In the fourth seminar in Phase Two of this Inquiry, Dr Chris Hobbs, a consultant 
community paediatrician from Leeds, told me that he considers maltreatment to be 
the single biggest cause of morbidity in children. If he is correct in his assessment 
(and I am unaware of any statistics which prove or disprove his assertion), then 
this is a staggering state of affairs. It seems clear that when considering the issue of 
deliberate harm to children, one must keep in mind that one is dealing not simply 
with the extreme cases which occasionally prompt Public Inquiries such as this one, 
but an enormous number of instances in which the health and development of 
children is impaired by maltreatment. 
11.42   Having heard the evidence of a large number of expert practitioners and academics 
who work in this field, I have no difficulty in accepting the proposition that the 
scale of this problem is greater than that of what are generally recognised as 
common health problems in children, such as diabetes or asthma.
11.43   That being so, Dr Hobbs’s further statement – that it is difficult to find doctors 
who wish to work in the field of child protection – is all the more surprising and 
disturbing. One might have expected that the scale of the problem would act 
as an inducement to those doctors who wished to make a significant impact 
on the health and well-being of the child population to enter the field. In such 11 Health  analysis
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circumstances it is vitally important that those practitioners who do work in the 
field are adequately equipped to do so effectively.
11.44   The two consultant paediatricians primarily responsible for Victoria’s care while 
she was in hospital, Dr Schwartz at the Central Middlesex Hospital and Dr Rossiter 
at the North Middlesex Hospital, were both vastly experienced in the child 
protection field. They were both the named doctor for child protection in their 
respective hospitals, and Dr Rossiter also filled the role of designated doctor for 
her health authority, as a result of which she sat on her local Area Child Protection 
Committee. They both conducted child protection training sessions for the 
benefit of their junior staff and were used to the multi-disciplinary aspects of the 
investigation of possible deliberate harm to children.
11.45   In view of their experience and expertise in the field, I was interested to know how 
they viewed the deliberate harm of a child in comparison with other ailments with 
which they have to deal as paediatricians. I put it to both doctors that there may 
be merit in approaching the diagnosis and treatment of deliberate harm in much 
the same way as one would approach the diagnosis and treatment of any other 
disease.
11.46   In essence, this would mean taking a history, conducting a thorough examination, 
carrying out investigations and tests, reaching a differential diagnosis and then 
determining treatment and management. This sort of systematic and rigorous 
approach, commonly applied to the treatment of physical disease, contrasts sharply 
with the rather haphazard manner in which Victoria’s case was managed by both 
hospitals and, I suspect, the manner in which cases of possible deliberate harm are 
managed in hospitals across the country.
11.47   Dr Schwartz told me that she had never before viewed deliberate harm as a disease 
process or entity, and thus had never approached its management in the same 
manner as other childhood ailments with which she would commonly have to 
deal. However, she thought that there was merit in such an approach, and that it 
was instructive to compare the management of a case of deliberate harm with the 
management of a physical disease. Dr Rossiter agreed.
11.48   I was grateful for the evidence of these two experienced clinicians on this matter. 
It helped reinforce my conclusion that there is no good reason why the rigorous 
and systematic approach commonly applied by paediatricians to the diagnosis and 
treatment of physical disease in children, should not be applied to cases of possible 
deliberate harm. Deliberate harm is a serious and potentially fatal condition. There 
is no reason, in my view, why it should be approached in any less thorough a 
manner than physical diseases of equal seriousness. 
11.49   It is tempting to question whether Victoria’s case would have received the 
same level of medical concern, and consequently the same level of evaluation 
and intervention, had she been admitted to either hospital with a presumptive 
diagnosis of a potentially fatal disease. Nothing I heard in evidence persuaded me 
that the majority of doctors involved in Victoria’s care – including Dr Schwartz and 
Dr Rossiter – gave anything like the same level of attention to Victoria’s condition 
as they might have done had she been admitted to hospital with, say, a possible 
brain tumour or a potentially fatal heart condition.
11.50   My firm conviction is that children presenting to doctors with an actual or a 
presumptive diagnosis of deliberate harm require the rigorous application of the 
medical model to their evaluation, and that anything less than this is neglectful of 
their needs and potentially dangerous.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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11.51   However, it is not enough to simply state that paediatricians should adopt a more 
sophisticated and thorough approach to the treatment of deliberate harm to 
children. It is also necessary that they have the skills to enable them to do so.
11.52   The lead in making sure that paediatricians in a given hospital are adequately 
trained and instructed in this area must come, in my view, from the named and 
designated doctors for child protection. These doctors wield a very significant 
degree of influence within both the hospital and the multi-disciplinary child 
protection teams. I have recorded numerous instances during the course 
of Victoria’s case where great regard has been shown to the views of the 
consultant paediatricians concerned, and it will often be the case that their 
diagnoses determine whether further investigation takes place or not. In those 
circumstances, it is vital that they have a level of expertise and training equal to 
their responsibilities. As Victoria’s case shows, the proper management of a case 
of possible deliberate harm to a child can be a very challenging job, even for an 
experienced paediatrician. 
11.53   In order to make sure that cases of possible deliberate harm to children are 
properly managed by well-qualified paediatricians, I make the following 
recommendations:
Recommendation
The investigation and management of a case of possible deliberate harm to a 
child must be approached in the same systematic and rigorous manner as would 
be appropriate to the investigation and management of any other potentially 
fatal disease.
Recommendation
All designated and named doctors in child protection and all consultant 
paediatricians must be revalidated in the diagnosis and treatment of deliberate 
harm and in the multi-disciplinary aspects of a child protection investigation.
Recommendation
The Department of Health should invite the Royal College of Paediatrics and 
Child Health to develop models of continuing education in the diagnosis and 
treatment of the deliberate harm of children, and in the multi-disciplinary 
aspects of a child protection investigation, to support the revalidation of doctors 
described in the preceding recommendation.12  General practice and liaison health visiting
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12   General practice and 
liaison health visiting
12.1     The diagnosis and management of deliberate harm to children is not the exclusive 
province of those health professionals who work in hospitals. Others, such as 
GPs and health visitors have an equally vital role to play in protecting children. 
During her life in this country, Victoria’s case came briefly and sporadically to the 
attention of a number of such professionals. This section records those occasions 
and considers ways in which the working practices of GPs and health visitors might 
be improved in order to provide children with more effective protection against 
deliberate harm.
General practice
The practice of Dr Indravadan Patel
12.2     On 8 June 1999, Victoria was registered with Dr Indravadan Patel, a single-handed 
GP whose surgery was situated close to the Nicoll Road hostel in which Victoria 
and Kouao had been living since the end of April 1999. Dr Patel told me that his 
practice covered an area of considerable economic and social deprivation and that 
he was kept extremely busy. He also had to contend with a high patient turnover 
and many temporary residents.
12.3     Dr Patel’s knowledge of and experience in child protection matters was limited 
at the time Victoria came to be registered with him. Although he made efforts to 
keep up-to-date with paediatric medicine in general, he had received no training 
in the medical aspects of child protection or joint working with other agencies. 
Nor, he told me, had he ever received any child protection policies or guidelines 
from his local medical committee, or elsewhere.
12.4     Despite this lack of training or guidance, Dr Patel was clear that, were he to 
consider that a child was or might be in need of protection, he would contact 
social services and pass on the relevant information. He had never had occasion 
to do so during the 30 years he had spent in general practice.
12.5     The practice nurse, Grace Moore, undertook Victoria’s registration. Nurse Moore 
was an experienced nurse of 15 years, although she too had had no child 
protection training.
12.6     Nurse Moore followed the computerised registration protocol used by the practice. 
The protocol covered such matters as general health, past operations and family 
history of major diseases. In addition, Victoria was weighed and measured as 
part of the registration process. Her height and weight were found, according to 
Dr Patel, to be “within normal guidelines”.
12.7     Nurse Moore had no independent recollection of Victoria, basing her evidence on 
her standard practice and Victoria’s patient summary, which consisted of a printout 
of the computerised registration protocol. However, there was nothing to suggest 
that the registration process went beyond the basic steps described above. No 
examination of Victoria was carried out and it would not appear as though Nurse 
Moore sought to question either Kouao or Victoria about their social circumstances 
or living conditions.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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12.8     Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that Nurse Moore did not feel there were any 
concerns of a child protection nature arising out of her contact with Kouao and 
Victoria that required any follow-up or report to another agency. Furthermore, as 
she was told that Victoria had no current health problems, she considered that 
there was no need to make any further appointment for Victoria to see either her 
or Dr Patel.
12.9     Dr Patel told me that there was a part-time health visitor attached to his practice. 
He also indicated he was aware of a ‘school contact’ to whom he could refer cases 
involving school-aged children where there might be a problem. Neither the health 
visitor nor the school contact was informed about Victoria by Nurse Moore.
12.10  Therefore,  Victoria’s contact with Dr Patel’s practice started and ended with the 
registration appointment on 8 June 1999. The sum total of the information that 
would appear to have been obtained on this occasion was that Victoria was of 
unexceptional height and weight, and that she had no current health problems.
The practice of Dr Gurdas Israni
12.11   On 30 June 1999, Kouao registered with Dr Gurdas Israni of the Greenhill Park 
Medical Centre, which is also located close to the hostel address in Nicoll Road. 
Dr Israni saw Kouao just once for a routine health check on the occasion of her 
registration. Kouao wrote on the new patient information card that she had five 
children aged 23, 20, 18, 16 and seven, but did not give their names. She told 
Dr Israni that all her children were living in France. 
The practice of Dr Martin Lindsay
12.12   On 20 July 1999, Kouao registered with Dr Martin Lindsay at the Somerset Gardens 
practice. The practice was situated a matter of yards from Manning’s flat, which 
Kouao gave as her address when she registered. Kouao made several visits to this 
surgery over the course of the next seven months. However, her records contain 
no family history or mention of any child.
12.13   On 24 November 1999, Victoria was registered with another doctor at the same 
practice, Dr Wasantha Gooneratne. Information about Victoria was provided in 
a registration form and a health questionnaire, completed on Victoria’s behalf 
(presumably by Kouao). This information was subsequently entered on the 
practice computer.
12.14   The registration was completed without anyone at the practice ever actually seeing 
Victoria. According to Dr Gooneratne, this was not unusual for children over the 
age of five with no disclosed medical problems. Unsurprisingly, given that Victoria 
was never seen by anyone at the practice, no child protection concerns were felt 
and no action was taken.
Victoria’s GP records
12.15  Victoria’s GP records amount, in total, to two registration cards – one from 
Dr Patel’s practice, the other from Dr Lindsay’s practice. Neither contains anything 
other than the most basic information. In particular, no mention is made of the 
two occasions on which Victoria was hospitalised, despite the fact that she was 
registered with Dr Patel at the relevant times.
12.16   Similarly, no reference is made in Victoria’s hospital notes to the fact that Dr Patel 
was her GP. However, there is a reference to the Somerset Gardens practice in 
Victoria’s North Middlesex Hospital notes, which is somewhat surprising given that 
she was not registered there until four months later.  12  General practice and liaison health visiting
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Suggestions for improvement
12.17   In my view, there are three issues arising out of the limited contact that Victoria 
had with GPs, which require particular attention. These are:
• The manner in which new child patients are registered with general practitioners
• The information that should be gathered during the registration process and the 
manner in which that information should be shared
• Training in child protection and knowledge of local policies and procedures.
I deal with each in turn.
The registration of new child patients with GPs
12.18   Dr Patel and Dr Gooneratne followed two different registration procedures. Victoria’s 
registration with Dr Patel required her to have a face-to-face screening interview with 
Dr Patel’s practice nurse. Victoria’s registration with Dr Gooneratne was by way of a 
registration form and health questionnaire, completed on her behalf. 
12.19   When Victoria was registered with Dr Patel in June 1999, signs of physical abuse 
and neglect may not have been of a nature or severity to have been apparent at a 
screening interview of the type conducted by Nurse Moore. While a child’s height 
and weight may cause concern in some cases, there is nothing to suggest that 
Victoria’s development had been significantly impaired at this stage. Even if Victoria 
had been subject to a more extensive examination by Nurse Moore, I heard no 
evidence to indicate that she would have found obvious signs of physical abuse on 
Victoria’s body.
12.20   The same cannot be said about the later registration at the Somerset Gardens 
practice. This took place three months before Victoria’s death and, according to 
Manning, approximately two months after she had started to spend her nights in 
the bath. She was also being regularly beaten. If Victoria been seen by a practice 
nurse on this occasion, it is possible (but by no means certain) that signs of the 
treatment she was being subjected to may have been apparent. However, as it 
was, no member of the Somerset Gardens practice staff ever saw Victoria.
12.21   Even the slightly more rigorous approach to registration adopted by Dr Patel’s 
practice would have been unlikely to detect anything but the most glaringly 
apparent signs of ill-treatment. Nurse Moore was required to do no more than 
complete the basic registration protocol. Once that had revealed that there were 
no immediate health concerns, nothing more was required – other than for 
Dr Patel to include Victoria on his large and rapidly changing list of patients.
12.22   Dr Patel agreed that “it would be nice” to offer a more comprehensive initial 
screening process, perhaps involving a more thorough examination and a wider 
questioning of the child and his or her carer, but pointed out that the practice he 
operated at the time followed the standard health authority protocol, and to do 
any more than this would take increased resources.
12.23   I understand these practical limitations. However, I regard the skills and experience 
of GPs as a vital component in any effective scheme of child protection. The 
registration of child patients with a GP should provide an opportunity to consider 
their needs over and above their immediate health status. 
12.24   I appreciate that in a busy inner-city practice of the type described by Dr Patel, 
overwhelming workload may make the operation of anything more than a basic 
registration protocol impractical. However, it is the welfare of children that is at 
stake, and the occasion of a child patient registration is an opportunity to consider The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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not only factors such as family history of heart disease, but also the wider social 
and developmental needs of the children concerned.
Information to be gathered and shared
12.25   Of particular relevance in this regard will be information such as whether the child 
concerned is attending school, how he or she is cared for, and the nature of the 
accommodation in which the family is living. Had such questions been asked at the 
time that Victoria registered with Dr Patel (and assuming that they were truthfully 
answered), he would have learned that Victoria was not attending a school, was 
living in a potentially unsuitable hostel and that Kouao was about to start a job 
which would reduce her capacity to look after Victoria during the day.
12.26   It seems to me that there must be a distinct possibility that Dr Patel, if apprised 
of this information, would have considered that Victoria was a child who needed 
careful monitoring. In this regard, I do not seek to suggest that GPs should be 
required to fill the role of social workers – they have neither the time nor the 
training to do so. However, I do believe that they have a role to play in the 
distribution of information which might be important in determining whether a 
child is in need of protection. The health visitor and the ‘school contact’ to which 
Dr Patel made reference are examples of the sort of resources available to GPs 
when they obtain information about a child who causes them concern.  
Training in child protection
12.27   I was surprised to hear that an experienced GP such as Dr Patel had never received 
any training or guidance in child protection matters, particularly in the recognition 
of possible deliberate harm. As is apparent from the preceding sections, these are 
difficult and sensitive matters and present a considerable challenge to even the 
most experienced practitioners. My view is that, in dealing with cases of deliberate 
harm to children, professionals must have more to rely on than simple common 
sense. They require training and regularly updated guidelines, and they must be 
clear as to what constitutes best practice in such situations.
12.28   I appreciate that in a busy general practice environment – particularly a 
single-handed one – making time to attend training courses is a challenge. 
With the many educational opportunities available in post-graduate medical centres, 
choosing how most profitably to spend one’s time in training is equally difficult. 
However, I consider training in child protection not just desirable for GPs, but an 
essential part of their initial and continuing professional training. Furthermore, 
I consider that this principle applies with respect to the training of other members 
of general practice staff where direct contact with children is a routine part of 
their work.
12.29   I repeat my view that GPs are an extremely important element of the child 
protection framework. It is crucial that the optimum possible use is made 
of their skills and experience. With this aim in mind, I make the following 
recommendations:
Recommendation
The Department of Health should invite the Royal College of General 
Practitioners to explore the feasibility of extending the process of new child 
patient registration to include gathering information on wider social and 
developmental issues likely to affect the welfare of the child, for example their 
living conditions and their school attendance.12  General practice and liaison health visiting
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Recommendation
The Department of Health should seek to ensure that all GPs receive training 
in the recognition of deliberate harm to children, and in the multi-disciplinary 
aspects of a child protection investigation, as part of their initial vocational 
training in general practice, and at regular intervals of no less than three years 
thereafter.
Recommendation
The Department of Health should examine the feasibility of introducing training in 
the recognition of deliberate harm to children as part of the professional education 
of all general practice staff and for all those working in primary healthcare services 
for whom contact with children is a regular feature of their work.
Recommendation
All GPs must devise and maintain procedures to ensure that they, and all 
members of their practice staff, are aware of whom to contact in the local health 
agencies, social services and the police in the event of child protection concerns 
in relation to any of their patients.
Liaison health visiting
12.30   In drafting this section of the Report, I have derived considerable assistance from 
the closing submissions made by Counsel to the Inquiry. They seem to me to 
accurately summarise the material evidence, and I have drawn heavily on them in 
the paragraphs that follow.
12.31   The purpose of a health visitor in cases where there are concerns of possible child 
abuse is, according to health visitor Rachel Crowe, to provide “child surveillance” 
to make sure that the child in question is developing properly and interacting 
appropriately within the family. In order to carry out that role, regular visiting will 
be required. She explained that referrals to a health visitor could come from a 
variety of sources, including the medical and nursing staff on the ward if a child 
happened to be an inpatient. However, she confirmed that in the majority of cases 
involving children admitted to hospital, the subsequent involvement of a health 
visitor will be dependent upon a referral being made by a liaison health visitor. 
The liaison health visiting context at the time
12.32   Victoria had the misfortune to be admitted to the North Middlesex Hospital at a 
time when the post of liaison health visitor with responsibility for the accident and 
emergency department was vacant. According to the Haringey Primary Care NHS 
Trust’s senior child protection nurse, Liz Fletcher, the post was eventually filled on 
4 October 1999 (having been vacant for four months before that).
12.33   In the period during which the post was vacant, cover was provided by health 
visitors covering the accident and emergency liaison role on a two-week rota basis. 
This was in addition to their own caseloads, for which they retained responsibility. 
Ms Crowe was providing cover at the time Victoria was admitted to the North 
Middlesex Hospital.
12.34   Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the temporary nature of the arrangements, Ms Crowe 
was unaware of the guidelines that were in force at the time. In particular, she was 
unaware of the different procedure that was to be followed in non-accidental injury The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
292
cases, including the requirement that four copies of the accident and emergency 
front sheet be taken and distributed to the individuals specified. 
12.35   She was also unaware of the procedure to be adopted in respect of school-aged 
children admitted to hospital during the school holidays. This was in spite of a 
memorandum, dated 22 July 1999, from Bridget Inal, locality nurse manager for 
north Tottenham, setting out the steps to be taken in such a case.
12.36   It was against this background that Ms Crowe read Victoria’s accident and 
emergency notes on or about 26 July 1999. The fact that she did read them would 
appear to be indicated by the initials “RC” marked on them, which Ms Crowe 
confirmed were written by her at the time. 
12.37   There are no notes or other records revealing what Ms Crowe did next concerning 
this referral, and she relied in her evidence solely on her independent recollection 
of events at what she accepted was a “busy” time for her. However, her memory 
was helped by the fact that Victoria’s referral was something out of the ordinary 
for her in that it was the only referral of a school-aged child that she made during 
the period of her cover. Therefore, she told me that she was confident in her 
recollection of the following sequence of events.
12.38   She went to the accident and emergency department and picked up Victoria’s 
admission card together with her accident and emergency notes. She agreed that 
there was nothing on Victoria’s card that indicated that she had been physically 
abused. However, it was the accompanying notes made by Dr Forlee that made 
it clear to her there was a possibility that non-accidental injury had occurred. She 
then telephoned the ward to establish the current position and remembered being 
told that Victoria would be on the ward for a while because of the child protection 
concerns.
12.39   She next telephoned Ms Fletcher to find out what to do with the referral because it 
concerned a school-aged child admitted during the school holidays. She said that 
Ms Fletcher’s advice was that she should speak to the health visitor responsible for 
the area in which Victoria lived.
12.40   In accordance with this advice, Ms Crowe telephoned the Lordship Lane Clinic and 
said she was informed that Launa Brown was the health visitor with responsibility 
for Victoria’s area.
12.41   Ms Crowe said that the two of them then had a telephone conversation during 
which she told Ms Brown about the child protection concerns surrounding Victoria. 
She said she told her that Victoria was a school-aged child in her area who would 
need to be followed up when she was discharged from hospital. There were 
concerns that Victoria had poured hot water over her face to relieve itching from 
scabies and it was suspected that the burn injuries to Victoria’s head might be 
non-accidental. She said that Ms Brown indicated that she would follow up the 
case after Victoria was discharged.
12.42   Again according to Ms Crowe, Ms Brown took down the relevant details and asked 
for the relevant documentation to be sent to her. In response to this request, 
Ms Crowe sent her a copy of Victoria’s accident and emergency card through the 
internal post system. She said that she added some handwritten comments to 
the back of the card before she sent it. Although she could not remember what 
she wrote, she believed she would have mentioned the concerns that she and 
Ms Brown had spoken about on the telephone. 12  General practice and liaison health visiting
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12.43   The evidence of Ms Crowe on these matters was both clear and coherent. It was 
also consistent with the evidence she gave in March 2000 to a locally conducted 
internal investigation into the Community Nursing Service’s involvement with 
Victoria’s case. That investigation concluded that Ms Crowe did make the referral 
but that “no record can now be found of this action”.
12.44  However,  Ms  Crowe’s evidence was directly contradicted by that of Ms Brown, 
who was equally confident in her recollection that she never received a call from 
Ms Crowe about Victoria. She also stated that she had no recollection of ever 
having seen Victoria’s accident and emergency card, and that subsequent checks 
had been unable to find any record of it having arrived at the Lordship Lane Clinic.
Lack of record keeping
12.45   As to this last point, there would seem to have been very little in the way of a 
system for logging referrals when they arrived at the clinic. If a referral arrived for 
a health visitor who was not in the office at the time, it would be placed on that 
health visitor’s desk. No record was made of the referral’s arrival at the clinic, or 
of the identity of the health visitor to whom it had been allocated. As a result, 
Ms Brown accepted that the relevant piece of paper could have gone missing 
without anyone knowing.
12.46   The absence of any system for the logging of referrals is also relevant to the 
assertion made by Ms Brown in her statement to the effect that she “checked all 
the records held at the clinic” and “checked with the other health visitors within 
the clinic” and could find no reference to Victoria’s case.
12.47   Given that there was no logbook or filing system that would have enabled those 
checking to have identified where the referral should have been, the fact that 
nobody at the clinic remembered the referral being made amounts to no more 
than those staff who were questioned being unable to recall what happened to 
a specific piece of paper some two years after the event. Therefore, the fact that 
there was no record of the referral having arrived at the clinic and that nobody 
remembered having seen it, provides me with little help.
12.48   The question of whether or not the referral of Victoria’s case was ever made by 
Ms Crowe to Ms Brown is not an easy one to resolve. Unfortunately, Ms Fletcher 
was unable to shed any light on the matter as she could not recall having spoken 
to Ms Crowe about the case and could not say whether or not Ms Crowe had 
called her to ask how she should deal with Victoria’s referral. 
12.49   Having carefully considered all the evidence, I have reached the same view as the 
internal investigation carried out in March 2000. I conclude that Ms Crowe did 
refer Victoria to Ms Brown.
12.50   In reaching this conclusion I derived considerable assistance from the only piece of 
documentary evidence available to me – the initialled copy of Victoria’s accident 
and emergency notes. It is clear to me from this that Ms Crowe was indeed aware 
of Victoria’s accident and emergency attendance and I consider it unlikely that, 
having noted it, the process of onward referral would have stopped at this point. 
Therefore, I conclude that when Ms Crowe became aware of Victoria, and of the 
possibility that she had suffered a non-accidental injury, she did indeed take the 
action she claimed and telephoned the Lordship Lane Clinic to speak to Ms Brown. 
However, I would emphasise that the lack of reliable evidence on this issue has left 
me far from confident as to what really happened.
12.51   More important than whether Ms Crowe or Ms Brown is correct in their 
recollection, is the fact that it was impossible, even in the immediate aftermath of The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Victoria’s death, to say with any certainty whether or not the referral was made. 
This points, in my view, to the absence of a reliable system for the recording and 
tracking of important referrals concerning vulnerable children.
12.52   The assertions of Ms Crowe, and of all the other parties involved in the community 
nursing aspects of Victoria’s care, were unsupported by documentary evidence 
other than the initialled accident and emergency notes. Neither was there any form 
of system for recording actions and the onward transmission of information. It is 
this, and what it represents for the care of vulnerable children, that is a matter of 
great concern to me.
The role of Rachel Crowe
12.53   A further indication of the unsystematic manner in which referrals of this nature 
were being handled at the time is given by Ms Crowe’s lack of awareness of the 
procedures that she was supposed to follow when dealing with cases like Victoria’s. 
While I have considerable sympathy for Ms Crowe’s individual situation as a busy 
health visitor having to cover a role with which she was unfamiliar, the fact that 
she was in this position reinforces, in my view, the need for clear and accessible 
procedures for her to follow.
The role of Launa Brown
12.54   The importance of the role of the liaison health visitor is illustrated by the 
description given by Ms Brown of the appropriate steps to be taken in response to 
a referral concerning a child in Victoria’s situation. She said that she would have 
first made inquiries to see whether the child was registered with a GP and was 
attending school. She would then have sought to find out where he or she lived 
and whether there were any siblings. Depending upon the result of those inquiries, 
it would be decided whether a home visit was necessary.
12.55   Given what we now know to have been Victoria’s circumstances at the time and 
Ms Crowe’s claims to have referred her case to Ms Brown, there seems little doubt 
that, had Ms Brown conducted the inquiries described above, she would have 
decided that a visit was necessary. One can only speculate as to what she may 
have discovered during the course of such a visit, but there seems little doubt that 
the supervision of a health visitor can only have increased the chances of Victoria’s 
abuse being discovered and addressed.
12.56   It is clear, therefore, that the precise circumstances surrounding the alleged referral 
are of considerably less importance than the fact that no action was taken by the 
health visiting service in Victoria’s case. Her admission to hospital and Ms Crowe’s 
apparent discovery of the concerns of the medical staff provided a valuable 
opportunity to include Victoria within the provision of primary health services 
of a type that may well have prevented her death. 
12.57   Nothing could illustrate more clearly the need for an efficient and effective 
referral system for children discharged from hospital about whom there are child 
protection concerns. In an effort to encourage the development of such systems, 
I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation 
Liaison between hospitals and community health services plays an important 
part in protecting children from deliberate harm. The Department of Health 
must ensure that those working in such liaison roles receive child protection 
training. Compliance with child protection policies and procedures must be 
subject to regular audit by primary care trusts.Part four: The police13  Brent Child Protection Team
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13   Brent Child Protection 
Team
The referral
13.1     Between 4.30pm and 5.15pm on 14 July 1999, PC Rachel Dewar received a 
telephone call from Michelle Hines, a social worker from Brent Social Services. 
According to PC Dewar, Ms Hines told her that Victoria was in the Central 
Middlesex Hospital suffering from bruised feet, arms, legs and buttocks, infected 
bruises on her fingers, and bloodshot eyes. PC Dewar was told that the medical 
staff at the hospital considered these to be “serious non-accidental injuries”. 
PC Dewar was also told that Victoria had been taken to hospital by a childminder 
who had become concerned as to the cause of her injuries.
13.2     PC Dewar happened to pick up the phone when Ms Hines rang, and so it seems 
this is why she became the officer in the case. There was no formal system within 
Brent Child Protection Team (CPT) for incoming referrals to be screened and 
assessed by a supervisor before being allocated to officers. Although Sergeant (Sgt) 
David Smith said he and Sgt John Gorry checked entries on the crime-recording 
computer database, CRIS, on a daily basis, an investigation could be well under 
way before a supervisor became aware of it. It also seemed to be the case that 
whoever happened to take the initial referral would end up dealing with the case.
13.3     In my view, such a practice carries with it two important disadvantages. First, it 
may lead to an already overloaded officer taking on more work when a colleague 
may be better placed to give the referral the required attention. Second, it deprives 
the team of a mechanism for filtering referrals to make sure valuable police time is 
not wasted dealing with matters that are not serious enough for police attention.
Accommodation
13.4     At the time it came to deal with Victoria’s case, Brent CPT was housed in rather 
scruffy accommodation in Edgware police station, which it shared with Harrow 
CPT. The accommodation and the facilities provided for the teams were, like those 
for many CPTs in London, of a poor standard. Detective Inspector (DI) Michael 
Anderson, the officer in charge of the team, thought the accommodation was 
“distinctly bad” when compared with the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) as a 
whole, but average for CPTs across the capital. However, I heard no evidence to 
suggest that the standard of the team’s accommodation affected the way Victoria’s 
case was dealt with, and DI Anderson expressly stated that, in his view, it was not 
responsible for the failings in Victoria’s case.
Training and experience of officers
13.5     I heard a great deal of evidence from the MPS witnesses about the training of 
individual officers and their career profiles before joining the CPTs. I am satisfied 
that it is highly desirable for officers engaged in child protection investigation work 
to have some experience in, or knowledge of, criminal investigation. Experience 
or knowledge would normally be gained by a period of time as a detective in a 
CID office, but uniformed officers who have worked in, for example, street crime 
units may also gain the necessary experience. Therefore, it is useful to consider the The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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training and experience of the Brent CPT officers who were directly involved in 
Victoria’s case.
13.6     Brent CPT was made up of one detective inspector, two sergeants and six police 
constables. The training and career profile of the officers directly involved in 
Victoria’s case are as follows.
Detective Inspector Michael Anderson
13.7     DI Anderson joined the force in 1971. By the time he gave evidence he had retired, 
but during the relevant period he had 28 years’ police service, of which 25 years 
were spent in various CID roles. He was therefore a ‘career detective’ and he 
had been the DI in charge of Brent CPT since 1996. He had received no training 
specifically in child protection work, but clearly he was a very experienced crime 
investigator and had attended the CID foundation course. DI Anderson considered 
Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) Philip Wheeler to be his immediate line manager, 
even though they rarely saw each other. At the time with which I am concerned, 
DI Anderson was also the officer in charge of Harrow CPT, also based in Edgware 
police station.
Sergeant John Gorry
13.8     Sgt Gorry joined the police service in 1975. He has never been a detective but 
has worked as a uniformed constable in local crime squads and the MPS clubs 
and vice squad. These roles would have given him some experience of criminal 
investigation. He said he felt adequately equipped to carry out the role of 
supervisor, but felt hampered by his lack of training. In particular, the fact he 
had received little child protection training and no CID training led him to feel 
ill-equipped to supervise some of the more involved criminal investigations.
Sergeant David Smith
13.9     Sgt Smith has been a police officer since 1980. He spent 10 years as a uniformed 
constable in various stations, including three years in a district crime squad in 
Camden. As a sergeant, he spent a period of time in charge of a reactive team 
dealing with all crime in the Harrow shopping centre. In these two posts he should 
have gained a reasonable amount of expertise in dealing with and supervising 
crime investigation. He had attended a two-week child protection course in 1996 
but had not undertaken the CID foundation course.
PC Rachel Dewar
13.10   PC Dewar was the officer from Brent CPT designated to investigate the crimes 
against Victoria. She joined the MPS in 1993 and, after serving for two and a half 
years as a uniformed beat constable, she successfully applied for a posting with 
a domestic violence unit. In July 1998, she transferred to Brent CPT. Therefore, 
by the time she was dealing with Victoria, she had one year’s CPT experience 
and virtually no experience of criminal investigation. She had never attended the 
CID foundation course and it would appear that her only relevant training was a 
three-day child protection course in December 1998.
13.11   Despite her job description saying that she should carry out the investigation 
of crime handed to her, I do not consider that PC Dewar had sufficient training 
or experience to qualify her to deal with a case of Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH). 
Her first-line supervisors were slightly better qualified, but with an inexperienced 
case officer it is vitally important to have first-line supervisors with plenty of 
experience of the requirements of criminal investigation. This was not the case 
in Brent CPT. The officer in charge, DI Anderson, was undoubtedly qualified to 
manage officers engaged in serious crime investigation, but he was expected to 
control two child protection units, consisting of around 20 officers and support staff.13  Brent Child Protection Team
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13.12   When invited to comment on the lack of training received by the officers in his 
team, Sgt Smith said, “I view it as a failure of the Metropolitan Police to train 
its officers properly for the most important task they could possibly do.” I have 
considerable sympathy with Sgt Smith’s view on this matter, and I conclude that 
the MPS had indeed failed to ensure that the team charged with the investigation 
of Victoria’s case had sufficient experience in the detection and investigation of 
serious crime. As a result, Brent CPT was not able to offer an adequate service to 
victims of child abuse in Brent.
The initial investigation
13.13   After taking the referral, one of the first things that PC Dewar did was to begin an 
entry on CRIS. In the box that asks for details of the allegation, she entered “assault 
S.18”. This is shorthand for ‘Wounding with intent to cause Grievous Bodily Harm’, 
an offence under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Other 
than homicide, this is the most serious assault there is, and it is significant that 
PC Dewar believed it was an offence of this importance that was being reported 
to her by social services. In her oral evidence, PC Dewar stood by the classification 
of the offence she made on the basis of the information given to her by Ms Hines. 
PC Dewar also noted on CRIS that the mother was the likely suspect.
13.14   Therefore, it is apparent that by just after 5pm, PC Dewar knew she was the 
investigating officer for a serious crime, that the victim was in hospital with 
multiple injuries, that there was an important witness in the form of the 
childminder who had taken the child to hospital, and that a suspect had been 
identified but not accounted for.
13.15   Apart from leaving a message with the police photographic department asking 
them to take photographs of Victoria’s injuries some time in the future, and doing 
a police database check to see if the family were known, PC Dewar did absolutely 
nothing to begin investigating the crime before she went off duty at 7pm.
13.16   As a result, vital hours were lost. When a crime comes to the attention of the 
police, the period immediately afterwards can often be critical to the effectiveness 
of the investigation. Unless prompt action is taken, forensic evidence can 
disappear, tracks can be covered and witnesses can be intimidated or coached. 
When dealing with a possible serious assault against a child, it will never be 
appropriate, in my view, simply to leave the matter until the following day.
13.17   Having decided against investigating the possible crime committed against 
Victoria that evening, PC Dewar instead agreed with Ms Hines to place Victoria 
under police protection. This course of action was taken before Victoria had been 
seen and before any assessment of her circumstances had been made. In my 
view, this is a wholly inappropriate way to proceed. Taking a child into police 
protection is a serious step. It is unthinkable that a proper assessment of the 
need for protection could be made before the child concerned has been seen 
and his or her circumstances have been assessed. I therefore make the following 
recommendation:
Recommendation
Save in exceptional circumstances, no child is to be taken into police protection 
until he or she has been seen and an assessment of his or her circumstances has 
been undertaken.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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13.18   One of the requirements of section 46 of the Children Act 1989 is that when a 
child is taken into police protection, both the child and parent are informed of the 
reasons why this course of action has been taken. It also requires a ‘designated 
officer’ to investigate the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether 
police protection is appropriate. Neither of these steps would appear to have been 
taken in Victoria’s case. Instead, the hospital was simply informed by means of a 
faxed ‘Form 72’ that Victoria was now in police protection and must remain in the 
hospital as an inpatient. This was an inadequate way of dealing with such a serious 
matter. It was done without any discussion with a doctor to find out if there was a 
medical need for her to stay in hospital, or for how long she could stay.
13.19   The use of police protection and the lack of procedures followed in its application 
in Victoria’s case are considered in detail at paragraph 13.67.
Crimes against children
13.20   It is worth spending time to examine what would have happened if the victim of 
this possible GBH had been an adult, rather than a seven-year-old child. It was 
clear from listening to the evidence of the MPS senior officers that they believed 
there should be no difference in the quality or timeliness of a serious crime 
investigation, just because of the victim’s age. Detective Chief Superintendent 
(DCS) David Cox, head of the North West Crime Operational Command Unit 
(OCU), was expressly asked what, if any, difference there should be between 
the investigation of a suspected GBH or serious assault on a child and a similar 
offence on an adult. He replied, “The police investigations side of it is largely the 
same. The only other factors would be that it would be a memorandum interview, 
it would be a joint interview with social services and I believe it would be the 
child protection plan issues, or those issues that are CPT related. But the actual 
mechanics of gathering the evidence, preserving the scene, arresting the suspect, 
getting the forensic evidence, would be much the same.”
13.21   His view was echoed by Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) William Griffiths 
who said, “The basic ingredients of assault are very easy and straightforward 
to deal with. You want the victim, the victim’s account, you want the medical 
evidence that supports the account, you want to visit the scene and retrieve 
evidence there and then you move on to suspects, and so on. These are basic 
steps that are probably taught in lesson two at recruit school: first steps at the 
report of a crime.“
13.22   Finally, DAC Carole Howlett, the current head of SO5 (the new Child Protection 
Command Unit established in 2000), agreed with her colleagues that there should 
be no difference in the quality of the investigation of an assault against a child 
compared with that of an adult. In particular, when asked how quickly she would 
expect a victim of an assault to be seen by police, she replied, “Within hours, 
within a couple of hours or whenever. As soon as possible. As soon as practically 
possible to get there.”
13.23   I share the view of the senior officers that a young victim of crime should receive 
the same prompt and professional service from the police as an adult. It is plainly a 
cause of serious concern that this does not appear to have been the case with regard 
to Victoria. On the evening of 14 July 1999, there was every reason to believe that 
Victoria was a victim of serious crime. Even so, PC Dewar not only went off duty 
without carrying out a proper investigation, but she also decided to continue with 
plans to attend a seminar the following day. I find it difficult to believe that this 
approach would have been adopted if it had been an adult victim of GBH lying in 
hospital with multiple injuries. Indeed, I was expressly told by PC Dewar that, had 13  Brent Child Protection Team
299
she received a referral concerning a case of GBH in the street during her time as a 
beat officer, she would have visited the hospital to see the victim.
13.24   Such discrepancies in the standards of service provided by the police are, in my 
view, obviously unacceptable. Crimes against children are every bit as serious as 
crimes against adults, and they demand the same prompt and efficient response. 
To address this worrying state of affairs, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Chief constables must ensure that crimes involving a child victim are dealt with 
promptly and efficiently, and to the same standard as equivalent crimes against 
adults.
Deficiencies in the investigation
13.25   The fact that PC Dewar decided to attend the seminar, even though Victoria’s case 
had yet to be investigated, presumably meant that PC Dewar did not anticipate 
starting the investigation until the following day – nearly 48 hours after Avril 
Cameron had first raised her concerns at the hospital.
13.26   In fact, an investigation should have begun straight away. Interviews with 
Ms Cameron, Kouao and Victoria should have been essential elements of the 
investigation. I deal with each in turn.
Avril Cameron
13.27   When she was asked why she did not urgently seek out and speak to Ms Cameron, 
PC Dewar replied, “Because I did not think there was anything I needed to 
urgently speak to Avril Cameron about from the information I had in the referral.” 
When pressed further on the issue, she went on to say, “Well, we would have done 
but I felt, on the information I had, that Avril Cameron had communicated to 
the medical staff, that there was nothing in that referral, she did not say who the 
perpetrator was.”
13.28   I have to say that I detect little sense in either of those two answers. When it 
was pointed out to PC Dewar that perhaps nobody had asked Ms Cameron who 
the perpetrator of the assaults against Victoria was, she blamed the medical staff 
at the hospital. She said she would have expected them to have obtained such 
information from Ms Cameron if it had been available.
13.29   Later, in her evidence to the Inquiry, PC Dewar said she was aware that social 
services were going to speak to Ms Cameron. If this was indeed her reason for not 
interviewing Ms Cameron herself, PC Dewar would appear to have been happy 
to leave the interviewing of the most important witness (other than the victim 
herself) to hospital staff and social workers, none of whom were trained to ask the 
right questions in a criminal investigation. This was, in my view, a crucial error 
of judgement on the part of PC Dewar. Had Ms Cameron been asked the right 
questions, the police could have obtained the following valuable information, 
all of which was within Ms Cameron’s knowledge:
• Victoria was not attending school.
• Kouao often became very angry towards Victoria and acted aggressively 
towards her.
• Victoria would regularly wet herself when taking a nap at Priscilla Cameron’s house.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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• Ms Cameron had asked Kouao about the cuts on Victoria’s hands and Kouao had 
told her that Victoria cut herself with razor blades.
• Kouao had asked Priscilla Cameron to look after Victoria permanently because the 
man she was staying with did not want Victoria around.
• On the night Kouao dropped Victoria off at the Camerons’ house, Ms Cameron 
noticed that Victoria had a cut above her eye, a healing wound on her cheek, 
and two bloodshot eyes.
• Ms Cameron had also noticed Victoria’s fingers were oozing pus and her face had 
swollen up.
• Marie Cader told Ms Cameron that Victoria chatted happily about other things, 
but when asked about her injuries she “went into auto pilot” and became 
withdrawn.
• While at the hospital, Ms Cameron had seen marks on Victoria’s legs, back and 
arms. She also noticed that Victoria’s nails were short and that she held her hand 
in a half-clenched manner.
• Ms Cameron had seen small circular marks on Victoria which the doctor had told 
her might have been caused by cigarette burns.
• Ms Cameron had never seen Victoria scratch herself.
• Ms Cameron had taken Victoria to the hospital because she was concerned about 
the seriousness of the injuries and the possible cause of them.
13.30   If PC Dewar had made proper inquiries, she would probably also have been told of 
a conversation with somebody called “Nigerian Mary”, to the effect that she had 
asked Mrs Cameron, “What is it you say to Kouao that makes her beat the child 
each night?”
13.31   In summary, the police would have quickly gained a clear indication that child 
abuse may have been taking place, and that Kouao was the perpetrator.
Kouao
13.32   In addition to being content for nurses, doctors or social workers to interview 
Ms Cameron, PC Dewar was prepared to allow social services to speak to Kouao 
alone. She accepted that Kouao was the main suspect, yet wanted a social worker 
to speak to Kouao in the first instance in order to “obtain her account” – this 
being a woman who was suspected of having caused GBH to her seven-year-old 
child. I find it extremely surprising that PC Dewar should have felt this was an 
appropriate manner in which to proceed with the investigation, especially given 
the disadvantages of questioning a suspect in any way but with the Codes of 
Practice set out in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
Victoria
13.33   I am firmly of the view that PC Dewar should have visited Victoria during the 
evening of 14 July 1999. She was questioned at length about her decision not to 
do so and gave various answers, of which the following is representative: “I have 
been told that I should not see the child before the memorandum interview. 
I knew that Ms Hines would see the child the next day.”
13.34   PC Dewar explained that the usual sequence of events in child protection 
investigations was, as far as she was aware, first to interview the victim and then to 
carry out any further work depending upon the outcome of the interview. In other 
words, the investigation should not even start until the child had been spoken to. 
In order for this approach to have anything other than a seriously damaging effect 
on the usefulness of the investigation, it is plainly necessary that children who are 
capable of giving evidence about what has happened to them are seen as soon 
as possible. Therefore, PC Dewar’s suggestion that she would not necessarily have 
sought to interview Victoria until she was discharged from hospital is extremely 
worrying.13  Brent Child Protection Team
301
13.35   I also reject PC Dewar’s claim that it would have been inappropriate for her to 
see Victoria before a memorandum interview had taken place. The established 
practice in 1999 was that the police, when dealing with suspected crimes against 
children, would interview the children concerned in a special video interview suite, 
in accordance with the government guidelines called The Memorandum of Good 
Practice. However, in cases where a child victim is in hospital, a degree of flexibility 
is necessary. It may have been open to PC Dewar to conclude it was inappropriate 
to conduct a full interview with Victoria in a hospital setting. However, she 
should not have made this decision without visiting Victoria and assessing her 
circumstances with a view to deciding on the appropriate location and timing of the 
interview. During the course of such an assessment, she should also have considered 
the chances of recovering forensic evidence from Victoria or from her clothing.
13.36   The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Codes of Practice (Code C, note 1B) 
expressly allows the police to speak to any person who can help with their 
inquiries. However, the MPS Child Protection Course Training Manual, dated 1995, 
advises that, except in urgent cases, interviews with children can only take place 
with the consent of a parent or guardian. Given this apparent confusion, and 
assuming that PC Dewar was familiar with the requirements of the manual, it is 
perhaps not surprising she formed the view that it would be inappropriate for 
her to see Victoria until she had been given the go ahead to do so by Ms Hines. 
However, there is no excuse for her failure to interview, and take full statements 
from, the medical staff involved.
13.37   In addition to interviewing the key witnesses, PC Dewar should also have visited 
the scene of the possible abuse. By the time Victoria was admitted to the Central 
Middlesex Hospital, she was living in Manning’s flat at 267 Somerset Gardens. 
One can only guess at what may have been found at the scene if it had been 
properly searched and examined at this point. However, it is conceivable that some 
evidence of deliberate harm may have been detected as early as mid July, if the 
police had tried to look for it. If such evidence had been found, then events may 
have followed a radically different course.
The end of the investigation
13.38   I turn now to consider why Brent CPT’s investigation, such as it was, ended 
so abruptly.
13.39   At around 10.30am on 15 July 1999, PC Dewar was at the training seminar at 
Bushey. She said she was expecting a call from Ms Hines to say that social services 
had spoken to the mother and obtained her account of how Victoria had received 
her injuries and her permission to speak to Victoria. Plainly, as far as PC Dewar 
was concerned, the investigation at this stage was in the hands of social services. 
However, instead of receiving the expected message, PC Dewar was told by 
Ms Hines that Dr Ruby Schwartz had examined Victoria and concluded that all 
her injuries were due to scabies.
13.40   However, it is likely that this was an incomplete summary of Dr Schwartz’s views, 
and that if PC Dewar had chosen to question Dr Schwartz, she would have 
discovered that Dr Schwartz had some lingering concerns about Victoria that she 
expected to be followed up by social services. More importantly, if Dr Schwartz 
had been questioned more closely, it would have become clear that she had not 
satisfactorily accounted for all the marks that had been noted on Victoria’s body, 
so that physical harm remained a possibility.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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13.41   I find it remarkable that PC Dewar was prepared to accept, without question, 
the reported diagnosis of scabies as an explanation for all of Victoria’s injuries, 
particularly because she had described these injuries on CRIS the night before 
as including multiple bruising on feet, arms, legs and buttocks, infected bruising 
on her fingers, and bloodshot eyes. If she had applied her mind to the matter, it 
seems highly likely she would have realised that a scabies diagnosis left several of 
the reported injuries unexplained.
13.42   The evidence of PC Dewar, together with that of a number of her colleagues, 
indicated a profound reluctance to challenge the diagnosis of a consultant 
paediatrician. In order to test the extent of that reluctance, Counsel to the Inquiry 
asked PC Dewar if she would have accepted a diagnosis of scabies if the child had 
a broken arm. PC Dewar replied that of course she would not. In re-examination, 
her Counsel went as far as to say that the analogy was plainly absurd. However, 
I found it useful because it demonstrated to me that a police officer would feel able 
to challenge an improbable medical diagnosis. The question raised by PC Dewar’s 
handling of Victoria’s case is how improbable that diagnosis would have to be 
before an officer might be prepared to exercise his or her own independent 
judgement.
13.43   In my view, social workers and child protection police officers are specialists in 
child protection. Doctors specialise primarily in dealing with the medical needs of 
sick children, so they are often able to give child protection investigators opinions 
as to the cause of injuries. However, the final analysis of the significance and 
interpretation of those injuries must be made by the practitioners who have the 
benefit of looking at the whole picture (including the wider family circumstances), 
any forensic evidence and the experience of the carers.
13.44   It is wrong for social workers or police officers to blindly accept everything they are 
told by doctors, no matter how important those doctors are, and they must fit the 
medical evidence in with the other information available before arriving at their 
own conclusion. It was entirely inappropriate for PC Dewar to completely abandon 
such a serious investigation because of a third-hand medical report told to her over 
the telephone.
13.45   Also, PC Dewar had written in the original CRIS entry, “Doctors consider the 
injuries to be serious non-accidental injuries” and so would have been aware that 
the reported diagnosis of Dr Schwartz differed from that of the doctors who had 
examined Victoria the day before. The fact that there was a divergence of medical 
opinion as to the cause of Victoria’s injuries should have led PC Dewar to question 
Dr Schwartz about her differing opinion.
13.46   However, having received the call from Ms Hines, PC Dewar immediately lifted the 
police protection and later marked up the CRIS entry as “no crime”. Regrettably, 
she also cancelled the one positive step she had taken the previous evening, which 
was to arrange for police photographs to be taken of Victoria’s injuries. This last 
action may have been important, because if PC Dewar had kept an open mind 
and obtained the photographs, then perhaps her supervisor, or one of her social 
services colleagues, may have seen them and felt suitably concerned to query 
Dr Schwartz’s diagnosis. Certainly, as events were to unfold, the photographs 
would have been extremely useful a few days later, when a further set of injuries 
was being pondered over.13  Brent Child Protection Team
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Deficiencies in supervision
13.47   Responsibility for failing to undertake any adequate investigation into the possible 
crime committed against Victoria cannot rest with PC Dewar alone. As I have 
already indicated, she was a junior officer with very little experience in the 
investigation of serious crime. In such circumstances, her handling of this referral 
should have been closely supervised by more senior officers.
13.48   The officer best placed to do so was her first-line manager, Sgt Gorry. Sgt Gorry 
said that he remembered hearing PC Dewar take the referral concerning Victoria 
and that she told him it related to a “serious assault, possibly a GBH, on a young 
girl”. He said in evidence, “I remember the call coming in. I remember Rachel’s 
reaction to the phone call and I can remember sort of reacting to it and thinking 
this is something quite important, quite serious.”
13.49   PC Dewar made no mention of any discussion with Sgt Gorry, although she did 
state that Sgt Gorry gave her permission to work one hour’s overtime on the 
evening in question, perhaps because he knew she had an important referral to 
deal with.
13.50   However, it would appear that Sgt Gorry took little interest in Victoria’s case and 
did not set down a plan of action for the investigating officer to follow. He was 
aware that another officer, PC Karen Blackman, was planning to assist PC Dewar 
with the referral, but despite being on duty throughout the evening, he appears 
to have left them to their own devices. When Sgt Gorry was asked what he did to 
satisfy himself that these two junior officers were conducting a proper investigation 
of this serious offence, he replied, “Other than the fact that I had spoken to them 
at the initial stages and was aware that they were carrying out the investigation 
what appeared to be diligently and effectively, nothing more. The reasoning 
behind that is that I have considerable confidence in the ability of both officers to 
have come to the right decision.”
13.51   Plainly, Sgt Gorry’s confidence was misplaced. His explanation for why he failed, 
the following day, to ask either of the officers what progress they had made in 
the investigation of the referral was that he was aware that PC Dewar had spoken 
directly to DI Anderson in the meantime. Sgt Gorry explained, “When I was at 
the seminar the following day, PC Dewar addressed Detective Inspector Anderson 
about the matter and it was really not my position to intervene and find out 
additionally what course of action she was going to take because I assumed, 
quite reasonably I feel, that the issues would have been covered, discussed and 
addressed in the conversation that she would have had with Detective Inspector 
Anderson.”
13.52   I am firmly of the view that any referrals of suspected child abuse to the 
police from social services should be handled at a managerial level, and that 
a manager from each agency should be involved in discussing how best to 
take the investigation forward. The danger of doing otherwise is that a junior 
officer would have to conduct an investigation as he or she sees fit with minimal 
input from more senior experienced officers. The inevitable risk would be that 
important decisions are incorrectly taken, causing the whole investigation to be 
seriously flawed. Such risks can, in my view, be reduced by the involvement of 
experienced managers in the investigative process. Therefore, I make the following 
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Recommendation
Whenever a joint investigation by police and social services is required into 
possible injury or harm to a child, a manager from each agency should always 
be involved at the referral stage, and in any further strategy discussion.
13.53   Sgt Gorry refused to accept that he should bear any blame for failing to supervise 
any investigation of Victoria’s case. I do not share his view. It seems to me that one 
of the principal functions of a sergeant in a child protection team is to supervise 
the investigation of crime by more junior officers. I believe Sgt Gorry should have 
taken a firm grip of this investigation as soon as the referral was taken. He should 
have agreed with PC Dewar a plan of action that had a clear timescale in which 
the work should have been carried out. Indeed, it is difficult to see why Sgt Gorry 
did not take any active part in the inquiry himself, perhaps by visiting the hospital 
that evening with PC Dewar. He was on duty until l0pm that night, and although 
he mentioned that he had to make a telephone call to America during the evening, 
it is hard to imagine that this should have taken precedence over ensuring that 
such a serious referral was being properly investigated.
13.54   When Sgt Gorry was asked if an “S.18” assault should not have been dealt with 
by someone more senior than a PC, he replied, “I think in the scheme of the 
investigations that have been dealt with in Brent, yes it is a serious assault. But 
initially I think it will be fair to say that there were no complexities about it and, 
had there been complexities within it, then obviously the supervisor would have 
overseen it or taken over, but at that initial stage it was something that I personally 
felt that the combined skills and abilities of PC Dewar and Blackman were able to 
deal with the initial investigation.” I reject Sgt Gorry’s assertion that Victoria’s case 
was neither serious or complex enough for him to have become involved, and 
I was surprised to hear that he continues to think so.
13.55   My view is that the skill and judgement that an experienced officer can bring to an 
investigation is of vital importance, particularly in making sure that matters get off 
to a good start. I consider that it should always be the case that such an officer is 
involved from the outset in investigations involving serious crimes against children. 
Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
In cases of serious crime against children, supervisory officers must, from 
the beginning, take an active role in ensuring that a proper investigation is 
carried out.
13.56   PC Dewar spoke to DI Anderson, but could not remember if it was before or 
after she received the message from Ms Hines concerning the diagnosis from 
Dr Schwartz. For his part, DI Anderson was also unable to remember. However, 
it would seem unlikely that he made a considered assessment of the case before 
the telephone call from Ms Hines, especially since he told me that, had he known 
Victoria was in hospital and nothing had been arranged, he would have instructed 
PC Dewar immediately to formulate a proper strategy with social services and 
organise for a plan of action to be put in place. Therefore, it is more likely that 
PC Dewar spoke to DI Anderson after her telephone call with Ms Hines, and 
presented him with an open and shut case, in as much as she already believed 
the diagnosis of Dr Schwartz ended the need for a criminal investigation.13  Brent Child Protection Team
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13.57   What emerges is a picture of blurred and confused management roles, with 
nobody taking responsibility for ensuring that an investigation takes place. 
Sgt Gorry was aware that the referral had come in, but gave no directions as 
to what action he expected to be taken. Once he knew DI Anderson had been 
consulted, he ceased to take any active interest.
13.58   When the case was mentioned to him the following day, DI Anderson probably did 
not grasp how serious the case had been viewed the evening before and, hearing 
about the scabies diagnosis, thought it was a formality for PC Dewar to lift the 
police protection and mark the investigation as complete on CRIS. Nonetheless, 
in my view, DI Anderson should have taken much greater care to explore with 
PC Dewar the extent to which she had properly investigated the case before lifting 
police protection. He should also have directed that a written medical opinion be 
obtained from Dr Schwartz.
13.59   The last occasion on which a supervisor had anything to do with the investigation 
was on 10 August 1999, when Sgt Smith checked the CRIS report to see if it was 
ready to close. He said that, having read the contents of the report, he was satisfied 
that it could be closed. When asked what he understood his role to be in checking 
the CRIS report before closure, he replied, “I wanted to make sure that the matter 
had been investigated. I wanted to make sure that the statutory checks had been 
carried out.” When asked whether he was satisfied this had been done after reading 
this particular report, he replied, “I could see that it had come in initially as a quite 
serious allegation, that the following day there had been discussions that had taken 
place between the hospital, the social services, between the officer of the case and 
the Detective Inspector and that a decision had been made to – I do not want to 
use the word downgrade – but to change the classification to ‘no crime’. When 
I saw that that had taken place and that there was no further explanation required 
by police, when I saw that report then I closed it.”
13.60   Clearly, Sgt Smith did no serious analysis of the case or any cross-checking to see 
whether PC Dewar’s understanding of the medical evidence was correct. If he had, 
he would quickly have found out that Dr Schwartz did have ongoing concerns for 
the child and that there were injuries which could not have been accounted for by 
scabies. It is also disturbing that a case that started off as being so serious could be 
closed without a written, detailed, medical report being examined by a supervisor.
13.61   Also, in common with his colleague Sgt Gorry, Sgt Smith placed a lot of 
importance on the fact that DI Anderson had apparently agreed the decision to 
“no crime” the case. Therefore, Sgt Smith’s input amounted to no more than a 
‘rubberstamping’ exercise, compounding the poor decision-making and supervision 
of others. Ironically, at the very time that Sgt Smith closed the CRIS entry in Brent, 
Victoria was being discharged from a hospital in the neighbouring borough, having 
suffered a further set of serious injuries.
Multi-agency investigation
13.62   In trying to find an explanation for the lack of useful action by Brent CPT, I was 
helped by another exchange between PC Dewar and her Counsel. He asked her, 
“In a multi-agency investigation such as this, who did you understand the lead 
agency to be?” PC Dewar replied that she understood it to be social services.
13.63   This was a view she held in common with several other police officers who gave 
evidence to the Inquiry. If the impression given by their evidence is representative, 
it would appear that child protection officers, for some considerable time, have 
been unsure about exactly where they fit within the Working Together system and The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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what their precise responsibilities are in the investigation of the possible deliberate 
harm of a child.
13.64   The principal function of the police is the prevention and detection of crime. 
I entirely reject the notion that the police should seek to avoid their responsibility 
to conduct a swift and thorough criminal investigation by hiding behind the excuse 
of others being the ‘lead agency’. The police are the ‘lead agency’ in a criminal 
investigation, and I am concerned that the good intentions of multi-agency 
decision-making, information sharing and joint working may have now led to a 
blurring of roles, uncertainty about who should take what action, and a convenient 
excuse for poor investigation. PC Dewar’s view that social services were the lead 
agency in the investigation of Victoria’s case would appear to be reflective of a 
common view held by child protection officers in the MPS.
13.65   When Victoria came to notice in Brent, social services had an important role to play 
and should undoubtedly have taken a lead in co-ordinating the various strands of 
information which were becoming available. However, there should have been a 
parallel police investigation into the serious crime reported against Victoria, and the 
evidence gathering exercise for that should have been led, and in large measure 
conducted, by the police.
13.66   The MPS, and the police service generally, needs seriously to examine its role 
in child protection investigations. As with other types of crime, it must take 
responsibility for gathering the necessary evidence. In order to advance this 
objective, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
The Association of Chief Police Officers must produce and implement the 
standards-based service, as recommended by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary in the 1999 thematic inspection report, Child Protection.
Police protection
13.67   Finally, I turn to the issue of police protection. Section 46 of the Children Act 1989 
provides a power for a police officer to remove a child into police protection, or 
cause the child to remain in a safe place such as a hospital, if there is evidence 
that the child is at risk of significant harm. A crucial safeguard for the child and the 
family is that an independent supervisory officer, known for these purposes as the 
‘designated officer’, assesses the action taken and ensures that there is a need to 
remove the child from the control of the carers, and to inform the relative parties 
why the steps were taken. The Home Office issued guidance to the police service 
in the form of circular 54/91, which suggested that the designated officer role was 
most appropriately carried out by an inspector.
13.68  In  Victoria’s case, PC Dewar acted as the actioning officer as well as the designated 
officer for the purposes of police protection. It was clear from her evidence to this 
Inquiry that, when dealing with Victoria’s case, she was unaware that the Home 
Office circular required these roles to be separate and filled by different officers. 
I heard evidence from senior officers in the MPS to the effect that they had 
acknowledged their failure to comply with government guidance on this issue and 
that this had now been corrected. I will therefore restrict myself to urging all police 
forces to ensure that they operate within Home Office guidelines relating to police 
protection, that a clear understanding of the designated officer’s role is established, 
and that they comply with the following recommendation:13  Brent Child Protection Team
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Recommendation
Police forces must review their systems for taking children into police protection 
and ensure they comply with the Children Act 1989 and Home Office 
guidelines. In particular, they must ensure that an independent officer of at least 
inspector rank acts as the designated officer in all cases.
13.69   It is doubtful whether there was a need to take Victoria into police protection at 
all. This is due to the fact that there was no known threat from Kouao that she 
would seek to remove Victoria from hospital. However, having taken this action, 
if an independent inspector had been overseeing the case, as laid down in the 
Children Act 1989 and the Home Office circular, there is a chance that he or she 
would have spotted the deficiencies in the way the case was being handled, and 
prevented the police protection from being lifted until a proper investigation had 
taken place.
13.70   I am also concerned about the fact that Victoria was taken into police protection 
over the telephone, and with no police officer having been to see her. Examination 
of the Children Act 1989 and Home Office guidance does not reveal any specific 
instruction that the child must be seen before taken into police protection. 
However, I believe it is poor practice for this not to happen. For the police to deny 
a parent access to their child is a serious step and requires the most searching 
examination of the need to take such action.
13.71   Whether or not the child needs to be seen, the legislation and guidance is clear 
that both the child and his or her carer must be told why police protection has 
been implemented. No attempt was made by any of the officers concerned 
with this case to explain either to Victoria or to Kouao why this step had been 
considered necessary.30814 Haringey  Child Protection Team
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14   Haringey Child 
Protection Team
Accommodation
14.1     At the time it came to deal with Victoria’s case, Haringey Child Protection Team 
(CPT) was housed in Highgate police station. The accommodation provided for 
the team, in common with many CPTs in the capital, was poor quality. In addition, 
I was told that the team was insufficiently equipped with staff, vehicles and IT 
equipment.
14.2     I have dealt with my concerns about the priority and resources given to CPTs by 
the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) elsewhere in section 13. I will not repeat 
them here, except to say that I have some sympathy for the view expressed by 
Sergeant (Sgt) Alan Hodges, one of the officers on the Haringey team. He said, 
“I do not want to sound pathetic, but it all adds up, and it was just another 
indication of the way we were treated as a unit.” I found no direct link between 
the standard of the service offered to Victoria by Haringey CPT and the adequacy 
of its resources, but I believe it would be wrong to discount the corrosive effect 
that a long period of neglect and under-resourcing can have on the morale and 
effectiveness of a team like Haringey CPT.
Training and experience of officers
14.3     One of the particular deficiencies in the team that was drawn to my attention was 
the lack of officers with detective training. In view of the importance that I attach 
to this issue, I detail the training and experience of the officers who had some 
direct involvement in Victoria’s case.
Detective Inspector Howard
14.4     Detective Inspector (DI) David Howard joined the police service in 1978 and 
became the officer in charge at Haringey CPT in May 1998. During his 20 years 
of service before taking up that post, he held a wide range of roles within the 
uniformed branch. These included beat patrol, public disorder policing, custody 
sergeant, and management of community beat officers. He had a little experience 
in mainstream CID work at Kilburn police station, where he was an inspector for 
about 15 months, but he had never attended the CID foundation course. In 1997, 
he attended a one-week Management of Serious Crime (MSC) course, which he 
said was the only investigative training he had received since leaving recruit school. 
He said, “During my short time in the CID, other than one murder inquiry I really 
did not investigate fully other crimes. So although I had probably more awareness 
than some, I certainly did not have the practical skills to really supervise or take on 
child protection work.”
14.5     He had no previous experience in a child protection team, and it was not until he 
had been in his post a year that he attended a one-week Working Together course. 
That was the only child protection training he ever did. Overall, I do not consider 
DI Howard to have been sufficiently trained and qualified to manage a group of 
staff undertaking serious criminal investigations, particularly relating to children.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Sergeant Michael Cooper-Bland
14.6     Sgt Cooper-Bland was, together with Sgt Richard Bird, responsible for the 
day-to-day supervision of PC Karen Jones at the time the first referral concerning 
Victoria was received in late July 1999. He joined the police service in 1977 and 
spent the first 12 years as a uniformed patrol officer. He was promoted to sergeant 
in 1989 and afterwards worked in various uniformed supervisory roles until 1994 
when he joined Haringey CPT. He therefore had no CID experience, nor any 
training or experience in serious crime investigation. However, by 1999 he had five 
years of child protection work under his belt and he had attended several courses 
relating to his child protection work, including a two-week Initial Child Protection 
course. This made him something of a rarity among the officers from whom I 
heard evidence.
Sergeant Richard Bird
14.7     Sgt Bird became a police officer in 1977 and spent the first 13 years as a uniformed 
patrol officer with the Hertfordshire constabulary. He transferred to the MPS in 
May 1989, and was promoted to sergeant two years later, continuing to serve in 
uniformed police roles. When he joined Haringey CPT in March 1999, he had no 
experience of dealing with serious crime investigations, let alone supervising them, 
and he had received no advanced investigative training. He made the point in his 
written statement to the Inquiry that, even up to the point of leaving the CPT in 
2001, he had still not received any investigative or procedural training for CPT 
officers, nor any joint investigation training with social services. He said he had 
specifically asked DI Howard about this, but was told that the training courses had 
been stopped on the North West Crime Operational Command Unit (OCU) and 
that there were none now available.
Sergeant Alan Hodges
14.8     Sgt Hodges completes the supervision team at Haringey. He arrived in the team 
during October 1999, effectively replacing Sgt Cooper-Bland in the middle of 
the relevant period. Before this, he had 16 years’ police service, nine years of 
which had been as a sergeant. Like his colleagues, Sgt Hodges had never held a 
detective’s post or received any training in serious crime investigation. Just before 
joining the CPT, he was fortunate enough to attend a five-day Working Together 
course, which at least gave him a basic insight into the main roles of the agencies 
involved in child protection.
14.9     The level of detective experience among the supervising officers in Haringey CPT 
is a matter that causes me some concern. In my view, it is extremely important 
that the first-line supervisors of child protection officers are either fully trained 
detectives, or have received sufficient training and experience to enable them 
effectively to oversee serious crime investigations.
14.10   It would seem that my concern was shared by some of the officers themselves. 
For example, Sgt Bird expressed his feelings rather forcefully when he said, 
“I applied for a post as police sergeant in the hope that I would gain the 
knowledge, experience and training to become a detective. There was no training. 
The Child Protection Manual was deemed to be out of date and, even though senior 
management had been tasked to rewrite and update it, this had not happened 
by the time I left two years later. I was put in the position of detective sergeant 
without the experience or the training to prepare me for the seriousness of the 
investigations I found myself dealing with.”
14.11   The situation among the constables was no better. When he arrived on the CPT, 
Sgt Bird said he was comforted by the fact that there was at least one detective 
constable on the team in the form of Detective Constable (DC) Braithwaite. 
However, DC Braithwaite was transferred to other duties in March 1999, which 14  Haringey Child Protection Team
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meant that, by the time Victoria arrived in the borough, there were no detectives 
in Haringey CPT.
PC Karen Jones
14.12   PC Jones was one of the most experienced constables left in the team, and she 
was to be the investigating officer on each of the two occasions that Victoria was 
referred to the team. She joined the police force in 1987 and carried out uniformed 
patrol duties until her appointment to Haringey CPT in 1996. She spent two years 
with the Clubs and Vice Unit but had never been a detective officer nor undertaken 
the CID foundation course, nor any other course involving serious crime 
investigation. However, in 1996, she did undertake the two-week child protection 
course that was in existence at that time. This course included the identification of 
possible signs of deliberate harm to a child and the evidence required. Within the 
first month of her being posted to Harrow CPT, she also attended a Memorandum 
of Good Practice Interviewing course and a five-day Working Together course. 
Therefore, by August 1999, PC Jones was both experienced in child protection 
work and, by comparison with other members of the team, was well trained as far 
as child protection work was concerned.
14.13   Having looked at the background of these officers, the picture which emerges is 
similar to that of Brent CPT. There were some very experienced police officers on 
Harrow CPT, but none had any relevant training or experience in dealing with the 
investigation of serious crimes.
Crimes against children
14.14   Again, a comparison with adult victims of crime is instructive. Sgt Bird said that 
no officer in his previous posting (the Vulnerable Persons Unit, which deals with 
domestic violence) would investigate such serious crimes as Grievous Bodily Harm 
(GBH) or rape, unless they were a detective. Such crimes, he said, would be 
passed on to CID. However, he confirmed that in Haringey CPT, a crime of equal 
seriousness committed against a child would be dealt with by an officer with no 
detective training at all.
14.15   This is a dangerous and illogical approach. It is wrong that victims of crime are 
disadvantaged in terms of the training and expertise of the investigating officer, 
simply because they are children. I heard worrying evidence to suggest that the 
culture of some police forces was such that child protection team work was seen 
as something less than the investigation of often very serious crimes. In order to 
address this issue, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Chief constables must ensure that the investigation of crime against children is as 
important as the investigation of any other form of serious crime. Any suggestion 
that child protection policing is of a lower status than other forms of policing 
must be eradicated.
14.16  Following  Victoria’s death, Haringey CPT was reviewed. The team was increased to 
contain three sergeants and eight constables, five of whom were detectives.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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The relationship with Haringey Social Services
14.17   In a report written after Victoria’s death (to which I return in more detail at 
paragraph 14.127), Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) Philip Wheeler wrote, 
“Haringey Social Services itself seems to have its own particular culture and ways 
of working within the child protection framework. It seems that they are extremely 
powerful within the protection network and some social workers work hard to 
actually prevent police involvement.” The validity of this comment was tested 
during the course of the evidence of the officers on the team.
14.18   Sgt Hodges was one of those who thought all was not well. He said that some 
members of Haringey Social Services were “aggressive” towards the police. In 
particular, he said that he detected a feeling among a minority of his social services 
counterparts that the police tended to take too heavy-handed an approach towards 
joint investigations, seeking to obtain a conviction at all costs rather than focusing 
on the interests of the child. The result was a feeling that the two agencies were 
working to different agendas.
14.19   In order to establish the practical effects of this difference in outlook, Sgt Hodges 
was asked whether he had been held back from doing what he wanted to do 
in terms of investigating a crime because of the approach of social services. He 
replied, “Not holding back, no, maybe more delayed, things were a lot slower. 
We could not just go off and do it, we had to consult with social services before. 
I remember having arguments over different investigations with different social 
workers and managers. I would not say I allowed them to dictate totally, but it did 
present me with a problem of how to progress investigations when they were our 
main conduit or access to that child or the family.”
14.20  Sgt  Hodges’ perception was echoed to some degree by Sgt Cooper-Bland. When 
asked to comment on the state of the relationship between Haringey CPT and 
social services, he replied, “I would say that on an individual basis, social worker 
to police officer, there were many, many examples of good working relationships. 
There were, conversely, examples of poor working relationships, and in very few 
cases downright rudeness. I think the perception that the police are heavy-handed 
and only interested in securing convictions and not always focusing on the child, 
is a stereotypical view held by some people in social services. I would say the 
minority.”
14.21   When asked for his views on this issue, DI Howard agreed there were difficulties. 
Although he thought that DCI Wheeler had exaggerated the problem, he did state 
that social services were “robust” and “inflexible”. He gave an example of this 
inflexibility by saying, “I made a suggestion, just a suggestion once, that maybe 
strategy meetings could be held at Highgate [police station]. I felt that would be 
something that would be progressive, the staff maybe could get to know some of 
their staff, but it was just a total look of amazement, as if it would take place at the 
social services offices or nowhere.”
14.22   If this was true, and I found no reason to doubt DI Howard, then this is 
inappropriate behaviour on the part of Haringey Social Services. The strategy 
meeting ought to be viewed as a shared, multi-agency meeting. It is not a social 
services meeting to which others are invited, and it should be the cornerstone of a 
joint investigation. There is absolutely no reason why the other agencies involved 
in child protection should always go to the social services offices.
14.23   The evidence of Sgt Hodges was illuminating on this issue. He told me, “There was 
a problem with time delays of having strategy meetings on occasions. Whether 
it was because of us or because of social services, I think it was a bit of both in 14  Haringey Child Protection Team
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many respects, a lot of times we would get phone calls quite late in the day 
saying, ‘We need to have a strategy meeting now’, and we would have nobody 
in the office to actually go all the way to Tottenham to have a strategy meeting. 
Social services appeared to be loath to have telephone strategy discussions, which 
maybe would have resolved that problem. On other occasions, you would arrive 
at the social services for a strategy meeting and then be asked to attend another 
strategy meeting immediately after. That caused problems because we would not 
actually know anything about the initial referral, and we would not have had the 
opportunity to actually do any of our checks as such.”
14.24   In her statement to the Inquiry, Rosemarie Kozinos, an acting senior practitioner 
at Haringey Social Services, said that because there was a difficulty with police 
attendance, social services would hold strategy meetings one after the other to 
help the police officers. It does not seem to have occurred to her that it would 
have been much more convenient to the police if the burden of travelling had 
been shared more equally between the agencies, perhaps by sometimes holding 
strategy meetings at police premises where appropriate.
14.25   The strategy meeting should be the forum in which the strategic and operational 
direction of the criminal investigation is discussed and agreed. It is pointless to 
ask whichever police officer happens to be at the office for an earlier meeting to 
attend, just to make up the numbers. For the police to be properly represented at 
a strategy meeting, the officer who is going to deal with the case, and his or her 
supervisor, should be present.
14.26   There appeared to me to be no sense of equal partnership between the two 
agencies. The police must accept criticism for allowing this unhealthy regime to 
develop without challenging it at the highest level. This is a good example of 
why the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should have ensured it sent a delegate 
to the Area Child Protection Committee (ACPC) meetings of sufficient rank to 
challenge such arrangements. This should certainly have been dealt with at 
superintendent/assistant director level, but it was the practice in the MPS to send 
the local CPT detective inspector.
 14.27 Echoes of this tension were heard in the evidence given by some of the social 
services witnesses. For example, Lisa Arthurworrey said that Angella Mairs did not 
like police officers coming into the social services office. When I asked her if there 
was a general feeling within Haringey Social Services of hostility towards the police 
or other agencies, she said, “Yes there was.”
14.28   The matter was put directly to Ms Mairs, but her response was confused and 
unhelpful. At one point she stated that she found it difficult to work with some 
Haringey police officers, citing “institutional racism” as the reason. Later, however, 
she tried to distance herself from this statement by suggesting that all such 
problems had long disappeared by the time Victoria’s case was being dealt with.
14.29   Ms Mairs aside, I heard enough evidence from other witnesses to conclude that the 
police in Haringey allowed themselves to be ‘led by the nose’ by Haringey Social 
Services. This subservient approach seriously compromised their ability to carry out 
robust, speedy and effective criminal investigations.
14.30   Obviously, effective multi-agency working will require some give and take by the 
various agencies involved. However, if the situation in Haringey is representative, it 
suggests to me that a careful re-evaluation of Working Together is needed to make 
sure that the particular roles and responsibilities of the various agencies involved in 
child protection are not blurred. In particular, I believe that although there should 
be a constant and thorough sharing of information between the agencies involved, The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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it is the police who should keep sole responsibility for the evidence-gathering 
process. This includes the forensic interview (known as a memorandum interview) 
with a child victim of crime, conducted in accordance with the government 
guidance Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings (2001).
14.31   The police should be in no doubt that their primary responsibility is the detection 
and prevention of crime, and when a crime is suspected, they are responsible 
for its efficient and prompt investigation. As I set out below, I take the view that 
Haringey CPT lost sight of the unique and specific role it had to play in dealing 
with the two referrals concerning Victoria. In doing so, they effectively allowed 
social services to dictate the speed and depth of the investigations that were 
carried out. If this type of ‘joint working’ is being replicated nationally, then new 
guidelines are urgently needed to ensure that each agency knows precisely the role 
it is to play in the investigation of possible deliberate harm to a child.
The initial investigation
The referral
14.32   The police in Haringey first became aware of Victoria when Sgt Cooper-Bland 
received a telephone call from Shanthi Jacob at 11am on 28 July 1999.
14.33   Sgt Cooper-Bland recalled that the information he received concerned a young 
girl who had been admitted to the North Middlesex Hospital four days earlier 
with burns to her face and head. He was told that the girl’s carer, Kouao, had told 
medical staff that the girl had poured hot water over herself. Sgt Cooper-Bland also 
remembers being told that a nurse had noticed old marks on the child’s body that 
resembled belt buckle marks.
14.34   In view of the fact that belt buckle marks were expressly mentioned, Sgt Cooper-
Bland must have known that he was being told about possible deliberate harm to a 
child. It is clear from what he was later to write in the entry on the crime-recording 
computer database, CRIS, that he also suspected that Victoria’s burns had been 
deliberately caused. According to the CRIS report, his understanding at the time 
was that Victoria’s burns had been caused “by the suspect, as yet unknown, 
pouring hot water over a child’s head”. In response to a question from me, he 
agreed that he was, at that stage, working on the assumption that the burns had 
been deliberately caused.
14.35   Sgt Cooper-Bland agreed that, in light of this information, the referral constituted 
a serious case which called for prompt investigation. He classified the allegation on 
CRIS as “actual bodily harm”, an offence under section 47 of the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861. Therefore, for the second time in two weeks, a CPT was faced 
with a clear indication that a serious crime may have been committed against 
Victoria.
14.36   Sgt Cooper-Bland recalled that Ms Jacob told him that social services had arranged 
a strategy meeting for 2.30pm on the afternoon of 28 July 1999 and that police 
attendance was required. It appears that little thought was given by social services 
as to whether this arrangement was convenient for the police, and this may 
be an example of social services’ inconsiderate action that I criticised above at 
paragraph 14.24.
Allocation to PC Jones
14.37   Rather than simply informing the police that a strategy meeting was to take place, 
a social services manager should have spoken to a manager in the CPT to agree 
whether a strategy meeting was needed. If so, they could then have agreed on 14  Haringey Child Protection Team
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an appropriate and mutually convenient time and place for it to be held (which, 
according to the local procedures in force at the time, should have been in the 
hospital). In the event, the manner in which the strategy meeting was arranged 
determined who would represent the police at the meeting.
14.38   Sgt Cooper-Bland said that his original intention had been to allocate the case 
to PC Sean Mangan, but because that officer was not able to attend the strategy 
meeting at the time set by social services, the case was given to another officer, 
PC Jones, who just happened to be at the North Tottenham District Office on that 
day, attending another meeting.
14.39   In my view, the decision as to which constable is allocated a particular case should 
be determined according to who is best placed to conduct the necessary criminal 
inquiry. Once that decision had been made in Victoria’s case, Sgt Cooper-Bland 
should have arranged with his counterpart in social services to hold the strategy 
meeting at a time which would have enabled that officer to attend. Despite the 
fact she was not his first choice, Sgt Cooper-Bland considered that PC Jones 
(as the most experienced officer on the team) would be able to deal with the 
case properly.
14.40   It is unclear whether Sgt Cooper-Bland, by instructing her to attend the strategy 
meeting, also expected PC Jones to take responsibility for the investigation. But 
there was little point in her attending the meeting if that was not to be the case. 
She certainly received little in the way of briefing from her sergeant before she 
arrived at the meeting. As Sgt Cooper-Bland put it, “I was not able to give her a 
detailed briefing at all. It would have been a telephone conversation asking her to 
attend the strategy meeting, outlining the briefest facts of the case.”
PC Jones’s understanding of the referral
14.41   This was the unsatisfactory chain of events which led to PC Jones attending the 
strategy meeting about Victoria at Haringey Social Services’ offices on 28 July 1999. 
At the end of the meeting, it appears that PC Jones assumed that responsibility 
for the case was to be hers, a state of affairs which plainly found favour with 
Sgt Cooper-Bland who said, “The following day, I was at Haringey CPT. It appeared 
that PC Karen Jones had allocated the investigation involving Victoria Climbié to 
herself. I confirmed with her that this was acceptable and that she was assuming 
responsibility for the investigation.”
14.42   Before dealing in detail with PC Jones’s investigation of Victoria’s case from this 
point on, it is helpful to note what she believed herself to be dealing with at the 
point that she entered the strategy meeting.
14.43   PC Jones told me that she remembered little about her telephone conversation 
with Sgt Cooper-Bland, but when reminded what he wrote on CRIS, PC Jones said 
that nothing there was in conflict with her memory of what she had been told. 
It is safe to assume, therefore, that she knew that Victoria, a seven-year-old girl, 
had been taken to hospital with burns to her face and head, that she believed the 
hospital was accepting the explanation given by her ‘mother’ that Victoria poured 
the water over herself, and that medical concerns were raised when a nurse found 
what looked like belt buckle marks on her body. When asked whether it seemed 
to her to be the sort of case that merited a full investigation, she unhesitatingly 
answered that it did. She also confirmed that she felt equipped, in terms of training 
and experience, to deal with it.
14.44   It is important to note that four days had passed between Victoria’s admission to 
hospital and the referral to the police. Wasting time at the outset can seriously 
damage the effectiveness of a criminal investigation. In this case, it gave Kouao The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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an opportunity to talk to and influence Victoria, for Victoria’s injuries to change 
appearance and for forensic evidence to be lost. Sgt Cooper-Bland did not raise 
the issue of the delay in bringing Victoria’s case to the attention of the police 
when he took the referral on 28 July 1999. His explanation was worrying: “It is 
not something I had considered. I have to say that while not common, it was not 
uncommon for cases to become – to be brought to our notice some time after the 
suspected offences had occurred.”
14.45   In my view, this was an issue that should have been considered, not just by 
Sgt Cooper-Bland when he took the referral, but also by PC Jones when she 
entered the strategy meeting. At the forefront of her mind should have been the 
fact that there was a victim in hospital to whom the main suspect had unrestricted 
access. She should also have been aware that, somewhere, there might be a belt 
buckle that matched the marks on Victoria’s body. There might also be witnesses 
able to give helpful evidence.
14.46   PC Jones should have been concerned that there had been a delay of four days 
between Victoria’s admission to hospital and the police being informed that she 
may have been the victim of deliberate harm. The damaging effect that such 
a delay could have on the effectiveness of a criminal investigation is obvious. 
The fact that she would not seem to have raised this issue with her colleagues at 
the strategy meeting is perhaps indicative of a general approach to investigations 
of this kind where the police neither receive nor insist upon the immediate 
notification of potential crimes. In my view, it is vital that the police are involved 
at the earliest possible opportunity. In order to encourage this practice, I make the 
following recommendation:
Recommendation
The guideline set out at paragraph 5.8 of Working Together must be strictly 
adhered to: whenever social services receive a referral which may constitute 
a criminal offence against a child, they must inform the police at the earliest 
opportunity.
The July strategy meeting
14.47   In view of the delay that had already occurred since Victoria’s admission to 
hospital, these were all matters which should have been at the forefront of 
PC Jones’s mind when she attended the meeting. She should have left the 
other participants of the strategy meeting in no doubt that the police needed 
to try and recover the time lost by the late referral and urgently commence a 
full investigation. Instead, PC Jones would seem to have done little more than 
somewhat passively accept a list of tasks from the chairperson at the meeting, 
who was Ms Kozinos.
14.48   I regard this as wholly unsatisfactory. However competent PC Jones believed 
Ms Kozinos to be, she was not qualified to direct the course of an investigation 
into a serious crime. That PC Jones allowed her to do so adds further weight to 
the recommendation I made at paragraph 13.52 that a police manager should 
be involved both at the referral stage and in initial strategy discussions in order to 
make sure, if nothing else, that the investigation gets off on the right foot.
14.49   The strategy meeting lasted half an hour. At the end of the meeting, PC Jones 
had gained more information, mainly from Karen Johns, a social worker at Enfield. 
She discovered that Victoria had been presented as unkempt, in a dirty dress and 
with no underwear, that there were 11 scars in total, including the two buckle 14  Haringey Child Protection Team
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marks, and that the injuries caused by the scalding appeared to be “bad”. PC Jones 
should have been in no doubt from this extra information that she was dealing 
with a serious allegation of crime, as well as a potential case of neglect. PC Jones 
confirmed the she understood herself to be investigating a possible case of Actual 
Bodily Harm (ABH).
14.50   The tasks specifically allocated to PC Jones at the strategy meeting were:
• to carry out a check with the immigration service;
• once medical reports had been obtained, to arrange a joint visit with social 
services to the child’s home in order to explain child protection procedures to 
the mother;
• to take the necessary steps should Kouao attempt to remove Victoria from hospital.
Deficiencies in the investigation
14.51   What concerned me most about the action plan agreed at the strategy meeting 
was not what the police agreed to do themselves, but what they were content 
to let others do on their behalf. Two of the most basic steps in investigating this 
crime should have been the obtaining of statements from the doctors and nurses 
concerned, and ensuring that Victoria’s injuries were photographed.
14.52   PC Jones did neither. In explanation, she told me that she expected Ms Johns to 
obtain the medical report. This, in my view, is grossly inadequate. PC Jones should 
have arranged for full witness statements to be obtained from the consultant 
paediatrician, Dr Mary Rossiter, and the other doctors and nurses who had 
examined Victoria. A medical report is worthless in a criminal investigation, and 
someone with PC Jones’s experience should have known that proper witness 
statements were required.
14.53   As to the photographs, although hospital photographs had been ordered (and 
were eventually taken on 29 July 1999) and arrangements were put in place at 
the strategy meeting for police and social services to be given a copy, PC Jones 
should have arranged for a police photographer to record the injuries. A police 
photographer would approach the matter from an evidential point of view, 
ensuring that all injuries and marks were photographed, and using special 
techniques where necessary, such as ultraviolet photography. We now know that 
the hospital photographer got basic instructions from a doctor about which areas 
to photograph, by a square being drawn on a body map. The area included the 
main burn injuries but many of the smaller injuries were not photographed, and 
the recording of such injuries may have been crucial in a criminal investigation.
14.54   There was a long and depressing exchange between Counsel to the Inquiry and 
PC Jones when he questioned her on her failure to take positive action at the 
beginning of what should have been her investigation of the case. Despite the 
ample evidence of physical abuse and neglect available to her at that stage, she 
doggedly stuck to her position that, because the doctors believed Kouao’s story 
about the scalding, it must be true. She did not see it as her role to question the 
doctors’ views, or even to check that it was indeed the concluded medical view, 
given that she had only received this information second-hand from Ms Johns. 
To discover that an experienced police officer and child protection ‘expert’ such 
as PC Jones would not even consider the possibility that Kouao might be lying is 
incredible. Once again, I repeat that if a competent police manager had been at 
the strategy meeting, he or she might have applied some independent thought 
and critical analysis to the available information.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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14.55   I believe that there were minimum steps which PC Jones should have informed 
Ms Kozinos the police would be undertaking:
• The scene of the crime should have been identified and searched for any clues 
that deliberate harm was taking place, and in particular for the actual belt which 
matched the buckle marks on Victoria’s body.
• Statements should have been arranged and obtained from all doctors and nurses 
concerned.
• Police photographs should have been obtained, or at the very least the hospital 
photographs should have been checked to ensure all injuries reported by medical 
staff had been recorded.
• A full forensic medical examination, by a forensically trained paediatrician or 
doctor, should have been carried out.
• The likely suspects should have been identified (the prime carers being the most 
obvious), and a strategy agreed for their arrest and interview in accordance with 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
• Arrangements should have been made to speak immediately to Victoria, 
independently of any of the suspects, to allow her to speak freely about what had 
happened to her. This should have been done with an interpreter and, as far as 
possible, in accordance with the Memorandum of Good Practice.
14.56   I heard no satisfactory explanation from any of the officers from Haringey CPT 
who gave evidence to the Inquiry as to why these basic investigative steps were 
not taken. PC Jones’s response to the question of why she did not carry out these 
basic tasks was simply to avoid and refuse to accept even her most obvious failings, 
saying that medical staff were responsible for identifying the crime scene and that 
she was not able to speak to Victoria because a doctor needed to examine her. 
Quite what she thought the doctors had been doing for the previous four days was 
never established. She even suggested that the police could not really do anything 
because they had not established that a crime had taken place. It was put to her 
that surely part of the role of the police is to establish exactly that, but she seemed 
not to grasp the logic of the argument.
14.57   The fundamental flaw in PC Jones’s view of her handling of Victoria’s case, and 
her role as a child protection officer, seems to me to be expressed in the following 
answer, which is representative of many she gave during the course of her 
evidence: “Child protection and ordinary policing are completely different things.” 
I believe that they are not different things and that it is absolutely vital that police 
officers engaged in joint investigations into possible deliberate harm realise that 
they are responsible for making sure that an effective investigation is carried out. 
In order to encourage this perception among police officers, I make the following 
recommendation:
Recommendation
The Working Together arrangements must be amended to ensure the police carry 
out completely, and exclusively, any criminal investigation elements in a case 
of suspected injury or harm to a child, including the evidential interview with a 
child victim. This will remove any confusion about which agency takes the ‘lead’ 
or is responsible for certain actions.
14.58   As to the three tasks allocated to her by Ms Kozinos at the strategy meeting, 
PC Jones said she carried out the immigration check which came back as “no 
trace” and she decided that no steps were necessary to prevent Kouao removing 
Victoria from hospital. This left just the ‘home visit’ to Kouao. As far as she was 
concerned, this was going to be arranged by the allocated social worker and the 14  Haringey Child Protection Team
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timing would be dictated by social services, leaving her to do no more than wait to 
be told when to turn up at Kouao’s home.
14.59   With the exception of the immigration check and a check of the police computer 
system, PC Jones did nothing more on the case for a further six days. In my view, she 
neglected her duty as a police officer, and Victoria was let down by this inaction.
The home visit
14.60   On 3 August 1999, PC Jones happened to be at the North Tottenham District 
Office for meetings in relation to other cases. She said that she saw Lisa 
Arthurworrey in reception, and that Ms Arthurworrey had got a statement, or 
statements, back from the hospital indicating that one doctor had described the 
marks on Victoria’s body as belt buckle marks. This was the crucial document 
which PC Jones said she was waiting for to begin further investigations. This 
was the confirmation she thought she needed that a crime had taken place. 
Ms Arthurworrey apparently told PC Jones that she did not have the statement 
in her possession because she was dealing with another matter at the time, but 
that she would fax it to the CPT office later. PC Jones said she was not “unduly 
concerned” that the document was not faxed that day, or indeed the next day.
14.61   Ms Arthurworrey had arranged with PC Jones to carry out the ‘home visit’ on 
4 August 1999. PC Jones said that she saw this visit as being for social services (as 
the lead agency) to assess whether it was suitable for Victoria to return there. If 
that is right, then it is unclear why it should have been necessary for PC Jones to 
attend at all. However, when PC Jones was asked what she thought the purpose of 
her attendance was, her answer was revealing. She said, “Because of the suspicion 
there was a crime, somebody had made an allegation.”
14.62   Plainly, that was correct. An allegation had been made, a crime was indicated, and 
Kouao was the principal suspect. That being so, PC Jones, rather than passively 
attending a social services-led home visit, should have arrested Kouao and 
interviewed her formally.
14.63   In reality, the home visit never took place. PC Jones recalled that, at the strategy 
meeting, it had been suggested that Victoria had suffered from scabies. On the 
day of the proposed home visit, she told me that she telephoned the casualty 
department at the North Middlesex Hospital and asked for advice relating to 
scabies. According to her, a casualty nurse (whose name she was unable to supply) 
warned her to wear protective clothing, not to remain in the infected area for long, 
and certainly no longer than an hour. She also said that she was advised to destroy 
her clothing, and wash and shower in disinfectant afterwards. Because of this 
advice, she said she had concerns for her own family and she therefore telephoned 
Ms Arthurworrey that morning to say she refused to go to the house.
14.64   The question of whether PC Jones really did receive advice to this effect from a 
nurse at the North Middlesex Hospital was one which occupied the Inquiry for 
some time. A number of nurses were asked directly whether they had given such 
advice. All of them answered “no”. Meriel Clarke, lead nurse in the accident 
and emergency department at the hospital, told me that she had undertaken an 
investigation among all the nurses in the casualty department. The investigation 
revealed that none of them could recall a conversation with PC Jones during which 
advice concerning scabies had been given.
14.65   In any event, it was unequivocally stated by all those medical staff who gave 
evidence on this issue, that the advice PC Jones claims to have been given was 
plainly wrong. Ms Clarke said that she could not believe that any of her nurses 
could have given such advice. In addition, Dr Thomas Mann, a consultant The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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dermatologist at the hospital, said in his statement to the Inquiry that, had he been 
asked for advice by PC Jones, he would have told her not to worry about scabies 
because Victoria had been successfully treated by this stage.
14.66   Had PC Jones received the advice that she claims she did and genuinely thought 
that Victoria’s home posed a risk of scabies infection, then plainly she should 
have objected strongly to Victoria being returned there before the risk had 
been eliminated. No satisfactory explanation was given as to why she took no 
such action. I am also left to wonder why PC Jones made no attempt to obtain 
protective clothing from the police stores, and why she did not consider that 
meeting Kouao at social services’ offices also exposed her to a risk of infection. 
Finally, I consider that had PC Jones been advised by an individual at the hospital, 
she would have recorded the name of that person and the exact advice given, 
particularly bearing in mind her otherwise meticulous note keeping on CRIS.
14.67   On balance, I conclude that there was no conversation between PC Jones and a 
casualty nurse during which she was advised to take the precautions she claims. 
I consider it to be more likely that PC Jones decided for herself that she would not 
attend the home visit, and that she invented the story about seeking advice from 
the casualty department as a way to avoid criticism.
The views of the medical staff
14.68   On 5 August 1999, PC Jones went to the North Tottenham District Office for 
the arranged meeting with Kouao. It was at this point that she finally saw the 
‘statement’ that Ms Arthurworrey said she had from a doctor. In fact, this turned 
out to consist of no more than a letter from Nurse Isobel Quinn. The effect of 
this letter was to put a stop to the police investigation in the same way that 
the third-hand report from Dr Schwartz had caused PC Dewar to abandon her 
investigation a few weeks earlier. The reason for this, according to PC Jones, was 
that the letter did not specifically say that Dr Rossiter (the named doctor for child 
protection) thought Victoria had been deliberately physically harmed.
14.69   The only mention of Dr Rossiter was the comment “Dr Rossiter ward round notes, 
evidence of emotional abuse”. This comment was, at best, ambiguous. By no 
stretch of the imagination did this rule out deliberate physical harm as well. Apart 
from anything else, the glaring thing that was missing was an explanation for the 
belt buckle marks. For PC Jones to decide that there was no crime because of this 
letter was extraordinary.
14.70   The only basis upon which the investigation could properly have been stopped at 
this point would have been a clear statement from Dr Rossiter to the effect that 
she was sure that all of the injuries to Victoria, including the belt buckle marks, had 
innocent explanations. At the outset of her ‘investigation’, PC Jones had identified 
the need for a doctor’s report. She closed the investigation without ever having 
received such a report, and without ever having ascertained exactly what the 
doctor’s diagnosis of Victoria’s injuries was.
14.71   PC Jones refused to accept that it was her role to make any inquiries herself with the 
doctors. She maintained the line that it was the doctors who should have told her 
if there was evidence of deliberate physical harm, and because Nurse Quinn’s letter 
did not address the belt buckle marks at all, PC Jones assumed they were no longer 
an issue.
14.72   She failed to appreciate, because she never bothered to find out, that the letter 
from Nurse Quinn was simply a response to the task set at the strategy meeting 
for social services to get more information on the issue of emotional abuse. It was 
never intended that this letter should be taken as a full diagnosis of Victoria’s 14  Haringey Child Protection Team
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condition and, as Dr Rossiter told the Inquiry, she actually thought that Victoria 
had suffered from “serious and appalling physical abuse”, which is what she would 
have made clear had she been asked directly. Once again, a simple telephone 
call from a police officer to the doctor concerned may well have cleared up the 
misunderstanding.
14.73   The parallels with the experience of PC Rachel Dewar in Brent when dealing with 
the admission of Victoria to the Central Middlesex Hospital are clear. In both 
cases, there seems to have been an unwillingness by the officers concerned to 
evaluate the information fed to them concerning the diagnosis of the consultants 
concerned. The reason may well be a general reluctance, among junior officers in 
particular, to challenge the diagnoses of what they consider to be eminent medical 
practitioners. I have already indicated that I regard specialist child protection 
officers as bringing distinct and invaluable skills to the multi-agency investigation 
of possible crimes against children. They should not feel inhibited in questioning 
or challenging the diagnoses of paediatricians. To address this issue, I make the 
following recommendation:
Recommendation
Training for child protection officers must equip them with the confidence to 
question the views of professionals in other agencies, including doctors, no 
matter how eminent those professionals appear to be.
The meeting with Kouao
14.74   Returning to the meeting with Kouao on 5 August 1999, PC Jones said that the 
original purpose for her attendance, despite her view that there was no need to 
carry out a criminal investigation, was to explain to Kouao the child protection 
procedures and the purpose of police involvement. She said that the meeting, from 
her perspective, was no more than a “fishing expedition”. This would seem to have 
been contrary to the view of Ms Arthurworrey, who said, “I understood Constable 
Jones’s role as to investigate potential crimes against Victoria.” That, of course, is 
precisely what PC Jones should have been doing.
14.75   In addition to her failure to get to the bottom of the belt buckle marks observed 
on Victoria’s body, PC Jones failed throughout her involvement with the case to 
address the two to five-hour time delay between Victoria suffering the burns, and 
her being taken to hospital by Kouao. She told me that she had simply overlooked 
this important discrepancy – as had Sgt Cooper-Bland when he took the referral on 
28 July 1999.
14.76   This was regrettable because, when they met, Kouao repeated to her and 
Ms Arthurworrey that the scalding incident occurred at 3pm. This would have been 
the ideal opportunity to ask why they did not arrive at the hospital until after 5pm. 
Indeed, the CRIS report, which was PC Jones’s main working document, said the 
scalding incident happened at midday, so there was a potential five-hour delay 
which should have been uppermost in her mind. I got the impression that PC Jones 
had by now completely closed her mind to the possibility that Victoria had been 
deliberately harmed, because it seems the meeting with Kouao was conducted in 
a very passive, non-interrogatory way.
14.77   This seemed to be confirmed by PC Jones when she said of Kouao, “She was not 
a suspect, she was a lady we were speaking to, to try to find things out about her 
circumstances, what had happened to her. It was not like a criminal interview, 
where I would be checking every detail that she said.”The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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14.78   I believe that the police should bring to the child protection arena a healthy 
scepticism, an open mind and, where necessary, an investigative approach. By 
the time that she first met her on 5 August 1999, PC Jones seemed to be ready to 
accept anything she was told by Kouao, which meant that her presence during the 
interview was worthless. When asked why, during the course of a later home visit, 
she did not challenge any of the inconsistencies in Kouao’s story, Ms Arthurworrey 
replied, “I am a social worker and I work with the facts as they are presented to 
me. As I have said to you, I was more trusting of Kouao when I went on that visit. 
I am not a detective. I had no reason to question what I saw and what I was being 
told at that point.” If the unquestioning acceptance of information given by a carer 
is undesirable in a social worker, it is unacceptable in a police officer.
Interview with Victoria
14.79   During the interview, Kouao gave permission for PC Jones and Ms Arthurworrey 
to speak to Victoria. As a result, they went to the North Middlesex Hospital the 
following afternoon. Their failure to go immediately gave Kouao enough time 
to visit Victoria and possibly coach her about what to say during the interview. 
However, given that PC Jones had effectively abandoned any pretence at 
investigation at this stage, one can well understand why this consideration failed 
to occur to her.
14.80   PC Jones has little recollection of the questions they asked, and she told the Inquiry 
that she did not take any notes. In broad terms, she said Victoria’s account was 
similar to that given by Kouao and that she made no allegations of crime. They 
spent about half an hour with Victoria. Apart from writing up, and ‘no-criming’ the 
CRIS entry when she got back to her office, that was the last action PC Jones took 
in connection with the referral received by the police on 28 July 1999.
14.81   In particular, both she and Ms Arthurworrey did not take any steps to obtain copies 
of the photographs taken by the hospital, which were so powerful and disturbing 
when they were shown during Phase One of the Inquiry. This meant that the 
respective managers in each agency, who should have been reviewing the work 
carried out by the two front-line staff, were not given the opportunity to see for 
themselves the extent of Victoria’s dreadful injuries, and so possibly challenge some 
of the assumptions made.
14.82   In my view, PC Jones failed to conduct an adequate investigation of the crime 
committed against Victoria of which she became aware on 28 July 1999. In the 
process, she displayed what I consider to be gross incompetence.
The investigation into sexual abuse
Referral and allocation
14.83   At around 4.30pm on 1 November 1999, Paula Waldron, a civilian administration 
assistant at Haringey CPT, took a referral from Ms Arthurworrey to the effect that 
Victoria had been indecently assaulted. Ms Waldron began the CRIS entry and 
recorded that, early that morning, Kouao had telephoned Ms Arthurworrey to 
allege that Manning had sexually assaulted Victoria. She then allocated the case 
to PC Jones, because she had dealt with the family before. PC Jones was not on 
duty at this time, having left the office over an hour earlier. The first time she 
became aware that she was the investigating officer for this report of crime was 
the following morning when she came on duty.
Initial investigation
14.84   The following morning, PC Jones discovered that the matter had been allocated to 
her. She took no action to commence an investigation and, at some point during 14  Haringey Child Protection Team
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her shift, was informed by Ms Waldron that Kouao had withdrawn the allegation. 
Thereafter she did nothing to progress the case until the strategy meeting 
convened by social services took place.
14.85   When it was put to PC Jones that her entire investigation of the alleged crime 
committed against Victoria, up to and including 5 November 1999, amounted to 
no more than her attendance at this strategy meeting, she candidly replied “yes”.
The November strategy meeting
14.86   As to the strategy meeting itself, it is worth repeating that this was a vital step in 
the conduct of the inquiry at which its future management was to be decided. 
As such, the need for the meeting should have been agreed between the key 
agencies involved and it should have taken place as soon as reasonably possible.
14.87   However, it appears that the police had no say in the timing or location of the 
strategy meeting and, once again, they simply turned up at North Tottenham 
District Office when they were told to. From the point of view of a criminal 
investigation, this was three days too late. A full inquiry should have been under 
way by 2 November 1999, if not on the afternoon of 1 November. The meeting 
was arranged for 5 November because Ms Arthurworrey was on a training course 
for a few days. This is certainly not a valid reason for holding up an investigation 
into a possible serious crime, and the police should have objected most strongly to 
the delay. These issues are discussed further in paragraphs 14.104 and 14.105.
14.88   The strategy meeting was chaired once again by Ms Kozinos. PC Jones again had 
no manager with her to take the lead in formulating police action, but she was 
accompanied by PC Pauline Ricketts, who happened to be at the North Tottenham 
District Office on other business. Ms Kozinos outlined the circumstances of the 
allegation by Victoria and the fact that Kouao had withdrawn it on Victoria’s behalf.
14.89   During the course of the meeting, 15 separate tasks were identified and recorded 
by Ms Kozinos, of which the following five were assigned to PC Jones:
• Check with immigration.
• Carry out a check on Manning.
• Obtain a police statement from Kouao.
• Speak to Victoria.
• Possibly carry out a joint home visit with social services.
The investigation
14.90   As for speaking to Victoria, the minutes of the strategy meeting record that there 
was an agreement not to carry out a formal ‘memorandum’ interview or medical 
examination with Victoria at that stage. In other words, PC Jones agreed that, 
despite four days having elapsed since the original allegation, there was to be a 
further delay of unspecified length before she would have any opportunity to speak 
to the potential victim.
14.91   As far as the other action points allocated to her are concerned, PC Jones told 
me that she completed the relevant checks with the immigration service and the 
police national computer (presumably in respect of Manning) “during the course 
of the next few days”. I would imagine that the work there consisted of two 
telephone calls.
14.92   She then decided to write to Kouao, in order to arrange an interview. Unbelievably, 
it was not until 12 January 2000, a period of about nine weeks after the strategy 
meeting, that this five-line letter inviting her into the office had been translated 
into French and posted to Kouao. PC Jones fully accepted that the delay was The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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unacceptable and that she should simply have made a telephone call to Kouao 
or visited her at her house.
14.93   In the event, the nine weeks spent preparing the letter were wasted. Simply 
inviting Kouao to attend the police station on either 26 or 31 January 2000, was 
completely inadequate. Unsurprisingly, Kouao failed to keep either appointment 
and, on 7 February 2000, PC Jones contacted Ms Arthurworrey one last time about 
the case. She was told that social services had not made any contact with the 
family either, and so she decided to close the police case completely. The CRIS 
entry was updated accordingly.
14.94   In respect of this second referral, the suggestion was again made to PC Jones that 
she should have done more to progress the investigation. In particular, it was 
put to her that she should have arranged a memorandum interview of Victoria 
immediately upon hearing of this serious allegation of sexual assault. PC Jones 
disagreed that this step was appropriate, but I am certain that it was fundamental 
in establishing what was really going on in Victoria’s life.
Deficiencies in supervision
14.95   I heard a large volume of evidence about the supervision, or lack of it, provided 
to PC Jones during the course of her involvement with Victoria. I was left with 
a remarkably similar impression to that of Brent CPT, with blurred lines of 
accountability and managers with little idea as to what their front-line staff 
were doing.
14.96   The importance of this issue cannot be overstated. Although I have been critical 
of PC Jones, I believe she was let down completely by her managers. The system 
of supervision by managers at Haringey CPT was totally ineffective. I address 
these comments not only in respect of her immediate managers, but also of more 
senior managers, including DCI Wheeler, Detective Superintendent Susan Akers 
and Detective Chief Superintendent David Cox. These three senior police officers 
presided over child protection teams in the north west crime OCU, which lacked 
proper management systems and where overworked front-line staff were left to 
muddle through as best they could, sometimes making grave mistakes which were 
never identified and corrected.
14.97   I feel strongly that, incompetent though they were, both PC Jones (Haringey) 
and PC Dewar (Brent), have borne the brunt of criticism both in the media and 
during this Inquiry, much of which should rightfully have been attributed to their 
line managers. These individual constables would not have been able to make 
such elementary mistakes if they had been properly supervised and guided by 
senior officers.
Supervision in Haringey
14.98   I have dealt specifically with the supervision provided in Brent CPT in section 13. 
I turn now to the situation in Haringey, as revealed by the evidence put before me.
14.99   According to the statement she submitted to the Inquiry, PC Jones reported directly 
to DI Howard during the period with which I am concerned, calling upon the 
assistance of whichever sergeant happened to be around as and when necessary.
14.100 I believe this to be an unsatisfactory arrangement. In order for managers to be 
held accountable, it is important that there is clarity about line management 
arrangements. It became clear that PC Jones, and presumably her colleagues, 14  Haringey Child Protection Team
325
would just speak to whoever was around out of the inspector and two sergeants in 
the team. Obviously, there will be times when immediate advice is needed and it is 
appropriate to seek it from whoever is most readily available. However, if nobody 
has ‘ownership’ of the supervision of a particular officer or case, important issues 
can be missed and conflicting advice given. In any event, it seems as though there 
was no ‘intrusive supervision’ offered to PC Jones at all. In other words, if PC Jones 
did not ask for advice, she was just left to her own devices.
14.101 Before I deal with each investigation in turn, I want to make the point that, unlike 
their colleagues at Brent CPT (and, indeed, unlike the majority of managers from 
all the other agencies involved with Victoria), the inspector and sergeants from 
Haringey CPT fully accepted that they had badly let down Victoria, her family and 
PC Jones. Their acceptance of their management failures certainly gives me hope 
that at least some officers will genuinely learn from this dreadful case and, faced 
with a similar situation in the future, will take a different course of action. I was 
impressed by the manner in which they gave their evidence and wish to give them 
credit for their honesty and frankness before me.
Supervision of first investigation
14.102 On 28 July 1999, Sgt Cooper-Bland received the telephone referral from social 
services to say that Victoria had been admitted to hospital with serious injuries. 
I have already expressed my view that it is important that a supervisor is aware of 
all referrals as they come in and, whether by luck or design, that was the case here.
14.103 However, almost immediately, things started to go wrong. Sgt Cooper-Bland 
explained his decision to send PC Jones to the July strategy meeting in the 
following way: “I decided that as PC Jones was already at the social services office 
on another matter, it would be a sensible use of resources to ask that she attends 
the strategy meeting.”
14.104 I have already indicated that I regard such an approach to be inadequate, and 
expressed my preference for social services and the police jointly to agree on the 
location and timing of strategy meetings. In order for such a system to work, 
there needs to be a relationship of mutual co-operation with social services so that 
strategy meetings are held at times and in places of mutual convenience. It may 
well be that the dominant status afforded by the police to Haringey Social Services 
may have influenced Sgt Cooper-Bland in his decision to send the officer who 
would enable the strategy meeting to go ahead as scheduled.
14.105 I also repeat my firm belief that all strategy meetings or discussions should include 
a manager from the key agencies. In this case, either Sgt Cooper-Bland or one of 
his senior colleagues should have gone with PC Jones to support her, and to ensure 
that operational decisions were made which would enhance the investigation into 
this serious crime.
14.106 In effect, PC Jones ended up allocating Victoria’s case to herself by virtue of the 
fact that she happened to be at the North Tottenham District Office at a time 
convenient for social services. In my view, it is not appropriate for junior officers in 
PC Jones’s position simply to allocate cases to themselves. It must be seen as part 
of the function of supervising officers in a CPT carefully to allocate work to their 
junior officers, and afterwards to assume specific and direct responsibility for the 
supervision of the case. Neither of these key steps were taken in Victoria’s case.
14.107 Having instructed PC Jones to attend the strategy meeting on behalf of the police, 
Sgt Cooper-Bland failed to ask her for an update after the meeting had taken 
place and he had approved PC Jones’s decision to deal with the case herself. In 
my view, this was a critical omission as it clearly indicates that Sgt Cooper-Bland The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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had no intention of playing any further part in the case from this point onwards. 
When it was put to him that his inactivity in this regard pointed “to a total lack of 
supervision in this case”, he candidly replied that it did.
14.108 In fact, Sgt Cooper-Bland had brief involvement with Victoria’s case on two further 
occasions. The first was on 4 August 1999, when he recalled having a conversation 
with PC Jones about a contagious disease and she informed him that she was 
cancelling a home visit. He would not appear to have questioned or challenged 
this decision of PC Jones, and he certainly failed to ask the obvious question of why 
she was prepared to allow Victoria to return to a house that she was not prepared 
to visit herself.
14.109 Second, on 8 August 1999, Sgt Cooper-Bland endorsed the CRIS entry to indicate 
that he was content with the way the investigation was progressing. However, 
in reality he knew nothing about the conduct of the investigation or the fact it 
had effectively ceased several days previously. Far from constituting supervision, 
his involvement on this occasion amounted to no more than the unquestioning 
assumption that all must be well. I agreed entirely with his own assessment of his 
involvement at this stage when he said, “Regrettably my last supervision occurred 
at a stage when Karen Jones was still carrying out inquiries into the case. My 
supervision on that occasion, on 8 August, was not rigorous and I can honestly say 
that I did not look at the crime in sufficient detail to take in all the information.“
14.110 Sgt Bird was also briefly involved in the case on 4 August 1999. Despite the fact 
that he knew nothing whatsoever about the background to the case, PC Jones 
apparently expressed concerns to him, as well, about carrying out the home visit 
as “the child had scabies”. Sgt Bird recalled that he advised her to seek advice 
from the Metropolitan Police occupational health service. Crucially, he said that 
he “fully expected her to carry out the home visit at some stage in the near 
future”. As subsequent events demonstrated, this assumption was incorrect and 
would suggest that he should have specifically directed PC Jones to carry out the 
visit once the appropriate advice had been obtained.
14.111 The next tier of supervision consisted of DI Howard. In his supervision of the 
first investigation carried out by PC Jones, DI Howard looked at the CRIS entries 
on 29 July and 9 August 1999. It should have been obvious to him, certainly 
by 9 August, that this investigation was not being carried out adequately. 
Nonetheless, he endorsed the CRIS entry in such a way as to indicate he was 
content. I do not believe he would have done so if he had taken anything more 
than the most superficial interest in the case. At the very least, he should have 
spoken to PC Jones about the investigation which, as he understood it, was 
still ongoing.
14.112 He admitted frankly that his supervision of PC Jones’s handling of the first referral 
concerning Victoria was inadequate. I agree with his assessment.
14.113 I was told that, after DCI Wheeler conducted his review, a new system of 
supervision was introduced in the team, whereby each sergeant supervises the 
cases of a particular group of officers. When asked if this was an improvement, 
Sgt Bird replied, “It is far better because it focuses your mind on that particular 
officer’s investigations. There were also bi-weekly, or fortnightly meetings 
arranged as well, to sit down with that officer and go through any difficult cases. 
In practice, we tried to go through all cases. The outcome of that was we took a 
lot less investigations on ourselves and that freed us up to do the job that we were 
employed to do, which was supervise.”14  Haringey Child Protection Team
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14.114 I welcome the change and believe its effectiveness illustrates the inadequacy 
of the arrangements in place when Victoria’s case came to be dealt with by 
Haringey CPT.
Supervision of second investigation
14.115 Turning now to the second referral, in November 1999, I see no reason why an 
administrative assistant such as Ms Waldron should not have taken the referral and 
made the initial CRIS entry. However, arrangements should have been in place to 
ensure that any discussion with social services about the timing of the beginning 
of the investigation, or the deploying of a particular officer, was carried out by a 
police manager. The fact that PC Jones had previously dealt with the family was 
no basis for automatically allocating this case to her. Regardless of the merits of 
the decision to do so, the decision itself should have been taken by one of the 
supervising officers following a consideration of all available information.
14.116 It would appear that the first time any supervisor became aware of this 
investigation was 11 November 1999, when Sgt Hodges carried out a routine 
check of CRIS. This was now 10 days after the original allegation by Victoria, and 
five days after the strategy meeting.
14.117 Like his colleagues, Sgt Hodges did nothing but note the CRIS entry, paying no 
attention to the fact that PC Jones was failing to carry out the tasks allocated to 
her at the strategy meeting. When asked how his failure to supervise could be 
explained, he said, “I have to accept responsibility for the actions of my staff. 
What we did not have at the time was this robust intrusive level of supervision, 
because the supervisors were relying on the staff to tell them how to do the job 
and this was a problem for us because we did not have the experience.”
14.118 While I accept that there may have been elements of his role that remained 
unfamiliar to Sgt Hodges at this stage (he had, after all, only been in post for 
13 days), he had been a sergeant for nine years. As such, he should have been 
entirely familiar with the basic principles of good supervision, one of which, in my 
opinion, is the need to satisfy oneself that the basic steps in an investigation have 
been taken.
14.119 At some stage, Sgt Hodges recalled that PC Jones expressed concerns about the 
delay in getting the letter translated into French, and he provided the bland advice 
that she should “chase up the transcription service”. Perhaps if he had inquired 
more closely, he would have found that the consequence of the letter not being 
translated was that several weeks had now passed without the victim of possible 
sexual abuse having been spoken to by the police.
14.120 The final chance for a supervising officer at Haringey CPT to make a difference to 
Victoria’s life was on 5 February 2000, when Sgt Hodges looked at the CRIS entry 
again. In evidence, he described what happened by saying, “On that occasion I 
left a message on the CRIS machine for Karen [PC Jones] to update on the result of 
the meeting that she was meant to have had with Kouao on 31 January. So I was 
not being robust, but I was asking what was happening, I was trying to progress 
this investigation. Karen has then replied to that memo two days later. I have not 
looked at the CRIS report after that. Unfortunately the CRIS report was closed 
by an officer outside of our department and I had no idea at that time that that 
investigation had actually been ended.” I need not labour the obvious failure of 
supervision revealed by this explanation.
14.121 Sgt Hodges accepted that he failed to supervise PC Jones’s handling of the sexual 
abuse allegation, but sought to justify this by a lack of training and experience. 
When asked, “Do you accept that you failed to adequately supervise Police The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Constable Jones in the criminal investigation of the sexual abuse allegation?” 
he replied, “I accept it. I did not have the experience or the training necessary at 
that time to fully supervise Karen Jones. She was a very experienced child protection 
team officer, and in many respects I was learning from her. What I did offer was 
some form of guidance and supervision within my limited capacity at that time.”
14.122 As I have already indicated, my view is that little in the way of specialist knowledge 
of child protection work, or the particular working practices of Haringey CPT, 
would have been necessary for Sgt Hodges to realise that basic steps in the 
investigation of this serious allegation had yet to be taken.
14.123 DI Howard was also ineffectual in any supervision of this sexual abuse allegation, 
and provided no safeguard for the inadequacies of his sergeant. Despite examining 
CRIS four times, on 29 November 1999, 29 December 1999, 8 January 2000 and 
26 January 2000, he did nothing which actually caused PC Jones to carry out the 
tasks allocated to her. He accepted the proposition, put to him by Counsel to the 
Inquiry, that these examinations of the CRIS entry should have prompted him to 
tell PC Jones to “get the investigation moving”.
14.124 In addition to the review by DCI Wheeler to which I have already referred, there 
was another review into Haringey CPT carried out after Victoria’s death called 
Operation Blue Martin. When dealing with the supervisory standards at Haringey 
CPT, the report was scathing. It said, “Put very bluntly, all three sergeants gave no 
active supervision to the investigating officer.” I entirely agree with this judgement 
and note that these were not newly-promoted officers – each of them had several 
years’ supervisory experience to fall back on. Therefore, I do not excuse them in 
any way for failing in their basic duty to ensure the crimes committed against 
Victoria were properly, and professionally, investigated.
Internal police reviews of Haringey CPT
14.125 When Victoria died, the MPS was clearly concerned about the working practices 
at Haringey CPT, and as a consequence instigated a series of reviews by senior 
police officers.
14.126 Before I say anything about these reviews, I was surprised that the MPS seemed 
to overlook the fact that Brent CPT had also failed Victoria by conducting an 
incompetent investigation earlier, in July 1999. There was never any formal review 
of Brent practice, and even the internal management review, carried out for the 
ACPC Part 8 process, was written by the line manager, DI Michael Anderson. 
Not surprisingly, it contained no criticism of the police. As I am sure has become 
clear in this Report, I consider the practice in Brent to have also fallen well below 
acceptable standards, and the MPS should have recognised this at an early stage.
14.127 On 29 February 2000, DCI Graham Sterry from the Westminster CPT was instructed 
to review the two criminal investigations carried out by Haringey. His report was 
named Operation Blue Martin. DCI Sterry reported that he and his team were 
hampered by the possibility of disciplinary proceedings because it meant they felt 
unable to speak to PC Jones directly. I have already made the point that this review 
was highly critical of the managers, but it also concluded that the CRIS entries 
showed investigations were incomplete in many areas and caused serious concern. 
They wrote that the “clear disclosure of sexual abuse had not been investigated by 
police”, and also “a thorough investigation into the allegations of physical abuse 
was clearly not made by PC Jones, nor is any effective supervision noted”.14  Haringey Child Protection Team
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14.128 At the same time as Operation Blue Martin was being completed, Commander 
Brown, the new Commander (Crime) for the area, commissioned another review 
to be carried out in Haringey, and this was led by DCI Wheeler. His report was 
dated 8 March 2000. I am astonished that DCI Wheeler was asked to carry out this 
task. He had been DI Howard’s line manager during the relevant period and could 
hardly be expected to provide an entirely independent and objective assessment in 
view of his responsibility for the work of the team.
14.129 Both reviewers found an office lacking in administration systems and management 
organisation, with poor supervision of cases by the inspectors and sergeants. 
They both highlighted difficulties with Haringey Social Services, in particular their 
attitude towards the police and their working practices. What was clearly missing 
from DCI Wheeler’s report, however, was any comment about his own role, or any 
critical evaluation of the performance of the higher management within the OCU.
14.130 Finally, on 30 March 2000, DCI Wheeler completed a follow-up report to his 
review. He wrote that he was “somewhat dismayed” to find that some of the 
remedial action he had requested had not been carried out. He also spoke about 
a relaxed approach in the office to working hours and continuing problems with 
supervision.
14.131 I should state that all of the officers from Haringey CPT who were invited to 
comment on the issue vehemently denied that they took anything other than 
a responsible approach towards their working hours. In light of their frankness 
when dealing with other criticisms of them, I have some doubt as to whether 
DCI Wheeler’s comments on this issue are justified. However, many of the 
problems revealed to me during the course of the evidence were echoed in the 
reviews of the team conducted in 2000.
14.132 It is a pity that a thorough and competent review of the working practices of 
Haringey CPT was not conducted soon enough to has helped Victoria. Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has an important role in identifying 
whether police forces are efficient and effective, but its inspectors should also 
identify any particular elements of an individual force which are failing. There was 
no evidence that HMIC had identified, during its regular inspections of the MPS, 
the poor state of the CPTs as they were identified by the internal inspections I have 
just described. Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
The Home Office, through Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, must 
take a more active role in maintaining high standards of child protection 
investigation by means of its regular Basic Commands Unit and force 
inspections. In addition, a follow-up to the Child Protection thematic inspection 
of 1999 should be conducted.33015 Child  protection policing in north west London
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15   Child protection policing 
in north west London
15.1     The starting point for my consideration of police involvement in Victoria’s case is 
the firm belief that children should enjoy the same protection from the law, and 
the same level of service from the police, as adults. ‘Child protection policing’ is 
no more or less than the investigation of crime. To treat it otherwise or to remove 
it from mainstream policing in either philosophy or operational practice is to do 
a grave disservice to the victims of such crime.
15.2     Therefore, I was very concerned to hear from a large number of officers who gave 
evidence before me, that child protection teams (CPTs) within the Metropolitan 
Police Service (MPS) were considered to be somehow ‘different’ from other police 
units. In particular, several officers told me that CPTs were the ‘poor cousins’ or 
‘Cinderellas’ of the force.
15.3     Having listened to a large volume of evidence on this issue, I conclude that the 
impression gained by these officers as to the priority given to CPTs by the MPS 
at the time Victoria was alive in this country is accurate. I am firmly of the view 
that child protection policing in north west London during the second half of 
1999 was given neither the attention nor the resources it needed and deserved.
15.4     All of the senior officers who gave evidence to the Inquiry were quick to accept 
that the work of CPTs is both vitally important and extremely challenging, 
involving the investigation of some of the most serious crimes. However, I have 
formed the view that at the time with which this Inquiry is concerned, there was 
an obvious difference between the priority and attention that these officers said the 
CPTs should have received, and that which they received, in reality.
15.5     This difference, it seemed to me, was most clearly revealed by the evidence 
concerning the following four aspects of child protection policing in north west 
London during the second half of 1999:
• training available to child protection officers
• number of qualified detectives working on child protection teams
• quantity and standard of equipment provided for the teams
• standard of accommodation provided for the teams.
I deal with each in turn.
Training
15.6     Every new recruit who joins the police takes a 15-week initial course followed by 
a series of two-week training modules during their two-year probationary period. 
A great deal of this training relates to the investigation of crime. On successful 
completion of their probation, all constables are expected to be able to deal with 
the investigation of crimes such as theft, assaults and actual bodily harm.
15.7     Those who wish to can apply to join the CID. As part of the selection process, they 
undertake a six-week CID foundation course. This is an advanced course for crime 
investigators, designed to improve an officer’s skills in dealing with crimes such 
as serious assaults and sexual offences, as well as increasing his or her awareness The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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of forensic science techniques, covert surveillance methods and the issues 
associated with the disclosure of unused material. I believe that some investigations 
undertaken by CPTs are so serious and complex that it is essential they are handled 
by officers who have had the benefit of advanced investigative training of this kind. 
I return to consider this issue in detail at paragraph 15.9.
15.8     However, all police officers should, as a result of their initial training, be aware of 
the basic principles of effective investigation. It may be unfortunate that neither 
of the two constables who dealt with Victoria were trained detectives. However, 
I do not think the almost total lack of effective investigation into any of the three 
referrals about her can be directly attributed to the fact that neither of them 
attended the CID foundation course.
Criminal investigation training
15.9     The obvious failures in the police’s handling of Victoria’s case are recorded in 
detail in the preceding sections. As Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) William 
Griffiths memorably said, “In the A to Z of an investigation, that investigation did 
not get to B.” I was also in agreement with Commander Michael Craik when he 
told the Inquiry “... all officers investigate. Probably any officer with more than two 
years’ service, who has been properly assessed as being competent and has the 
relevant investigative skills, is capable of starting life working in child protection 
teams”. He went on to say, “It is a cop’s job, doing something. Police get called, 
they start an investigation. The first day a probationer walks out, they could be 
called to a house where a child has been abused.”
15.10   Having listened to these experienced officers, I consider that any constable should 
be able to take the initial basic steps at the outset of a criminal investigation. 
As a result, I reject the suggestion made by some of the junior officers involved 
in Victoria’s case that a lack of detective training excused their poor performance. 
PC Rachel Dewar, for example, told me she felt ill-equipped to deal with serious 
child abuse because she had only limited experience of criminal investigation, 
where the most serious level of crime she would deal with would be actual bodily 
harm. In my judgement, even a basic level of inquiry that would routinely be 
expected in a case of actual bodily harm could have been enough to discover that 
Victoria was being abused by her carers.
15.11   However, the MPS should take little comfort from the fact that it provided just 
enough training for these officers to do the basics. In my view, the organisation 
should have made sure that there were enough officers on CPTs, particularly those 
in a supervisory role, who were trained detectives. It seems to me to be self-evident 
that a child victim of a serious assault is entitled to expect at least the same level of 
expertise as an adult victim with similar injuries. If adults can expect to have serious 
assaults against them investigated by trained detectives, so should children in a 
similar situation.
15.12   During the relevant period, there were hardly any officers working in either Brent 
CPT or Haringey CPT who had attended the CID foundation course. Certainly none 
of the officers who worked on, or directly supervised, Victoria’s case had done so. 
Detective Inspector (DI) Michael Anderson was the only manager within either of 
the CPTs who could properly be regarded as a ‘career detective’.
15.13   The explanation for this situation doesn’t seem to lie in the failure of local 
managers to ensure that their staff were appropriately trained. I was told that 
it is not possible for local managers to instigate CID foundation training. In any 
event, it would appear that at the time with which I am concerned, such training 
did not exist. Detective Superintendent (D Supt) Gary Copson told me, “There 
was no detective training course, there was no junior initial CID course for the 15  Child protection policing in north west London
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Metropolitan Police for nearly four years [prior to Victoria’s death] to the best of 
my recollection. There was not any.” Even if local managers had wanted to put 
their CPT staff on a CID foundation course in the years leading up to Victoria’s 
death, they would have been unable to do so.
Child protection training
15.14   In addition to generic investigative training, CPT officers should have additional 
training to deal with the particular requirements of child protection investigation. 
Sergeant (Sgt) David Smith told me that such training was “vital” to the effective 
exercise of a CPT officer’s duties. With regard to such training, the position within 
the MPS during the relevant period was haphazard to say the least. Despite having 
taken a large volume of evidence on the matter, it remains unclear exactly what 
training was available. Some officers recalled having attended courses ranging from 
three days to two weeks, but according to DI Anderson, child protection training 
had been stopped completely by the MPS training department in 1996. If this 
is right (and DI Anderson appeared confident in his recollection), the inevitable 
result was that, by 1999, many officers employed in CPTs had received neither CID 
training nor any form of child protection training.
15.15   The alternative arrangements, described by DI Anderson as “learning on the job”, 
were, in my view, manifestly inadequate. I have formed the view that the officers in the 
CPTs of north west London at the time Victoria was alive in the area were insufficiently 
trained to equip them for the difficult job they were required to perform.
15.16   In an effort to ensure that similar deficiencies are avoided in other areas of the 
country, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
The Home Office, through Centrex and the Association of Chief Police Officers, 
must devise and implement a national training curriculum for child protection 
officers as recommended in 1999 by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
in its thematic inspection report, Child Protection.
Staff levels
15.17   It would appear that, following Victoria’s death, some consideration has been 
given by the MPS to the number of detectives working on CPTs. D Supt Copson 
expressed shock at what he found. He said, “I do not think I am easily shocked but 
it certainly shocked me to discover how few there were when I went round looking 
and counting.” These sentiments were echoed by DAC Griffiths, who took over 
the child protection portfolio from Commander David Kendrick in February 1999. 
He told me that reading a survey about the distribution of detectives among the 
CPTs soon after he came into post had been a “shock and revelation” to him.
15.18   However, the problem was shared by other units within the force. I was told that 
many borough CID offices were also operating with few trained detectives during 
this period. Much of the explanation for this state of affairs would seem to lie in 
the combination of an unusually high murder rate in the year in question, and the 
transfer of a large number of detectives to murder teams following the report of 
Sir William Macpherson into the death of Stephen Lawrence. Indeed, Commander 
Carole Howlett, in her statement to the Inquiry, went as far as to say, “Anecdotal 
information would suggest that following the Macpherson Inquiry into the death of 
Stephen Lawrence, child protection teams were plundered in order to increase the 
numbers of personnel on murder investigation teams.”The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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After Victoria’s death
15.19   I do not wish to underestimate the scale of the challenges faced by the force 
in the period with which I am concerned. Nonetheless, the speed and apparent 
effectiveness of the measures it took to improve child protection policing in 
London following Victoria’s death suggests to me that more could and should 
have been done at the time.
15.20   I was told that the MPS tried very hard after Victoria’s death to improve the 
practices and composition of CPTs in the capital. Energetic new managers, such 
as Commander Howlett and Detective Chief Superintendent (DCS) Derrick Kelleher, 
were given the task of making sweeping changes. As a result, a new department 
called SO5 (the Child Protection Command Unit) was created, bringing all the 
CPTs in London under centralised control.
15.21   Much work has also been done to improve the status of child protection work 
within the force. A number of officers, including D Supt Copson, told me that there 
was a significant amount of “macho nonsense” in the force concerning the work 
of CPTs, which were sometimes referred to in a derogatory way such as “cardigan 
squads”. One of the consequences of this low status was that the best detectives 
would be put off from applying to join these teams.
15.22   Among the initiatives that have been taken to address this problem is the 
designation of all CPT officers as “branch detectives”. I cannot accept the utility 
of what is basically a cosmetic gesture that fails to address (and may even mask) 
the lack of real detectives on the teams, but I do welcome the sentiment behind 
it. Strong efforts must be made throughout the police force to raise the profile 
and status of child protection work to a level that its importance deserves, 
thereby encouraging high-calibre officers to apply.
15.23   It may, of course, prove to be the case that even after such efforts have been 
made, the number of detectives who voluntarily apply for postings on CPTs is 
insufficient. In those circumstances, I have considerable sympathy with the view 
of Commander Craik. He told me that in such circumstances, a degree of coercion 
might be required: “Sorry, you work for the police. We like to have committed 
volunteers, but if the need was great I would put people in there.”
15.24   It is easy to state that there should be some detectives on CPTs, but it is harder to 
say how many. My view is similar to that shared by DAC Griffiths and Commander 
Kendrick. They said that a one-to-one ratio of “uniform background” officers 
against detectives was the aspirational target, but that at least one detective to 
every two “uniform background” officers was a realistic minimum. Drawing on the 
considerable experience of these officers, and in light of the evidence in Victoria’s 
case, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Chief constables must ensure that officers working on child protection teams 
are sufficiently well trained in criminal investigation, and that there is always a 
substantial core of fully trained detective officers on each team to deal with the 
most serious inquiries.
15.25   In addition to containing a suitable number of detectives, it is also important to 
ensure that CPTs are led by officers of sufficient rank and experience. In this regard, 
Commander Kendrick told me that, in his view, CPTs ought to be headed-up by 
detective inspectors. However, he acknowledged that during the period with which 15  Child protection policing in north west London
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I am concerned, this was not the case in nine out of 28 London CPTs – a situation 
he considered “unacceptable”.
15.26   This is indicative, in my view, of the general state of CPTs in London in 1999, and it shows 
the priority they were accorded by the MPS as a whole. It would seem that the force 
was content to allow these teams to perform the vital work of protecting children with, 
in many cases, insufficient numbers of detectives and inadequately qualified managers.
Equipment
15.27   The Inquiry heard from several witnesses that the CPTs were lacking equipment 
essential to the proper conduct of their functions. Police vehicles were scarce, 
computer equipment was outdated and inadequate, and offices were poorly 
decorated and equipped.
15.28   As to the significance of these deficiencies, I have considerable sympathy with the 
views of DAC Griffiths who told me, “I do not believe that the lack of provision of 
resources such as IT, vehicles and so on are actually a reason for not doing your 
job. Clearly it is desirable for everyone to have the tools they need to do their 
job but these were not tools that would prevent an officer performing simple, 
straightforward tasks that are to do with the core role of policing. So whilst I 
accept the desirability, I do not accept that it is a reason for failing in your duty.”
15.29   However, while inadequate facilities may in themselves have had little direct impact on 
the manner in which Victoria’s case was handled, the less tangible effects may have been 
considerable. I have already expressed the opinion that the CPTs in London were given 
unacceptably low priority by the MPS as a whole. In addition, the status of the work 
was low and there was little incentive for high-calibre officers to apply for postings 
on the teams. The feeling that one’s work is not valued or considered important can 
have a corrosive effect. It damages morale and leads to poor performance. In light of 
this, and in view of my conclusion that the MPS failed to provide CPTs with adequate 
equipment of a standard enjoyed by many other branches of the force, I turn briefly 
to consider the particular deficiencies which were brought to my attention.
Vehicles
15.30   When SO5 was formed in early 2000, the new management team discovered that 
the 31 CPT sites had only seven police vehicles between them. When one considers 
that there were approximately 10 staff working from each site, it is clear that this 
level of provision was inadequate.
15.31   The undesirable consequence of this state of affairs was that officers were obliged, where 
possible, to use their own cars for police business. In my view, it is wholly inappropriate 
for officers to be expected to transport detained suspects, or child victims being 
taken for an interview, in their own private vehicles. Quite apart from the potential 
insurance difficulties and a lack of necessary equipment (such as child seats), it simply 
reinforces the impression of a somewhat amateurish and low-priority operation.
15.32   I was very pleased to hear that there are now five times as many vehicles allocated 
to the CPTs in London as there were in 2000.
Information Technology
15.33   The computer applications used by the MPS at the material time were:
• CRIS – a crime recording system
• OTIS – an office management system
• CRIMINT – a criminal intelligence system.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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The evidence I heard indicated that the CPTs were limited in the access they had 
to all three.
15.34   The problem appears to have been particularly acute with regard to OTIS. 
Witnesses from all levels of the organisation stated that there were few OTIS 
terminals readily available to CPT officers. DI Anderson, for example, told me, 
“What we did not have, unfortunately, was OTIS. You have heard about OTIS, 
effectively an important telecommunications system within the Metropolitan Police, 
something which I had asked for personally from the borough we were working for 
and been refused it, and something which repeated requests I think from all the 
CPT DIs have been made for, and we were simply assured that yes, we would get 
it, but the timescale kept getting put back and back.”
15.35   A similar picture was painted by Sgt Smith, who said, “I felt very much that we 
were the poor relations in regard to information technology. A system called OTIS 
has been mentioned. The OTIS system enables communication throughout London 
by computers such as email, it allows police notices and orders to be accessible to 
every police officer in London at the touch of a button. OTIS was introduced in 
the Metropolitan Police. I know that DI Anderson continued to try to get us access 
to this, and the information that was fed back to us was that there was a rolling 
programme and we were at the back end of this rolling programme.”
15.36   Even where a particular application was available for use by a CPT, there was no 
guarantee that it was operationally effective. Sgt Alan Hodges told the Inquiry, 
“When I arrived at Haringey Child Protection Team they had two computers that 
were stand-alone systems, very old, liable to break down on a regular basis. The 
only other system we had was the CRIS system, which was causing us problems 
at that time, technical problems. We also had access to OTIS but we had one 
machine in the police station, it was one floor above us, it was not our machine. 
Again we had link problems with the main server, which virtually made it unusable 
for our staff.”
15.37   When asked about the CRIMINT system, he said, “The problem we had with 
CRIMINT, it was available to us on that one OTIS machine but it would take 20, 30 
minutes to be able to access the system, which was not good enough. We could 
not spend 20, 30 minutes waiting by a computer waiting for it to warm up.”
15.38   PC Karen Jones’s experience of using Haringey’s CRIS machines was similar. When 
asked if they were user-friendly, she replied, “No, they would break down. The first 
one we had was just old, an old machine. The station has stopped using that type 
of machine. The new one that we got was the newer type that stations were using, 
but they would still break down, they would often freeze, just lock. You might get 
the screen and you could not get rid of the screen whatever button you pressed.”
15.39   The deficiencies in the IT facilities with which they were provided by the MPS led 
some CPTs to develop their own individual methods of recording referrals. The 
most obvious disadvantage of this practice was that it meant that individual CPTs 
were operating virtually in isolation, unable to share information electronically with 
their counterparts in other boroughs. Apart from reinforcing the impression of 
amateurishness surrounding the work of the CPTs, the practical impact of this state 
of affairs is well illustrated by Victoria’s case. None of the officers in Haringey CPT 
ever became aware, before her death, that Victoria had been the subject of police 
protection in Brent a mere two weeks before she first came to their attention.
15.40   I was told by Commander Howlett and DCS Kelleher that the MPS is planning 
to purchase and install systems called PROTECT and MERLIN, which will vastly 
improve the IT capabilities of the CPTs. I hope that this proves to be the case and 15  Child protection policing in north west London
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that whatever the other advantages of these systems may be, they will facilitate the 
effective exchange of information between the capital’s CPTs. Therefore, I make 
the following recommendation:
Recommendation
The Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) should evaluate the 
child protection IT systems currently available, and make recommendations 
to chief constables, who must ensure their police force has in use an effective 
child-protection database and IT management system.
Accommodation
15.41   The impression I gained of CPTs being neglected by the MPS in the years 
leading up to Victoria’s death was reinforced by the evidence I heard about 
the accommodation with which they were provided. For example, some teams 
were based in premises other than police stations. Commander Kendrick said 
that remoteness from the principal arena of police activity is seen by some as a 
problem, because it makes CPTs feel “semi-detached”. I agree. I have already 
expressed the view that child protection policing, and the principles that underpin 
it, should not be viewed as somehow distinct from other forms of policing. It will 
inevitably prove more difficult to promote this view if the teams are physically 
separated from the rest of the force.
15.42   However, the simple fact of location within a police station does not appear to 
be a guarantee of adequate accommodation. Both Brent and Haringey CPTs were 
located in police-owned buildings and I heard considerable evidence concerning 
cramped conditions, poor heating systems and difficult access.
15.43   I will not labour the issue because, as I have indicated already, I see no direct 
correlation between the mishandling of Victoria’s case and the accommodation 
in which the two CPTs concerned were housed. I will simply note that the poor 
state of the accommodation provided to many CPTs in London adds weight to my 
conclusion that they had been seriously neglected for some time. No doubt it also 
added to the feelings of isolation and poor status apparently experienced by many 
officers working in those teams.
15.44   Overall, the impression I gained from the evidence about the equipping and 
resourcing of CPTs in London during the period with which I am concerned, 
is entirely consistent with the findings of the report by DCS Kelleher who, in 
September 2000, was commissioned to explore what would be needed to bring 
the CPTs up to a suitable standard. Among his conclusions were the following: 
“Child protection teams have become the Cinderella of the Metropolitan Police 
Service ... they have been under-resourced”; and “Child protection teams have 
suffered ten years of neglect.”
15.45   Having heard evidence relating only to CPTs in London, I am unable to comment on 
the extent to which the problems I have identified above are replicated across the 
country. In order to ensure that they are not, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
Chief constables must ensure that child protection teams are fully integrated 
into the structure of their forces and not disadvantaged in terms of 
accommodation, equipment or resources.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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15.46   I heard evidence that suggested that part of the explanation for the long-term 
neglect of child protection teams, at least in London, may be due to the lack of 
prominence given to such policing by central government. It is a branch of policing, 
I was told, which very rarely finds its way onto the list of ministerial priorities. While 
this should not serve as an excuse for any failure to provide an adequate service to 
child victims of crime, it would be naïve to underestimate the impact of a strong 
lead from central government on this issue. With a view to prompting such a lead 
being given and responded to, I make the following recommendations:
Recommendation
The Home Office must ensure that child protection policing is included in the 
list of ministerial priorities for the police.
Recommendation
Chief constables and police authorities must give child protection investigations 
a high priority in their policing plans, thereby ensuring consistently high 
standards of service by well-resourced, well-managed and well-motivated teams.
Accountability
15.47   One of the principal problems I met in seeking to determine who was ultimately 
accountable for the state of the CPTs in north west London in 1999, was the 
conflicting evidence of senior officers as to whose job it was to ensure that the 
teams were adequately staffed and equipped. There would seem to be two 
potential candidates: the commander of the crime Operational Command Unit 
(OCU) in whose area the CPT was located, and the ‘strategic portfolio holder’ with 
responsibility for maintaining an overview of CPTs across London.
Commander Kendrick
15.48   The portfolio holder up to February 1999 was Commander Kendrick. His evidence 
did little to convince me that he had much direct knowledge or understanding 
of the manner in which CPTs were operating during the period he was in 
post. In 1998, some three years after he assumed responsibility for the CPT, 
he commissioned an inspection of CPTs across London as a whole. The results 
echoed many of the findings that I have recorded above: teams were understaffed 
with poorly trained officers and lacked basic equipment. Prior to this inspection, 
however, Commander Kendrick told me that he thought that the MPS was 
providing the CPTs with adequate resources and appropriately trained and 
qualified staff.
15.49   In my view, Commander Kendrick could not have held this view throughout 
the three years or so prior to the inspection unless he was anything other than 
seriously out of touch with the condition of CPTs on the ground. The situation 
in which they found themselves at the time Victoria’s case came to be dealt with 
was not one which, in my view, could have arisen overnight, and I suspect that 
the conclusion of DCS Kelleher in his September 2000 report that the CPTs had 
suffered “ten years of neglect” is sound.
15.50   On the assumption that the deficiencies revealed by his 1998 inspection had been 
present for some time, Commander Kendrick was asked why there had been no 
mechanisms in place to bring them to his attention. He replied that mechanisms 
should have existed within the relevant crime OCUs for identifying and addressing 15  Child protection policing in north west London
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such matters. He told me that he was not seeking to “pass the blame” for the 
neglect of CPTs to area commanders, but did invite me to conclude that such 
commanders should be seen as having a degree of “operational responsibility” 
for the state of the CPTs in their OCU.
Commander Campbell
15.51   For five years leading up to March 1999, the commander (crime) for the OCU 
which included both Brent and Haringey CPTs was Malcolm Campbell. It was plain 
from his evidence that he regarded the adequate resourcing and training of CPT 
officers as the responsibility of Commander Kendrick as the portfolio holder. He 
told me, “David Kendrick already had meetings, I am not sure of the frequency 
of these, with the DIs from child protection teams. He was their champion, as 
it were, to improve their lot, to gain them better resources.” When asked if he 
accepted that he had failed to take sufficient steps to address issues of training 
and resourcing within the CPTs, he replied, “No, I brought them to the notice 
of Commander David Kendrick.”
15.52   The problem is clear. The two officers who ought to be taking responsibility for 
ensuring that the CPTs were properly staffed and equipped had inconsistent views 
as to their respective responsibilities in this regard. Put simply, each thought that 
the other was doing more than was in fact the case. The inevitable consequence 
was that not enough was done by either.
15.53   My view is that Commander Campbell, as the commander (crime) for the OCU in 
which Brent and Haringey CPTs were situated, was responsible for the performance 
of those teams. As such he should have made sure that he was properly informed 
about the condition of the teams and the quality of their work. I find that he 
did not do this, and that he demonstrated precious little understanding of the 
state of the CPTs in his area or the problems that they faced. This, in my view, 
amounts to a fundamental gap in the knowledge and awareness of a senior officer 
in Commander Campbell’s position. The work of CPTs is of central importance to 
all police forces. It is vital that senior officers have an understanding of that work 
and an appreciation of the challenges faced by the teams. In order to increase that 
understanding, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
The Home Office, through Centrex, must add specific training relating to 
child protection policing to the syllabus for the strategic command course. 
This will ensure that all future chief officers in the police service have adequate 
knowledge and understanding of the role of child protection teams.
Commander Craik
15.54   Commander Campbell was succeeded in April 1999 by Commander Michael Craik, 
who held the post of commander (crime) throughout the period that Victoria was 
alive in Brent and Haringey. The timing of his appointment was such that, even if 
he had wished to make radical changes to the CPTs, he could have achieved little 
in time to help Victoria. However, it is fair to say that, whatever the explanation, 
Commander Craik’s level of awareness about the state of the CPTs under his 
operational command at the time Victoria’s case was being dealt with, was little 
different to that of his predecessor.
15.55   Commander Craik accepted from the outset of his evidence to the Inquiry, that 
he was responsible for the operational performance of the CPTs in the north 
west London area during his time in post. When asked by Counsel for the MPS The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
340
to what extent he personally accepted responsibility for police failures that may 
have contributed to Victoria’s death, Commander Craik candidly replied, “My 
officers let Victoria and her parents down. I was responsible for those officers. I was 
the commander. By anybody’s definition – you can go through job descriptions 
as much as you like – I was the boss in the organisation. If they let the family 
down and Victoria down, I let them down, and I would like to apologise to them 
for that.” This was refreshing to hear. I was impressed by Commander Craik’s 
evidence, and the manner in which he gave it.
15.56   I will say one more thing about Commander Craik, which applies equally to 
DCS David Cox. Following Victoria’s death, it was essential that her killers were 
identified and successfully prosecuted. The crime OCU managed by these two 
senior officers, which let Victoria down so badly when she was alive, appears to 
have carried out a highly professional and detailed murder investigation, which 
resulted in the conviction of both Kouao and Manning. It is right to give the MPS, 
and the North West Crime OCU, credit for that successful investigation.
15.57   I recognise the difficulty faced by senior officers in the MPS in maintaining an 
accurate picture of the standards of work carried out by individual police units 
operating across the capital. I was reminded during the course of the Inquiry that 
the MPS is an organisation with 40,000 employees operating from more than 
100 sites. One of the principal challenges posed by the management of large 
organisations such as this, is to be able to retain a feel for life on the ‘shop floor’. 
I do not underestimate the scale of that challenge.
15.58   In order to be able to meet it, it seems to me that senior officers need regular and 
reliable intelligence from their junior staff. In view of this, I turn now to consider 
the level of awareness of the condition of the CPTs demonstrated by officers further 
down the chain of command who gave evidence to the Inquiry.
DCS David Cox
15.59   I start with DCS Cox, who took considerable trouble in both his written and oral 
evidence to ensure that I was aware of the context in which he and his officers 
were working in north west London in 1999. Of particular relevance, I was told, 
was the unusually high murder rate. Put briefly, his area of London had the 
misfortune to be the scene of 92 murders during the course of that year. This, 
apparently, is equivalent to the total number of murders dealt with in a typical 
year by the whole of Greater Manchester Police plus West Midlands Police plus 
any other county’s police force.
15.60   The fact that there were a large number of murders occurring in north west London 
in 1999 cannot explain or excuse the individual failings of the officers who had direct 
contact with Victoria’s case. However, it may help in understanding why more senior 
officers in the OCU failed to give the CPTs the attention they deserved. Whatever 
the explanation, it was clear from his evidence that DCS Cox was not aware of 
the true state of the CPTs for which he was responsible. Much of his evidence is 
summarised well by the following answer: “I realised, certainly, the situation on the 
murder teams was out of control. I do not think I realised the situation on the CPTs 
was as desperate as it was. I thought they were in better shape.”
15.61   Regardless of the murder rate, the CPTs were a critical part of the OCU for which 
DCS Cox was responsible. Therefore, it was essential that he took the necessary 
steps to find out whether they were operating in a satisfactory manner. It is plain 
to me that he either had no mechanisms in place for keeping abreast of the state 
of his CPTs, or that those mechanisms were inadequate. My overall impression is 
that DCS Cox, like many of his senior colleagues, actually paid little regard to the 
CPTs under his command in 1999 because he did not see them as a high priority.15  Child protection policing in north west London
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D Supt Susan Akers
 15.62 It is possible that DCS Cox drew some comfort from the fact that his deputy, 
D Supt Akers, was herself a former child protection detective inspector, and 
appeared to take a keen interest in that side of the work. Of the three detective 
superintendents working in the crime OCU, she was the one who, for most of the 
relevant period, had specific responsibility for managing the CPTs. DCS Cox plainly 
thought that D Supt Akers was keeping a close eye on the teams. He told me, 
“Child protection was always a topic which Sue had on her lips, so I felt that she 
was doing that, and she had a good grasp.”
15.63   D Supt Akers’s view was somewhat different. She said that although she had 
nominal responsibility for the CPTs, the huge bulk of her work was with the murder 
squads. Once again, there appears to have been some confusion between senior 
officers as to the extent to which their colleagues were monitoring and taking 
responsibility for the work and condition of the CPTs. In my view, this further 
supports the conclusion that CPTs in the period with which I am concerned had 
slipped a very long way down the MPS’s agenda.
DCI Philip Wheeler
15.64   I deal finally with DCI Wheeler, the most senior officer in the crime OCU who was 
not heavily engaged in murder inquiries in 1999. As I have stated above, it is vital 
that senior managers in large organisations of any sort receive accurate intelligence 
from their subordinates as to the state of affairs on the ‘shop floor’. Within the 
context of the CPTs, someone had to have the job of ‘drilling down’ into the 
individual teams to ensure that they were carrying out proper investigations and 
were adequately equipped for the task.
15.65   All the senior officers to whom this question was addressed were clear in their 
recollection that the person whose job it was to fulfil this function was DCI 
Wheeler. Unfortunately, DCI Wheeler did not agree. He told me that he was in no 
way responsible for the operational management of the CPTs and that his function 
was an administrative one only. Specifically, when asked if DCS Cox had expressly 
told him that this was to be the extent of his role, he replied, “He did indeed. 
I went and spoke to him after one of the reports and he said, ‘Do your best, do 
the best you can’ and it is simply administrative, and that is all.”
15.66   This seems to me to be a critical matter. Either there was a senior officer 
responsible for determining whether the CPTs with which I am concerned were 
doing a good job or there was not. If there was, then he or she will inevitably bear 
some responsibility for the shortcomings evident in Victoria’s case. If not, then one 
is left facing the remarkable conclusion that nobody in the MPS was charged with 
the operational management of the north west London area CPTs.
15.67   Furthermore, the practical result of this confusion would seem to be that nobody 
properly managed the CPTs of Haringey or Brent from within the crime OCU. DCI 
Wheeler said that he never visited those CPT offices during the relevant period 
because he did not see it as his role, and the respective detective inspectors 
confirmed that they hardly ever saw him. This is, frankly, disastrous management 
on the part of the MPS. For example, had a senior officer taken the trouble to visit 
Haringey CPT in the months leading up to Victoria’s death, there is every chance 
that he or she would have discovered the same deficiencies in practice highlighted 
in the two reviews of the team conducted after Victoria’s death. Had they done so, 
then steps could have been taken to remedy the situation in time to have helped 
Victoria. In view of the seriousness of these matters, I deal with this conflict of 
evidence in some detail.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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15.68   Commander Craik was asked what his understanding of DCI Wheeler’s role was in 
terms of the operational supervision of the CPTs. He replied, “I would expect him 
to have the capacity to get down and dip sample at that level, as well as checking 
what the inspector said and checking that the inspector was doing exactly the 
same thing, looking into the work and quality checking. I would expect him [the 
inspector] to be able to do some of that himself and verify it. But I would say 
Mr Wheeler would be the last point in that chain. Mr Wheeler could certainly do 
it for the number of officers under his command.”
15.69   D Supt Akers was equally clear when she was asked if DCI Wheeler had 
responsibility for operational matters or whether his post was purely concerned 
with administrative matters. She answered, “both”. When informed that 
DCI Wheeler’s evidence was that DCS Cox had assured him that his (DCI 
Wheeler’s) role with regard to the CPTs was purely administrative, D Supt Akers 
replied, “I find it incredible to believe that Mr Cox would have said that because 
his view, like my own, was that CPTs needed more than administrative support.” 
When it was put to her that the differences between her and DCI Wheeler on this 
issue were irreconcilable, and that if her evidence is correct it must mean that DCI 
Wheeler is lying about what he was told by DCS Cox, D Supt Akers replied, “Yes, I 
am afraid it does.”
15.70   For completeness, I should record that DCS Cox was adamant in his oral evidence 
that he never told DCI Wheeler that his (DCI Wheeler’s) role was restricted to the 
administrative management of the CPTs and that he fully expected him to take 
operational responsibility as well.
15.71   I have to make a judgement about whether DCI Wheeler knew he was the 
operational line manager of the CPTs, or whether, as he put it, he was simply 
asked to look after their administration. I am satisfied not only that he was the 
operational line manager for the CPT detective inspectors, but also that he knew 
his role was to oversee the work of their teams and ensure they were operating to 
a high standard. He chose not to discharge that function, with the result that the 
CPTs with which I am concerned operated throughout 1999 without the benefit of 
any adequate operational supervision.
15.72   In reaching this conclusion, I have been influenced to some degree by the fact that 
I find it inconceivable that DCS Cox would have said to DCI Wheeler that he was 
just to act as an administrator. Even if that had happened, I would have expected 
DCI Wheeler immediately to point out that the result of such an arrangement 
would be the CPT detective inspectors operating unsupervised – a plainly 
unsatisfactory state of affairs. When this was put to him, DCI Wheeler replied that 
he did not do so because he did not see it as part of his function to bring such 
matters to the attention of his superiors. I reject his evidence in this regard. As a 
senior officer within the crime OCU it would plainly have been his responsibility to 
bring any inherent defects in the management structure to DCS Cox’s attention. 
I find it inconceivable that he would have chosen to keep such matters to himself, 
had he indeed been given the wholly inappropriate role he claims.
15.73   The resolution of this issue has been far from easy but I was assisted to some extent 
by the insight into DCI Wheeler’s working practices provided by D Supt Copson, 
who took over as his line manager in late 1999. He said of DCI Wheeler, “I think he 
was hard-working within his own definition and hard-working according to his own 
priorities, but his priorities were not my priorities, and they are not the priorities 
he should have had. Phil Wheeler was probably the most difficult supervision case 
I have had in 23 years’ service and I tried hard for a long time to find a way of 
reaching him and persuading him that he ought to do things differently, and the 
conclusion I was forced to, was that he did not want to be managed.”15  Child protection policing in north west London
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15.74   The lack of supervision by DCI Wheeler was, in my view, a crucial factor in 
Haringey and Brent CPTs being allowed to deteriorate to the state they were in 
by the time they came to deal with Victoria’s case. In the absence of any indication 
from him to the contrary, it was possible for more senior officers, when they 
thought about the CPTs at all, to think that all was well. The evidence that I have 
heard, together with the findings of the reviews of Haringey CPT carried out after 
Victoria’s death, demonstrates precisely the opposite.
15.75   In my view, DCI Wheeler, given his operational responsibility for the CPTs involved, 
should have been aware that they were struggling to provide an adequate service. 
He should then have brought this information to the attention of more senior 
officers so that the deficiencies in the composition, resourcing and practices of the 
teams could have been addressed. His failure to do so means, in my view, that he 
must assume a great deal of responsibility for the flawed investigations that were 
carried out by those under his command.34416  Working with diversity
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16 Working with diversity
“There is some evidence to suggest that one of the consequences of 
an exclusive focus on ‘culture’ in work with black children and families, 
is [that] it leaves black and ethnic minority children in potentially 
dangerous situations, because the assessment has failed to address a 
child’s fundamental care and protection needs.” 
Ratna Dutt, director, Race Equality Unit
16.1     Victoria was a black child who was murdered by her two black carers. Many of 
the professionals with whom she came into contact during her life in this country 
were also black. Therefore, it is tempting to conclude that racism can have had no 
part to play in her case. But such a conclusion fails to recognise that racism finds 
expression in many ways other than in the direct application of prejudice.
16.2     One of the ways in which race may play a part in a case involving a child is 
highlighted by the observation quoted above. This was made by Ratna Dutt, 
director of the Race Equality Unit, during the course of one of the seminars in 
Phase Two of this Inquiry. I believe it makes an extremely important point. Several 
times during this Inquiry I found myself wondering whether a failure by a particular 
professional to take action to protect Victoria, may have been partly due to that 
professional losing sight of the fact that her needs were the same as those of any 
other seven-year-old girl, from whatever cultural background.
The effect of assumptions
16.3     I do not for one moment suggest that the ill-treatment of Victoria by Kouao and 
Manning was either condoned or deliberately ignored by those responsible for 
Victoria’s case. However, it may be that assumptions made about Victoria and her 
situation diverted caring people from noting and acting upon signs of neglect or 
ill-treatment.
16.4     Examples of such assumptions at work may include the following:
• Lisa Arthuworrey said that when she heard of Victoria “standing to attention” 
before Kouao and Manning she “concluded that this type of relationship was one 
that can be seen in many Afro-Caribbean families because respect and obedience 
are very important features of the Afro-Caribbean family script”. Victoria’s 
parents, however, made it clear that she was not required to stand in this formal 
way when she was at home with them. Therefore it seems Ms Arthurworrey’s 
assumption was unfounded, in Victoria’s case at least.
• Pastor Pascal Orome told me that he attributed Victoria’s potentially concerning 
behaviour to the fact that she had come “freshly” from Africa. This of course 
was not the case – Victoria had been in Europe for almost a year by the time she 
came to his attention.
• On more than one occasion, medical practitioners who noticed marks on 
Victoria’s body considered the possibility that children who have grown up in 
Africa may be expected to have more marks on their bodies than those who have 
been raised in Europe. This assumption, regardless of whether it is valid or not, 
may prevent a full assessment of those marks being made.
16.5     The danger of making assumptions of this kind is clear. Cultural norms and models 
of behaviour can vary considerably between communities and even families. The 
concept of Afro-Caribbean behaviour referred to in Victoria’s case illustrates the The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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problem. The range of cultures and behavioural patterns it includes is so wide that 
it would be meaningless to make generalisations, and potentially damaging to an 
effective assessment of the needs of the child. The wisest course is to be humble 
when considering the extent of one’s own knowledge about different ‘cultures’ and 
to take advice whenever it is available.
16.6     Of course, it is impossible to assess after the event the likelihood of a particular step 
being taken in Victoria’s case if she had been a white child. There were so many 
instances of bad practice in this case that one simply cannot begin to determine 
which of them may have been influenced by some form of prejudice, and which 
were due to incompetence or a lack of attention. However, it may well be that, at 
some point, the focus may have shifted from Victoria’s fundamental needs because 
of misplaced assumptions about her cultural circumstances.
Fear of being accused of racism
16.7     There is another way in which race may have had an impact in Victoria’s case. 
As Counsel to the Inquiry perceptively pointed out in his opening statement to the 
Inquiry, “Race can affect the way people conduct themselves in other ways. Fear 
of being accused of racism can stop people acting when otherwise they would. 
Fear of being thought unsympathetic to someone of the same race can change 
responses.” He urged the Inquiry to keep an open mind on such matters.
16.8     Applying an open mind to the evidence I heard, I detected some hints of the sort 
of difficulties to which Counsel referred. The evidence of Dr Mary Rossiter provides 
one example. She said, “I was aware that as a white person I had to be sensitive 
to the feelings of people of all races and backgrounds, both clinically and with 
professionals. Maybe some social workers felt they knew more about black children 
than I did.”
16.9     Those involved in the protection of children perform vital and difficult work. 
They should never feel inhibited from acting in a child’s interests on the grounds 
that they are felt by others to have an insufficient grasp of the child’s particular 
circumstances.
Child safety comes first
16.10   The basic requirement that children are kept safe is universal and cuts across 
cultural boundaries. Every child living in this country is entitled to be given the 
protection of the law, regardless of his or her background. Cultural heritage 
is important to many people, but it cannot take precedence over standards of 
childcare embodied in law. Every organisation concerned with the welfare and 
protection of children should have mechanisms in place to ensure equal access 
to services of the same quality, and that each child, irrespective of colour or 
background, should be treated as an individual requiring appropriate care.
16.11   There can be no excuse or justification for failing to take adequate steps to protect 
a vulnerable child, simply because that child’s cultural background would make 
the necessary action somehow inappropriate. This is not an area in which there is 
much scope for political correctness. In my view, Dr Nnenna Cookey, a participant 
in the Phase Two seminars and a consultant paediatrician, put the matter very 
eloquently during the course of one of the seminars. She said, “I do take huge 
issue with the emphasis that black families should be assessed by or given the 
opportunity to have a black social worker. For me that detracts from the whole 
process. A child is a child regardless of colour. I think the social and cultural 
differences or backgrounds ... of these families is crucial and should be taken into 
account as part of a general assessment. But I think if we are not careful we’ll lose 
the whole emphasis on the child’s welfare. I think if we are not very careful we 
will send out the very wrong message that non-black social workers do not have 16  Working with diversity
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the capabilities, the standards and everything that goes with it to assess black 
families. That would be a mistake, that will be wrong, and I think it does fly in the 
face of lots of social workers who are Caucasian, or whatever ... who are doing a 
very good job. I say that not because I want to be anti-establishment. I do not do 
political correctness when it comes to children. I really do think that these children 
may be further disadvantaged if we go down that track. I also feel that it means in 
some ways non-black social workers do not feel able to access the information they 
need regarding a child’s cultural background.”
16.12   I agree entirely. A child is a child regardless of his or her colour and he or she must 
be kept safe. Cultural issues must be considered but the objective is the safety of 
the child. The success of Ms Ackah and Avril and Priscilla Cameron in identifying 
the worrying signs that prompted them to seek the intervention of the authorities 
may have had much to do with the fact that they treated Victoria like any other 
little girl.
16.13   This was not an Inquiry into racism. But what cannot be ignored is that we live in 
a culturally diverse society and that safeguards must be in place to ensure that skin 
colour does not influence either the assessment of need or the quality of services 
delivered. That is the challenge to us all.348Part five: Learning from experience17 The  seminars
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17 The seminars
The purpose of the seminars
17.1     The Terms of Reference set for this Inquiry were not restricted to looking back in 
order to understand and evaluate the reasons for the failure of services to protect 
Victoria. The Inquiry was also required to look forward and make recommendations 
on how the safeguards for children might be strengthened in order to prevent a 
tragedy of this kind happening again.
17.2     To meet this challenge, the Inquiry organised a series of seminars, chaired by Neil 
Garnham QC. All the seminars were constructed around the essential elements 
of good childcare practice, and the processes designed to secure the safety and 
well-being of children.
17.3     An important aspect of the seminars was ensuring that the Inquiry’s 
recommendations would not be based solely on a single tragic case, or on the 
performance of services in a part of north London. Therefore, those invited 
to participate were drawn from across the country and from a wide range of 
professional backgrounds. The wide-ranging experience of participants, and their 
commitment to serving children and families, was reflected both in the breadth 
and in the quality of the discussion at each seminar. 
17.4     A list of those who contributed can be found in Annex 5. I take this opportunity 
to thank each one of them, and their employers, for helping the Inquiry. This 
section cannot do justice to the value of their contributions. Many participants also 
went to the trouble of submitting written material, which was greatly appreciated. 
This material and the seminar transcripts can be found on the Inquiry’s website 
(www.victoria-climbie-inquiry.org.uk).
17.5     The first half of this section summarises key elements of the discussion under each 
of the seminar headings. It became apparent that although five topics had been 
selected for discussion, there was a marked degree of overlap between them. The 
level of agreement about how to improve services for children and families was 
striking. In recognition of this, overarching themes for improvement arising from 
the seminars are taken up in the second half of this section, and recommendations 
are made in relation to them.
Seminar one: Discovery and inclusion
17.6     The first seminar looked at how we can ensure that every child and their carer 
receive the full range of services they need and to which they are entitled. Most 
children and their carers come into contact with various agencies that operate 
nationally and locally. These include education, health, housing, social services, the 
police and social security. Discussion in this seminar focused on how to make the 
most of these opportunities to make sure that no child is lost to the system.
17.7     The mobility of England’s population can make keeping track of children more 
difficult. The problem of discovering the existence of children was felt to be 
particularly acute in areas where children who have just arrived in the country 
are settled. These difficulties may be made worse by changes in practice of some 
services; for example, changes in the organisation of the work of health visitors. 
In addition, it was noted that some sectors of society feel excluded from, or are The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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hostile to, any form of intervention by those whom they see as representing 
authority. 
Keeping track
17.8     There is a well-developed system for recording the birth of a child and for 
connecting the child with the health visiting service and other health services. It 
should be noted, however, that organisational changes have affected the work of 
health visitors, who can often act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the community. In the 
past, the health visiting service was based on geographical boundaries, but this is 
no longer the case. Under current arrangements, health visitors are mostly attached 
to GPs and relate to that GP’s patient list, regardless of where the patient lives. 
17.9     Once the child reaches school age, the health visitor will usually transfer his or her 
records to the school nurse. However, a school nurse may not always be available 
and children do not always attend school. Parents are entitled to educate their 
children at home. If a child has never attended school, as opposed to those who 
have been withdrawn once they have started, parents are not legally obliged to 
notify their local education authority of their child’s existence. Families who move 
home are not obliged to inform the authorities of their movements. If parents 
do not do this, or do not then register the child with the authorities at their new 
address, it is particularly difficult to keep track of the child. Records held by the 
local health authority will not necessarily be transferred if the child’s new address is 
not known and, as stated above, parents do not have to enrol their child at school. 
Therefore, there is no guarantee of successfully keeping track of all children, and 
there is likely always to be a small number of children who either remain unknown, 
or become ‘lost’ to the system. 
New arrivals to the country
17.10   The problem in respect of children newly arrived in this country is perhaps more 
acute. The immigration service takes steps to ensure that information in relation 
to unaccompanied children arriving in this country is passed to the relevant 
authorities. An unaccompanied child seeking asylum is referred to the children’s 
panel of the Refugee Council, which then provides support and advice to the child 
throughout the asylum process. They also ensure that the child is ‘plugged into’ 
the social and health services. Some local authorities have established teams that 
have direct links with the immigration service.
17.11   The situation is rather less satisfactory where children arrive in the UK as part of 
a ‘family’. If a child arrives in the UK with people who appear to be his or her 
parents, and the immigration officer is satisfied that the family’s documentation 
is genuine and their reason for entering the UK is acceptable, they will be given 
leave to enter and pass through immigration control. ‘Families’ who are EU citizens 
will be subject to only minimal scrutiny, if any at all. In such circumstances, no 
notification of the child’s arrival in the UK is made to health, education or social 
services. One participant estimated that some 90 million people enter Britain each 
year, of which about 75 million do so as EU citizens.
Private fostering
17.12   Under current regulations, prospective foster parents must tell the local authority 
of private foster care arrangements. There is also an obligation on parents who are 
involved in having a child privately fostered. There is no duty, however, to approve 
or register private foster parents. It has to be recognised that a large number of 
children who are privately fostered do not become known to the authorities.
17.13   For children who live with their parents but go to a childminder every day, the 
position is different. Local authorities must keep a register of childminders and 
the registration system is based on the person being “fit” to look after children. 17 The  seminars
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The local authority must also inspect the premises annually. It is an offence to 
provide daycare for children without being registered.
17.14   There was general agreement – with which I concur – that this inconsistency in the 
law should be removed. These issues were fully reported by Sir William Utting in 
the document People Like Us.
Hostility and exclusion
17.15   It was recognised that children may hesitate or be too frightened to approach 
agencies who may be able to provide help and support. Indeed, they may go out 
of their way to avoid identification by such agencies. It was agreed that ways must 
be found to make it easier for children experiencing difficulties to approach the 
agencies.
17.16   A number of participants agreed that there would be value in introducing a process 
whereby all practitioners who come across a child for the first time should, as a 
matter of routine, make sure they obtain basic information about the child and his 
or her family. This would include:
• the name of the child
• age
• address
• relationship to the primary carer
• whether he or she is registered with a GP and if so who
• if he or she is of school age, whether or not he or she is enrolled at and 
attending school. 
17.17   This practice should be put into operation across all key agencies and include 
services such as housing and social security. If the response to any or all of these 
questions gives rise to concern it should trigger further inquiries. This may appear 
to be a rather simple suggestion to a complex problem, but on reflection I 
concluded that it would be yet another easy-to-operate safeguard, and if it secures 
the well-being of even a handful of children it will have justified itself.
Seminar two: Identification
17.18   The second seminar looked at ways of identifying, at the earliest possible stage, 
those children who may be in need of help or, if necessary, protection. It also 
considered how agencies can best work together to ensure a consistent approach.
Common thresholds
17.19   The seminar attempted to reach an understanding of what it was that we should 
be aiming to achieve for children. The responses supported the common objective 
of ensuring that each child is able to reach his or her maximum potential. While it 
is plainly the case that different agencies will have particular areas of responsibility, 
and that the broad objective of reaching maximum potential comprises a whole 
range of elements, it was encouraging to learn that there was this degree of 
agreement.
17.20   Participants considered whether it was possible to achieve the desired consistency 
of outcome in the absence of common thresholds of intervention. In other words, 
are common definitions of need necessary in order to ensure that all children 
receive the help they need to reach their potential?
17.21   This is important because it is clear that there are marked variations in both the 
understanding and the application of thresholds, not only across the country, The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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but also between different services of the same authority. There would seem to 
be a number of reasons for this, of which the most significant was said to be the 
availability of resources. It was claimed that the only way in which services can 
work within the limited resources allocated to them is to apply eligibility criteria so 
as to control the number of children coming through the ‘front door’. In particular, 
one unintended consequence of social services departments using thresholds in this 
way is that other agencies, seeking to refer a child, will often frame the referral in 
such a way as to prompt a response.
17.22   By acting in this way, the operation of the system becomes distorted. Instead of 
responding creatively to the particular needs of the individual child in an effort to 
achieve agreed outcomes, professionals become preoccupied by the categorisation 
of children in light of eligibility criteria. This means that not only do fewer children 
receive help of an early, preventive nature, but that also the degree of danger is 
sometimes exaggerated in order to secure action.
Identification of need in the local population
17.23   Some services have a better picture of both the problems and strengths of their 
local community than others. But it was clear from the discussion that there would 
be considerable benefit to be gained from all the services knowing their local 
communities better and by services being more accessible to the communities they 
serve. Key services could do this directly themselves or involve community-based 
organisations, such as voluntary and charitable organisations. Each local authority 
needs to develop a strategy to achieve this and to ensure that it happens in practice.
17.24   The benefits of such an approach are clear. If the analysis and strategic planning 
are done effectively, then the resources of the agencies involved can be targeted 
at the sections of the population with the greatest potential need. There is also the 
possibility that by using such an approach, the different agencies will be able to 
complement, rather than duplicate, each other’s work.
Identification of individual children
17.25   After considering how need could better be identified on a community-wide level, 
the discussion turned to the identification of individual children. A number of 
participants explained their approach in identifying children potentially in need of 
services. It appeared that often there is considerable variation in the way guidance 
is applied to individual children – even between staff in the same agency.
17.26   In light of the high level of variability illustrated by this discussion, the seminar 
explored how greater consistency might be achieved in identifying children 
who may need a greater level of help. Four areas in particular received detailed 
consideration:
• the possibility of a ‘common language’ being developed by those working with 
children and families;
• whether a common referral form could be used by agencies when referring cases 
to social services;
• the question of whether a common assessment format could be developed for 
use by those working with children and families;
• whether common elements could be incorporated in the training of all staff 
working with children and families. At present it seems that such training is 
developed independently by each agency.
Sharing information and issues of confidentiality 
17.27   The discussion then turned to the critical issue of how information collected could 
best be shared between agencies so that an accurate picture of the entirety of the 
child’s situation could be formed.17 The  seminars
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17.28   Central to this question is the issue of confidentiality. Some participants had 
developed practical approaches to this issue, but many said there was confusion 
among professionals as to when they were allowed to share information with each 
other without the consent of the child or of his or her carers. The general view 
seemed to be that many professionals found that current guidelines rely too much 
on individual judgement and would be assisted by clear, central guidance on these 
issues, to which reference could be made by staff on a day-to-day basis. 
Involving other groups
17.29   Having considered how best to use the information gained by practitioners as 
a result of their contact with children, alternative sources of information were 
discussed. The discussion was concerned with obtaining information from the 
children themselves, from voluntary and community organisations, and from the 
community-at-large.
17.30   There was general agreement that improvements are necessary in the way that 
staff in the different services talk to children and how staff use the information 
given. A range of suggestions was made. However, a point that was returned to 
time and time again was the need for a relationship of trust between practitioner 
and child. Clearly, some children tend to react badly to authority and, as said at 
paragraph 17.15, tend to be fearful of the consequences of confiding in someone 
in a position of authority. It was suggested that this distrust of authority means that 
voluntary and community organisations are particularly important when identifying 
need among children. The potential contribution of the general public was 
discussed, and the general view was that the ‘eyes and ears’ of the community are 
not used enough in the identification of children potentially in need. It was felt that 
efforts should be made to encourage more members of the public to come forward 
with their concerns.
Seminar three: Determining requirements
17.31   Having identified children and families in need of extra help and support from the 
agencies, the third seminar went on to explore how a thorough assessment of their 
needs should be carried out, and how an appropriate plan of action could be put 
in place to meet those needs.
Essential elements of a good assessment
17.32   The seminar began by examining what constitutes a good assessment of a child’s 
needs and what commonly prevents a good assessment from taking place.
17.33   There was general agreement that the essential prerequisite of good assessment is 
clearly defined and agreed objectives. Without a clear idea of what the assessment 
is attempting to achieve, the staff involved will inevitably face considerable 
difficulty in conducting it in a practical and focused way. The basic aim of any 
assessment of a child should be to understand the child in his or her social 
situation.
17.34   A number of participants were also able to draw on their experience of the 
assessment process to provide a number of helpful pieces of practical guidance 
for general use. Some of the most useful suggestions were:
• allowing sufficient time in the assessment process to listen to the views of the 
child concerned, as well as to those of the family;
• information that the assessment will be based on should be collected in a 
systematic way;The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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• those conducting the assessment must be prepared not just to record 
information, but to analyse it and consider its potential significance;
• conclusions that are reached must be recorded so that those who come to deal 
with a case at a later stage are aware of the analysis that has already been made.
Obstacles to a good assessment
17.35   Three obstacles were identified as particularly significant.
17.36   First, the limited resources within which all the relevant agencies are required to 
operate, and the resulting need to prioritise the provision of services, means that 
in some cases, assessments are focused on identifying immediate risk to the child, 
rather than his or her needs.
17.37   Second, there is a tendency among many social workers to assess cases as either 
section 17 or section 47 at an early stage of the assessment process. The purpose 
of drawing such a distinction is to attempt to ensure that the available resources 
are targeted at the most serious cases. However, there are two principal problems 
with such an approach. First, the majority of section 47 cases start off as section 17 
cases, and so only dealing with them when they become serious represents false 
economy for social services. Second, the rigid classification is insufficiently flexible 
to deal with the wide variety of cases with which social services has to deal. The 
result is that some children may not receive the services they need because they do 
not fit neatly into one specific category. 
17.38   Third, as a result of the prioritisation of cases, other services find themselves tempted 
to present information to social services in a misleading way. If it is known to the 
referrer that social services are unlikely to act or to provide a service to a child about 
whom they are concerned unless it is perceived that the child is at risk of harm, then 
the temptation is to overstate the risks they consider the child is facing.
17.39   Assessment does not exist in a vacuum, nor is it a ‘once and for all time’ process. 
The needs of the child and the family may not be catered for in the current range 
of available services. It is frustrating to assess a child as being in need of a particular 
service if that service is then unavailable to them. Where resources are limited, the 
temptation is understandably to assess children according to availability of services, 
rather than according to their need.
Identifying the roles of the agencies involved 
17.40   The seminar then turned to consider the respective roles of the different agencies 
concerned with the care and protection of children in the assessment process, in 
order to explore the extent to which assessment is purely a social services function. 
While there may be general agreement that ‘assessment is everybody’s business’, 
and should be viewed as such, it would appear that the situation on the ground 
is different.
17.41   The reality appeared to be that assessment was seen as the business of social 
services, who could call for the input of other agencies as appropriate. It seems 
there is sometimes a lack of enthusiasm among the other agencies to adopt a more 
active approach to assessment with a view to establishing whether they could meet 
the needs of a particular child from their own resources, without the need for a 
referral or as partners in a plan of action.
17.42   Part of the explanation for this may be that many people outside social services 
view the process of assessing a child and his or her family as a complicated 
one, requiring specialist skills. This may be true quite often, but there has been 
considerable success experienced in some areas of the country by introducing a 17 The  seminars
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basic initial assessment tool, which can be used by a wide range of services that 
come into contact with children.
National Assessment Framework
17.43   The seminar considered whether a basic multi-agency assessment tool might 
be used more widely. In particular, consideration was given to the question of 
whether the initial assessment components of the National Assessment Framework 
were suitable for use across the agencies. While a number of minor criticisms 
were made regarding its length and complexity, there was strong support for the 
National Assessment Framework, which was described variously as “a huge move 
forward” and “a major achievement”. However, while the breadth of support 
was impressive, it was somewhat disappointing to hear of the extent to which 
the National Assessment Framework was seen by the other agencies as almost 
exclusively a social services tool.
17.44   In order for a variety of agencies to participate effectively in the assessment process 
and make consistent use of a common tool to assist them, some form of common 
training would seem to be highly desirable.
Confidentiality and the exchange of information
17.45   There was clear evidence that staff in a whole range of agencies felt inhibited from 
freely exchanging information relating to children and families due to concerns 
about alleged legal restrictions on doing so. The need for clarity was emphasised 
with several participants calling for a nationally devised protocol setting out 
precisely what information can be shared and in what circumstances. In addition, 
wherever possible, professionals should ensure that they are passing on material 
that has been validated. The indiscriminate sharing of unchecked information 
can have the counterproductive effect of presenting a misleading picture to the 
receiving agency, as well as swamping it with more information than it can process 
effectively. This issue was also discussed in seminar two. See paragraphs 17.27 and 
17.28 for more details.
Seminar four: Service provision and delivery
17.46   Despite a national regulatory framework for children’s services, the organisation 
and delivery of those services, both in and across agencies, is not consistent. The 
fourth seminar examined the current issues that influence service provision and 
service delivery.
17.47   It was said that when work with children goes well it is because staff with different 
expertise know and trust each other. But there were competing views about what 
it was that damaged trust and co-operation. Some thought that agencies other 
than social services often did not give enough priority to their work in relation to 
protecting children. Others said that social services had become the dominant 
agency rather than the lead agency, and to an unhealthy degree. 
17.48   For some, the problem lay in society’s attitude to children. Children were not 
sufficiently valued and some level of violence towards them was tolerated. The 
solution would be nationally agreed outcomes for children, which everyone 
involved could work to.
17.49   For many of the participants, inadequacies in the level and quality of staffing had 
an immediate effect on service provision. Front-line staff in all the services were 
said to be under pressure because of increasing workloads, high vacancy rates, 
inadequate information technology and administrative systems, and inadequate 
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Structural reform
17.50   A number of the papers received for this seminar suggested that the deficiencies in 
the child protection system could only be addressed properly by structural reform. 
The main suggestions were:
• a national child protection agency
• a national supervising agency
• a national network of multi-agency teams, based on the Youth Offending Team 
model
• child safeguarding teams
• reform of Area Child Protection Committees (ACPCs)
• a ‘virtual’ child protection team.
National child protection agency
17.51   The suggested creation of a national child protection agency would be a 
freestanding, independent agency, staffed by qualified social workers, police officers, 
medical practitioners, and other professionals. It would investigate and respond to all 
cases where there were grounds to suspect the ill-treatment of a child.
National supervising agency
17.52   The Metropolitan Police Service proposed an alternative arrangement. It was 
suggested that the current agency structures should be retained but that a new 
national supervising agency should be superimposed. The agency would be 
responsible for policy, inspection and review, training and investigative standards, 
and the setting of standard operating procedures across the country.
National network of multi-agency teams
17.53   The Youth Offending Team model brings together the important agencies without 
divorcing them from their local management. This model was considered by some 
participants as providing a useful model for child protection work.
Child safeguarding teams
17.54   The NSPCC, in their written submission, had developed detailed proposals for 
greatly strengthened multi-disciplinary teams. During the seminar, they expanded 
on their call for the establishment of child safeguarding teams involving all the 
main agencies in the delivery of initial investigation and assessment of children.
Reform of ACPCs
17.55   Proposals for reforming ACPCs received wide support. Although many do good 
work, they seemed widely to be regarded as lacking ‘teeth’. They had no real 
authority over their constituent agencies and did not provide the strategic 
leadership needed.
17.56   There were several proposals on how ACPCs could be made more effective. 
These included:
• placing them on a statutory footing 
• strengthening their executive powers 
• requiring them to engage independent chairs 
• making them directly accountable to the local authority chief executive or to the 
National Care Standards Commission 
• giving them power to require financial contributions from the other agencies
• adding to their membership representatives of housing authorities or local social 
security offices or Jobcentres 
• giving them a strategic responsibility.17 The  seminars
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‘Virtual’ child protection team
17.57   The creation of a ‘virtual’ child protection team with the aid of modern technology 
and the electronic sharing of information was also discussed, and such a model 
was described. The model described did not remove the apparent legal restrictions 
on data sharing, but it did appear to provide a sensible way of managing large 
amounts of information from different sources.
Improving performance
17.58   There was much discussion about the means by which performance in the delivery of 
services might be improved, and what the barriers to such improvement would be.
17.59   It was suggested it was important that practice should be governed by professional 
judgement, and not by rules and procedures. While regulation had its place, it 
could not be a substitute for reflection and judgement. There was also much 
discussion about the importance of high-quality supervision and clear lines of 
accountability.
17.60   A really serious matter is the recruitment and retention of good-quality staff, which 
is a prerequisite to improving performance. It was considered essential that means 
are found to acknowledge the importance of child protection and support work 
for children and families, and to value staff who do this work. The ‘blame culture’, 
that was said to have developed, has to be replaced by a ‘responsibility culture’ to 
discourage the present tendency of defensive practice.
17.61   Unsurprisingly, training was regarded as critical to improving performance. 
Training had to be of high quality, not only before qualification, but also during 
practice. Continuing training for social workers had to be more systematic, 
and it was suggested by some that training of medical staff in the safeguarding 
of children should become compulsory at all levels. Risk assessment and risk 
management training were seen as essential for both medical and social care staff. 
Child protection training for the police needs to be more detailed.
17.62   Finally, the discussion turned to look at the way in which agencies decide what 
services to provide. There appeared to be a widely held view that in practice, social 
work tends to be service-led rather than needs-led. The majority of service users 
tend to receive the services that are available, not necessarily the services they 
require. This is the result of limited resources, administrative convenience, and the 
failure to recognise the need for individual assessment to determine the service to 
be provided.
17.63   The difficulty in adopting a needs-led approach was said to be due both to the 
shortage of skilled staff and to the substantial capital investment involved in 
providing certain services that demanded their subsequent use. Nonetheless, there 
should be the expectation that all agencies ought to be providing services that 
meet the needs of their clients rather than seeking users that can take advantage 
of their services.
Seminar five: Monitoring performance
17.64   Monitoring performance plays a vital role in delivering good outcomes for children 
and their families. Robust systems that monitor what is actually taking place and 
its effectiveness is critical. The fifth and final seminar addressed the question of 
how the performance of the agencies involved in protecting children should be 
evaluated. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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17.65   There was no doubt that the work of each of the key agencies supporting children 
and families should be rigorously monitored. In the past, the tendency has been 
to concentrate on the measurement of inputs; for example, the size of the budget, 
the number of staff, or the range of equipment used. This approach is of limited 
value and does not address the more important question of what is actually being 
achieved, and whether the lives of children and families are being improved by 
the investment.
17.66   In recent years, some progress has been made in correcting this deficiency. 
However, it was said that, in general, performance measurements remain crude. 
Often what emerges from their analysis is still more information about the quantity 
of activity, rather than about the quality and effectiveness of the work delivered. 
Meaningful and informative outcome measurements in the field of child and family 
support are notoriously difficult to achieve. However, this should not deter efforts 
being made to refine the current arrangements for the evaluation of services.
17.67   For monitoring to be effective it has to be conducted against a predetermined 
set of standards. The development of the National Assessment Framework for 
children was seen as a means of bringing together what had previously been the 
fragmented and uncoordinated provision of services for children. Although still at 
an early stage of development, it was seen to be capable of providing the sort of 
outcome-based standards seen as desirable.
Internal monitoring
17.68   It was said that there is a marked variation in the quality of internal monitoring 
among social services departments and police forces. In social services, 
performance and measurement had to be made relevant to outcomes for children 
and families. What matters is that such measures continue to strengthen what is 
best for children and families, and are not diverted from this by undue attention 
being centred on targets set by central government. Performance management 
among the police was described as “at best, ad hoc”. As regards child protection, 
it was said that until the protection of children features in the Home Secretary’s 
‘Police Priorities’ list, it was unlikely that steps would necessarily be taken at a local 
level to improve the quality of police child protection teams.
17.69   It is intended that introducing clinical governance will make a significant difference 
throughout the health service, but little was heard to suggest that the monitoring 
of performance in relation to the protection of children at a local level in the NHS 
has been much developed so far. There was much discussion in general terms 
about the need to develop a culture of self-audit – “empowering the front line” – 
and providing mechanisms for medical practitioners to talk about outcomes, and 
develop the ones that they regard as important.
17.70   A healthy culture begins with high-quality leadership by senior managers willing 
to ‘walk the talk’ and who are anxious to understand the issues facing front-line 
staff. It grows once people are willing to analyse their individual practice and 
contemplate change. That in turn requires management being willing to adopt, 
not a blame-free culture, but a learning culture. Individual responsibility had to be 
recognised, but there needed to be a willingness to accept that it was possible for 
teams and individuals to fail, to learn from their mistakes, and to start again. In 
that context, performance measurements become a means of self-improvement.
Multi-agency monitoring
17.71   There was a good deal of support in the papers received for the idea that 
multi-agency working should be monitored on a multi-agency basis. This is 
already an established feature of current practice. In particular, in response to the 
Government’s White Paper Modernising Social Services, fieldwork is presently being 17 The  seminars
359
undertaken to prepare a report on the state of child safeguards. That involves joint 
working by eight different inspectorates. This report has now been published. This 
approach appears, for good reason, to be widely welcomed. There was support for 
its extension so that, for example, it covered regular inspection of police forces by 
such ‘outsiders’ at both senior and grass-roots levels.
17.72   The possibility of changes to the role of multi-agency bodies in monitoring 
performance was considered. 
17.73   There was considerable debate on the best way to learn from child deaths. I was 
told that often Part 8 reviews carried out under the auspices of ACPCs concentrate 
on organisational rather than practice issues. There was said to be a lack of 
uniformity across the country as to when Part 8 reviews are ordered. It was felt that 
benefit could be gained by taking steps to ensure that practice lessons are learned 
not just locally, but nationally too. Work on analysing the effectiveness of Part 8 
reviews has already been done in Wales and is currently being done in England.
17.74   There was some discussion about the possibility of adapting the Department 
of Health’s ‘Confidential Inquiry’ system. This is used, for example, in cases of 
maternal deaths and child protection cases. The NSPCC’s proposal for child death 
review teams was also considered.
17.75   There are clear advantages in ensuring that every death or serious deliberate harm 
to a child known to social services is investigated. It would remove the stigma 
attached to Part 8 reviews, it would ensure that no cases were missed, and it would 
assist in the development of preventive strategies more generally. Others thought 
such an arrangement might be expensive and bureaucratic, adding further systems 
and processes to those already in place.
External monitoring
17.76   The current arrangements for external inspection of children’s services are 
changing. It was said that the Social Services Inspectorate (SSI) is moving from 
thematic inspections to a rolling programme of inspections and is revising its 
methodologies. Joint reviews in their present form between the SSI and the Audit 
Commission are to end next year. A new Police Standards Unit is being established 
in the Home Office. However, it must be recognised that the government 
inspectorates operate annual programmes which are designed to ensure that over 
the years, each of the key responsibilities of the services have been inspected. This 
being so, it may well be that several years will elapse between the inspection of the 
services dealing with the safety of children. Something more than this is required.
17.77   In the week before seminar five, the Government announced the establishment 
of two new inspectorates – a social care inspectorate (the National Social Care 
Inspectorate) and a health inspectorate (the Commission for Health Audit and 
Inspection). The two are to have similar duties, powers and responsibilities and be 
placed under statutory duties to co-operate with each other.
17.78   I hope these changes strengthen inspection and secure a more effective way of 
monitoring the co-operation between agencies. 
Seminar conclusions
17.79   These seminars proved to be of great value to this Inquiry. They provided the 
opportunity to consider, in a wider forum, many of the issues raised in evidence 
during Phase One. It was disturbing to hear that many of the weaknesses in the 
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discussions. However, it was reassuring that there was support for the legislative 
framework provided by the Children Act 1989. Concerns were primarily about the 
way agencies worked together and standards of practice.
17.80   It is obvious that the focus of the work of each of the services must be on securing 
the well-being of children. The challenge is to ensure that this is translated into 
day-to-day practice. This requires staff in each of the services being properly 
trained for their different tasks, and each person having the ability and the will to 
work flexibly across organisational boundaries.
17.81   In order to avoid either drift or confusion, the decision-making processes must be 
clearly defined, generally understood, and always put into operation. This is never 
more important than when the safety of a child is at stake. 
17.82   The recommendations that follow are not intended to restrict the imaginative ways 
in which children can be helped and safeguarded. They are intended to create 
more freedom, but this freedom must be exercised in a system which is consistent 
and well organised. Success in safeguarding children and families depends in large 
measure on each of the key services being properly managed and financed. The 
outcomes for children and families should be closely monitored so that lessons 
can be learned within each service with a view to securing constant improvements 
in practice. All staff working with children and families should be required to 
undertake regular training to ensure that practice is kept up to date.
17.83   It should be noted that this Inquiry is the latest in a long list of inquiries following 
the tragic death or deliberate serious harm to a child known to the services. Even 
during the course of this Inquiry, tragic cases of a similar nature have appeared 
before the courts.
17.84   The concerns expressed about the way in which the Children Act 1989 is being 
put into practice highlighted the need for greater certainty about the operational 
and practice standards in each of the services. I am in no doubt that it must be 
possible to provide more effective means of supporting families and children – not 
just for those children for which there is concern for their safety. To achieve this, 
local authorities should encourage and support the work of independent agencies. 
Many voluntary organisations have demonstrated an ability to help children and 
families to overcome their reluctance to either seek or accept help. These agencies 
can be both innovative and flexible in responding to the needs of children and 
families. The value of the services they provide should be acknowledged and 
ways should be found to enable them to contribute to the responsibilities of the 
proposed local Management Board for Children and Families referred to in the 
recommendation below.
The need for change
A new management and accountability structure
17.85   What is needed most of all is a structure in which there is no ambiguity about the 
decision-making process for the quality of services to children and families. The 
performance of managers and their effectiveness should be judged against the 
efficiency, reliability and standards of services delivered to vulnerable children and 
families, rather than in the maintenance of bureaucratic procedures, which may 
have limited relevance to the safety of children.
17.86   Both Parliament and the public must have confidence in the effectiveness and 
efficiency of these arrangements. This Inquiry heard too much evidence of 17 The  seminars
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organisational confusion and ‘buck passing’ for me to believe that the safety of 
a child can be achieved simply through issuing more guidance.
17.87   The evidence to this Inquiry indicates there is an urgent need to ensure that the 
numerous policies, procedures, protocols and strategies for children and families 
are translated into coherent action at the point at which services are delivered.
17.88   In recent years, the Government has announced several initiatives aimed at 
reducing the impact of organisational boundaries and securing better joint working 
between staff in key agencies. It is clear that what is now needed is a structure 
which is reinforced by statute, and which has at its centre a clear process for both 
decision making and monitoring of performance; for example, it should not be 
possible for multi-agency plans to safeguard children to be drawn up and then left 
solely for social services to implement.
17.89   It is unrealistic to expect that it will ever be possible to eliminate the deliberate 
harm or death of a child – indeed, no system can achieve this. However, there is 
great scope for services to be operated more efficiently and effectively. This will 
require action at all levels, ranging from agreed outcomes for children to having 
a well-managed, properly-resourced and adequately-trained workforce.
17.90   At present, the gap between intention and achievement is unacceptably large. 
The delivery of services is too unpredictable and the co-operation between staff of 
the key agencies relies too heavily on personal inclination. The need to work across 
ever-changing geographical boundaries has created the danger that too much time 
is being spent on the bureaucratic aspects of inter-agency working and too little on 
actually helping children and families in need.
17.91   Over the years, preventive work with families has been declining. As a result, the 
absence of a timely supportive intervention has allowed more family problems 
to deteriorate to the point of crisis. This trend has to be reversed. This can only 
be achieved if a higher priority is given to services working jointly in supporting 
families and helping them to overcome their difficulties. These arrangements need 
to be properly funded.
17.92   The support and protection of children cannot be achieved by a single agency. 
It is best achieved when the statutory services work in close association with 
community-based groups, whether they are independent agencies, charities or 
self-help groups.
17.93   None of this will be possible unless the statutory agencies become more 
outward-looking and more flexible in the way they work and use their resources. 
This cannot be confined to the enthusiasts. Every service has to play its part. 
All staff must have placed upon them the clear expectation that their primary 
responsibility is to the child and his or her family. The changes recommended in 
this section of the Report are based on the following eight principles. The service 
must be:
• child and family centred;
• responsive to local needs and opportunities;
• adequately resourced;
• capable of delivering an agreed set of measurable, national outcomes for children;
• clear in its accountability from the top to the bottom of the organisation;
• transparent in its work and open to scrutiny;
• clear and straightforward to understand;
• placed on a statutory footing, with the powers to deliver the desired outcomes.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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It is with these principles in mind that I make the recommendations set out below.
Structural change
17.94   The evidence I heard in both Phase One and Phase Two of this Inquiry leads me to 
the conclusion that the structures within which the services to children and families 
in need is organised are inefficient and need to be changed; for example, I heard 
that ACPC arrangements had become removed from day-to-day practice and lack 
any statutory powers. In many parts of the country, the lack of overlap of the 
boundaries in the key services has resulted in local arrangements being thought to 
be bureaucratic and with little impact on delivery of services. The safety of children 
should not be placed in jeopardy because of the absence of machinery to ensure 
the co-operation of the different services.
Serious case reviews
17.95   During this phase of the Inquiry there was considerable variation in the evidence 
relating to the number of deaths and serious injury caused deliberately to children 
in this country. I do not propose to comment on this beyond saying that it 
would be valuable if information on the topic was collected on the basis of an 
agreed definition. One estimate is that 90 serious case reviews (Part 8 reviews) are 
conducted each year by ACPCs. However, there is no certainty that this figure is a 
true reflection of the other times when, with proper intervention, the well-being of 
a child could have been safeguarded.
17.96   A fundamental weakness of the current system is the variability of the circumstances 
under which a review must be taken. In fact, it could be said that there are 
considerable incentives against undertaking such reviews, not least because of the 
amount and complexity of the work involved, and the extent of service failures that 
may be exposed. I conclude that this procedure is inadequate and must now be 
replaced by a system which is both more robust and more consistent.
17.97   The new arrangements must retain the ability to look beyond child deaths caused 
intentionally, and to examine cases where children have been deliberately harmed, 
but not killed. This is an essential way to learn lessons and promote examples of 
good practice. Therefore, I make the following recommendations:
Recommendation
With the support of the Prime Minister, a ministerial Children and Families Board 
should be established at the heart of government. The Board should be chaired 
by a minister of Cabinet rank and should have ministerial representation from 
government departments concerned with the welfare of children and families.
Recommendation
The chief executive of a newly established National Agency for Children and 
Families will report to the ministerial Children and Families Board. The post of 
chief executive should incorporate the responsibilities of the post of a Children’s 
Commissioner for England.17 The  seminars
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Recommendation
The newly established National Agency for Children and Families should have 
the following responsibilities: 
• to assess, and advise the ministerial Children and Families Board about, the 
impact on children and families of proposed changes in policy;
• to scrutinise new legislation and guidance issued for this purpose;
• to advise on the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child;
• to advise on setting nationally agreed outcomes for children and how they 
might best be achieved and monitored;
• to ensure that legislation and policy are implemented at a local level and are 
monitored through its regional office network;
• to report annually to Parliament on the quality and effectiveness of services 
to children and families, in particular on the safety of children.
Recommendation
The National Agency for Children and Families will operate through a regional 
structure which will ensure that legislation and policy are being implemented 
at a local level, as well as providing central government with up-to-date and 
reliable information about the quality and effectiveness of local services.
Recommendation 
The National Agency for Children and Families should, at their discretion, 
conduct serious case reviews (Part 8 reviews) or oversee the process if they 
decide to delegate this task to other agencies following the death or serious 
deliberate injury to a child known to the services. This task will be undertaken 
through the regional offices of the Agency with the authority vested in the 
National Agency for Children and Families to secure, scrutinise and analyse 
documents and to interview witnesses. I consider it advisable that these case 
reviews are published, and that additionally, on an annual basis, a report is 
produced collating the Part 8 review findings for that year.
Recommendation
Each local authority with social services responsibilities must establish a 
Committee of Members for Children and Families with lay members drawn from 
the management committees of each of the key services. This Committee must 
ensure the services to children and families are properly co-ordinated and that 
the inter-agency dimension of this work is being managed effectively.
Recommendation
The local authority chief executive should chair a Management Board for Services 
to Children and Families which will report to the Member Committee referred 
to above. The Management Board for Services to Children and Families must 
include senior officers from each of the key agencies. The Management Board 
must also establish strong links with community-based organisations that make 
significant contributions to local services for children and families. The Board must 
ensure staff working in the key agencies are appropriately trained and are able to 
demonstrate competence in their respective tasks. It will be responsible for the 
work currently undertaken by the Area Child Protection Committee.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
364
Recommendation
The Management Board for Services to Children and Families must appoint a 
director responsible for ensuring that inter-agency arrangements are appropriate 
and effective, and for advising the Management Board for Services to Children 
and Families on the development of services to meet local need. Furthermore, 
each Management Board for Services to Children and Families should:
• establish reliable ways of assessing the needs and circumstances of children in 
their area, with particular reference to the needs of children who may be at risk 
of deliberate harm;
• identify ways of establishing consultation groups of both children and adult 
users of services.
Recommendation
The budget contributed by each of the local agencies in support of vulnerable 
children and families should be identified by the Management Board for Services 
to Children and Families so that staff and resources can be used in the most 
flexible and effective way. 
Recommendation
As part of their work, the government inspectorates should inspect both the 
quality of the services delivered, and also the effectiveness of the inter-agency 
arrangements for the provision of services to children and families.
Recommendation
The Government should review the law regarding the registration of 
private foster carers.
Recommendation
Front-line staff in each of the agencies which regularly come into contact with 
families with children must ensure that in each new contact, basic information 
about the child is recorded. This must include the child’s name, address, age, 
the name of the child’s primary carer, the child’s GP, and the name of the child’s 
school if the child is of school age. Gaps in this information should be passed on 
to the relevant authority in accordance with local arrangements.
Improvements in practice and operation of services to children and families
17.98   Changes to the structure need to be reinforced and supported by improvements 
in the practice and operation of services to children and families. This includes the 
way in which referral of a child is managed by social services, training, exchange 
of information between professionals, and a database for children. I refer to each 
in turn.
Social services’ response to a referral of a child
17.99   Throughout this Inquiry, I repeatedly heard evidence which caused me great 
concern about the way in which social services departments interpret their 
responsibilities under sections 17 and 47 of the Children Act 1989. Section 17 of 
the Act places a general duty on the local authority “to safeguard and promote 
the welfare of children” in need in their area. Section 47 places a duty on the local 
authority to “make or cause to be made, such inquiries as they consider necessary” 17 The  seminars
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if they “have reasonable cause to suspect that a child ... in their area is suffering, 
or is likely to suffer, significant harm ... the purpose of which being to establish 
whether they need to take any action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare”. 
The evidence I heard of a potentially harmful debate around sections 17 and 47 
of the Children Act 1989 appears to have a number of serious implications for 
practice, but the most significant of these are as follows.
17.100 Professional confusion exists about what inquiries can be made into concerns 
about children without parental permission being first sought and granted. I was 
repeatedly told that if a case fell short of a clear section 47 child protection 
label, and was therefore categorised as section 17, no dialogue could take place 
between the protective agencies until the child’s carer had been informed and their 
permission given. Furthermore, if their permission was not given, the nature of any 
intervention would have to be reconsidered, and it could well stop there and then.
17.101 It was often suggested that if social services respond under section 17, then only in 
exceptional circumstances might a child be spoken to by a social worker without 
parental permission having first been sought and granted. Also, if a case attracted 
a section 17 ‘label’, its status was automatically lowered and it soon slipped down 
the priority list.
17.102 I also heard evidence that the downgrading of cases to the status of section 17, 
and afterwards closure, was becoming an attractive option to childcare teams 
struggling to deal with what they perceived to be an ever-increasing number of 
child protection referrals, case conferences and registrations. In response to social 
services downgrading referrals under section 17, partner agencies either tended 
not to make referrals or to re-frame concerns about children in a way which would 
attract a section 47 response. They saw the latter as the only way to access services 
for children they were worried about.
17.103 This approach to the use of sections 17 and 47 can only be described as 
dangerous. It is at odds with my understanding of the aspirations of the Children 
Act 1989. These factors were clearly evident in the failure to protect Victoria in the 
four different local authorities, the two hospitals, and the one police force.
17.104 It was clear from a number of witnesses that there is uncertainty about taking 
any preventive action under section 17 without parental consent. I believe that 
parents of most children in this country would expect the protective agencies to 
communicate with each other and check the information they have about the 
child as soon as possible before deciding on any further action.
17.105 Clearly, the co-operation of parents or carers must always remain a vital 
consideration of any plan to safeguard and promote the welfare of a child. Parents 
or carers must continue to be fully involved as soon as possible in circumstances 
that fall short of a section 47 label. The attempt to secure parental permission 
should not block the initial information gathering and sharing exercise, which must 
also include talking to the child, as appropriate.
17.106 Child protection cases do not always come labelled as such. At the point of referral, 
the social worker can never be sure what the degree of potential harm to the child 
may be. Good communication, checking with partner agencies at the point of 
referral, and talking to the child as appropriate, must be the main way to decide 
how best to safeguard and promote a child’s welfare.
17.107 The Department of Health’s evidence to the Inquiry was that the seeking of parental 
permission and the sharing of information between agencies is a matter for local The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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negotiation. In my view, this is unacceptable. Existing Working Together guidance 
and national assessment framework guidance must be clearer on this issue.
17.108 In my view, the main task facing all the agencies is to jointly agree a response 
following the identification of concerns about a child. This response must meet 
both the immediate needs of the child and promote the child’s welfare. Under this 
approach, sections 17 and 47 of the Children Act 1989 are used simply to identify 
the part of the Act which is being used and is not a justification for inactivity.
17.109 To achieve this, consideration should be given to unifying the Working Together 
guidance and the National Assessment Framework guidance into a single 
document, which sets out clearly how these sections of the Children Act 1989 
should be applied. A clear direction should be given for the action to be taken 
under both section 17 and section 47 of the Act.
17.110 I was told that staff feel under pressure to reduce the number of section 47 
inquiries. As a result, there is widespread practice of driving down child protection 
case conferences and the number of children whose names are placed on the 
child protection register. Therefore, the value of the local register has reduced. 
I recognise that including the name of a child on a register does not add to the 
safeguarding of that child. Indeed, there is the danger that other agencies may 
make unwarranted assumptions of the level of help and support being given 
to a child whose name is on the register. It is for this reason that I now have 
considerable doubt about the usefulness of these registers in the safeguarding 
of children.
17.111 Therefore, I make the following recommendation:
Recommendation
The Department of Health should amalgamate the current Working Together and 
the National Assessment Framework documents into one simplified document. 
The document should tackle the following six aspects in a clear and practical way:
• It must establish a ‘common language’ for use across all agencies to help those 
agencies to identify who they are concerned about, why they are concerned, 
who is best placed to respond to those concerns, and what outcome is being 
sought from any planned response.
• It must disseminate a best practice approach by social services to receiving and 
managing information about children at the ‘front door’.
• It must make clear in cases that fall short of an immediately identifiable 
section 47 label that the seeking or refusal of parental permission must not 
restrict the initial information gathering and sharing. This should, if necessary, 
include talking to the child.
• It must prescribe a clear step-by-step guide on how to manage a case through 
either a section 17 or a section 47 track, with built-in systems for case 
monitoring and review.
• It must replace the child protection register with a more effective system. 
Case conferences should remain, but the focus must no longer be on whether 
to register or not. Instead, the focus should be on establishing an agreed plan 
to safeguard and promote the welfare of the particular child.
• The new guidance should include some consistency in the application of both 
section 17 and section 47. 17 The  seminars
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Training
17.112 It is clear that the safeguarding of children will continue to depend upon services 
such as health, education, housing, police and social services working together. Each 
of these services has its own training organisation dedicated to its core functions 
and the specific responsibilities they carry. It may be neither desirable nor possible 
to change the fundamentals of these arrangements, but proper recognition must be 
paid to the importance of effective joint working between the staff of these services. 
The National Agency for Children and Families should require the training bodies 
of each of the key agencies to demonstrate how inter-agency working fits into the 
curricula of the training they authorise. Furthermore, each training body should 
be required to promote training specifically designed to bring together staff from 
different agencies on topics where joint working is essential, such as working with 
children and families.
17.113 The key national training bodies should be required to produce a National 
Framework for Joint Training to which they are each committed. It is important 
that the organisations with a specific responsibility to promote professional 
training give a strong lead on this. The skills involved in working successfully 
across organisational boundaries must be given proper recognition in both the 
basic training and in the continuing training of staff. It cannot be left only to those 
individuals who have the motivation to do it. Working across boundaries should be 
an expectation placed on all staff, and it must be reflected in training programmes.
17.114 It is now generally recognised that training is not confined to the beginning of 
professional life, but must be a life-long process. Each service must ensure that training 
opportunities are available throughout the career of staff. Individual staff should be 
required to take responsibility for keeping their practice up to date by demonstrating 
they have satisfactorily completed appropriate training courses. The ACPC arrangement 
lacked the authority to ensure this happened at local level. The new Management 
Board for Services to Children and Families must have the power to fill this gap and 
ensure that training is provided. Its performance in this should be evaluated as part 
of the inspections to be undertaken jointly by the relevant government inspectorates. 
Therefore, I make the following recommendations:
Recommendation
The National Agency for Children and Families should require each of the 
training bodies covering the services provided by doctors, nurses, teachers, 
police officers, officers working in housing departments, and social workers to 
demonstrate that effective joint working between each of these professional 
groups features in their national training programmes. 
Recommendation
The newly created local Management Boards for Services to Children and 
Families should be required to ensure training on an inter-agency basis is 
provided. The effectiveness of this should be evaluated by the government 
inspectorates. Staff working in the relevant agencies should be required to 
demonstrate that their practice with respect to inter-agency working is up to 
date by successfully completing appropriate training courses.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Exchange of information between professionals
17.115 Throughout this Inquiry it was said repeatedly that when there is professional 
concern about the welfare of a child, the free exchange of information is inhibited 
by the Data Protection Act 1998, the Human Rights Act 1998, and common law 
rules on confidentiality. The evidence put to the Inquiry was that unless a child 
is deemed to be in need of protection, information cannot be shared between 
agencies without staff running the risk that their actions are unlawful. This either 
deters information sharing, or artificially elevates concern about the need for 
protection – each of which is not compatible with serving well the needs of 
children and families. Clearly these matters are complicated. There must be a 
balance struck between the protection of a child and the right to privacy.
17.116 I heard evidence that professionals working with children and families in these 
circumstances would be assisted by clear guidance on the related issues of 
confidentiality and the exchange of information. Therefore, I make the following 
recommendation:
Recommendation
The Government should issue guidance on the Data Protection Act 1998, 
the Human Rights Act 1998, and common law rules on confidentiality. The 
Government should issue guidance as and when these impact on the sharing 
of information between professional groups in circumstances where there are 
concerns about the welfare of children and families. 
A national database for children
17.117 Seminar one was about ‘discovery and inclusion’. It focused on the means by 
which we can be sure that every child is included in the general provision of 
services to which they are entitled. Several of the participants in this seminar 
recounted their personal experiences of individual children having ‘slipped through 
the net’ or having disappeared without any of the services knowing where they 
had gone. The potential for this to happen seems to be greater in urban areas. It is 
contributed to by an increasing number of homeless families, changes in traditional 
family group structures, and a mobile population. Several factors, therefore, 
suggest that it is much easier now than in the past for children to be ‘lost in the 
system’. In addition to this, adults who wish to exploit the vulnerability of children, 
or who harm them in outbursts of temper, often go to great lengths to ensure that 
their children are kept out of sight.
17.118 One suggestion that attempts to overcome these factors, is for the Government to 
establish a national database for children. I was advised that there are no technical 
reasons why every child could not be registered shortly after birth, or upon arrival 
in this country, and then ‘tracked’ throughout their childhood. There are bigger 
and more complex systems in operation, for example, the national vehicle licence 
system and systems operated by the Passport Office and the Inland Revenue. 
17.119 I realise this suggestion should not be made lightly. Indeed, it is likely to be 
countered by concerns about personal privacy expressed by those who oppose the 
use of national identity cards. Therefore, it will be a matter of judgement about 
where the balance is struck between providing a possible greater safeguard for 
children and what may be felt by some to be an intrusion into privacy. 17 The  seminars
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17.120 Strict controls would need to be in place to ensure against the unauthorised access 
of information held in a database for children. Such a system would also need to 
be easy to use, effective in the maintenance of contact with children and families, 
and value for money.
17.121 The support expressed by participants for a national children’s database persuaded 
me of the potential worth of such a facility. However, only a feasibility study will 
reveal whether this is a practical proposition. Therefore, I make the following 
recommendation:
Recommendation
The Government should actively explore the benefit to children of setting up 
and operating a national children’s database on all children under the age of 16. 
A feasibility study should be a prelude to a pilot study to explore its usefulness in 
strengthening the safeguards for children.The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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18 Recommendations
This section brings together the recommendations that are to be found in the 
Report. The way in which local authorities name committees and officers can vary. 
For ease of reference, the recommendations are expressed in the terms of the Local 
Authorities Personal Social Services Act 1970. To the left of each recommendation 
is an indication of the timescale for action: 
1 means the recommendation should be implemented within three months.
2 means the recommendation should be implemented within six months.
3 means the recommendation should be implemented within two years.
Of the 108 recommendations in this Report, 46 are under ‘1’ and a further 36 are 
under ‘2’. This means that some 82 of the recommendations could be acted upon 
within six months.
The paragraph numbers that follow the recommendations are cross-references to 
the paragraphs in this Report in which they can be found. 
General recommendations
3          Recommendation 1 With the support of the Prime Minister, a ministerial Children 
and Families Board should be established at the heart of government. The Board 
should be chaired by a minister of Cabinet rank and should have ministerial 
representation from government departments concerned with the welfare of 
children and families. (paragraph 17.97)
3          Recommendation 2 The chief executive of a newly established National Agency 
for Children and Families will report to the ministerial Children and Families Board. 
The post of chief executive should incorporate the responsibilities of the post of a 
Children’s Commissioner for England. (paragraph 17.97)
3          Recommendation 3 The newly established National Agency for Children and 
Families should have the following responsibilities: 
• to assess, and advise the ministerial Children and Families Board about, the 
impact on children and families of proposed changes in policy;
• to scrutinise new legislation and guidance issued for this purpose;
• to advise on the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child;
• to advise on setting nationally agreed outcomes for children and how they 
might best be achieved and monitored;
• to ensure that legislation and policy are implemented at a local level and are 
monitored through its regional office network;
• to report annually to Parliament on the quality and effectiveness of services 
to children and families, in particular on the safety of children. (paragraph 17.97)
3          Recommendation 4 The National Agency for Children and Families will operate 
through a regional structure which will ensure that legislation and policy are being 
implemented at a local level, as well as providing central government with up-to-date 
and reliable information about the quality and effectiveness of local services. 
(paragraph 17.97)The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
372
3          Recommendation 5 The National Agency for Children and Families should, at their 
discretion, conduct serious case reviews (Part 8 reviews) or oversee the process if 
they decide to delegate this task to other agencies following the death or serious 
deliberate injury to a child known to the services. This task will be undertaken 
through the regional offices of the Agency with the authority vested in the National 
Agency for Children and Families to secure, scrutinise and analyse documents and 
to interview witnesses. I consider it advisable that these case reviews are published, 
and that additionally, on an annual basis, a report is produced collating the Part 8 
review findings for that year. (paragraph 17.97)
2          Recommendation 6 Each local authority with social services responsibilities 
must establish a Committee of Members for Children and Families with lay 
members drawn from the management committees of each of the key services. 
This Committee must ensure the services to children and families are properly 
co-ordinated and that the inter-agency dimension of this work is being managed 
effectively. (paragraph 17.97)
2          Recommendation 7 The local authority chief executive should chair a 
Management Board for Services to Children and Families which will report to the 
Member Committee referred to above. The Management Board for Services to 
Children and Families must include senior officers from each of the key agencies. 
The Management Board must also establish strong links with community-based 
organisations that make significant contributions to local services for children and 
families. The Board must ensure staff working in the key agencies are appropriately 
trained and are able to demonstrate competence in their respective tasks. It will 
be responsible for the work currently undertaken by the Area Child Protection 
Committee. (paragraph 17.97)
3          Recommendation 8 The Management Board for Services to Children and 
Families must appoint a director responsible for ensuring that inter-agency 
arrangements are appropriate and effective, and for advising the Management 
Board for Services to Children and Families on the development of services to meet 
local need. Furthermore, each Management Board for Services to Children and 
Families should:
• establish reliable ways of assessing the needs and circumstances of children in 
their area, with particular reference to the needs of children who may be at risk 
of deliberate harm;
• identify ways of establishing consultation groups of both children and adult users 
of services. (paragraph 17.97)
2          Recommendation 9 The budget contributed by each of the local agencies 
in support of vulnerable children and families should be identified by the 
Management Board for Services to Children and Families so that staff and 
resources can be used in the most flexible and effective way. (paragraph 17.97)
2          Recommendation 10 As part of their work, the government inspectorates should 
inspect both the quality of the services delivered, and also the effectiveness of the 
inter-agency arrangements for the provision of services to children and families. 
(paragraph 17.97)
3          Recommendation 11 The Government should review the law regarding the 
registration of private foster carers. (paragraph 17.97)18 Recommendations
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1          Recommendation 12 Front-line staff in each of the agencies which regularly come 
into contact with families with children must ensure that in each new contact, 
basic information about the child is recorded. This must include the child’s name, 
address, age, the name of the child’s primary carer, the child’s GP, and the name 
of the child’s school if the child is of school age. Gaps in this information should 
be passed on to the relevant authority in accordance with local arrangements. 
(paragraph 17.97)
3          Recommendation 13 The Department of Health should amalgamate the current 
Working Together and the National Assessment Framework documents into one 
simplified document. The document should tackle the following six aspects in a 
clear and practical way:
• It must establish a ‘common language’ for use across all agencies to help those 
agencies to identify who they are concerned about, why they are concerned, 
who is best placed to respond to those concerns, and what outcome is being 
sought from any planned response.
• It must disseminate a best practice approach by social services to receiving and 
managing information about children at the ‘front door’.
• It must make clear in cases that fall short of an immediately identifiable 
section 47 label that the seeking or refusal of parental permission must not 
restrict the initial information gathering and sharing. This should, if necessary, 
include talking to the child.
• It must prescribe a clear step-by-step guide on how to manage a case through 
either a section 17 or a section 47 track, with built-in systems for case monitoring 
and review.
• It must replace the child protection register with a more effective system. Case 
conferences should remain, but the focus must no longer be on whether to 
register or not. Instead, the focus should be on establishing an agreed plan to 
safeguard and promote the welfare of the particular child.
• The new guidance should include some consistency in the application of both 
section 17 and section 47. (paragraph 17.111)
3          Recommendation 14 The National Agency for Children and Families should 
require each of the training bodies covering the services provided by doctors, 
nurses, teachers, police officers, officers working in housing departments, 
and social workers to demonstrate that effective joint working between each 
of these professional groups features in their national training programmes. 
(paragraph 17.114)
2          Recommendation 15 The newly created local Management Boards for Services 
to Children and Families should be required to ensure training on an inter-agency 
basis is provided. The effectiveness of this should be evaluated by the government 
inspectorates. Staff working in the relevant agencies should be required to 
demonstrate that their practice with respect to inter-agency working is up to date 
by successfully completing appropriate training courses. (paragraph 17.114)
3          Recommendation 16 The Government should issue guidance on the Data 
Protection Act 1998, the Human Rights Act 1998, and common law rules on 
confidentiality. The Government should issue guidance as and when these impact 
on the sharing of information between professional groups in circumstances where 
there are concerns about the welfare of children and families. (paragraph 17.116)
3               Recommendation 17 The Government should actively explore the benefit to children 
of setting up and operating a national children’s database on all children under the age 
of 16. A feasibility study should be a prelude to a pilot study to explore its usefulness in 
strengthening the safeguards for children. (paragraph 17.121)The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Social care recommendations
1          Recommendation 18 When communication with a child is necessary for the 
purposes of safeguarding and promoting that child’s welfare, and the first language 
of that child is not English, an interpreter must be used. In cases where the use of 
an interpreter is dispensed with, the reasons for so doing must be recorded in the 
child’s notes/case file. (paragraph 6.251)
1          Recommendation 19 Managers of duty teams must devise and operate a system 
which enables them immediately to establish how many children have been 
referred to their team, what action is required to be taken for each child, who 
is responsible for taking that action, and when that action must be completed. 
(paragraph 4.14)
2          Recommendation 20 Directors of social services must ensure that staff in their 
children and families’ intake teams are experienced in working with children and 
families, and that they have received appropriate training. (paragraph 4.16)
1          Recommendation 21 When a professional makes a referral to social services 
concerning the well-being of a child, the fact of that referral must be confirmed 
in writing by the referrer within 48 hours. (paragraph 4.59)
1          Recommendation 22 If social services place a child in temporary accommodation, 
an assessment must be made of the suitability of that accommodation and 
the results of that assessment must be recorded on the child’s case file. If the 
accommodation is unsuitable, this should be reported to a senior officer. 
(paragraph 4.77)
1          Recommendation 23 If social services place a child in accommodation in 
another local authority area, they must notify that local authority’s social services 
department of the placement. Unless specifically agreed in writing at team 
manager level by both authorities or above, the placing authority must retain 
responsibility for the child concerned. (paragraph 4.82)
1          Recommendation 24 Where, during the course of an assessment, social services 
establish that a child of school age is not attending school, they must alert the 
education authorities and satisfy themselves that, in the interim, the child is subject 
to adequate daycare arrangements. (paragraph 4.143)
1          Recommendation 25 All social services assessments of children and families, and 
any action plans drawn up as a result, must be approved in writing by a manager. 
Before giving such approval, the manager must ensure that the child and the 
child’s carer have been seen and spoken to. (paragraph 4.152)
1          Recommendation 26 Directors of social services must ensure that no case 
involving a vulnerable child is closed until the child and the child’s carer have been 
seen and spoken to, and a plan for the ongoing promotion and safeguarding of 
the child’s welfare has been agreed. (paragraph 4.183)
2          Recommendation 27 Chief executives and lead members of local authorities with 
social services responsibilities must ensure that children’s services are explicitly 
included in their authority’s list of priorities and operational plans. (paragraph 5.4)18 Recommendations
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2          Recommendation 28 The Department of Health should require chief executives 
of local authorities with social services responsibilities to prepare a position 
statement on the true picture of the current strengths and weaknesses of their 
‘front door’ duty systems for children and families. This must be accompanied 
by an action plan setting out the timescales for remedying any weaknesses 
identified. (paragraph 5.9)
2          Recommendation 29 Directors of social services must devise and implement a 
system which provides them with the following information about the work of the 
duty teams for which they are responsible:
• number of children referred to the teams;
• number of those children who have been assessed as requiring a service;
• number of those children who have been provided with the service that 
they require;
• number of children referred who have identified needs which have yet to 
be met. (paragraph 5.24)
1          Recommendation 30 Directors of social services must ensure that senior managers 
inspect, at least once every three months, a random selection of case files and 
supervision notes. (paragraph 5.27)
2          Recommendation 31 Directors of social services must ensure that all staff 
who work with children have received appropriate vocational training, receive 
a thorough induction in local procedures and are obliged to participate in 
regular continuing training so as to ensure that their practice is kept up to 
date. (paragraph 5.30)
3          Recommendation 32 Local authority chief executives must ensure that only one 
electronic database system is used by all those working in children and families’ 
services for the recording of information. This should be the same system in use 
across the council, or at least compatible with it, so as to facilitate the sharing of 
information, as appropriate. (paragraph 5.46)
3          Recommendation 33 Local authorities with responsibility for safeguarding children 
should establish and advertise a 24-hour free telephone referral number for use by 
members of the public who wish to report concerns about a child. A pilot study 
should be undertaken to evaluate the feasibility of electronically recording calls to 
such a number. (paragraph 5.71)
2          Recommendation 34 Social workers must not undertake home visits without being 
clear about the purpose of the visit, the information to be gathered during the 
course of it, and the steps to be taken if no one is at home. No visits should be 
undertaken without the social worker concerned checking the information known 
about the child by other child protection agencies. All visits must be written up on 
the case file. (paragraphs 5.108 and 6.606)
1          Recommendation 35 Directors of social services must ensure that children 
who are the subject of allegations of deliberate harm are seen and spoken to 
within 24 hours of the allegation being communicated to social services. If this 
timescale is not met, the reason for the failure must be recorded on the case file. 
(paragraph 5.127)
1          Recommendation 36 No emergency action on a case concerning an allegation 
of deliberate harm to a child should be taken without first obtaining legal advice.  
Local authorities must ensure that such legal advice is available 24 hours a day. 
(paragraph 5.128)The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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2          Recommendation 37 The training of social workers must equip them with the 
confidence to question the opinion of professionals in other agencies when 
conducting their own assessment of the needs of the child. (paragraph 5.138)
1          Recommendation 38 Directors of social services must ensure that the transfer 
of responsibility of a case between local authority social services departments is 
always recorded on the case file of each authority, and is confirmed in writing 
by the authority to which responsibility for the case has been transferred. 
(paragraph 5.152)
1          Recommendation 39 All front-line staff within local authorities must be trained 
to pass all calls about the safety of children through to the appropriate duty team 
without delay, having first recorded the name of the child, his or her address, and 
the nature of the concern. If the call cannot be put through immediately, further 
details from the referrer must be sought (including their name, address and contact 
number). The information must then be passed verbally and in writing to the duty 
team within the hour. (paragraph 5.169)
1          Recommendation 40 Directors of social services must ensure that no case that has 
been opened in response to allegations of deliberate harm to a child is closed until 
the following steps have been taken:
• The child has been spoken to alone.
• The child’s carers have been seen and spoken to.
• The accommodation in which the child is to live has been visited.
• The views of all the professionals involved have been sought and considered. 
• A plan for the promotion and safeguarding of the child’s welfare has been 
agreed. (paragraph 5.187)
2          Recommendation 41 Chief executives of local authorities with social services 
responsibilities must make arrangements for senior managers and councillors to 
regularly visit intake teams in their children’s services department, and to report their 
findings to the chief executive and social services committee. (paragraph 5.193)
1          Recommendation 42 Directors of social services must ensure that where the 
procedures of a social services department stipulate requirements for the transfer of 
a case between teams within the department, systems are in place to detect when 
such a transfer does not take place as required. (paragraph 6.7)
2          Recommendation 43 No social worker shall undertake section 47 inquiries unless 
he or she has been trained to do so. Directors of social services must undertake an 
audit of staff currently carrying out section 47 inquiries to identify gaps in training 
and experience. These must be addressed immediately. (paragraph 6.12)
1          Recommendation 44 When staff are temporarily promoted to fill vacancies, 
directors of social services must subject such arrangements to six-monthly reviews 
and record the outcome. (paragraph 6.29)
1          Recommendation 45 Directors of social services must ensure that the work of 
staff working directly with children is regularly supervised. This must include 
the supervisor reading, reviewing and signing the case file at regular intervals. 
(paragraph 6.59)
1          Recommendation 46 Directors of social services must ensure that the roles 
and responsibilities of child protection advisers (and those employed in similar 
posts) are clearly understood by all those working within children’s services. 
(paragraph 6.71)18 Recommendations
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3          Recommendation 47 The chief executive of each local authority with social  
services responsibilities must ensure that specialist services are available to respond 
to the needs of children and families 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The 
safeguarding of children should not be part of the responsibilities of general 
out-of-office-hours teams. (paragraph 6.181)
1          Recommendation 48 Directors of social services must ensure that when children 
and families are referred to other agencies for additional services, that referral is 
only made with the agreement of the allocated social worker and/or their manager. 
The purpose of the referral must be recorded contemporaneously on the case file. 
(paragraph 6.263)
1          Recommendation 49 When a professional from another agency expresses concern 
to social services about their handling of a particular case, the file must be read 
and reviewed, the professional concerned must be met and spoken to, and the 
outcome of this discussion must be recorded on the case file. (paragraph 6.289)
1          Recommendation 50 Directors of social services must ensure that when staff are 
absent from work, systems are in place to ensure that post, emails and telephone 
contacts are checked and actioned as necessary. (paragraph 6.318)
1          Recommendation 51 Directors of social services must ensure that all strategy 
meetings and discussions involve the following three basic steps:
• A list of action points must be drawn up, each with an agreed timescale and 
the identity of the person responsible for carrying it out.
• A clear record of the discussion or meeting must be circulated to all those 
present and all those with responsibility for an action point.
• A mechanism for reviewing completion of the agreed actions must be specified. 
The date upon which the first such review is to take place is to be agreed and 
documented. (paragraph 6.575)
2          Recommendation 52 Directors of social services must ensure that no case is 
allocated to a social worker unless and until his or her manager ensures that he 
or she has the necessary training, experience and time to deal with it properly. 
(paragraph 6.581)
1          Recommendation 53 When allocating a case to a social worker, the manager must 
ensure that the social worker is clear as to what has been allocated, what action is 
required and how that action will be reviewed and supervised. (paragraph 6.586)
2          Recommendation 54 Directors of social services must ensure that all cases of 
children assessed as needing a service have an allocated social worker. In cases 
where this proves to be impossible, arrangements must be made to maintain 
contact with the child. The number, nature and reasons for such unallocated 
cases must be reported to the social services committee on a monthly basis. 
(paragraph 6.589)
1          Recommendation 55 Directors of social services must ensure that only those cases 
in which a social worker is actively engaged in work with a child and the child’s 
family are deemed to be ‘allocated’. (paragraph 6.590)The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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1          Recommendation 56 Directors of social services must ensure that no child known 
to social services who is an inpatient in a hospital and about whom there are child 
protection concerns is allowed to be taken home until it has been established by 
social services that the home environment is safe, the concerns of the medical staff 
have been fully addressed, and there is a social work plan in place for the ongoing 
promotion and safeguarding of that child’s welfare. (paragraph 6.594)
2          Recommendation 57 Directors of social services must ensure that social work staff 
are made aware of how to access effectively information concerning vulnerable 
children which may be held in other countries. (paragraph 6.619)
1          Recommendation 58 Directors of social services must ensure that every child’s 
case file includes, on the inside of the front cover, a properly maintained 
chronology. (paragraph 6.629)
2          Recommendation 59 Directors of social services must ensure that staff working 
with vulnerable children and families are provided with up-to-date procedures, 
protocols and guidance. Such practice guidance must be located in a single-source 
document. The work should be monitored so as to ensure procedures are followed. 
(paragraph 8.7)
2          Recommendation 60 Directors of social services must ensure that hospital social  
workers working with children and families are line managed by the children and 
families’ section of their social services department. (paragraph 8.19)
1          Recommendation 61 Directors of social services must ensure that hospital social 
workers participate in all hospital meetings concerned with the safeguarding of 
children. (paragraph 8.27)
2          Recommendation 62 Where hospital-based social work staff come into contact 
with children from other local authority areas, the directors of social services of 
their employing authorities must ensure that they work to a single set of guidance 
agreed by all the authorities concerned. (paragraph 8.53)
1          Recommendation 63 Hospital social workers must always respond promptly to 
any referral of suspected deliberate harm to a child. They must see and talk to 
the child, to the child’s carer and to those responsible for the care of the child in 
hospital, while avoiding the risk of appearing to coach the child. (paragraph 8.100)
Healthcare recommendations
1          Recommendation 64 When a child is admitted to hospital and deliberate harm 
is suspected, the nursing care plan must take full account of this diagnosis. 
(paragraph 9.35)
2          Recommendation 65 When the deliberate harm of a child is identified as a 
possibility, the examining doctor should consider whether taking a history directly 
from the child is in that child’s best interests. When that is so, the history should 
be taken even when the consent of the carer has not been obtained, with the 
reason for dispensing with consent recorded by the examining doctor. Working 
Together guidance should be amended accordingly. In those cases in which English 
is not the first language of the child concerned, the use of an interpreter should be 
considered. (paragraph 9.39)18 Recommendations
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1          Recommendation 66 When a child has been examined by a doctor, and concerns 
about deliberate harm have been raised, no subsequent appraisal of these concerns 
should be considered complete until each of the concerns has been fully addressed, 
accounted for and documented. (paragraph 9.60)
2          Recommendation 67 When differences of medical opinion occur in relation to the 
diagnosis of possible deliberate harm to a child, a recorded discussion must take 
place between the persons holding the different views. When the deliberate harm 
of a child has been raised as an alternative diagnosis to a purely medical one, the 
diagnosis of deliberate harm must not be rejected without full discussion and, if 
necessary, obtaining a further opinion. (paragraph 9.65)
1          Recommendation 68 When concerns about the deliberate harm of a child have 
been raised, doctors must ensure that comprehensive and contemporaneous 
notes are made of these concerns. If doctors are unable to make their own notes, 
they must be clear about what it is they wish to have recorded on their behalf. 
(paragraphs 9.72 and 10.30)
1          Recommendation 69 When concerns about the deliberate harm of a child have 
been raised, a record must be kept in the case notes of all discussions about the 
child, including telephone conversations. When doctors and nurses are working 
in circumstances in which case notes are not available to them, a record of all 
discussions must be entered in the case notes at the earliest opportunity so that 
this becomes part of the child’s permanent health record. (paragraph 9.95)
2          Recommendation 70 Hospital trust chief executives must introduce systems 
to ensure that no child about whom there are child protection concerns is 
discharged from hospital without the permission of either the consultant in charge 
of the child’s care or of a paediatrician above the grade of senior house officer. 
Hospital chief executives must introduce systems to monitor compliance with this 
recommendation. (paragraphs 9.101 and 10.145) 
2          Recommendation 71 Hospital trust chief executives must introduce systems to 
ensure that no child about whom there are child protection concerns is discharged 
from hospital without a documented plan for the future care of the child. The plan 
must include follow-up arrangements. Hospital chief executives must introduce 
systems to monitor compliance with this recommendation. (paragraphs 9.101 
and 10.146) 
1          Recommendation 72 No child about whom there are concerns about deliberate 
harm should be discharged from hospital back into the community without an 
identified GP. Responsibility for ensuring this happens rests with the hospital 
consultant under whose care the child has been admitted. (paragraph 9.105)
2          Recommendation 73 When a child is admitted to hospital and deliberate harm 
is suspected, the doctor or nurse admitting the child must inquire about previous 
admissions to hospital. In the event of a positive response, information concerning 
the previous admissions must be obtained from the other hospitals. The consultant 
in charge of the case must review this information when making decisions about 
the child’s future care and management. Hospital chief executives must introduce 
systems to ensure compliance with this recommendation. (paragraph 10.36)
1          Recommendation 74 Any child admitted to hospital about whom there are 
concerns about deliberate harm must receive a full and fully-documented physical 
examination within 24 hours of their admission, except when doing so would, in 
the opinion of the examining doctor, compromise the child’s care or the child’s 
physical and emotional well-being. (paragraph 10.41)The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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1          Recommendation 75 In a case of possible deliberate harm to a child in hospital, 
when permission is required from the child’s carer for the investigation of such 
possible deliberate harm, or for the treatment of a child’s injuries, the permission 
must be sought by a doctor above the grade of senior house officer. 
(paragraph 10.73)
1          Recommendation 76 When a child is admitted to hospital with concerns about 
deliberate harm, a clear decision must be taken as to which consultant is to be 
responsible for the child protection aspects of the child’s care. The identity of that 
consultant must be clearly marked in the child’s notes so that all those involved 
in the child’s care are left in no doubt as to who is responsible for the case. 
(paragraph 10.105)
1          Recommendation 77 All doctors involved in the care of a child about whom there 
are concerns about possible deliberate harm must provide social services with a 
written statement of the nature and extent of their concerns. If misunderstandings 
of medical diagnosis occur, these must be corrected at the earliest opportunity in 
writing. It is the responsibility of the doctor to ensure that his or her concerns are 
properly understood. (paragraph 10.162)
1          Recommendation 78 Within a given location, health professionals should work 
from a single set of records for each child. (paragraph 11.39)
1          Recommendation 79 During the course of a ward round, when assessing a child 
about whom there are concerns about deliberate harm, the doctor conducting 
the ward round should ensure that all available information is reviewed and taken 
account of before decisions on the future management of the child’s case are 
taken. (paragraph 11.39) 
1          Recommendation 80 When a child for whom there are concerns about deliberate 
harm is admitted to hospital, a record must be made in the hospital notes of all 
face-to-face discussions (including medical and nursing ‘handover’) and telephone 
conversations relating to the care of the child, and of all decisions made during 
such conversations. In addition, a record must be made of who is responsible for 
carrying out any actions agreed during such conversations. (paragraph 11.39)
2          Recommendation 81 Hospital chief executives must introduce systems to 
ensure that actions agreed in relation to the care of a child about whom there 
are concerns of deliberate harm are recorded, carried through and checked for 
completion. (paragraph 11.39)
2          Recommendation 82 The Department of Health should examine the feasibility 
of bringing the care of children about whom there are concerns about deliberate 
harm within the framework of clinical governance. (paragraph 11.39)
2          Recommendation 83 The investigation and management of a case of possible 
deliberate harm to a child must be approached in the same systematic and 
rigorous manner as would be appropriate to the investigation and management 
of any other potentially fatal disease. (paragraph 11.53)
3          Recommendation 84 All designated and named doctors in child protection and 
all consultant paediatricians must be revalidated in the diagnosis and treatment 
of deliberate harm and in the multi-disciplinary aspects of a child protection 
investigation. (paragraph 11.53)18 Recommendations
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3          Recommendation 85 The Department of Health should invite the Royal College 
of Paediatrics and Child Health to develop models of continuing education 
in the diagnosis and treatment of the deliberate harm of children, and in the 
multi-disciplinary aspects of a child protection investigation, to support the revalidation 
of doctors described in the preceding recommendation. (paragraph 11.53)
3          Recommendation 86 The Department of Health should invite the Royal College 
of General Practitioners to explore the feasibility of extending the process of new 
child patient registration to include gathering information on wider social and 
developmental issues likely to affect the welfare of the child, for example their 
living conditions and their school attendance. (paragraph 12.29)
3          Recommendation 87 The Department of Health should seek to ensure that all 
GPs receive training in the recognition of deliberate harm to children, and in the 
multi-disciplinary aspects of a child protection investigation, as part of their initial 
vocational training in general practice, and at regular intervals of no less than three 
years thereafter. (paragraph 12.29)
3          Recommendation 88 The Department of Health should examine the feasibility of 
introducing training in the recognition of deliberate harm to children as part of 
the professional education of all general practice staff and for all those working in 
primary healthcare services for whom contact with children is a regular feature of 
their work. (paragraph 12.29)
2          Recommendation 89 All GPs must devise and maintain procedures to ensure that 
they, and all members of their practice staff, are aware of whom to contact in the 
local health agencies, social services and the police in the event of child protection 
concerns in relation to any of their patients. (paragraph 12.29)
2          Recommendation 90 Liaison between hospitals and community health services 
plays an important part in protecting children from deliberate harm. The 
Department of Health must ensure that those working in such liaison roles receive 
child protection training. Compliance with child protection policies and procedures 
must be subject to regular audit by primary care trusts. (paragraph 12.57)
Police recommendations
1          Recommendation 91 Save in exceptional circumstances, no child is to be taken 
into police protection until he or she has been seen and an assessment of his or 
her circumstances has been undertaken. (paragraph 13.17)
1          Recommendation 92 Chief constables must ensure that crimes involving a 
child victim are dealt with promptly and efficiently, and to the same standard 
as equivalent crimes against adults. (paragraph 13.24)
1          Recommendation 93 Whenever a joint investigation by police and social services 
is required into possible injury or harm to a child, a manager from each agency 
should always be involved at the referral stage, and in any further strategy 
discussion. (paragraph 13.52)
1          Recommendation 94 In cases of serious crime against children, supervisory 
officers must, from the beginning, take an active role in ensuring that a proper 
investigation is carried out. (paragraph 13.55)The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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3          Recommendation 95 The Association of Chief Police Officers must produce 
and implement the standards-based service, as recommended by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary in the 1999 thematic inspection report, Child 
Protection. (paragraph 13.66)
2          Recommendation 96 Police forces must review their systems for taking children into 
police protection and ensure they comply with the Children Act 1989 and Home 
Office guidelines. In particular, they must ensure that an independent officer of at 
least inspector rank acts as the designated officer in all cases. (paragraph 13.68)
2          Recommendation 97 Chief constables must ensure that the investigation of crime 
against children is as important as the investigation of any other form of serious 
crime. Any suggestion that child protection policing is of a lower status than other 
forms of policing must be eradicated. (paragraph 14.15)
1          Recommendation 98 The guideline set out at paragraph 5.8 of Working Together 
must be strictly adhered to: whenever social services receive a referral which may 
constitute a criminal offence against a child, they must inform the police at the 
earliest opportunity. (paragraph 14.46)
3          Recommendation 99 The Working Together arrangements must be amended to 
ensure the police carry out completely, and exclusively, any criminal investigation 
elements in a case of suspected injury or harm to a child, including the evidential 
interview with a child victim. This will remove any confusion about which agency 
takes the ‘lead’ or is responsible for certain actions. (paragraph 14.57)
3          Recommendation 100 Training for child protection officers must equip them 
with the confidence to question the views of professionals in other agencies, 
including doctors, no matter how eminent those professionals appear to be. 
(paragraph 14.73)
3          Recommendation 101 The Home Office, through Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, must take a more active role in maintaining high standards of child 
protection investigation by means of its regular Basic Commands Unit and force 
inspections. In addition, a follow-up to the Child Protection thematic inspection of 
1999 should be conducted. (paragraph 14.132)
3          Recommendation 102 The Home Office, through Centrex and the Association of 
Chief Police Officers, must devise and implement a national training curriculum for 
child protection officers as recommended in 1999 by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary in its thematic inspection report, Child Protection. (paragraph 15.16)
3          Recommendation 103 Chief constables must ensure that officers working on child 
protection teams are sufficiently well trained in criminal investigation, and that 
there is always a substantial core of fully trained detective officers on each team 
to deal with the most serious inquiries. (paragraph 15.24)
3          Recommendation 104 The Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) 
should evaluate the child protection IT systems currently available, and make 
recommendations to chief constables, who must ensure their police force 
has in use an effective child-protection database and IT management system. 
(paragraph 15.40)
2          Recommendation 105 Chief constables must ensure that child protection teams 
are fully integrated into the structure of their forces and not disadvantaged in 
terms of accommodation, equipment or resources. (paragraph 15.45)18 Recommendations
383
2          Recommendation 106 The Home Office must ensure that child protection policing 
is included in the list of ministerial priorities for the police. (paragraph 15.46)
2          Recommendation 107 Chief constables and police authorities must give child 
protection investigations a high priority in their policing plans, thereby ensuring 
consistently high standards of service by well-resourced, well-managed and 
well-motivated teams. (paragraph 15.46)
2          Recommendation 108 The Home Office, through Centrex, must add specific 
training relating to child protection policing to the syllabus for the strategic 
command course. This will ensure that all future chief officers in the police 
service have adequate knowledge and understanding of the roles of child 
protection teams. (paragraph 15.53)384AnnexesAnnex 1  Glossary
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Annex 1 Glossary
Area Child Protection Committee (ACPC) Based on the boundaries of a local 
authority, it provides a forum for developing, monitoring and reviewing local child 
protection policies, and promoting effective co-operation between the various 
agencies involved in the protection of children.
Body map An outline drawing of the whole body where marks and injuries 
observed during physical examination are noted down.
Centrex The Central Police Training and Development Agency.
Emergency protection order A court order granted under section 44 of the 
Children Act 1989 on the grounds that a child will suffer significant harm unless 
they are moved from where they are currently living.
Memorandum interview An interview with a child, in accordance with the Home 
Office Memorandum of Good Practice on Video Recorded Interviews with Child 
Witnesses for Criminal Proceedings (HMSO, London, 1992). See Memorandum of 
Good Practice.
Memorandum of Good Practice Document issued by the Home Office setting out 
the recognised good practice to be adopted by police officers when conducting 
investigative interviews with children.
MERLIN An information management system in use across the Metropolitan Police 
Service.
OTIS A police office management system that also allows officers to electronically 
share information.
Part 8 review A review conducted by the local Area Child Protection Committee 
into the death or serious injury of a child where child abuse is confirmed 
or suspected, or where child protection issues likely to be of major public 
concern arise.
Police protection Under section 46 of the Children Act 1989, if a police officer 
has reasonable cause to believe that a child would otherwise be likely to suffer 
significant harm, he or she may remove the child to suitable accommodation or 
take reasonable steps to ensure that the child’s removal from any hospital or any 
other place is prevented.
Section 17 Section 17 of the Children Act 1989 places a general duty on the local 
authority “to safeguard and promote the welfare of children” in their area.
Section 47 Section 47 of the Children Act 1989 places a duty on the local 
authority to conduct an inquiry if they “have reasonable cause to suspect that 
a child ... in their area is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm”.386Annex 2  Witnesses
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Annex 2 Witnesses
The following is a list of witnesses who were asked to give evidence to this Inquiry. 
Those who gave written evidence are marked with a “W” and those who gave oral 
evidence in addition to written evidence are marked with an “O”. The exception is 
Kouao, who gave oral evidence but did not provide a written statement.
The witnesses’ positions and job titles are those held at the time the individual 
or their organisation was involved with Victoria, or other relevant period, as 
appropriate.
Abernethy, I  Senior medical photographer, North Middlesex Hospital  W
Ackah, E  Relative of Kouao  O
Adamou, G  Councillor, Haringey council, lead member for social services  O
Addington, L  Hospital teacher, Brent Education Support Service  W
Agyarko, K  Acquaintance of Kouao  W
Ajayi-Obe, E  Locum paediatric registrar, Central Middlesex Hospital  O
Akers, S  Detective Superintendent, North West Crime Operational 
Command Unit, Metropolitan Police Service  O
Alexander, S  Specialist registrar in paediatrics, North Middlesex Hospital  O
Alexandrou, M  Housing registration officer, Haringey Social Services  O
Almeida, B  Senior practitioner, Haringey Social Services  O
Alsford, L  Consultant paediatrician, North Middlesex Hospital  O
Anderson, F  Senior re-housing officer, Brent Social Services  O
Anderson, M  Detective Inspector, Brent and Harrow Child Protection
Teams, Metropolitan Police Service  O
Anderson, P  Social worker, Brent Social Services  O
Ani, C  Paediatric senior house officer, North Middlesex Hospital  W
Armstrong, E  Team manager, Brent Social Services  O
Arnold, L  Councillor, Haringey council  W
Arthurworrey, L  Social worker, Haringey Social Services  O
Atherton, DJ  Consultant paediatric dermatologist, 
Great Ormond Street Children’s Hospital   W
Austin, C  Senior social worker, Brent Social Services  O
Bainbridge, A  Manager, First Capital Bus Company  W
Bamford, B  Assistant director finance and administration, 
Brent Social Services   O
Banjoko, O  Community paediatric registrar, North Middlesex Hospital   O
Baptiste, C  Team manager, Haringey Social Services  O
Barnett, P  GP, Somerset Gardens Family Healthcare Centre  WThe Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Bell, P  Staff nurse, accident and emergency department, 
North Middlesex Hospital   W
Benjamin, L  Detective Superintendent, Serious Crime Group West, 
Metropolitan Police Service  W
Beynon, R  Senior house officer, accident and emergency department, 
Central Middlesex Hospital  O
Bird, R  Sergeant, Haringey Child Protection Team, 
Metropolitan Police Service   O
Bishop, M  Bursar, Harlesden Primary School  W
Blackman, K  Police Constable, Brent Child Protection Team, 
Metropolitan Police Service   O
Boafoa, C  Nurse, Rainbow ward, North Middlesex Hospital  W
Bolton, J  Director of joint reviews, Audit Commission  W
Boyd, A  Detective Constable, Serious Crime Group East, 
Metropolitan Police Service   W
Boyle, M  Director, Brent Social Services  O
Bradley, P  Social worker, Haringey Social Services, 
and UNISON trade union representative   O
Brandon, R  Police Sergeant, Metropolitan Police Service  W
Bridgeman, M  Senior social worker, Brent Social Services  O
Bristow, A  Director, Haringey Social Services  O
Britto, J  Consultant paediatrician, paediatric intensive care unit, 
St Mary’s Hospital Paddington   W
Brown, DA  Temporary Area Detective Chief Inspector, 
Metropolitan Police Service   W
Brown, L  Team leader in health visiting, Haringey NHS 
Primary Care Trust   O
Cader, M  French teacher  O
Cameron, A  Daughter of Priscilla Cameron, Victoria’s childminder  O
Cameron, Patrick Son of Priscilla Cameron, Victoria’s childminder  O
Cameron, Priscilla Victoria’s childminder   O
Campbell, M  Commander, North West Crime Operational Command 
Unit, Metropolitan Police Service   O
Carey, N  Home Office accredited pathologist, Guy’s Hospital  O
Carr, L  Team manager, Enfield Social Services  O
Charlett, D  Team manager, Brent Social Services  O
Chauhan, S  Accident and emergency department nurse, 
Central Middlesex Hospital  W
Choufani, O  Translator/interpreter, language services, 
Ealing council, London  W
Clarke, M  Lead accident and emergency department nurse, 
North Middlesex Hospital  OAnnex 2  Witnesses
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Climbié, F  Victoria’s father  O
Clitheroe, H  Finance and systems manager, Housing Resource Centre, 
Brent council   W
Cooper-Bland, M Detective Sergeant, Haringey Child Protection Team, 
Metropolitan Police Service   O
Copson, G  Detective Superintendent, North West Crime Operational 
Command Unit, Metropolitan Police Service   O
Corrigan, J  Deputy domestic manager, Gardiner Merchant Food and 
Management Services   W
Cox, DM  Detective Chief Superintendent, North West Crime 
Operational Command Unit, Metropolitan Police Service   O
Craik, M  Commander, North West Crime Operational Command 
Unit, Metropolitan Police Service   O
Crego, J  Director of learning technologies, Metropolitan Police Service  W
Cribbin, M  Councillor, Brent council, lead member for social services  O
Crowe, R  Health visitor, Haringey Primary Care NHS Trust  O
Cuddihy, B  Operational services manager, North Middlesex Hospital  O
Cussons, PD  Consultant in burns and plastic surgery, 
Mount Vernon Hospital   W
Daniel, G  Chief executive, Brent council  O
Davidson, T  Staff nurse on Rainbow ward, North Middlesex Hospital   O
Dempster, C  Locum paediatric senior house officer, 
Central Middlesex Hospital   O
Deveney, L  Head of homelessness and advice, Ealing council, London  W
Dewar, R  Police Constable, Brent Child Protection Team, 
Metropolitan Police Service   O
Dickinson, D  Detective Constable, Serious Crime Group West, 
Metropolitan Police Service   W
Dillon, I  Doctor, paediatric intensive care, St Mary’s Hospital 
Paddington   W
Doncaster, S  Sister, accident and emergency department, 
North Middlesex Hospital  W
Doyle, B  Classroom assistant, Brent Education Support Service  W
Duncan, D  Commissioning manager, Haringey Social Services  O
Edwards, B  Designated doctor for child protection, 
Central Middlesex Hospital   O
Emes, A  Forensic scientist  W
Eminowicz, M  Senior education officer, Brent Social Services  O
Ezekwe, AM  Paediatric senior house officer, North Middlesex Hospital   W
Featherstone, L  Leader of the opposition, Haringey council  W
Finlay, J  Senior commissioning manager, Ealing Social Services  OThe Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Fletcher, E  Senior nurse for child protection, Haringey Primary Care
NHS Trust   O
Forlee, S  Senior house officer in paediatrics, North Middlesex Hospital   O
Forrest, P  Leader of the Conservative group, Haringey council  W
Fortune, P  Social worker, Ealing Social Services  O
Frederick, L  Team manager, Haringey Social Services  O
Fysh, R  Forensic scientist, Metropolitan Police Service  O
Gallagher, A  Operational service manager, North Middlesex 
University Hospital NHS Trust   O
Gallagher, S  Sister, accident and emergency department, 
North Middlesex Hospital  W
Garner, K  Bank nurse, North Middlesex Hospital  W
Gaunt, D  Social worker, Ealing Social Services  O
Geraghty, D  Police Constable, Metropolitan Police Service  W
Gibb, R  Chief executive of North Middlesex University 
Hospital NHS Trust   O
Gilbert, C  Acquaintance of Manning  W
Gobin, B  Staff nurse, Barnaby Bear ward, Central Middlesex Hospital   O
Golding, E  Information officer, Haringey Education Services  W
Goodall, J  Director, Brent Social Services  O
Goodman, D  Director of primary care development, 
Haringey Primary Care NHS Trust   W
Gooneratne, W  GP, Somerset Gardens Family Healthcare Centre   W
Gorry, J  Detective Sergeant, Brent Child Protection Team, 
Metropolitan Police Service   O
Graham, A  Commissioning manager, child protection quality and review, 
Haringey Social Services  O
Graham, B  Director of education and community services, NSPCC  W
Graham, C  Staff nurse, Barnaby Bear ward, Central Middlesex Hospital   O
Graham, M  Staff nurse, Rainbow ward, North Middlesex Hospital  O
Gray, J  Social services inspector  O
Green, D 
(née Cardis)
  Child protection adviser, Haringey Social Services  O
Green, R  Transfer and registration officer, Brent Social Services  O
Griffin, M  Housing assessments manager, Haringey housing services  W
Griffiths, J  The Benefits Agency  W
Griffiths, W  Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Service  O
Harris, T  Leader, Haringey council  W
Hartley-Martin, A Assistant to the Pastors at the Universal Church of the 
Kingdom of God   OAnnex 2  Witnesses
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Haviland, J  Paediatrics registrar, Central Middlesex Hospital  W
Hayes, M  Social worker, Haringey Social Services  O
Heatley, J  Commissioning manager, Haringey Social Services  O
Henry, S  Practice manager, Tottenham Child and Family Centre, NSPCC   O
Hinds, L  Staff nurse, Rainbow ward, North Middlesex Hospital   O
Hines, M  Senior social worker, Brent Social Services  O
Hitchen, C  Assistant director, Brent Social Services  W
Hobbs, L  Social worker, Brent Social Services  O
Hodges, A  Police Sergeant, Haringey Child Protection Team,
Metropolitan Police Service  O
Howard, D  Detective Inspector, Haringey Child Protection Team,
Metropolitan Police Service   O
Howard, L  Service manager, Enfield Social Services  W
Howlett, C  Commander in the serious crime group, 
Metropolitan Police Service   O
Hunt, N  Director of child protection, NSPCC  W
Hunt, S  Customer services officer, One Stop Shop, Brent  O
Ieronimou, A  Family centre officer, Tottenham Child and Family Centre, 
NSPCC   W
Inal, B  Primary care manager (Haringey), Haringey Primary Care
NHS Trust   O
Irwin, J  Deputy leader, Haringey council  W
Israni, GK  GP, Greenhill Park Medical Centre  W
Jackson, A  Paediatric senior house officer, North Middlesex Hospital   W
Jacob, S  Senior practitioner, Haringey Social Services  O
Jennings, S  Senior staff nurse, Rainbow ward, North Middlesex Hospital   O
John, A  Deputy leader, Brent council  O
Johns, J  Director of Mobile Radiography Services LTD  W
Johns, K  Social worker, Enfield Social Services  O
Johnson, P  Ward manager, Barnaby Bear ward, Central Middlesex Hospital   O
Jones, K  Police Constable, Haringey Child Protection Team, 
Metropolitan Police Service   O
Jones, L  Social worker, Ealing Social Services  O
Jones, S  Service manager, surgery and paediatrics services, 
Central Middlesex Hospital   W
Joseph, P  Assistant lawyer, Ealing Social Services  O
Junior, C  Pastor, Universal Church of the Kingdom of God  W
Kakouratos, B  Housing registration manager, Haringey Social Services  O
Keating, C  Senior paediactics staff nurse, Rainbow ward, 
North Middlesex Hospital   OThe Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Kelleher, D  Detective Chief Superintendent, Paddington Green Division, 
City of Westminster, Metropolitan Police Service  O
Kendrick, D  Commander (Crime and Criminal Justice) 
North East London, Metropolitan Police Service  O
Kimbidima, C  Acquaintance of Kouao  O
Kimbidima, J  Acquaintance of Kouao  O
Kitchman, P  Child protection adviser, Haringey Social Services  O
Konigsberg, M  Assistant director, Brent Social Services  O
Kouao, MT  Convicted of the murder of Victoria Climbié O
Kousoulou, D  Deputy director, Haringey Social Services  O
Kozinos, R  Senior practitioner, Haringey Social Services  O
Lachman, P  Clinical director for women and children services, 
directorate of North West London Hospitals NHS Trust   O
Lally, M  Director of adult and child community health services, 
Haringey Primary Care NHS Trust   W
Lampe, C  Nursery nurse, North Middlesex Hospital  W
Lapeze, J  Secretary, private letting agency  W
Laudat, J  Senior assessment officer, Haringey housing services  W
Lawrence, S  Senior practitioner, Ealing Social Services  O
Lewin, D  Forensic odontologist and registered dental surgeon  W
Lewington, P  Assistant branch secretary (Haringey), UNISON  O
Lima, A  Pastor, Universal Church of the Kingdom of God  O
Lindsay, MS  GP, Somerset Gardens Family Healthcare Centre  W
Lipworth, C  Team manager, Enfield Social Services  O
Lloyd, G  Principal social services solicitor, Haringey Social Services   W
Ludgate, R  Acting director, Brent Social Services  O
Mairs, A  Team manager, Haringey Social Services  O
Makar, S  Paediatric senior house officer, North Middlesex Hospital   W
Makwana, C  Product development manager, Metropolitan Police Service  W
Mallia, J  Detective Constable, Metropolitan Police Service  W
Mandic, R  Proprietor of bed and breakfast accommodation used by 
Victoria and Kouao  W
Mann, T  Consultant dermatologist, North Middlesex Hospital  W
Manning, C  Convicted of the murder of Victoria Climbié O
Marques, T  Assistant Pastor, Universal Church of the Kingdom of God  W
Marsh, M  Director and chief executive, NSPCC  W
Martin, A  Team manager, Haringey Social Services  W
Martin, W  Social worker, Ealing Social Services  O
McColl, B  Radiographer, North Middlesex Hospital  WAnnex 2  Witnesses
393
McDougall, M  Service unit manager, Brent Social Services  W
McFarlane, C  Neighbour of Kouao  W
McGregor, K 
(née Brown)
  Home visitor (housing), Haringey Social Services  O
McKennan, A  Interpreter  W
McMahon, A  Paediatrics senior house officer, Central Middlesex Hospital   W
McTigue, J  Chief inspector, inspection unit, Brent Social Services  W
Mead, S  Assistant review director, Audit Commission  W
Meates, MA  Consultant paediatrician, North Middlesex Hospital  O
Meehan, G  Leader, Haringey council  O
Mensah, P  Minister, Joy Baptist Church, Harlesden  O
Millard, T  Radiographer, North Middlesex Hospital  W
Miran, M  Lecturer, School of Oriental and African Studies  W
Modi, A  Specialist registrar in paediatrics, Central Middlesex Hospital   O
Moore, G  Registered nurse, the surgery of Dr IP Patel  W
Moore, L  Interim assistant director, Enfield Social Services  O
Mooruth, K  Staff nurse, paediatrics, Central Middlesex Hospital  W
Niven, K  Detective Inspector, North West Area Major Incident Team,  
Metropolitan Police Service  O
Norman, B  Lead nurse, Paediatrics, North Middlesex Hospital  O
Nottage, A  Deputy chief inspector, social services inspectorate  W
O’Boyce, N  Hospital play specialist, North Middlesex Hospital  O
Orome, P  Pastor, Mission Ensemble Pour Christ  O
Pandelli, P  Employee, Star Estates and Lettings  W
Park, K  Detective Inspector, Serious Crime Group, 
Metropolitan Police Service   W
Patel, I  General family practitioner, The Surgery, London  O
Patel, R  Service development manager, Brent Social Services  W
Peatfield, P  Independent chair of child protection case conferences, 
Haringey Social Services   O
Pereira, G  Registered nurse, Rainbow ward, North Middlesex Hospital   O
Phillips, P  Senior social worker, Brent Social Services  W
Philpotts, R  Social worker, Haringey Social Services  W
Pinarbasi, S  Minicab driver, Lord Cars Minicab Office  W
Pollock, T  Homestay agency manager, central London  W
Prince, D  Director of operations, Audit Commission  O
Punch, M  Team administration support officer, Brent Social Services   O
Quansah, G  Daughter of Esther Ackah, distant relative of Kouao  WThe Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Quinn, I  Senior staff nurse, Rainbow ward, North Middlesex Hospital  O
Raimundo, P  Pastor, Universal Church of the Kingdom of God  W
Reynders, D  Paediatric senior house officer, North Middlesex Hospital   O
Richardson, J  Paediatric registrar, North Middlesex Hospital  O
Richardson, M  Director, Haringey Social Services  O
Ricketts, P  Police Constable, Haringey Child Protection Team, 
Metropolitan Police Service   W
Riordan, J  Executive medical director, North West London Hospitals 
NHS Trust  O
Robertson, V  Social worker, Haringey Social Services  O
Rodgers, C  Social worker, Haringey Social Services  O
Roper, T  Team manager, Brent Social Services  O
Rossiter, MA  Consultant paediatrician, North Middlesex Hospital  O
Routis, JJ  Social services officer, Department of Social Services, 
Villepinte and Tremblay-en-France, France   W
Ryan, M  Staff nurse, Rainbow ward, North Middlesex Hospital   O
Sanders, C  Solicitor, Ealing Social Services  W
Schwartz, R  Consultant paediatrician and named doctor for child 
protection, Central Middlesex Hospital and St Mary’s 
Hospital Paddington   O
Scott, C  Service manager, Tottenham Child and Family Centre, NSPCC   O
Selby, A  Ambulance technician, London Ambulance Service  W
Sexton, M  Staff nurse, Central Middlesex Hospital  W
Shirsalkar, N  Ophthalmology senior house officer, North Middlesex Hospital   W
Simpson, D  Joint review team, Audit Commission  O
Singh, G  Chief executive, Haringey council  O
Sivanandam, P  Office manager, private letting agency  W
Skinner, J  Assistant director, Ealing Social Services  O
Small, L  Customer services officer (housing), Brent Social Services   W
Smit, E  Social worker, Brent Social Services  O
Smith, D  Police Sergeant, Brent Child Protection Team, 
Metropolitan Police Service   O
Smith, J  Staff nurse, accident and emergency department, 
Central Middlesex Hospital  W
Smith, R  Group administration officer, Brent Social Services  O
Spicer, J  Paramedic, London Ambulance Service  W
Stinson, A  Clinical facility manager/Senior Nurse, accident and 
emergency department, Central Middlesex Hospital   O
Stollard, S  Team manager, Ealing Social Services  O
Stoneham, P  Detective Sergeant, Metropolitan Police Service  WAnnex 2  Witnesses
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Strugnell, S  Criminal intelligence analyst, Metropolitan Police Service  W
Sulaiman, T  Deputy lead member for social services, Haringey council  W
Sy, R  Sessional interpreter, Haringey  W
Tachakra, S  Clinical director of accident and emergency services, 
Central Middlesex Hospital   W
Tall, S  Partnerships and commissioning services manager  W
Taub, L  Sister, special care baby unit, North Middlesex Hospital  O
Teodorski, H  Ambulance technician, London Ambulance Service  O
Thrift, K  Social worker, Brent Social Services  O
Travers, A  Head of corporate finance, Haringey council, London    O
Tsiagbe, R  Nursery nurse, North Middlesex Hospital  W
Tudor-Williams, G Consultant microbiologist, St Mary’s Hospital Paddington  W
Turnbull, A  Assistant director, Haringey Social Services  W
Turton, C  Chair, social services committee, Haringey council  O
Tutt, N  Director, Ealing Social Services  O
Tyrrell, K  Joint reviewer, Audit Commission  W
Tyrrell, V  Specialist child protection nurse, Brent and Harrow 
Health Authority   O
Victor, G  Social worker, Ealing Social Services  O
Viljoen, Y             Locum social worker, Haringey Social Services  O
(née Hurter)
Wakelin, S  Consultant dermatologist, St Mary’s Hospital Paddington  W
Watling, C  Staff Nurse, North Middlesex Hospital  W
Watson, C  Diagnostic radiographer, North Middlesex Hospital  W
Watson, ED  Practice manager, Tottenham Child and Family Centre, NSPCC   O
Webster, A  Director of public services research, Audit Commission  W
Weithers, E  Lead clinician, accident and emergency department, 
North Middlesex Hospital  W
Wheeler, P  Detective Chief Inspector, North West Crime Operational 
Command Unit, Metropolitan Police Service   O
White, Y  Housing registration officer, Haringey housing services  W
Wilkin, B  Group support assistant, Ealing Social Services  O
Wilson, C  Assistant director, Haringey Social Services  O
Wilson, E  Student nurse, Central Middlesex Hospital  W
Winter, J  Homeless persons officer, Ealing Social Services  O
Young, M  Family liaison officer, Metropolitan Police Service  W396Annex 3  Inquiry staff
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Annex 3 Inquiry staff
The size and composition of the team varied according to the various stages of the 
Inquiry. The following is a list of all staff who worked on the Inquiry.
Secretary to the Inquiry
Mandy Jacklin
Solicitor to the Inquiry
Michael Fitzgerald
Counsel to the Inquiry
Neil Garnham QC
Caroline Gibson
Neil Sheldon
Secretariat
Tara Lawson Mean (Deputy Secretary, February – August 2001)
Maria Butler
Sarah Connelly
Dawn Cumberbatch Worrall
Hannah Fitzgerald
Emily Forder White
Susan Goodwin
Legal team
Fiona Loveridge (Assistant Solicitor, April – August 2001)
Lyndon Branfield
Edward Brown
Simon Catherall
Steve Condie
Jane Herschell
Richard Moule
Philip Perrins
Kathleen Price
Charlotte Reynolds
Jessica Skinns
Marianne Thorbro
Sarah WatsonThe Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Special advisers
Dr Valerie Brasse
Dr Susan Shepherd
Communications
Paul Rees (Communications Director)
Lara Williams
Contractors
ICL/CSC
Michael Aremu
David Johnson
Haris Kazazic
Smith Bernal
Jacqueline Gleghorn
Chanelle Piper
Claire Stanley
Ailsa Williams
Sound
Jean-Raphael Dedieu
This Report was prepared for publication by COI Communications.Annex 4  Legal representatives
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Annex 4 Legal representatives
Interested Parties and their representatives before the 
Inquiry
Interested Parties  Representatives
Mr and Mrs Climbié  Margo Boye-Anawoma and Joanna Dodson QC, 
instructed by Imran Khan & Partners solicitors, and 
Bhatt Murphy solicitors from July 2002
Ealing council  Vera Mayer, instructed by Director of Legal and 
Democratic Services, London Borough of Ealing
Enfield council  Alex Verdan, instructed by Solicitor to the Council, 
London Borough of Enfield
Brent council  David Turner QC and Joy Okoye, instructed by 
Borough Solicitor, London Borough of Brent
Haringey council  Elizabeth Lawson QC and James Presland, instructed 
by Borough Solicitor, London Borough of Haringey
North West London 
Hospitals NHS Trust
  David Mason of Capsticks solicitors 
North Middlesex 
University Hospital Trust
  David Mason of Capsticks solicitors 
Haringey Primary Care 
NHS Trust
  David Mason of Capsticks solicitors 
Barnet, Enfield and 
Haringey Health Authority
  David Mason of Capsticks solicitors 
Metropolitan Police Service  Ronald Thwaites QC and Vince Williams, 
instructed by Directorate of Legal Services, 
Metropolitan Police Service
Detective Inspector Howard  Patrick Gibbs, instructed by 
Reynolds Dawson solicitors 
Police Sergeants Hodges, 
Bird and Cooper-Bland
  Gareth Rees, instructed by 
Russell Jones & Walker solicitors 
PC Karen Jones  Maura McGowan QC, instructed by 
Russell Jones & Walker solicitors 
Detective Inspector 
Anderson, Detective 
Sergeant Smith and 
Detective Constable Dewar
  Michael Egan, instructed by 
Reynolds Dawson solicitors The Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Lisa Arthurworrey  Jane Hoyal and Michael Paget, instructed by 
Employment Rights Unit, UNISON
NSPCC  Peter Downey of Hempsons solicitors 
Witnesses and their representatives before the Inquiry
Witnesses Representatives
Ackah, E  Imran Khan & Partners solicitors
Akers, S  Rowe Cohen solicitors
Armstrong, E  Thompsons solicitors
Baptiste, C  Fisher Meredith solicitors
Cameron, A  Imran Khan & Partners solicitors
Cameron, Patrick  Imran Khan & Partners solicitors
Cameron, Priscilla  Imran Khan & Partners solicitors
Copson, G  Rowe Cohen solicitors
Cox, D  Rowe Cohen solicitors
Gorry, J  Venters Reynolds solicitors
Gray, J  Solicitor to the Department of Health
Kitchman, P  Mullinger Banks solicitors
Kouao, MT  Chesham & Co. solicitors
Kozinos, R  Reynolds Porter Chamberlain solicitors
Mairs, A  Irwin Mitchell solicitors
Prince, D  Solicitor to the Audit Commission
Simpson, D  Solicitor to the Audit Commission
Teodorski, H  Legal Services department for London Ambulance
Wheeler, P  Illiffes Booth Bennett solicitors
Wilson, C  Bates Wells & Braithwaite solicitorsAnnex 5  Seminar participants
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Annex 5 Seminar participants
Seminar one: Discovery and inclusion
Name Title Organisation
Antoniou, G Homestart scheme manager Enfield and Haringey Health Authority
Baderman, H Accident and emergency consultant
Bowen, R Assistant director of children’s services Southwark Social Services
Clarke, B Chair  Community Practitioners’ and Health 
Visitors’ Association
Cloke, C Head of child protection awareness 
and advocacy
NSPCC
Coaker, L Housing assessment manager Harrow council
Dutt, R Director Race Equality Unit
Ellery, S Policy officer West Sussex Social Services
Gibb, M Executive director of housing and 
social services
Kensington and Chelsea council
Jones, R Assistant chief inspector Social Services Inspectorate
Khan, R Duty assessment team manager Birmingham Social Services
Lammy, D MP for Tottenham House of Commons
Macaulay, S Senior education welfare officer Education Welfare Service, Wandsworth
Mason, R Social worker Portsmouth Social Services
McCallum, D Detective Sergeant, child protection 
expert
Avon and Somerset Constabulary
McCullough, A Project leader Safe in the City, Manchester
McEwan, Y GP and GP tutor Essex Health Authority
McGrath, B Private fostering co-ordinator Gloucestershire Social Services
McQuarrie, R Practice nurse Hertfordshire
Morgan, P Deputy director of operational support Immigration Services, Home Office
Palmer, T Principal policy and practice officer Barnardo’s
Parton, N Director, Centre for Applied Childhood 
Studies
University of Huddersfield
Pritchard, C Professor of psychiatric social work University of Southampton
Sanderson, J Caller care manager Samaritans
Shiyabola, T Director African Women’s Welfare Association
Tomkins, B Designated nurse for child protection East Kent Community NHS TrustThe Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Seminar two: Identification
Name Title Organisation
Amamoo, N Director African Families Foundation
Ariyo, MD Co-ordinator Africans Unite Against Child Abuse
Barker, J Senior practitioner Norfolk Social Services
Booth, L School improvement officer Manchester
Carthigesan, S Consultant community paediatrician and 
named doctor for child protection
Medway Maritime Hospital
Cheal, S Chief executive  The Who Cares? Trust 
Emberson, M Principal child care manager Reading Social Services
Fletcher, T Project leader, First Stop Project The Children’s Society
Hayler, T Detective Superintendent Avon and Somerset Constabulary
Hogg, J Detective Sergeant, child protection unit Northumbria Police 
Holmes-Smith, J Consultant paediatrician Surrey Hampshire Borders NHS Trust
Jones, R Assistant chief inspector  Social Services Inspectorate, 
Manchester
Little, M Researcher Dartington Social Research Unit
Munro, E Lecturer in social policy London School of Economics and 
Political Science
Pearson, D Director Churches’ Child Protection Advisory 
Service
Peel, M Director of the national open learning 
programme
Open University
Pell, K Named nurse for child protection Children’s Centre, City Hospital, 
Nottingham
Plant, A Team manager Dudley Social Services
Tapsfield, R Chief executive Family Rights Group
Williams, J Director Cheshire Social Services
Wilson, R Consultant paediatrician Royal College of Paediatrics and Child 
HealthAnnex 5  Seminar participants
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Seminar three: Determining requirements
Name Title Organisation
Anderson, B Assistant director, commissioning and 
planning
East Kent Social Services
Atkinson, I Senior practitioner Peterborough Education and 
Children’s Services
Banks, R Principal for the Standards and 
Qualifications Framework
Training Organisation for Personal 
and Social Services (TOPSS)
Basker, D Principal child care manager North Lincolnshire Social and 
Housing Services
Begley, P IT consultant ISISS Ltd
Bowman, A Strategic director, social care and health Brighton and Hove council
Butler, C Acting chief executive South West London and St George’s 
NHS Trust
Cookey, N Consultant paediatrician North Durham NHS Trust
Davies, O National officer for social services UNISON
Davies, R Assistant commissioner for Wales, policy 
and services evaluation
National Assembly for Wales 
Evans, D Child protection co-ordinator Swindon Social Services
Hampson, P Chief Constable West Mercia Constabulary
Held, J Director Camden Social Services
Hendry, E Head of child protection training and 
consultancy
NSPCC
Jones, D Consultant child, adolescent and family 
psychiatrist
Park Hospital for Children, Oxford
Jones, R Assistant chief inspector Social Services Inspectorate, 
Manchester
Lynch, M Professor of community paediatrics Guy’s, King’s and St Thomas’s School 
of Medicine
Marlow, K Detective Inspector South Wales Police
Rundle, M Director of social services Wandsworth Social Services
Ryan, H Child care manager Northamptonshire Social Services
Spicer, D Honorary secretary British Association for the Study 
and Prevention of Child Abuse and 
Neglect
Thorpe, D Professor of applied social science Lancaster University
Tunstill, J Professor of social work Royal Holloway, University of London
Webster, D Principal educational psychologist Lancashire councilThe Victoria Climbié Inquiry
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Seminar four: Service provision and delivery
Name Title Organisation
Barnett, A Assessment team manager, children and 
families’ services
Middlesbrough Social Services
Bates, R Manager, policy performance and 
commissioning (children)
Bradford Social Services
Blom-Cooper QC, Sir L Independent
Brook, G Clinical nurse specialist Birmingham Children’s Hospital NHS 
Trust
Cooper, A Professor of social work Tavistock Clinic and University of 
East London
Dawson, H MP for Lancaster and Wyre  House of Commons
Hobbs, C Consultant community paediatrician Leeds Teaching Hospitals’ NHS Trust
Hopwood, M Detective chief inspector West Yorkshire Police
Hutchinson, R Director of social services Portsmouth Social Services, Chair 
of Association of Directors of Social 
Services Children and Families’ 
Committee
Johnston, I Director British Association of Social Workers
Kings, A Detective Constable, family support unit Greater Manchester Police
Mason, G Assistant chief inspector Social Services Inspectorate
Peynser, P Head of children and families’ services Sheffield Social Services
Ransford, J Director of education and social policy Local Government Association
Ross, J Chief executive, primary care trust and 
director of social services
Barking and Dagenham council
Shephard, G MP for Norfolk South West House of Commons
Simpson, V Chartered forensic and counselling 
psychologist, child protection specialist
Independent
Skinner, J Senior social worker Kensington and Chelsea council
Stone, R Policy adviser NSPCC
Sturge, M General director African and Caribbean Evangelical 
Alliance
Thoburn, J Professor of social work University of East Anglia, Norwich
Thomas, I Detective Superintendent Metropolitan Police Service
Tucker, C Assistant director for children, families and 
youth offending services
Brighton and Hove Social Services
Utting, Sir W Former chief inspector of social services
York, A Consultant child and adolescent 
psychiatrist
Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
Service, Richmond, Surrey
Young, F Named nurse for child protection Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS 
TrustAnnex 5  Seminar participants
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Seminar five: Monitoring performance
Name Title Organisation
Aynsley-Green, A National clinical director for children and 
chair of the children’s taskforce
Department of Health
Conlon, M Primary care lead NHS Clinical Governance Support 
Team
Cooling, R Clinical director Sutton and Merton Primary Care 
Trust
Donkor, E Clinical governance manager University Hospital Lewisham NHS 
Trust
Foster, Sir A Controller Audit Commission
Frater, M Chief executive Telford and Wrekin council
Fry, M Head of clinical quality, ethics and 
genetics division
Department of Health
Grange, T Chief Constable Dyfed-Powys Police Service
Grindrod, K Senior practitioner Manchester city council
Hallsworth, K Detective Inspector South Liverpool Family Support Unit
Herbert, B Programme director Office of Children’s Rights, 
Commissioner of London
Hollis, T Assistant Inspector of constabulary with 
lead for crime
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary
James, A Team manager Leeds Social Services
Leadbetter, M Director Essex County Social Services
Logan, L Chief Inspector and chairman Black Police Association
Pinnock, M Social services performance manger North Lincolnshire Social Services
Platt, D Chief inspector Social Services Inspectorate
Renouf, C Director of inspection services NSPCC
Rigg, G Head of children and families’ services Lancashire Social Services
Robertson, D Lead officer for child protection West Kent Health Authority
Robertson, L Regional development officer Training Organisation for Personal 
and Social Services (TOPSS)
Street, B Assistant director Bridgend Social Services
Webster, A Director of public services research 
department
Audit Commission